Assisted death and martyrdom.

Against the backdrop of ancient, mediaeval and modern Catholic teaching prohibiting killing (the rule against killing), the question of assisted suicide and euthanasia is examined. In the past the Church has modified its initial repugnance for killing by developing specific guidelines for permitting killing under strict conditions. This took place with respect to capital punishment and a just war, for example. One wonders why in the least objectionable instance, when a person is already dying, suffering, and repeatedly requesting assistance in dying, there is still such widespread condemnation of assisted suicide and euthanasia. In a Gedankexperiment, I suggest that certain stories of martyrdom in the history of the Christian Church shed some light on the role of taking one's life, or putting one's life in danger out of love. I further suggest that requesting assisted suicide and/or euthanasia from the motive of love of one's family or care givers might possibly qualify as one instance of justifiable euthanasia, although I acknowledge that the Church will not be making changes in its stance any time soon.     

Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings

Can collectives feel guilt with respect to what they have done? It hasbeen claimed that they cannot. Yet in everyday discourse collectives areoften held to feel guilt, criticized because they do not, and so on.Among other things, this paper considers what such so-called collectiveguilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimesappropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed beguilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collectiveto intend to do something and to act in light of that intention.According to this account, and in senses that are explained, there is acollective that intends to do something if and only if the members of agiven population are jointly committed to intend as a body to do thatthing. A related account of collective belief is also presented. It isthen argued that, depending on the circumstances, a group's action canbe free as opposed to coerced, and that the idea that a collective assuch can be guilty of performing a wrongful act makes sense. The ideathat a group might feel guilt may be rejected because it is assumed thatto feel guilt is to experience a ``pang'' or ``twinge'' of guilt –nothing more and nothing less. Presumably, though, there must becognitions and perhaps behavior involved. In addition, the primacy, eventhe necessity, of ``feeling-sensations'' to feeling guilt in theindividual case has been questioned. Without the presumption that it isalready clear what feeling guilt amounts to, three proposals as to thenature of collective guilt feelings are considered. A ``feeling ofpersonal guilt'' is defined as a feeling of guilt over one's own action.It is argued that it is implausible to construe collective guiltfeelings in terms of members' feelings of personal guilt. ``Membershipguilt feelings'' involve a group member's feeling of guilt over what hisor her group has done. It is argued that such feelings are intelligibleif the member is party to the joint commitment that lies at the base ofthe relevant collective intention and action. However, an account ofcollective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting.Finally, a ``plural subject'' account of collective guilt feelings isarticulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt asa body. The parties to a joint commitment of the kind in question may asa result find themselves experiencing ``pangs'' of the kind associatedwith personal and membership guilt feelings. Since these pangs, byhypothesis, arise as a result of the joint commitment to feel guilt as abody, they might be thought of as providing a kind of phenomenology forcollective guilt. Be that as it may, it is argued the plural subjectaccount has much to be said for it.     

Blameless Guilt: The Case of Carer Guilt and Chronic and Terminal Illness

My ambition in this paper is to provide an account of an unacknowledged example of blameless guilt that, I argue, merits further examination. The example is what I call carer guilt: guilt felt by nurses and family members caring for patients with palliative-care needs. Nurses and carers involved in palliative care often feel guilty about what they perceive as their failure to provide sufficient care for a patient. However, in some cases the guilty carer does not think that he has the capacity to provide sufficient care; he has, in his view, done all he can. These carers cannot legitimately be blamed for failing to meet their own expectations. Yet despite acknowledging their blamelessness, they nonetheless feel guilty. My aims are threefold: first, to explicate the puzzling nature of the carer guilt phenomenon; second, to motivate the need to solve that puzzle; third, to give my own account of blameless guilt that can explain why carers feel guilty despite their blamelessness. In doing so I argue that the guilt experienced by carers is a legitimate case of guilt, and that with the right caveats it can be considered an appropriate response to the progressive deterioration of someone for whom we care.     

