Are Envy,Anger, and Resentment Moral Emotions?

Abstract

The moral status of emotions has recently become the focus of various philosophical investigations. Certain emotions that have traditionally been considered as negative, such as envy, jealousy, pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, and pride, have been defended. Some traditionally “negative” emotions have even been declared to be moral emotions.

In this brief paper, I suggest two basic criteria according to which an emotion might be considered moral, and I then examine whether envy, anger, and resentment are moral emotions.     

Are Moral Emotions Key to Informed Risk Decisions? A Commentary on Sabine Roeser,Risk, Technology,and Moral Emotions

Science and Engineering Ethics -     

What Should I Be Doing, and Where Are They Doing It? Scholarly Productivity of Academic Psychologists

ABSTRACT— Scholarly productivity is used to index faculty achievement, but normative data on publication rates among academic psychologists are scarce. This article presents the results of a study of 1,216 faculty members from 96 schools, ranging from elite research universities to minor undergraduate colleges. As expected, faculty members at research universities publish the most, followed by those at elite 4-year schools and other doctoral institutions. Institutional prestige has little effect on productivity, except that elite universities employ a greater proportion of truly eminent scholars than other schools do. The fact that many of these scholars are hired by elite schools after achieving eminence elsewhere suggests that financial prowess, rather than institutional climate, produces the latter effect. Academics at all of these types of schools tend to continue publishing throughout their careers; achieving tenure has little effect on their subsequent scholarship. Faculty members at master's universities and lesser 4-year schools publish less than others and tend to cease publication activity after about 10 years, presumably upon receiving tenure. Males tend to publish more than females during the initial push for tenure, but not thereafter; females, unlike males, tend to increase their publication rates as they mature professionally. A subset of highly productive males who are moving toward more prestigious types of schools accounts for much of the remaining gender difference. The number of predoctoral publications is a relatively weak predictor of postdoctoral scholarship.     

Moral Emotions,Awareness, and Spiritual Freedom in the Thought of Zhu Xi (1130–1200)

It is well known that the Neo-Confucian thinker Zhu Xi (1130–1200) particularly emphasizes the role of emotions in human life. This paper shows that the four ‘moral emotions’ (e.g. feelings like ‘compassion’ and ‘disdain’ as described in the Mencius) are central to Zhu's thinking, insofar as only their genuine actualization enables the individual to achieve spiritual freedom. Moreover, I discuss the crucial notions of ‘awareness’/‘perception’ (zhījué) and ‘knowledge’/‘wisdom’ (zhī), in order to reveal the complex dynamic that moral emotions are said to create in the moral agent. I also analyse two important passages from the Mencius (1A/7 and 2A/6) and examine how Zhu Xi, in his exegetical glosses, defines the conditions of virtuous agency as based on the moral emotions. Finally, I explain the reasons why Neo-Confucians like Zhu Xi have sometimes been described as Kantian thinkers avant la lettre.     

Linguistic Archipelago and (Its?) History

In this article I examine Jean–François Lyotard's conception of history, its philosophical presuppositions, and its implications. As his conception's most crucial implicit assumptions I consider Lyotard's account of language and his notion of agonistics and dissent. Concerning its implications, I consider the nominalist and relativist conclusions Lyotard's theory may engender if thought through to its end, as well as the possibilities it opens up for ethics and justice for alterity, or otherness, via a new notion of human history. My aim is to show how Lyotard advances philosophical thought about history and to examine whether he succeeds in delivering the goods he promises. I conclude with suggestions for an alternative approach. The main thesis of the article is that Lyotard's metacritique of past accounts of human history is pertinent and apposite but, because of some negative implications of certain implicit assumptions on which he relies to articulate this critique, it appears inadequate in some respects. I argue that it is possible to promote a critique of older notions of human history along Lyotardian lines and to preserve the merits of Lyotard's critique for a sensitive and nonlogocentric approach to otherness via another route, one that is not committed to Lyotard's agonistics and incommensurability of language games.     

Doing without representing?

