Spacious Awareness in Mahāyāna Buddhism and Its Role in the Modern Mindfulness Movement

This paper investigates a particular understanding of ‘awareness’ in Mahāyāna Buddhism and its relevance for secular mindfulness. We will focus on the Zen and Mahāmudrā traditions which share a view of awareness as an innate wakefulness, described using metaphors of space, light and clarity. These traditions encourage practices in which the meditator rests in this spacious ‘non-dual’ awareness: Zen’s ‘just sitting’ and Mahāmudrā’s ‘open presence’. We explore the role of this approach within secular mindfulness, in particular Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) and Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT). We see how Jon Kabat-Zinn brought influences from Zen into the creation of MBSR, in his approach of ‘non-doing’, and in the practice of ‘choiceless awareness’, akin to Zen’s ‘just sitting’. We then examine how ‘open presence’ meditation is developed in the Tibetan Mahāmudrā tradition, using a sixteenth-century text Mahāmudrā: The Moonlight as our focal point. Turning to interviews with leading UK mindfulness teachers with Tibetan Buddhist training, we explore how this understanding of awareness can infuse meditation with a sense of ‘space’, and how that manifests in their teaching. We argue that a willingness to explore the ‘space of awareness’ can help mindfulness to offer a transformative path beyond stress reduction and therapy.     

One ring to rule them all: Master discourses of enlightenment—and racism—from colonial to contemporary New Zealand

We interrogated historical continuity and change in discourses of enlightenment and racism through the analysis of 160 years of New Zealand Speeches from the Throne (1854–2014, 163 speeches). Enlightenment discourses of benevolence and perfectibility were prevalent in all periods, much more so than racism. ‘Old‐fashioned’ racism took the form of an assumed civilizational superiority (including accusations of ‘barbarism’) during colonization, with ‘modern’ racism taking forms like blaming Māori for not ‘productively’ using the land. Both declined to almost zero by the 20th century, undermining the idea of ‘old‐fashioned’ versus ‘modern’ racism. Utilitarian discourses peaked in the late 19th to early 20th centuries as justification for Māori land alienation. ‘Master discourses of enlightenment’ consisted of a central core of social representations that changed at the periphery, with a gradual expansion of symbolic inclusion of Māori in discourses of national identity to the point where biculturalism is the dominant discourse for elites today.     

Is Adhikāra good enough for ‘rights'?

The paper considers the question of whether ‘rights’ as we have it in modern Western thinking has an equivalence within the Indian framework of Dharma. Under Part I we look at purusārthas to see if the desired human goals imply rights by examining the tension between aspired ‘values’ and the ‘ought’ of duty. Next, a potential cognate in the term ’adhikāra’ is investigated via the derivation of a refined signification of ‘entitlements’, especially in the exegetical hermeneutics of the Mimāmsā. Finally, adhikāra's re‐emergence in the Bhagavadgitā is considered. We suggest that while the boundary is significantly extended, the Gitā too appears to be circumspect in opening up the discourse in the more abstract and absolute sense which the term ‘rights’ nowadays enjoys.     

From Ideology to Feeling: Discourse,Emotion, and an Analytic Synthesis

Recent arguments in the social sciences exhort a turn to affect and, either explicitly or by implication, a move away from or beyond the earlier turn to language. This conveys a presumption that the site and logic of discursive investigation must inevitably be different to the site and logic of affective investigation. Instead, this article suggests that a nonreductive psychosocial understanding of both discourse and affect needs a way of dissolving the dualism which inhabits and motivates much current debate around discursive and affective “fields.” This article illustrates a route towards dismantling the apparent segregation of discourse and affect in the call to an affective turn. The data come from a project exploring women’s talk of success and failure. Analysis here focuses on affective-discursive practices in discussion of “failed attempts to control body weight” set within the context of contemporary western neoliberal ideology. Discourse and affect are both approached as semiotic, relational practice. As such, affect is made accessible to analysis via concepts already familiar in studies of discursive practice in social psychology, including the reproduction and negotiation of ideologies and the management of trouble. This analytic focus on practical deployments in interaction enables epistemological and ontological psychosocial arguments to be grounded in practical discursive-affective accomplishments.     

