共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Dan Cavedon-Taylor 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):105-107
Hans Muller has recently attempted to show that Frank Jackson cannot assert the existence of qualia without thereby falsifying
himself on the matter of such mental states being epiphenomenal with respect to the physical world. I argue that Muller misunderstands
the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism and that, as a result, his arguments against Jackson do not go through.
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Dan Cavedon-TaylorEmail: |
2.
Dimitris Platchias 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):31-46
According to some representationalists (M. Tye, Ten problems of consciousness, MIT Press, Massachusetts, USA, 1995; W.G. Lycan,
Consciousness and experience, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 1996; F. Dretske, Naturalising the mind, MIT Press,
Massachusetts, USA 1995), qualia are identical to external environmental states or features. When one perceives a red rose
for instance, one is visually representing the actual redness of the rose. The represented redness of the rose is the actual
redness of the rose itself. Thus redness is not a property of one’s experience but an externally constituted property of the
perceived physical object. In this sense, qualia are out there, in the external world. Here, I argue that the main representationalist
arguments to this effect, if successful, establish no more than a symmetrical supervenience relation between representational
content and qualia, and that a supervenience relation alone (albeit symmetrical) doesn’t suffice for identity. This supervenience
thesis between qualia and representational content leaves open the question as to the essential nature of qualia.
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Dimitris PlatchiasEmail: |
3.
Daniel A. Weiskopf 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(2):265-276
Defenders of the extended mind thesis say that it is possible that some of our mental states may be constituted, in part,
by states of the extrabodily environment. Often they also add that such extended mentation is a commonplace phenomenon. I
argue that extended mentation, while not impossible, is either nonexistent or far from widespread. Genuine beliefs as they
occur in normal biologically embodied systems are informationally integrated with each other, and sensitive to changes in
the person’s overall system of beliefs. Environmental states, however, fail to satisfy this central feature of the functional
role of belief, and hence fail to be genuine mental states.
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Daniel A. WeiskopfEmail: |
4.
Peter W. Ross 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(3):299-316
There has been some recent optimism that addressing the question of how we distinguish sensory
modalities will help us consider whether there are limits on a scientific understanding of perceptual states. For example,
Block has suggested that the way we distinguish sensory modalities indicates that perceptual states have qualia which at least
resist scientific characterization. At another extreme, Keeley argues that our common-sense way of distinguishing the senses
in terms of qualitative properties is misguided, and offers a scientific eliminativism about common-sense modalities which
avoids appeal to qualitative properties altogether. I’ll argue contrary to Keeley that qualitative properties are necessary
for distinguishing senses, and contrary to Block that our common-sense distinction doesn’t indicate that perceptual states
have qualia. A non-qualitative characterization of perceptual states isn’t needed to avoid the potential limit on scientific
understanding imposed by qualia.
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Peter W. RossEmail: |
5.
Jesse Ramon Steinberg 《Sophia》2008,47(2):193-199
In this paper I discuss a number of problems associated with the suggestion that it is possible for God to randomly select
a possible world for actualization.
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Jesse Ramon SteinbergEmail: |
6.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《Sophia》2009,48(1):1-14
In this paper, I expose a conundrum regarding divine creation as Leibniz conceives of such creation. What energizes the conundrum
is that the concept of omnibenevolence—“consequential omnibenevolence”—that the Leibnizian argument for the view that the
actual world is the best of all possible worlds presupposes, appears to sanction the conclusion that God has no practical
reasons to create the actual world.
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Ishtiyaque HajiEmail: |
7.
Jessica Brown 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(3):397-405
In my remarks, I discuss Sosa's attempt to deal with the sceptical threat posed by dreaming. Sosa explores two replies to
the problem of dreaming scepticism. First, he argues that, on the imagination model of dreaming, dreaming does not threaten
the safety of our beliefs. Second, he argues that knowledge does not require safety, but a weaker condition which is not threatened
by dreaming skepticism. I raise questions about both elements of his reply.
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Jessica BrownEmail: |
8.
9.
Shamik Dasgupta 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(1):35-67
We naturally think of the material world as being populated by a large number of individuals. These are things, such as my laptop and the particles that compose it, that we describe as being propertied and related
in various ways when we describe the material world around us. In this paper I argue that, fundamentally speaking at least,
there are no such things as material individuals. I then propose and defend an individual-less view of the material world
I call “generalism”.
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Shamik DasguptaEmail: |
10.
Andrei A. Buckareff 《Philosophia》2006,34(2):143-152
Sharon Ryan has recently argued that if one has compatibilist intuitions about free action, then one should reject the claim that agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over coming to believe. In this paper I argue that the differences between beliefs and actions make the expectation of direct voluntary control over coming to believe unreasonable. So Ryan's theory of doxastic agency is untenable.
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Andrei A. BuckareffEmail: Phone: +1-716-3533623 |
11.
