The decolonial Aquinas? Discerning epistemic worth for Aquinas in the decolonial academy

As the ideological constructor of the destruction of colonised peoples and knowledge, Western philosophy must bear its burden for complicity. Decoloniality is amid the discourses of critique contra modernity and its denigration of the colonised. In the South African academy, for instance, much support has been validly rendered to decoloniality, consequently those employing “Western” frameworks should be challenged to constant re-evaluation. Here, the virtues and vices of decoloniality will not be considered. Rather a discernment will be undertaken of the “epistemic worth” of conducting – specifically mediaeval and Western – philosophical research amid calls for the decentring of Western epistemological dominance, within the tradition of Saint Thomas Aquinas in the decolonial milieu. The argument is proffered – from multifold perspectives – that Aquinas, as both pre-modern and pre-colonial, does have relevance to the decolonial academic climate. The case is defended that Arabic philosophers importantly influenced Aquinas’ work, thus, demonstrating his openness to non-Western thought. Furthermore, from an epistemological perspective, it is contended that Aquinas’ placing of the subject at the focal point of adequations to truth by credencing the situatedness of the perceiver, deconstructs modern objectivity, which in itself has caused considerable damage to non-Western epistemologies. Aquinas’ epistemic relevance in this context, it is argued, may contribute to a median between demonstrable science and the multi-layered context of the epistemic subject.     

Tell me, what did you see? The stimulus on computers

Most psychology experiments start with a stimulus, and, for an increasing number of studies, the stimulus is presented on a computer monitor. Usually, that monitor is a CRT, although other technologies are becoming available. The monitor is a sampling device; the sampling occurs in four dimensions: spatial, temporal, luminance, and chromatic. This paper reviews some of the important issues in each of these sampling dimensions and gives some recommendations for how to use the monitor effectively to present the stimulus. In general, the position is taken that to understand what the stimulus actually is requires a clear specification of the physical properties of the stimulus, since the actual experience of the stimulus is determined both by the physical variables and by the psychophysical variables of how the stimulus is handled by our sensory systems.     

The Individualist? The autonomy of reason in Kant’s philosophy and educational views

Immanuel Kant is often viewed by educational theorists as an individualist, who put education on “an individual track,” paving the way for political liberal conceptions of education such as that of John Rawls. One can easily find evidence for such a view, in “Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’,” as well as in his more metaphysical, moral inquiries. However, the place of reason in Kant’s philosophy––what I call the “autonomy of reason”––spells out a negative rather than positive conception of freedom, from which stems a less individualistic or political liberal education than many presume. I cite both well known and lesser known works in the essay to demonstrate that Kant defended universal freedom only as a means towards developing the “autonomy of reason”, and I consider comparatively the education it entails with that spelled out by Rawls, despite the common conflation of the two.     

Was Thomas Aquinas a Sociobiologist? Thomistic Natural Law,Rational Goods,and Sociobiology

Abstract. Traditional Darwinian theory presents two difficulties for Thomistic natural‐law morality: relativism and essentialism. The sociobiology of E. O. Wilson seems to refute the idea of evolutionary relativism. Larry Arnhart has argued that Wilson's views on sociobiology can provide a scientific framework for Thomistic natural‐law theory. However, in his attempt to reconcile Aquinas's views with Wilson's sociobiology, Arnhart fails to address a critical feature of Aquinas's ethics: the role of rational goods in natural law. Arnhart limits Aquinas's understanding of rationality to the Humean notion of economic rationality–that “reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions.” On Aquinas's view, rationality discovers goods that transcend the merely biological, viz., the pursuit of truth, virtue, and God. I believe that Aquinas's natural‐law morality is consistent with some accounts of sociobiology but not the more ontologically reductionist versions like the one presented by Wilson and defended by Arnhart. Moreover, Aquinas's normative account of rationality is successful in refuting the challenges of evolutionary relativism as well as the reductionism found in most sociobiological approaches to ethics.     

