Educating moral emotions: a praxiological analysis

This paper presents a praxiological analysis of three everyday educational practices or strategies that can be considered as being directed at the moral formation of the emotions. The first consists in requests to imagine other's emotional reactions. The second comprises requests to imitate normative emotional reactions and the third to re-appraise the features of a situation that are relevant to an emotional response. The interest of these categories is not just that they help to organize and recognize the significance of what might otherwise appear to be a disparate set of ordinary moral-educational interactions between children and educators. We suggest, further, that this analysis provides some new insight into what distinguishes the broad and recurrent conceptions of moral education from one another. Rather than being straightforwardly reducible to intractable differences over core normative or meta-ethical questions they can also be seen as correlating with different suppositions about the central role of the emotions in moral life and, correspondingly, different but to a large degree compatible interpretations of what the "education of the moral emotions" primarily means.

Moral emotions and the development of the moral self in childhood

Researchers have been emphasizing the importance of moral emotions for young children's moral self. However, the relationship between children's moral self and moral emotions has never been investigated empirically. The present study examined the relationship between children's self-representations about (im)moral behaviour and moral emotions attributions in a sample of 132 elementary-school children (M _age = 8.39 years, SD = 2.50). Participants were presented a newly developed moral self measure, along with a measure of moral emotion attributions. Two dimensions of children's moral self-concept were identified: preference for prosocial behaviour and avoidance of antisocial behaviour. Results revealed a slight decrease in preference for prosocial behaviour with age, as well as an increased correlation between preference for prosocial behaviour and moral emotion attributions. Overall, findings suggest that moral emotions do not play a pivotal role for young children's moral self-concept. Children's moral self-concept becomes increasingly coordinated with moral emotions as they approach adolescence.     

The role of emotions for moral judgments depends on the type of emotion and moral scenario

Emotions seem to play a critical role in moral judgment. However, the way in which emotions exert their influence on moral judgments is still poorly understood. This study proposes a novel theoretical approach suggesting that emotions influence moral judgments based on their motivational dimension. We tested the effects of two types of induced emotions with equal valence but with different motivational implications (anger and disgust), and four types of moral scenarios (disgust-related, impersonal, personal, and beliefs) on moral judgments. We hypothesized and found that approach motivation associated with anger would make moral judgments more permissible, while disgust, associated with withdrawal motivation, would make them less permissible. Moreover, these effects varied as a function of the type of scenario: the induced emotions only affected moral judgments concerning impersonal and personal scenarios, while we observed no effects for the other scenarios. These findings suggest that emotions can play an important role in moral judgment, but that their specific effects depend upon the type of emotion induced. Furthermore, induced emotion effects were more prevalent for moral decisions in personal and impersonal scenarios, possibly because these require the performance of an action rather than making an abstract judgment. We conclude that the effects of induced emotions on moral judgments can be predicted by taking their motivational dimension into account. This finding has important implications for moral psychology, as it points toward a previously overlooked mechanism linking emotions to moral judgments.     

Reintegrative Shaming Theory, moral emotions and bullying

This article investigates the usefulness of Reintegrative Shaming Theory (RST) in explaining the bullying of siblings in families and peers in schools. Questionnaires were completed by 182 children aged 11-12 years in ten primary schools in Nicosia, Cyprus, about sibling and peer bullying. A vignette-based methodology was used to investigate children's expectations of the type of shaming their parents would offer in response to their possible wrong doing. Children were also asked questions about the emotions they would have felt (i.e. shame, remorse, guilt or anger) if they were in the position of the child in the vignette. The level of bonding toward each parent was also examined. In agreement with the theory, a path analysis showed that mother bonding influenced children's expectations of the type of shaming offered by parents. Disintegrative shaming (i.e. shaming offered in a stigmatizing or rejecting way) had a direct effect on the way children managed their shame. Shame management directly influenced sibling and peer bullying. Father bonding had no direct or indirect effects in the model. Against the theory, reintegrative shaming (i.e. shaming offered in the context of approving the wrongdoer while rejecting the wrongdoing) did not have a direct effect on shame management. Beyond the postulates of RST, mother bonding-a plausible indicator of family functioning-had a direct effect on sibling and peer bullying. Mother bonding had a stronger effect for boys than for girls. It is concluded that RST is useful in explaining the link between family factors and bullying, and that RST has cross-cultural applicability.     

Divergent effects of different positive emotions on moral judgment

Positive emotions are often treated as relatively similar in their cognitive-behavioral effects, and as having unambiguously beneficial consequences. For example, Valdesolo and DeSteno (2006) reported that a humorous video made people more prone to choose a utilitarian solution to a moral dilemma. They attributed this finding to increased positive affect. To determine whether such results actually stem in general from positive affect or from other more specific properties of humor, we conducted an experiment with moral dilemmas presented during an interleaved emotion-induction procedure involving mirth and another positive emotion, elevation. Mirth increased permissiveness for deontological violations, whereas elevation had the opposite effect. Furthermore, affective valence had no apparent independent influence on these judgments. Our results suggest that mirth and elevation have distinct cognitive consequences whose properties reflect their respective social functions, not their shared positive valence.     

