Pluralism,Postmodernism and Interreligious Dialogue

Interreligious dialogue does not take place in a vacuum, nor is it a matter of casual conversation. Dialogue is a contested phenomenon, advocated and embraced on one hand, eschewed and discarded on the other. By way of an exploration of the fact of plurality, the notions of modernism and postmodernism, and a brief discussion of select pertinent issues (unity, truth, and the very idea of theology), the paradigmatic context of pluralism will be critically discussed. Contemporary engagement in interreligious dialogue and interfaith relations requires to be underpinned by a carefully thought-out conceptualising of the context in which it can authentically occur. This paper seeks to contribute to the understanding of the context of and for interreligious dialogue.

Reclaiming Bonhoeffer After Auschwitz

Abstract : Christians having sought refuge from guilt by claiming Nazi martyr Dietrich Bonheoffer to be their representative have come under critique by Jewish Holocaust thinkers. Was the historical Bonhoeffer complicit in the anti‐Semitism of his era or a model of prophetic heroism in the face of state sponsored racism and genocide? This article traces the early history of Bonhoeffer's thinking on the “Jewish Question” and the implications of his prison writings for the future of Jewish‐Christian relations. Simplistic defenses and simplistic dismissals fall short of understanding this most complex of theological figures.     

Adorno,Ferenczi, and a new “categorical imperative after Auschwitz”

Abstract

Theodor W. Adorno's mature thought can be characterized by the attempt to articulate what he calls a “new categorical imperative after Auschwitz.” By this, Adorno means that theory and praxis must be organized in such a way that the Holocaust does not repeat itself. This article argues that Sándor Ferenczi’s metapsychology is key to understanding Adorno’s attempt to rethink the nature of precisely such a new categorical imperative. One of the key themes of Adorno’s entire corpus is the problem of the “identification with the aggressor” – an idea that originates with Ferenzci rather than, as is commonly thought, Anna Freud. The Ferenczian dimension of Adorno’s thinking becomes particularly clear in Adorno’s thoughts on the question of freedom. In this context, Adorno engages in a psychoanalytically informed critique of the philosophy of freedom and a speculative philosophical critique of psychoanalysis. The fashioning of a “new categorical imperative” after Auschwitz entails a form of education directed towards a new form of Mündigkeit, one oriented towards contradiction, resistance, and a steadfast refusal to “identify with the aggressor.”     

Modernism,Postmodernism and (Evidence-Based) Practice

One dominant discourse in the mental health arena revolves around evidence-based practice (EBP). Although there is ongoing debate about the implementation of EBP in the mental health field, most of these discussions have been limited to modernist ideas. While discussions about EBP have occurred from alternate perspectives, particularly postmodernism, a lack of open dialogue has resulted in these two groups “talking past each other” (Levy in Family Process 45:55–73, 2006). In this article we discuss the positions of both modernism and postmodernism with consideration of their respective epistemologies and attitudes toward research and EBP. We argue that critical thinking about EBP needs to include mutual debate from both modern and postmodern perspectives.     

Reconstituting the Subject: Feminism,Modernism, and Postmodernism

Political agency is vital to the formulation of a feminist politics so feminists have attempted to create a subject that eschews the sexism of the Cartesian subject while at the same time retaining agency. This paper examines some of the principal feminist attempts to reconstitute the subject along these lines. It assesses the success of these attempts in light of the question of whether the subject is a necessary component of feminist theory and practice.     

Personality Psychology and Postmodernism

Interest in constructing theories of the individual person as a whole has been relatively weak since 1950. This disinterest, especially in the past 2 decades, may, it is suggested, be partly due to the growth and popularity of postmodern thought, which seems to be in conflict with the idea that behavior is controlled by real psychological properties within the individual. The aim of this article is to question some of the main postmodern assumptions that represent obstacles to a renewed interest in the nature of the individual. It is concluded that the parts of postmodernism that are inconsistent with a science of the person as a whole are all false—and that the part that is true is consistent with a science of the individual.     

Theology, Science, and Postmodernism: Responding to Stanley Grenz

This article responds to Stanley J. Grenz's Templeton Lecture, “Why Do Theologians Need to Be Scientists?” published in the June 2000 issue of Zygon (Grenz 2000). In the first part I outline my reasons for finding the kind of theological reflections in which Grenz engages worthy of attention by noting my disagreement with the view that a sufficient response to theological issues can be formulated on the basis of an examination of our biological nature. I assert, in that connection, the autonomy of reason as a way of investigating and understanding the world. In the second part I respond directly to Grenz by explaining my disagreement with the postmodern critique of science upon which he relies and his adherence to Christian eschatology as an answer to the conundrums into which, he posits, we are drawn as a result of that critique. I note that I agree with Grenz, however, that the activity of valuing is necessarily a forward‐looking Godlike endeavor that is not derivable from science. In the third part I suggest that we must be open to the investigation of the possible existence of an objective realm of value and that, in any case, rejection of the postmodern critique of science in many cases pro‐vides a sound basis for the disciplined resolution of factual questions that frequently lie at the base of disagreements about values.