The Problem of Prejudice: some notes on philosophical hermeneutics for broad-visioned Buddhologists

This paper examines how and why conventional truth is, in Tsong khapa's view, false and deceptive yet indeed truth that stands shoulder to shoulder with ultimate truth. The first part of the paper establishes the complementary nature of the two truths by responding to the question ‘Why is conventional truth “truth” at all?’ The discussion in the second part examines the uses of conventional discourse within the Mādhyamika philosophical framework—partly by discussing Tsong khapa's response to the question ‘Why is conventional truth “false” and “deceptive”?’, and partly by considering his views on the application of the worldly convention within the Prāsangika Mādhyamika system.     

EMOTION IN SIKH MUSICOLOGY

Recent studies in Sikh musicology have focused on its history and theory. However, there is an absence of theoretical research which focuses on the role of emotions in Sikh music. In this paper, we contribute to this research by investigating key issues relating to emotions in Sikh musicology. We explore theories which propose that a rāga will evoke a particular emotion/mood in the listener and that there are a number of factors which influence this process. In particular, we focus on two parallel theories which we term the ‘one rāga one emotion’ and the ‘one rāga multiple emotions’ theories. We consider these theories within the context of the shabads (We are adding an ‘s’ for Punjabi plural words such as shabads and rāgas although the plural in Punjabi in this case would be Shabad or rāga. By Anglicising the words in this way we hope that it makes the paper easier to read), in particular rāgas of the Guru Granth Sahib which convey a number of emotions/moods. In this paper, we explore the problem of how to approach the interpretation of rāgas within the context of the emotions/moods presented in the shabads of those rāgas whilst adhering to the musical structure of the rāga. We use rāga Sirī to exemplify and focus the discussion. We challenge the ‘one rāga one emotion’ theory and propose that a rāga can be performed to evoke a number of emotions/moods but that certain considerations have to be taken into account by the performer during the rendition of the rāga.     

No Outside,No Inside: Duality,Reality and Vasubandhu's Illusory Elephant

Some of the basic terminology of Yogācāra philosophy needs reevaluation. Whereas commentaries almost universally gloss the term dvaya (‘duality’) with some version of the phrase grāhya grāhaka ca (lit. ‘grasped and grasper’, but usually translated as ‘subject and object’), in fact this gloss is absent from the earliest strata. The term and its gloss are derived from separate streams of Yogācāra reasoning—one from discussions of linguistic conceptualization and the other from discussions of perception. Once we see that these two are distinct, it becomes clear that the commentarial literature asserts their identity in order to philosophically unify Yogācāra thought. One upshot of this is that even in this later assertion ‘duality’ refers not to the distinction between internal and external reality (as in ‘textbook’ Yogācāra), but to the falsely projected distinction between mental subjects and mental objects.     

Mettābhāvanā in Traditional and Popular Buddhist Contexts

Some have referred to relatively recent forms of popular Buddhism as an ‘engaged’ Buddhism that has revived or redirected traditional Buddhist ideas and practices found in meditation texts to reflect a greater social or worldly emphasis than suggested in earlier historical moments. One of these ideas is the quadripartite framework of the ‘immeasurable states’ (aprameya/appameya) or ‘divine abidings’ (brahmavihāra), the most prominent of which in popular Buddhism is mettā (friendliness/loving-kindness). This article traces the philosophy of the ‘immeasurable states’ found in meditation texts from various Indic traditions (Buddhist, Jain, and Hindu) and then presents the ways in which these traditional ideas (especially mettā) have informed popular Buddhist movements in the twentieth century. Points of discussion include: ‘engaged’ Buddhism's relationship with traditional Buddhist ethics; arguments concerning the coalescence of monastic-centred meditation practices with popular Buddhist notions of social service; and the distinct utilization of mettā in contemporary Buddhist societies in contrast to the mobilizing impulses of comparable religious communities (Hindu and Jain) with a similar heritage of mettā discourse in South Asia.     

Language as an Instrument of Soteriological Transformation from the Madhyamaka Perspective

Buddhist teachings and practices can be viewed as a journey of soteriological transformation, where language, as a tool for the analysis of views, occupies a place of special significance and importance. This article examines how the concept of non-duality, from the Madhyamaka perspective, has served as a powerful rhetorical device with the explicit aim of fostering soteriological transformation. Among the various expressions representative of the Madhyamaka perspective, two are particularly explored in this article for their facilitation of soteriological transformation: the expression of ‘neither a dharma nor a not-dharma’ (na sa dharmo nâdharma?) and the teaching that ‘one should let go even of dharmas, still more so not-dharmas’ (dharmā? eva prahātavyā? prāg evâdharmā?). I argue that the Madhyamaka expression of ‘neither A nor not-A’ is hardly ever just about conforming to any linguistic conventions. It is about gaining liberation from linguistic conventions and unexamined remarks.     

