The brain basis of emotion: a meta-analytic review

Researchers have wondered how the brain creates emotions since the early days of psychological science. With a surge of studies in affective neuroscience in recent decades, scientists are poised to answer this question. In this target article, we present a meta-analytic summary of the neuroimaging literature on human emotion. We compare the locationist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories consistently and specifically correspond to distinct brain regions) with the psychological constructionist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories are constructed of more general brain networks not specific to those categories) to better understand the brain basis of emotion. We review both locationist and psychological constructionist hypotheses of brain-emotion correspondence and report meta-analytic findings bearing on these hypotheses. Overall, we found little evidence that discrete emotion categories can be consistently and specifically localized to distinct brain regions. Instead, we found evidence that is consistent with a psychological constructionist approach to the mind: A set of interacting brain regions commonly involved in basic psychological operations of both an emotional and non-emotional nature are active during emotion experience and perception across a range of discrete emotion categories.     

The metabolic mind: A role for leptin and ghrelin in affect and social cognition

Leptin and ghrelin are metabolic hormones central to energy regulation in the body. Theories of allostasis suggest that metabolism could matter for more than just food intake and weight regulation but also ultimately for psychological processes, such as affect and social cognition. Allostasis is the process by which the brain monitors ongoing physiological states and, in turn, regulates physiology based on expectations about how a given situation will impact the self. Motivated by this allostatic perspective, we argue that leptin and ghrelin may be influenced by and even contribute to psychological processes such as affect and social cognition. Specifically, we review literature suggesting that leptin and ghrelin may be sensitive to social affective signals and related contexts (e.g., social status, and social threat vs. support), given that these signals and contexts may represent access to tangible physical and psychological resources that support allostasis and metabolic needs. We then review literature showing that leptin, ghrelin, and associated metabolic states may feed into the construction of social affective states and behaviors (e.g., emotion and risk taking), in order to motivate behaviors in line with allostatic needs. We close by offering guidelines for researchers interested in contributing to this emerging field and highlight opportunities for future research. We believe that leptin and ghrelin offer exciting new directions for social and affective scientists interested in linking the mind, brain, and body.     

The emotional self: Embodiment,reflexivity, and emotion regulation

Current dominant trends in the biological and psychological sciences tend to put emphasis on the role of the brain, cognition, and consciousness in realising emotional states and attempting to regulate them. In this article, I suggest an alternative approach with the idea that emotions emerge within social relations and give meaning and value to the situations in which we are located. Humans are understood as embodied emotional selves for who thought and emotion are intertwined. However, individuals can get caught in obsessive and compulsive thinking and feeling traps where the self loses touch with its emotions, and because of this also loses contact with the social situation and the ability to skilfully navigate it. In such circumstances, the self gets overwhelmed by emotion and loses its poise in the social setting. I consider Buddhist meditation as a technique through which people can develop a more reflexive emotional self, where reflexivity is not about control of emotion but owning one's feelings and being able to respond more sensitively and skilfully in various situations.     

人际互动中的“自我-他人”区分:多水平的探索

人际互动的根本问题在于我们如何在表征自身想法和感受的同时试图去理解他人的心理和情感状态, 以驾驭复杂的社交环境。最近研究发现个体主要通过模拟自我加工过程实现对他人的理解, 但这种自我加工以及心理模拟在一定程度上混淆了自我与他人。因此, 为进行成功的人际互动, 大脑必须灵活区分自我和他人相关的表征, 这种能力被称为“自我-他人”区分(self-other distinction, SOD)。通过探讨感知、动作、认知以及情感等不同加工水平社会认知过程中的“自我-他人”区分及相应的研究范式, 实现对人际互动过程更全面而深入的理解, 为改善社会认知、情感障碍以及自闭症的干预提供依据。在此基础上, 提出了具体的研究展望。     

THE ROLE OF COGNITION AND FEELING IN RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