Is God His Essence? The Logical Structure of Aquinas’ Proofs for this Claim

In this article I consider whether Aquinas’ arguments for the claim that God is His essence are conclusive, and what was his purpose of upholding this thesis. I show his proofs from Summa Theologiae and Summa Contra Gentiles to be problematic and argue that the defense of Aquinas’ views on that matter suggested by certain remarks of P. T. Geach is flawed.     

Bion and C.G. Jung. How did the container‐contained model find its thinker? The fate of a cryptomnesia

This paper investigates the possible impact of C.G. Jung's Tavistock Lectures on Bion's concept of the living container. In the first part of the paper, the author offers clues pointing to such an essential impact, which can be found in text passages as well as in the facts of the Bion‐Beckett case, up to and including Bion's first publication of ‘The imaginary twin'. The author suggests that cryptomnesia is the result of repression targeting a highly cathected author's communication which functions like a deep interpretation for the recipient, whose new theory then is a return of the repressed content as well as a transformation of it. The second part of the paper investigates the fate of the assumed cryptomnesia. From this point of view Bion's concept of the container in itself appears to be the result of growth in the container‐contained mode. Finally the author deals with the question whether cryptomnesia in psychoanalytical literature can frequently be seen as the result of psychic growth.     

Urbild und Abbild. Leibniz, Kant und Hausdorff über das Raumproblem

The article attempts to reconsider the relationship between Leibniz’s and Kant’s philosophy of geometry on the one hand and the nineteenth century debate on the foundation of geometry on the other. The author argues that the examples used by Leibniz and Kant to explain the peculiarity of the geometrical way of thinking are actually special cases of what the Jewish-German mathematician Felix Hausdorff called “transformation principle”, the very same principle that thinkers such as Helmholtz or Poincaré applied in a more general form in their celebrated philosophical writings about geometry. The first two parts of the article try to show that Leibniz’s and Kant’s philosophies of geometry, despite their differences, appear to be preoccupied with the common problem of the impossibility to grasp conceptually the intuitive difference between two figures (such as a figure and its scaled, displaced or mirrored copy). In the third part, it is argued that from the perspective of Hausdorff’s philosophical-geometrical reflections, this very same problem seems to find a more radical application in Helmholtz’s or Poincaré’s thought experiments on the impossibility of distinguishing distorted copies of our universe from the original one. I draw the conclusion that in Hausdorff’s philosophical work, which has received scholarly attention only recently, one can find not only an original attempt to frame these classical arguments from a set-theoretical point of view, but also the possibility of considering the history of philosophy of geometry from an uncommon perspective, where especially the significance of Kant’s infamous appeal to “intuition” can be judged by more appropriate standards.     

The effects of good moods on systematic processing: “Willing but not able,or able but not willing?”

Previous research has indicated that good moods may disrupt systematic processing of persuasive messages (e.g., Worth & Mackie, 1987). Three experiments were conducted to attempt a replication of this disruptive effect and determine whether this effect is attributable either to cognitive capacity deficits (i.e., ability) or to motivational concerns (e.g., mood maintenance, desire to think about something other than the experimental topic). Several similarities were noted across the experiments. First, no interactions between mood and argument strength emerged on measures of message-based persuasion. Similarly, the quantity of message-related thoughts generated by our subjects was not consistently influenced by the manipulation of mood. Most importantly, consistent findings regarding the relationship between polarity of message elaborations and message-based persuasion implied that good moods may have disrupted message processing when (a) the message was low in personal relevance, (b) source information preceded the message itself, or (c) subjects were led to believe that their moods were stabilized by a drug. These results call into question the robustness of the alleged disruptive effect of positive mood on systematic processing, and are incompatible with the view that such effects are attributable to cognitive capacity deficits.Portions of this research were presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Psychological Association, Boston, August 1990, and San Francisco, August 1991. The authors wish to thank Richard E. Petty and several anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.     

