Some reflections on grammaticality

This paper presents a piece of philosophical analysis of the notion of grammaticality. It presents two notions of grammaticality and discusses some of their properties. The presuppositions of proofs of grammaticality are scrutinized. Finally, some remarks on grammaticality, poetry and isolated occurrences are presented.     

Some reflections on the individuation of events

Theories in physics require reference to manifolds of locations and events. Abstract versions of these manifolds, ‘space’, ‘time’ and ‘space‐time’ are frequently used as reference systems. Should they be included in the ontology of physics as well as the material manifolds from which they are abstracted? This problem can be approached through a study of the identity conditions of events. The argument is offered that neither an abstract ‘time’ of moments is viable, nor is the assumption that events are individuated by their locations necessary. Taken together these conclusions would require reinterpretation of relativity as a grammar of histories and of the Einstein—Podolski‐Rosen experiment as displaying the possibility of spatially distributed events.     

Some reflections on the notion of hypotyposis in Kant

In the Critique of Judgement, Kant, despite his strong condemnation of rhetoric, introduces the figure of hypotyposis at the very moment he sets out to tackle the philosophical problem of presentation as such. This study holds that this choice of the rhetorical term is not fortuitous. Its connotations of vivid illustration, synopsis, and moral grandeur serve Kant in arguing that, on a transcendental level, presentation secures the mind's life, unity, and self-affection. Although of rhetorical origin, hypotyposis is thus shown to link up with a specifically philosophical meaning of the term in the writings of Aristotle.     

Some reflections on Indian metaphysics

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Some reflections on religious knowledge

The essay that follows considers two topics. After dealing with relevant preliminaries, it asks: (a) what differences are there in what must be done in order to tell whether there is any religious knowledge if an internalist evidentialist account of knowledge is true, from what must be done in order to tell whether there is any religious knowledge if an externalist reliabilist account of knowledge is true; and (b) does the best current externalist reliabilist account of knowledge require (or perhaps already implicitly contain) an internalist evidentialist element? Put in a nutshell, then, a belief has warrant for a person S only if that belief is produced in S by cognitive faculties functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction) in a cognitive environment that is appropriate for S’s kind of cognitive faculties, according to a design plant that is successfully aimed at truth … when a belief meets these conditions and does enjoy warrant, the degree of warrant it enjoys depends on the strength of the belief, the degree of firmness with which S holds it. This is intended as an account of the central core of our concept of warrant … [Warranted Christian Belief, 156; implicit in reference to a design plan here is another feature—that the belief is subject to no undefeated defeaters; such a belief, if true, constitutes knowledge.]     

Some reflections on boredom.

Boredom is a complex mental phenomenon, incorporating both affective and cognitive components, which cannot be understood within the confines of conflict theory alone. The paucity of fantasy in the bored person may reflect a developmental ego defect as well as, or instead of, the commonly-cited impulse-defense conflicts. The need for externally-supplied stimulation characteristic of persons with a field-dependent cognitive style, and/or characterological passivity may be among the significant predisposing factors for the development of boredom, and phase-specific factors may encourage its occurrence at particular periods of life. Boredom in the analyst, too, is multiply determined; the analytic situation itself contains features that contribute to it.     

Some critical reflections on the hiddenness argument

J.L. Schellenberg’s Argument from Divine Hiddenness maintains that if a perfectly loving God exists, then there is no non-resistant non-belief. Given that such nonbelief exists, however, it follows that there is no perfectly loving God. To support the conditional claim, Schellenberg presents conceptual and analogical considerations, which we subject to critical scrutiny. We also evaluate Schellenberg’s claim that the belief that God exists is logically necessary for entering into a relationship with the Divine. Finally, we turn to possible variants of Schellenberg’s case, and argue that the modifications necessary to accommodate our criticismas leave those variants with much less of a sting than originally suggested by his provocative formulation.