The paradox of negation in Nāgārjuna's philosophy

This essay discusses the paradox of the Nāgārjunian negation as presented in his Vigrahavyāvartani. In Part One it is argued that as the Naiyāyika remarks, Nāgārjuna's speech act ‘No proposition has its own intrinsic thesis’ seemingly contradicts his famous claim that he has no negation whatsoever. In Parts Two and Three I consider the traditional as well as modem responses to this paradox and offer my own. I argue that Nāgārjuna's speech act does not generate a paradox for two reasons: (a) the equivalence thesis of the kind‐?P = ?P is obviously false; and (b) since Nāgārjuna's speech act is situated in the dialogical/conversational universe of discourse as opposed to the argumentative/systematic universe of discourse, the teaching of the non‐intrinsic thesis of all statements that it purports, holds for all statements in its class, including itself. Lastly, it is argued that even though the Nāgārjunian speech act is not a negation situated in the argumentative universe of discourse, it serves both philosophical and soteriological purposes.     

Buddhist functionalism—Instrumentality reaffirmed

This article seeks to determine if Buddhism can best be understood as primarily a functionalist tradition. In pursuing this, some analogies arise with various Western strands—particularly James’ ‘pragmatism’, Dewey's ‘instrumentalism’, Braithwaite's ‘empiricism’, Wittgenstein's ‘language games’, and process thinkers like Hartshorne and Jacobson. Within the Buddhist setting, the traditional Theravāda framework of sila (ethics/precepts), samādhi (meditation) and pañña (wisdom) are examined, together with Theravāda rituals. Despite some ‘correspondence’ approaches with regard to truth claim statements, e.g. vipassanā ’insight’ and Abhidharma analysis, a more profound functionalism seems present. This is even more clear with the Mahāyāna. Apart from the basic and explicit Mahāyāna underpinning of upāya, the Mādhyamika, Tantras and Ch'an (Zen) schools are clearly functionalist. Moreover, despite initially seeming more ‘absolutist’ in their positions, other strands like the Pure Land and Nichiren faith traditions, and Dharmakirti's Vijñānavāda epistemology can also be tied into this functionalist setting.     

Clinging to Nothing: The Phenomenology and Metaphysics of Upādāna in Early Buddhism

The concept of clinging (upādāna) is absolutely central to early Buddhist thought. This article examines the concept from both a phenomenological and a metaphysical perspective and attempts to understand how it relates to the non-self doctrine and to the ultimate goal of Nibbāna. Unenlightened consciousness is consciousness centered on an ‘I’. It is also consciousness that is conditioned by and bound up with a being in the world. From a phenomenological perspective, clinging gives birth to the illusion of self, or what is called the ‘conceit of “I am”’. From a metaphysical perspective, clinging binds consciousness to a worldly being. Seen in the first way, Nibbāna is ‘centerless’ consciousness. Seen in the second, it is unconditioned consciousness. Viewed in either way, Nibbāna is a state of consciousness reached through the eradication of clinging     

Applying discursive psychology to ‘fact’ construction in political discourse

In this paper, we show how discursive psychology can be used to show how ‘facts’ are used rhetorically by politicians. That is, they are more than neutral reflections of an objective reality—these ‘facts’ are highly attuned to the local context of political argumentation. We draw upon examples from two studies that used discursive psychology to analyse two different political contexts: (1) Islamophobia in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attack and (2) debates over Great Britain and the European Union. In both contexts, the analysis uncovers how politicians challenge both the context and the relevance of a fact. The context of ‘facts’ is reconstructed to undermine their original argumentative strength, whereas questioning the relevance of a ‘fact’ undermines it both as fact and as a rhetorical tool to be used in a debate. These findings show how discursive psychology can contribute to knowledge about political communication, as well as the benefits of applying discursive psychology to political discourse.     