Sanford C. Goldberg 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(1):105-117
The following three propositions appear to be individually defensible but jointly inconsistent: (1) reliability is a necessary
condition on epistemic justification; (2) on contested matters in philosophy, my beliefs are not reliably formed; (3) some
of these beliefs are epistemically justified. I explore the nature and scope of the problem, examine and reject some candidate
solutions, compare the issue with ones arising in discussions about disagreement, and offer a brief assessment of our predicament.
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Sanford C. GoldbergEmail: |
12.
Gabriele Contessa 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(2):187-190
In this note, I argue that a dynamically shifted world—i.e. a world identical to our own except for a fixed constant difference
in the absolute acceleration of each object—is nomically impossible in a Newtonian world populated by finitely many objects.
A dynamic shift however seems to be nomically possible in a world populated by infinitely many objects, but only in a broad
sense of nomic possibility.
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Gabriele ContessaEmail: |
13.
John Milliken 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(5):563-571
Those working within the tradition of Humean psychology tend to mark a clear distinction between beliefs and desires. One
prominent way of elucidating this distinction is to describe them as having different “directions of fit” with respect to
the world. After first giving a brief overview of the various attempts to carry out this strategy along with their flaws,
I argue that the direction of fit metaphor is misleading and ought to be abandoned. It fails to take into account the actual
complexity of the roles played by belief and desire and forces us to look for a single, fundamental contrast between these
two that is unlikely to be found.
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John MillikenEmail: |
14.
Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):509-529
It is a common conviction among philosophers who hold that phenomenal properties, qualia, are distinct from any cognitive,
intentional, or functional properties, that it is possible to trace the neural correlates of these properties. The main purpose
of this paper is to present a challenge to this view, and to show that if “non-cognitive” phenomenal properties exist at all,
they lie beyond the reach of neuroscience. In the final section it will be suggested that they also lie beyond the reach of
psychology, so that they may be said to lie beyond the reach of science.
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Hilla Jacobson-HorowitzEmail: |
15.
Peter Alward 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(2):235-255
In this paper, I argue, contra Perry, that the existence of locating beliefs does not require the abandonment of the analysis
of belief as a relation between subjects and propositions. I argue that what the “problem of the essential indexical” reveals
is that a complete explanation of behaviour requires both an explanation of the type of behaviour the agent engaged in and
an explanation of why she engaged in it in the circumstances that she did. And I develop an account of belief which encompasses
both explanatory roles and which still treats belief as a two-place relation between subjects and propositions.
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Peter AlwardEmail: |
16.
Simon Roberts-Thomson 《Res Publica》2008,14(2):69-82
The institution of slavery is an unjust institution. The aim of this paper is to provide an explanation of why it is unjust.
I argue that slavery is unjust because it makes it impossible for slaves to realise both their interest in self-respect and
their interest in being at home in the world. Furthermore, I argue that this explanation of the injustice of slavery also
provides us with an argument for political equality.
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Simon Roberts-ThomsonEmail: |
17.
Jakub Čapek 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):453-463
The first part of this essay is basically historical. It introduces the explanation–understanding divide, focusing in particular
on the general–unique distinction. The second part is more philosophical and it presents two different claims on action. In
the first place, I will try to say what it means to understand an action. Secondly, we will focus on the explanation of action
as it is seen in some explanatory sciences. I will try to argue that in some cases these sciences commit what I call an “external
contradiction”.
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Jakub ČapekEmail: |
18.
Asifa Siraj 《Contemporary Islam》2009,3(1):41-57
Islam’s explicit condemnation of homosexuality has created a theologically based homophobia which engenders the intolerance
of homosexuals by Muslims. In this article I explore Muslim attitudes towards homosexuality and homosexuals as this area has
elicited very little research. Based on structured interviews with 68 Muslim male and female heterosexuals I examine the connection
between participants’ attitudes towards homosexuality and their understanding of gender and gender roles. I also analyse whether
participants’ views are shaped by their religious beliefs and values. Age, gender, education and level of religiosity are
analysed to see whether they affect attitudes. Data suggest that participants held negative attitudes towards homosexuals
and this is the result of being religiously conservative in their attitudes towards homosexuality and gender roles.
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Asifa SirajEmail: |
19.
20.
Hamid Vahid 《Erkenntnis》2008,69(3):295-313
It is not difficult to make sense of the idea that beliefs may derive their justification from other beliefs. Difficulties
surface when, as in certain epistemological theories, one appeals to sensory experiences to give an account of the structure
of justification. This gives rise to the so-called problem of ‘nondoxastic justification’, namely, the problem of seeing how
sensory experiences can confer justification on the beliefs they give rise to. In this paper, I begin by criticizing a number
of theories that are currently on offer. Finding them all wanting, I shall then offer a diagnosis of why they fail while gesturing
towards a promising way of resolving the dispute. It will be argued that what makes the problem of nondoxastic justification
a hard one is the difficulty of striking the right balance between a notion of normative justification that is content-sensitive
and truth conducive and the possibility of error while acknowledging the fact that our experiences can justify our beliefs
in cases we are hallucinating.
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Hamid VahidEmail: |