Mortality salience, martyrdom, and military might: the great satan versus the axis of evil

Study 1 investigated the effect of mortality salience on support for martyrdom attacks among Iranian college students. Participants were randomly assigned to answer questions about either their own death or an aversive topic unrelated to death and then evaluated materials from fellow students who either supported or opposed martyrdom attacks against the United States. Whereas control participants preferred the student who opposed martyrdom, participants reminded of death preferred the student who supported martyrdom and indicated they were more likely to consider such activities themselves. Study 2 investigated the effect of mortality salience on American college students' support for extreme military interventions by American forces that could kill thousands of civilians. Mortality salience increased support for such measures among politically conservative but not politically liberal students. The roles of existential fear, cultural worldviews, and construing one's nation as pursing a heroic battle against evil in advocacy of violence were discussed.     

Guilt and Guiltlessness: An Integrative Review

This paper reviews the relationship between guilt and prosocial behaviors, and integrates multiple antisocial phenomena with the construct of guiltlessness both at the interpersonal and intergroup level. Interpersonal guilt is basically prosocial and introspective. Collective guilt is the vicarious acceptance of misdeeds of the ingroup. Yet it is sometimes so painful and detrimental for the individual and the society to tolerate guilt that people do not feel guilty, especially when the possibility of reparation is low. We argue that guilt is the acceptance of the mildly undesirable self whereas guiltlessness is the rejection of unbearable mental distress of anticipatory guilt. Guiltlessness requires great efforts for defense and justification. Multiple strategies and justifications are sought to relieve guilt. Furthermore, guiltlessness is related to various personality and ideology variables and entails moral disengagement. Guiltlessness can be destructive because, for example, during times of large‐scale conflicts ordinary people who feel guiltless are inclined to become ruthless. Reciprocity morality, ostracism, deservingness, empathy, and self‐control are proposed as means of explaining the origins of guilt and their implications for guiltlessness.     

Guilt and self-sacrifice: The plight of the better-off sibling

In this article, the experience of guilt and its behavioral sequelae, self-sacrifice, in the lives of certain therapy clients is explored. Subjects are adults who perceived as children that they were more gified in some area critical to their parents' values than was a sibling. These clients were successful children, but have come to therapy unsuccessful in some crucial area of their adult lives. Their sibling relationship was of primary importance to them. The relationship was very relevant to the lack of adult success they had experienced. Theory is developed to explain this phenomenon, and illustrative case examples are presented and suggestions are made for treatment.     

Self-image and Guilt: A Further Test of the Cognitive-Developmental Formulation

The cognitive-developmental formulation of self-image disparity holds that an increasing disparity between the real and ideal self-image is due to (a) increasing differentiation of the real from the ideal self with maturity and (b) the increased capacity for incorporation of social mores with a greater propensity for guilt as a result. Guilt and self-image disparity were assessed in 47 young adults in Study 1, and in 108 children, of varying intellectual abilities, in the 5th, 8th, and 11th grades in Study 2. In both studies, guilt was related to self-image disparity. At all age levels, guilt was related to a higher ideal self-image. Guilt was related to a higher real self-image among 5th graders, but not among older individuals. Brighter children had a higher ideal self-image, greater self-image disparity, and marginally more guilt than children of average intellectual abilities. Guilt and self-image disparity were not related to grade level. The pattern of findings indicated that self-image is influenced by both cognitive-developmental and experiential determinants.     

Guilt and Child Soldiers

The use of child soldiers in armed conflict is an increasing global concern. Although philosophers have examined whether child soldiers can be considered combatants in war, much less attention has been paid to their moral responsibility. While it is tempting to think of them as having diminished or limited responsibility, child soldiers often report feeling guilt for the wrongs they commit. Here I argue that their feelings of guilt are both intelligible and morally appropriate. The feelings of guilt that child soldiers experience are not self-censure; rather their guilt arises from their attempts to come to terms with what they see as their own morally ambiguous motives. Their guilt is appropriate because it reaffirms their commitment to morality and facilitates their self-forgiveness.