Replanting the Bodhi tree: New paradigms for Buddhist philosophy from quantum physics

This study explores and assesses the nature and practice of Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) from the perspective of Theravāda Buddhism. It is particularly concerned with how both models of training understand and apply ‘mindfulness’. The approach here is, firstly, to examine how the Theravāda understands and employs mindfulness and, secondly, to explore, and more accurately contextualize, the work of MBCT. The evaluation of MBCT in terms of the Theravāda suggests the former has both a strong affinity with, as well as some significant distinctions from, its dominant Theravādin influences.     

Sankara's doctrine of Māyā

Like all monisms Vedanta posits a distinction between the relatively and the absolutely Real, and a theory of illusion to explain their paradoxical relationship. Sankara's resolution of the problem emerges from his discourse on the nature of māyā which mediates the relationship of the world of empirical, manifold phenomena and the one Reality of Brahman. Their apparent separation is an illusory fissure deriving from ignorance and maintained by ‘superimposition’. Māyā, enigmatic from the relative viewpoint, is not inexplicable but only not self‐explanatory. Sahkara's exposition is in harmony with sapiential doctrines from other religious traditions and implies a profound spiritual therapy.     

Of Seeds and Sprouts: Defilement and its Attachment to the Life-stream in the Sarvāstivāda H[rdot]daya Treatises

The notions of selflessness (anātmaka) and karman are two key concepts in Buddhist philosophy. The question how karman functions with respect to the rebirth of a worldling who is, actually, devoid of a self, was a major philosophical issue in early Buddhist doctrine. Within the Sarvāstivāda school, the Vaibhā[sdot]ikas became the representative of an interpretation of this problem that hinges on the notion of ‘possession’ (prāpti). Their theory was contradicted by the Sautrāntikas, whose interpretation is based on the notion of ‘seed’ (bīja). The Sarvāstivāda H[rdot]daya treatises, compiled in a time period spanning from the beginning of the common era to the fourth century AD, i.e. the period of the rise of the Sautrāntika school, are a particularly interesting set of works, as they reflect the gradual development of these two major theories.     

Negotiating the spaces: exploring issues of human rights in an Indian text

This article is an attempt to negotiate the spaces between a number of problematic positions concerning Hinduism and human rights through the close study of one particular text, the Rājadharmaparvan of the Mahābhārata. By examining safeguards and provisions for subjects articulated in the text’s discourse of kingly duty, it engages with some of the arguments forwarded in the theoretical literature on human rights. Here it interrogates, in particular, the idea that Hinduism is distinctively incompatible with these norms in a way other historical or cultural traditions are not. The article concludes by asking whether it is possible to counter Eurocentric tendencies in global debates without furthering illiberal agendas within local ones. Discussing the appropriation of ‘Raj dharma,’ and the texts that deal with it, by the Hindu Right, it briefly outlines some recent moves in human rights theory that help facilitate the reclamation of a rich and plural textual heritage.     

From criticism to approval: A reconsideration of Ji’s Yogācāra position on Madhyamaka

Madhyamaka and Yogācāra are two Mahāyāna schools which have distinct systems. In the seventh century East Asia, the doctrinal distinction between the two schools was received as doctrinal contrast in the polemic circumstance of Emptiness-Existence (C. kongyou 空有) controversy. In this context, Ji 基 (632–682), the putative founder of East Asian Yogācāra school, has been normally considered by scholars to have advocated ‘Existence’ (viz., Yogācāra) in opposition to ‘Emptiness’ (viz., Madhyamaka). It is problematic, however, to brand Ji’s Yogācāra position simply as anti-Madhyamaka. Although Ji evidently expresses evident criticism on such a Madhyamaka exegete as Bhāvaviveka (ca. 500–570) in some of his works, he also describes Bhāvaviveka in an amicable or even respective way in other works. By analyzing Ji’s extant works, this article argues that Ji’s scholastic attitude toward Madhyamaka changed from criticism to approval.     

Reflections on the Dichotomy Rūpakāya/Dhammakāya

In the first part of the paper, I argue against the idée reçue that rūpakāya is a Pali phrase referring to relics and images of a Buddha after his nirvana. It does not: it refers either to any human body, or to the Buddha's body while alive. In the second part I argue that appreciating how the dhammakāya is actually instantiated through time requires us to abandon the interpretive dichotomy which sets it as an ‘immaterial’, ‘spiritual’ object against ‘material objects’ such as relics, images, and amulets. As instantiated in writing and speech-events it functions in the same ways. It too is an embodied object of ritual pūjā.