Correlations of trait and state emotions with utilitarian moral judgements

In four experiments, we asked subjects for judgements about scenarios that pit utilitarian outcomes against deontological moral rules, for example, saving more lives vs. a rule against active killing. We measured trait emotions of anger, disgust, sympathy and empathy (the last two in both specific and general forms, the latter referring to large groups of people), asked about the same emotions after each scenario (state emotions). We found that utilitarian responding to the scenarios, and higher scores on a utilitarianism scale, were correlated negatively with disgust, positively (but weakly and inconsistently) with anger, positively with specific sympathy and state sympathy, and less so with general sympathy or empathy. In a fifth experiment, we asked about anger and sympathy for specific outcomes, and we found that these are consistently predictive of utilitarian responding.     

Assessing the dimensionality of the Singhapakdi, Vitell, and Kraft measure of moral intensity

In a sample of 105 students, the dimensionality of a moral intensity scale developed by Singhapakdi, Vitell, and Kraft in 1996 was assessed. Principal components analysis yielded a one-factor solution across 10 ethics scenarios, indicating that moral intensity may be treated as a unidimensional construct in some situations.     

Young Humeans: the role of emotions in children's evaluation of moral reasoning abilities

Three experiments investigated whether children in grades K, 2, and 4 (n = 144) view emotional comprehension as important in solving moral dilemmas. The experiments asked whether a human or an artificially intelligent machine would be best at solving different types of problems, ranging from moral and emotional to nonmoral and pragmatic. In Experiment 1, children in all age groups indicated that a human would be superior to a computer not only at comprehending emotions, but also at solving moral dilemmas. In Experiment 2, older children also indicated that a human could solve moral dilemmas better than a 'robot' with human-like perceptual and physical abilities. Experiment 3 further demonstrated that these effects were not solely due to a bias towards humans. Thus, children as young as age 5 view emotional understanding as an important element for moral, but not for nonmoral, reasoning, suggesting that the basis for Humean intuitions emerges early in life.     

Understanding of moral emotions and social exclusion in pre-schoolers and third graders

Abstract

This study examined whether children use information about moral emotions when judging peer exclusion. Japanese pre-schoolers and third graders (N = 110) listened to stories featuring characters who felt happy or sad after engaging in immoral behaviour or avoiding immoral behaviour (pushing a child off a swing and stealing another child’s doughnuts). In study 1, participants judged the extent to which characters who felt happiness, guilt, and pride would be socially excluded. In study 2, participants judged whether characters who felt guilt, no guilt, pride, and no pride would be socially excluded. Participants believed that characters would be socially excluded based on moral emotions. Characters who did not feel guilt or pride were excluded more frequently relative to those who did; however, children found it easier to judge exclusion based on guilt rather than pride, especially in the case of pre-schoolers. Moreover, pre-schoolers had difficulty explaining their reasoning.     

Adolescents' self‐attributed moral emotions following a moral transgression: Relations with delinquency,confidence in moral judgment and age

The study investigates adolescents' self‐attributed moral emotions following a moral transgression by expanding research with children on the happy‐victimizer phenomenon. In a sample of 200 German adolescents from Grades 7, 9, 11, and 13 (M = 16.18 years, SD = 2.41), participants were confronted with various scenarios describing different moral rule violations and asked to judge the behaviour from a moral point of view. Subsequently, participants' strength of self‐evaluative emotional reactions was assessed as they were asked to imagine that they had committed the moral transgression by themselves. Results indicate that the intensity of self‐attributed moral emotions predicted adolescents' self‐reported delinquent behaviour even when social desirability response bias was controlled. Further, as adolescents' metacognitive understanding of moral beliefs developed, self‐attributed moral emotions and confidence in moral judgment became more closely associated. No general age‐related change in adolescents' self‐attributed moral emotions was found. Overall, the study provides evidence for a coordination process of moral judgment and moral emotion attributions that continues well beyond childhood and that corresponds with the more general notion of the formation of a moral self in adolescence.     

道德情绪在道德隐喻映射中的作用及其神经机制

道德隐喻的加工, 实质上是从始源域的身体感知觉经验映射到目标域, 表征抽象道德概念的过程。新近研究从认知神经科学角度揭示道德隐喻加工的神经机制, 进而探讨情绪因素在道德隐喻映射中的作用。道德隐喻映射机制是在具体道德情境中身体感知经验与情绪体验、认知加工相互作用的结果。未来研究应拓展道德隐喻映射的维度和方向, 在社会交互环境中丰富和完善研究范式, 提高生态效度和跨文化效度。     

Effect of opponent type on moral emotions and responses to video game play

This study suggests that fighting against different types of opponents in video games (e.g., human opponents vs. monster opponents) may lead to different emotional responses and moral judgments toward game characters. Based on Bandura's moral disengagement theory, this study proposes that shooting at monster opponents makes game players feel less guilty and judge the player-controlled character as more morally justified. An experiment was conducted in which participants played shooting games with either human opponents or monster opponents. The results show that when playing against monster opponents, participants felt both less ashamed and less guilty, reported enjoying the game more, and judged their character as more justified than participants who played against human opponents.     