What causes birth order-intelligence patterns? The admixture hypothesis, revived.

Recent evidence shows that the relation between birth order and intelligence is not the same in cross-sectional and within-family data. This simple empirical observation invalidates the conclusions from hundreds of previous birth order studies that relied on cross-sectional data. Simultaneously, the empirical foundation disappears from underneath theories like dilution and the confluence model that use explanatory processes occurring within the family. A theory proposed almost 25 years ago--the admixture hypothesis--effectively accounts for these empirical patterns. In this article, the author describes why birth order is of such intense interest to both parents and researchers (the birth order trap), discusses past birth order-intelligence patterns, shows that the admixture hypothesis accounts for those patterns, and reframes the original argument to support future productive research efforts.     

F. Munzel,Kant’s Conception of Pedagogy: Toward Education for Freedom

Studies in Philosophy and Education -     

The effects of uncontrollable, unpredictable aversive and appetitive events: Similar effects warrant similar, but not identical, explanations?

Exposure to uncontrollable, unpredictable appetitive events produces a variety of cognitive debilitations and vegetative changes as does exposure to uncontrollable, unpredictable aversive events. Similarities include impaired escape from aversive events, impaired discrimination, finicky consumption, analgesia, and body weight loss. However, in stark contrast, uncontrollable aversive stress causes reduced motor activity where as similar appetitive treatment does not; aversively induced debilitation is causally related to energy regulation, whereas the appetitively induced effects are not. Parallel mechanisms are suggested to explain these effects in terms of a revised anxiety account of the aversive effects, and a frustration account of the appetitive effects. Finally, factors likely to limit important research to resolve the many remaining issues are identified: negative presentation of animal research, political decision making, and ignorance and fear in committees which review the ethics of research. The research reported here was supported by a Sydney University Special Project Grant and Australian Research Council Grants to R.F.S. Job. The paper was completed while the author was supported by a Special Study Leave Grant from the University of Sydney.     

The Unconventional, but Conventionalist, Legacy of Lewis’s “Convention”

The philosopher David Lewis is credited by many social scientists, including mainstream economists, with having founded the modern (game-theoretical) approach to conventions, viewed as solutions to recurrent coordination problems. Yet it is generally ignored that he revised his approach, soon after the publication of his well-known book. I suggest that this revision has deep implications (probably not perceived by Lewis himself) on the analytical links between coordination, uncertainty and rationality. Thinking anew about these issues leads me to map out an alternative social scientific research programme. The traditional ontological equipment of methodological individualism should be reinforced in order to admit the existence of an “intersubjective” world beside the two familiar worlds: the “objective” world of observable things, and the “subjective” world of expectations and individual beliefs. In particular, language becomes necessary to understand coordination via conventions, rather than the other way round. That has led a group of institutionalist economists and pragmatist sociologists to develop an enlarged model of rationality, no longer isolated from questions of coordination and values. This model is the basis for the “Economics of Conventions”.     

The Effects of Uncontrollable, Unpredictable Aversive and Appetitive Events: Similar Effects Warrant Similar, but not Identical, Explanations?

Exposure to uncontrollable, unpredictable appetitive events produces a variety of cognitive debilitations and vegetative changes, as does exposure to uncontrollable, unpredictable aversive events. Similarities include impaired escape from aversive events, impaired discrimination, finicky consumption, analgesia, and body weight loss. However, in stark contrast, uncontrollable aversive stress causes reduced motor activity where as similar appetitive treatment does not; aversively induced debilitation is causally related to energy regulation, whereas the appetitively induced effects are not. Parallel mechanisms are suggested to explain these effects in terms of a revised anxiety account of the aversive effects, and a frustration account of the appetitive effects. Finally, factors likely to limit important research to resolve the many remaining issues are identified: negative presentation of animal research, political decision making, and ignorance and fear in committees which review the ethics of research.