Abstract Inquiry into religious experience is informed by conceptualizations of emotion. Although a long history of theoretical and empirical work has provided considerable insight into the philosophical, psychological, and (more recently) neurobiological structure of emotion, the role of cognition and feeling in religious emotional states remains poorly conceived, and, hence, so does the concept of religious experience. The lack of a clear understanding of the role of emotion in religious experience is a consequence of a lack of an adequate interdisciplinary account of emotions. Our primary aim here is to examine the consequences of a properly interdisciplinary understanding of emotions for the analysis of religious experience. To this end, we note points of convergence between psychological, philosophical, and neuroscientific accounts of emotion and between such accounts and reports on the neurobiology of religious experience, in particular two recent human brain imaging studies. We conclude that emotions are richer phenomena than either pure feeling or pure thought and that, rightly understood, emotion affords religious experience its distinctive content and quality. Accordingly, we argue that religious experience cannot be reduced to pure feeling or pure thought. Rather, on our analysis, religious experience emerges as “thinking that feels like something.”     

Conceptualising the biology-culture relationship in emotion: An analogy with gender

Abstract

Recent conceptual developments in the psychology of gender can be productively applied to understanding two facets of emotion: the biological manifestation of emotion and the psychological embodiment of emotion. Gender researchers distinguish between sex, the biologically based categories of female and male and gender, the psychological features that are often associated with biological states and that involve social categories rather than biological categories. In other words, the term sex is used to refer to the physical fact of primary and secondary sex characteristics; the term gender is used to refer to a psychological and cultural construct, a loose translation of sex into social terms. It is proposed that two analogous facets of emotion can be identified, namely, one which is comprised of emotion's hardwired, pan-cultural, developmentally persistent qualities, the analogue to sex. The second, constructed aspect of emotion is the analogue to gender. Six dimensions on which sex and gender can be contrasted are described, and the application of each to the study of emotion is discussed.     

Mapping discrete and dimensional emotions onto the brain: controversies and consensus

A longstanding controversy in the field of emotion research has concerned whether emotions are better conceptualized in terms of discrete categories, such as fear and anger, or underlying dimensions, such as arousal and valence. In the domain of neuroimaging studies of emotion, the debate has centered on whether neuroimaging findings support characteristic and discriminable neural signatures for basic emotions or whether they favor competing dimensional and psychological construction accounts. This review highlights recent neuroimaging findings in this controversy, assesses what they have contributed to this debate, and offers some preliminary conclusions. Namely, although neuroimaging studies have identified consistent neural correlates associated with basic emotions and other emotion models, they have ruled out simple one-to-one mappings between emotions and brain regions, pointing to the need for more complex, network-based representations of emotion.     

认知固执导致持续应激的认知与神经机制

认知固执(Perseverative Cognition, PC)是一种重复或长期的消极认知表征,既能够使用量表测量,也可以通过实验诱发。认知固执会导致持续应激反应,进而影响个体的身心健康。其导致持续应激反应的认知机制体现在个体难以识别安全信号,高认知固执个体会表现出低心率变异性的显著特征;在脑机制方面主要表现为前额叶的抑制控制功能失调、杏仁核与前扣带回的病理性改变以及前额叶-杏仁核的连接减弱。未来研究应深入探讨认知固执的影响因素以及干预措施,同时需要进一步分析内隐认知固执的测量方式及其对个体的影响。     

基础认知与社会认知中内隐过程及其脑机制*

认知过程及其脑机制是心理学研究的重要内容。社会认知是人们在社会生活中对他人行为的意图及情感的认识,是人际互动的重要方面,具有深刻的理论和实践意义。本文全面深入地对社会认知和基础认知中自动加工过程进行了研究综述,对基础认知与社会认知的研究方式进行了比较。自动加工过程是社会认知和基础认知中都存在的重要过程,从脑机制研究角度,相关的电生理学指标(如N400等)都可以作为研究的指标来考察社会认知中的自动加工过程。本文从社会认知与基础认知的比较入手,介绍了各种领域的研究方法,特别是事件相关电位技术等认知神经科学研究方法。     

中庸的文化心理特征及其实践理路

中庸是中国人的核心文化心理特质,主要呈现为两种形态：理想中庸和现实中庸。对理想中庸的理论研究能够夯实现实中庸实证研究的理论基础。中庸具有相互融通的三维内涵：执两用中,用中为常道,中和可常行。中庸具有德性的本质规定性,显现为三个方面的文化心理特征：执两用中的中庸认知,执中致和的中庸情感,刚柔并济的中庸人格。中庸具有鲜明的实践品格,礼仪制度是中庸实践的客观根据,籍由观照本心所作出的道德判断是中庸实践的主观根据,择善而固执是中庸实践的现实路径。     