Connectionism and classicism, it generally appears, have at least this much in common: both place some notion of internal representation at the heart of a scientific study of mind. In recent years, however, a much more radical view has gained increasing popularity. This view calls into question the commitment to internal representation itself. More strikingly still, this new wave of anti-representationalism is rooted not in armchair theorizing but in practical attempts to model and understand intelligent, adaptive behavior. In this paper we first present, and then critically assess, a variety of recent anti-representationalist treatments. We suggest that so far, at least, the sceptical rhetoric outpaces both evidence and argument. Some probable causes of this premature scepticism are isolated. Nonetheless, the anti-representationalist challenge is shown to be both important and progressive insofar as it forces us to see beyond the bare representational/non-representational dichotomy and to recognize instead a rich continuum of degrees and types of representationality.     

Are Emotions Natural Kinds?

ABSTRACT— Laypeople and scientists alike believe that they know anger, or sadness, or fear, when they see it. These emotions and a few others are presumed to have specific causal mechanisms in the brain and properties that are observable (on the face, in the voice, in the body, or in experience)—that is, they are assumed to be natural kinds. If a given emotion is a natural kind and can be identified objectively, then it is possible to make discoveries about that emotion. Indeed, the scientific study of emotion is founded on this assumption. In this article, I review the accumulating empirical evidence that is inconsistent with the view that there are kinds of emotion with boundaries that are carved in nature. I then consider what moving beyond a natural-kind view might mean for the scientific understanding of emotion.     

What Are Emotions About?

This paper discusses the interrelations between three aspects of human emotions: their intentionality, their expressivity and their moral significance. It distinguishes three kinds of philosophical views of emotions: the cognitivist (classically held by the Stoics), the emotivist which reduces emotions to non-intentional bodily sensations and physiological states, and the moral phenomenologist , the latter being held by Annette Baier, whose work is the focus of the discussion. Her view, which represents an original development of ideas found in Descartes and Hume, avoids the reductionism of congitivist and emotivist accounts. The paper gives special attention to her notion of 'deep'objects of emotions and to her account of the expressivity of emotions, arguing that while the first is problematic, the second is a significant contribution to our understanding of the role of emotions in our moral lives.     

Reply to Kurth,Crosby, and Basse’s review of Emotions,Values, and Agency

In this reply, I argue that the worries raised by Kurth and this coauthors are not fatal for the perceptual theory of emotions. A first point to keep in mind in discussing the analogy argument in favor of that account is that what counts is the overall balance of similarities and differences, given their respective weight. In any case, I argue that none of the alleged differences between sensory perceptual experiences and emotions are such as to rule out that emotions are a kind of perceptual experience which can confer epistemic justification of our evaluative beliefs. Finally, I suggest that the perceptual theory is in a position to nicely capture what happens when we disagree about evaluative issues.     

Peers,Social Control,or Guilt? Self-Conscious Emotions as Explanation for Antisocial Behavior

Criminologists rarely include self-conscious emotions like guilt or shame to explain delinquency. Instead, factors external to the individual are often used, such as social institutions, the family, or peers. This study uses a longitudinal sample of 526 youth from two waves of survey data to assess the effects of peer influences, social control, and the self-conscious emotion of guilt on youth problem behaviors. Problem behavior is measured using teacher assessments at Time2. All other variables are baseline youth self-report measures that were collected at Time1. The results show that guilt statistically predicted teacher-assessed problem behaviors. Further work is needed to develop this measure in criminology.     

Is Biosphere Doing Theology?

Three theories about evolution are presently under discussion: the genocentric theory, the organismocentric theory, and the biospherocentric theory. A brief discussion of the three theories is presented. These theories have different implications for theology. The genocentric theory is related to the Darwinian interpretation and, for theology, means the end of an apologetic vision of natural science and for this reason the end of natural theology. The organismo-centric theory is mainly related to events of autoorganization and follows the path of the geometrical harmony of nature. But it is far different from the apologetic interpretation of natural theology which cannot be restored. The biospherocentric theory, on the contrary, contains many fruitful perspectives. This theory, which counts Teilhard de Chardin among its founders, allows the development of a new approach to the theology of nature. In this approach, it is actually the biosphere herself that is doing theology thanks to her thinking sphere: the noosphere.     