Punishing hypocrisy: The roles of hypocrisy and moral emotions in deciding culpability and punishment of criminal and civil moral transgressors

Three experiments explored how hypocrisy affects attributions of criminal guilt and the desire to punish hypocritical criminals. Study 1 established that via perceived hypocrisy, a hypocritical criminal was seen as more culpable and was punished more than a non-hypocritical criminal who committed an identical crime. Study 2 expanded on this, showing that negative moral emotions (anger and disgust) mediated the relationships between perceived hypocrisy, criminal guilt, and punishment. Study 3 replicated the emotion finding from Study 2 using new scenarios where group agents were clearly aware of the hypocrisy of their actions, yet acted anyway. Again, perceived hypocrisy worked through moral emotions to affect criminal guilt and punishment. The current studies provide empirical support for theories relating hypocrisy and moral transgressions to moral emotions, also informing the literature on the role of moral emotions in moral reasoning and legal decision making.     

The BDNF Val66Met polymorphism impacts victim's moral emotions following interpersonal transgression

Immoral behaviors make individuals abominate and punish transgressors. Inspired by the associations between the Val66Met polymorphism of brain‐derived neurotropic factor (BDNF) gene and emotional responses following negative events, we investigated whether this polymorphism was also associated moral emotions such as punishment and forgiveness following interpersonal transgression. To do so, we categorized 340 individuals according to the BDNF Val66Met and assessed moral emotions by using 12 hypothetic scenarios in different conditions of intention and interpersonal consequence. The results indicated that this polymorphism was significantly associated with moral aversion and punishment towards transgressors. Victims with the Val/Val genotype expressed less aversion and punishment than the Met carriers, regardless of intention and interpersonal consequence. Moreover, this polymorphism was associated with forgiveness. Victims with the Val/Val genotype expressed more forgiveness than the Met carriers. Taken together, these findings highlight the importance of the BDNF Val66Met to moral emotions.     

The moral emotions: a social-functionalist account of anger, disgust, and contempt

Recent research has highlighted the important role of emotion in moral judgment and decision making (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Haidt, 2001). What is less clear is whether distinctions should be drawn among specific moral emotions. Although some have argued for differences among anger, disgust, and contempt (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999), others have suggested that these terms may describe a single undifferentiated emotional response to morally offensive behavior (Nabi, 2002). In this article, we take a social-functionalist perspective, which makes the prediction that these emotions should be differentiable both in antecedent appraisals and in consequent actions and judgments. Studies 1-3 tested and found support for our predictions concerning distinctions among antecedent appraisals, including (a) a more general role for disgust than has been previously been described, (b) an effect of self-relevance on anger but not other emotions, and (c) a role for contempt in judging incompetent actions. Studies 4 and 5 tested and found support for our specific predictions concerning functional outcomes, providing evidence that these emotions are associated with different consequences. Taken together, these studies support a social-functionalist account of anger, disgust, and contempt and lay the foundation for future research on the negative interpersonal emotions.     

On the emotions associated with violations of three moral codes (community,autonomy, divinity)

According to CAD theory, different moral domains are associated with different emotions: (C) community violations with contempt, (A) autonomy violations with anger, and (D) divinity violations with disgust. Do people from different cultural groups make the same associations? Three studies (Ns?=?120, 240, 240) tested the CAD theory. Participants from three cultural groups—North Americans, North Indians, and South Indians—associated emotions (with words or facial expressions) with vignettes of moral violations. Across all three cultures, moral violations were associated with more than one emotion: all negative rather than positive, anger for most, and disgust for violations involving sex and pathogens. CAD faired poorly, with C and A collapsing, and D limited to sex and pathogens.     

Two neglected moral emotions in university settings: some data on pride and shame

Pride and shame, two moral emotions partially neglected by the literature, can also be categorised as achievement emotions, because of their salience within everyday school and academic life. Our aims were to explore whether they are organised in a setting-specific manner and whether they differ in two settings, learning exam-relevant material and taking exams. Five hundred and forty university students evaluated pride and shame related to the two settings. A confirmatory multitrait-multimethod analysis (MTMM) indicated higher salience of type of emotion rather than type of setting; however, the structure of pride and shame was best explained when also type of setting was accounted for. A repeated-measure analysis of variance revealed higher levels of the positive emotion compared to the negative emotion, with the latter higher for the evaluative setting. Findings are discussed in light of their theoretical and applied relevance.