Seven sins in the study of emotion: correctives from affective neuroscience

This brief commentary highlights seven sins in the study of emotion that are explicitly treated in contemporary affective neuroscience. These sins are (1) Affect and cognition are subserved by separate and independent neural circuits; (2) Affect is subcortical; (3) Emotions are in the head; (4) Emotions can be studied from a purely psychological perspective; (5) Emotions are similar in structure across age and species; (6) Specific emotions are instantiated in discrete locations in the brain; and (7) Emotions are conscious feeling states. Each of these is briefly discussed and evidence from affective neuroscience that bears on these sins is noted. The articles in this Special Issue underscore the vitality of research in affective neuroscience and illustrate how some of these sins can be addressed and rectified using concepts and methods from affective neuroscience.     

What Are the Brain Mechanisms on Which Psychological Processes Are Based?

ABSTRACT— That the human brain is the organ of the mind is not in dispute, but we know remarkably little about the brain mechanisms underlying the mind. What are the functional structures and computational processes of the human brain that subserve cognition, emotion, and behavior? Given the complexity of the human brain, progress in understanding the functional organization and structure of the human brain depends on sophisticated theoretical specifications of the psychological representations and processes that differentiate two or more comparison conditions. Psychological scientists, therefore, are well positioned to lead the search for brain mechanisms underlying psychological processes. Doing so constitutes an expansion of the purview of psychological science beyond a science of behavior, and beyond a science of the mind, to include a science of the brain. Such an expansion of the mission of psychological science has implications for the infrastructure and training needs of the discipline.     

知情交互作用的实证研究现状与展望

知情交互作用(the interaction of cognition-emotion)是指认知与情绪之间相互作用,相互影响,二者密不可分.当前,知情交互作用的研究主要涉及两个方面:一是认知对情绪的影响,即认知对情绪的产生和情绪调节的影响;二是情绪对认知的影响,即情绪对感知觉、记忆和思维的影响.本文从实证角度,综合相关文献选取各自领域具有代表性的最新研究成果进行了概要述评,并进一步指出未来的研究应该在无意识情绪的脑机制、情绪-想象的交互作用、情绪-语言的交互作用,以及知-情-行的整合等方面进一步探讨.     

Situating Emotions: From Embodied Cognition to Mindreading

In this article we analyze the strengths and weaknesses of mindreading versus embodied cognition approaches to emotion understanding. In the first part of the article we argue that mindreading explanations of how we understand the emotions of others (TT, ST or hybrid) face a version of the frame problem, i.e. the problem of how to limit the scope of the information that is relevant to mindreading. Also, we show that embodied cognition explanations are able to by-pass this problem because they provide a characterization of social understanding as being essentially situated. However, embodied cognition explanations seem to be limited in scope insofar as they do not target the more sophisticated forms of emotion understanding that have traditionally been the main focus of mindreading explanations. In the second part of the article we discuss Goldie’s account of emotion understanding as a possible way to complement embodied cognition approaches without re-introducing the frame problem. We offer two suggestions that might further the integration of Goldie’s account of emotion understanding within the framework of embodied cognition.     

A cognitive-emotional model of NSSI: using emotion regulation and cognitive processes to explain why people self-injure

Non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI) is a complex behaviour, routinely engaged for emotion regulatory purposes. As such, a number of theoretical accounts regarding the aetiology and maintenance of NSSI are grounded in models of emotion regulation; the role that cognition plays in the behaviour is less well known. In this paper, we summarise four models of emotion regulation that have repeatedly been related to NSSI and identify the core components across them. We then draw on social cognitive theory to unite models of cognition and models of emotion in developing a new cognitive-emotional model of NSSI. Our model articulates how emotion regulation and cognition can work in concert to govern NSSI, and offers several new research questions that can be addressed within this framework.     