Overriding “Doing Wrong” and “Not Doing Right”: Validation of the Dispositional Self-Control Scale (DSC)

We present the Dispositional Self-Control (DSC) Scale, which reflects individuals’ tendency to override 2 types of temptations, termed doing wrong and not doing right. We report a series of 5 studies designed to test the reliability and validity of the scale. As hypothesized, high DSC predicts distant future orientation and low DSC predicts deviant behaviors such as aggression, alcohol misuse, and aberrant driving. DSC also predicts task performance among resource-depleted participants. Taken together, these findings suggest that the DSC Scale could be a useful tool toward further understanding the role of personality in overcoming self-control challenges.     

Introduction to the Symposium on Sabine Roeser’s Risk,Technology, and Moral Emotions

Science and Engineering Ethics -     

Toddlers’ Understanding of Peers’ Emotions

The second year of life sees dramatic developments in infants’ ability to understand emotions in adults alongside their growing interest in peers. In this study, the authors used a social-referencing paradigm to examine whether 12-, 18-, and 24-month-old children could use a peer's positive or negative emotion messages about toys to regulate their own behavior with the toys. They found that 12-month-olds decreased their play with toys toward which a peer had expressed either positive or negative emotion compared with play following a peer's neutral attention toward a toy. Also, 18-month-olds did not respond systematically, but 24-month-old children increased their toy play after watching a peer display negative affect toward the toy. Regardless of their age, children with siblings decreased their play with toys toward which they had seen a peer display fear, the typical social-referencing response. The authors discuss results in the context of developmental changes in social understanding and peer interaction over the second year of life.     

“Doing Gender” and “Doing Religion” in Science: A Cross-National Examination

Women tend to be both underrepresented in science and overrepresented in organized religion, yet the connection between these two phenomena is rarely examined. With survey data collected among 6,537 biologists and physicists from four national contexts—the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, and India—we test whether science as a social field shapes religious expressions and attitudes differently for men and women. Findings reveal a religious gender gap in India and Italy but not in the United States and the United Kingdom. Further, except in Italy, men had higher odds of perceiving religion and science to be in conflict, believing that their colleagues have a negative attitude about religion, and reporting that science made them less religious. Evidence suggests that men in science may disproportionately internalize normative pressures to masculinize by eschewing religion. Our findings have implications for selection into academic science and the practice of religion among men and women in science.     

The Self‐Conscious Emotions: How are they Experienced,Expressed, and Assessed?

The self‐conscious emotions (e.g., embarrassment, guilt, pride, shame) are a special class of emotions that critically involve the self, including the capacity to form stable self‐representations and to evaluate oneself relative to internal and external standards. In this article, we summarize five areas of recent research on self‐conscious emotions: (a) the cognitive elicitors, or causal appraisals, that generate them; (b) their non‐verbal expressions; (c) the underlying neural processes; (d) the degree to which their experience and expression varies across cultures; and (e) the measures that have been developed to assess them. In each section, we provide recommendations for future research directions.     

Leaning In and Out: Work–Life Tradeoffs,Self-Conscious Emotions,and Life Role Satisfaction

Drawing on self-discrepancy theory, which posits discomfort when actual selves deviate from ideal or ought selves (Higgins, 1987), we examine the complementary and compounding effects of work–life tradeoffs on self-conscious emotions, life role satisfaction, and spouse/partner work satisfaction. Across multiple samples, we augment and refine extant tradeoff measures to include minor tradeoffs (e.g., limiting networking, missing a family event) in addition to the more frequently researched major tradeoffs (e.g., quitting a job, choosing not to have children) and test their effects. Work compromising tradeoffs (i.e., sacrificing work for family/personal activities) were associated with negative self-conscious emotions and lower levels of job, career, and life satisfaction indirectly through professional self-discrepancy, suggesting that making work compromises for family affects how individuals see themselves as professionals. Family/personal compromising tradeoffs (i.e., sacrificing family/personal activities for work) were associated with negative self-conscious emotions and lower levels of job, career, family, and life satisfaction indirectly through family and professional self-discrepancy, suggesting individuals view their family and professional selves less favorably when they make family/personal compromises for work. Despite negative effects for the employees, our results suggest work tradeoffs are beneficial for spouse/partner work hours and satisfaction.