睡眠剥夺影响风险决策的双系统模型探讨

睡眠剥夺是指由于环境或自身原因无法满足正常睡眠时间的情况。大量实证研究发现, 睡眠剥夺会导致个体在风险决策中更倾向于风险寻求, 同时也有研究表明睡眠剥夺会导致个体风险规避, 而目前尚无统一结论。睡眠剥夺从风险感知、风险容忍、风险决策策略三个方面影响了风险决策, 其心理机制可由认知和情绪双路径模型进行解释, 且脑神经生理学研究也提供了相关证据。未来的研究应该进一步关注：(1)现实工作生活中的睡眠不足对风险决策的影响; (2)睡眠剥夺影响风险决策的理论模型建构。     

Facial expressions of emotion: a cognitive neuroscience perspective

Facial expressions are one example of emotional behavior that illustrate the importance of emotions to both basic survival and social interaction. Basic facial responses to stimuli such as sweet and bitter taste are important for species fitness and governed by simple rules. Even at this basic level, facial responses have communicative value to other species members. During evolution simple facial responses were extended for use in more complex nonverbal communications; the responses are labile. The perception and production of facial expressions are cognitive processes and numerous subcortical and cortical areas contribute to these operations. We suggest that no specific emotion center exists over and above cognitive systems in the brain, and that emotion should not be divorced from cognition.     

Theory of mind and its relationship with executive functions and emotion recognition in borderline personality disorder

Impaired social cognition has been claimed to be a mechanism underlying the development and maintenance of borderline personality disorder (BPD). One important aspect of social cognition is the theory of mind (ToM), a complex skill that seems to be influenced by more basic processes, such as executive functions (EF) and emotion recognition. Previous ToM studies in BPD have yielded inconsistent results. This study assessed the performance of BPD adults on ToM, emotion recognition, and EF tasks. We also examined whether EF and emotion recognition could predict the performance on ToM tasks. We evaluated 15 adults with BPD and 15 matched healthy controls using different tasks of EF, emotion recognition, and ToM. The results showed that BPD adults exhibited deficits in the three domains, which seem to be task‐dependent. Furthermore, we found that EF and emotion recognition predicted the performance on ToM. Our results suggest that tasks that involve real‐life social scenarios and contextual cues are more sensitive to detect ToM and emotion recognition deficits in BPD individuals. Our findings also indicate that (a) ToM variability in BPD is partially explained by individual differences on EF and emotion recognition; and (b) ToM deficits of BPD patients are partially explained by the capacity to integrate cues from face, prosody, gesture, and social context to identify the emotions and others' beliefs.     

Dialectic – a universal for consciousness?

Dialectic is a word of many meanings but used here in the classical sense of the apposition of thesis and antithesis leading to synthesis. The first, counterfactual phase is expressible symbolically by the symmetric difference $, “one or the other, but not both”. The second, synthesis phase is taken here to correspond to the complement ∼$, consisting of commonality and context within the universe of discourse. After a brief discussion of parallels between “events” in quantum theory and the dialectical pair ($, ∼$), it is argued that the latter is more fundamental for brain and mind. Consciousness is “carved at the joints” as comprising basic awareness (=not-unconscious), self-awareness, perception and cognition factored by attention, and emotion. The dialectical pair ($, ∼$) is then referred to Working Memory and Long-Term Memory, categories both mathematical and psychological, knowledge and learning, negotiation and dialogue, problem solving, affect and emotion, and brain structure and function. Coupling previous work by the author for the ($, ∼$) model with the present analysis, it is concluded that the dialectical pair provides a universal for consciousness parallel to its known universal property for the most general sorts of equivalences in mathematics.     

OUTSOURCED COGNITION

Recent developments in technologically enabled social cognition call for a rethinking of many aspects of human cognition. According to the hypothesis of extended cognition, we must revise our psychological categories by eliminating allegedly superficial distinctions between internal cognition and external processes. As an alternative to this proposal, I outline a hypothesis of outsourced cognition which seeks to respect distinctions that are operative in both folk psychology and the social and cognitive sciences. According to this hypothesis, the cognitive states and processes of the individual are substantially and explanatorily distinct from the relevant external states and processes. In consequence, the individual remains a cognitive unit that is both central and indispensable in the explanations of cognitive science. As a case study, I consider the epistemology of testimony. I will argue that important epistemological categories may be preserved by adopting the hypothesis of outsourced cognition over the hypothesis of extended cognition. Moreover, I will argue that the outsourced cognition hypothesis deepens the problems that beset an extended epistemology of testimony.