Exploring the perceptual biases associated with believing and disbelieving in paranormal phenomena

Ninety-five participants (32 believers, 30 disbelievers and 33 neutral believers in the paranormal) participated in an experiment comprising one visual and one auditory block of trials. Each block included one ESP, two degraded stimuli and one random trial. Each trial included 8 screens or epochs of “random” noise. Participants entered a guess if they perceived a stimulus or changed their mind about stimulus identity, rated guesses for confidence and made notes during each trial. Believers and disbelievers did not differ in the number of guesses made, or in their ability to detect degraded stimuli. Believers displayed a trend toward making faster guesses for some conditions and significantly higher confidence and more misidentifications concerning guesses than disbelievers. Guesses, misidentifications and faster response latencies were generally more likely in the visual than auditory conditions. ESP performance was no different from chance. ESP performance did not differ between belief groups or sensory modalities.     

The connection between random sequences,everyday coincidences,and belief in the paranormal

This paper argues against the theory that people interpret unusual coincidences as paranormal because they misunderstand the probability of their occurring by chance. In the two studies reported here, 214 subjects were given a questionnaire on the frequency of coincidences in their lives, a series of probabilistic problems, and a scale assessing their belief in the paranormal. Believers reported more coincidences than disbelievers. Believers made more errors than disbelievers in tasks reflecting sensitivity to the relationship between expected distribution of chance events and total number of occurrences; and avoided repetitions of identical alternatives in a random sequence to a greater extent. However, the last two effects completely disappeared in a subsample of university students. It is proposed that a more frequent experience of coincidences, on the one hand, and a more biased representation of randomness, on the other, are independent consequences of a stronger propensity of believers in the paranormal to connect separate events. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

It's still bending: Verbal suggestion and alleged psychokinetic ability

Some alleged psychics appear to be able to deform metallic objects, such as keys and cutlery, by thought alone. This paper describes two studies that examined whether one aspect of these demonstrations could be created by verbal suggestion. In the first study, participants were shown a videotape in which a fake psychic placed a bent key on a table. Participants in one condition heard the fake psychic suggest that the key was continuing to bend, whilst those in the other condition did not. Participants in the suggestion condition were significantly more likely to report that the key continued to bend. These findings were replicated in the second study. In addition, participants who reported that the key continued to bend displayed a significantly higher level of confidence in their testimony than others, and were significantly less likely to recall that the fake psychic had suggested the continued bending of the key. Neither experiment revealed any differences between participants who expressed a prior belief in the paranormal compared with those who did not. The paper discusses the implications of these results for the psychology of suggestion and the assessment of eyewitness testimony for anomalous events.     

Paranormal beliefs and religiosity: Chinese version of the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale

This paper reports an initial study investigating the relations of paranormal beliefs with religiosity in a Chinese sample, as well as the development of a Chinese version of the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale and a test of its psychometric properties with 310 college students (5.5% Christians, 21.3% Buddhists, 61% believers in traditional Chinese religions, and 12% atheists). The reliability and validity of the Chinese version were satisfactory. In general, traditional Chinese religious believers had higher scores on paranormal belief than did Christians and atheists, and the mean total score of the Chinese participants was higher than previously reported in a Western sample. It was concluded that the greater involvement of practitioners of traditional Chinese religions in activities emphasizing paranormal experiences might contribute to their greater paranormal belief, especially as compared to the minority Christian group. The results are consistent with the idea that Christianity may offer the least support for paranormal belief.     

Probabilistic reasoning,affirmative bias and belief in precognitive dreams

Three hundred and eighty‐six participants were interviewed about their experience of dreams that seem to predict an event in the future, and their belief about whether such dreams can be explained naturally or paranormally. For those without university education, participants who had had a dream that seemed to predict the future (termed experiencers) and believers in paranormal explanations for such dreams (termed believers) made more errors on a probabilistic reasoning task about a lottery. Contrary to the chance baseline shift hypothesis experiencers and believers did not give lower estimates than non‐experiencers and non‐believers for the frequency with which others would answer three simple personal questions affirmatively. However, they were more likely to answer the three simple personal questions affirmatively about themselves than were non‐experiencers and non‐believers, which suggests an affirmative bias. This affirmative bias either affects paranormal experience and belief, or is a confound in the methods used in assessing experience and belief. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Vitalistic thinking in adults

Vitalistic thinking has traditionally been associated with reasoning about biological phenomena. The current research aimed to investigate a broader range of vitalistic thinking than previously studied. Esoteric notions of ‘energy’ are frequently used by individuals when making causal attributions for strange occurrences, and previous literature has linked such thinking with paranormal, magical, and superstitious beliefs. Two experiments are described that aim to investigate whether adults are vitalistic when asked to make causal judgments, and whether this can be predicted by thinking styles and prior paranormal belief. Experiment 1 asked participants to rate three causal options (one of which was vitalistic) for six vignettes. Scores on one dimension of paranormal belief (New Age Philosophy) and analytical thinking significantly predicted vitalism, but scores on intuitive thinking and Traditional Paranormal Beliefs did not. Experiment 2 extended the findings by asking participants to generate their own causal responses. Again, paranormal belief was found to be the best predictor of vitalism, but this time Traditional Paranormal Beliefs were associated with vitalistic responses whilst both intuitive and analytical thinking were unable to significantly predict classification. Results challenge previous findings, suggesting that vitalistic thinking may operate differently when applied to everyday causal reasoning.     

Paranormal believers are more prone to illusory agency detection than skeptics

It has been hypothesized that illusory agency detection is at the basis of belief in supernatural agents and paranormal beliefs. In the present study a biological motion perception task was used to study illusory agency detection in a group of skeptics and a group of paranormal believers. Participants were required to detect the presence or absence of a human agent in a point-light display. It was found that paranormal believers had a lower perceptual sensitivity than skeptics, which was due to a response bias to ‘yes’ for stimuli in which no agent was present. The relation between paranormal beliefs and illusory agency detection held only for stimuli with low to intermediate ambiguity, but for stimuli with a high number of visual distractors responses of believers and skeptics were at the same level. Furthermore, it was found that illusory agency detection was unrelated to traditional religious belief and belief in witchcraft, whereas paranormal beliefs (i.e. Psi, spiritualism, precognition, superstition) were strongly related to illusory agency detection. These findings qualify the relation between illusory pattern perception and supernatural and paranormal beliefs and suggest that paranormal beliefs are strongly related to agency detection biases.     

Misperception of Chance,Conjunction, Framing Effects and Belief in the Paranormal: A Further Evaluation

Studies exploring relationships between belief in the paranormal and vulnerability to cognitive bias suggest that believers are liable to misperception of chance and conjunction fallacy. Research investigating misperception of chance has produced consistent findings, whilst work on conjunction fallacy is less compelling. Evidence indicates also that framing biases within a paranormal context can increase believers' susceptibility. The present study, using confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modelling, examined the contribution of each bias to belief in the paranormal and assessed the merits of previous research. Alongside, the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale, participants completed standard and paranormal framed perception of randomness and conjunction problems. Perception of randomness was more strongly associated with belief in the paranormal than conjunction fallacy. Inherent methodological issues limited the usefulness of framing manipulations; presenting problems within a paranormal context weakened their predictive power.Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The impact of event vividness,event severity,and prior paranormal belief on attributions towards a depicted remarkable coincidence experience: Two studies examining the misattribution hypothesis

Two studies examine the impact event vividness, event severity, and prior paranormal belief has on causal attributions for a depicted remarkable coincidence experience. In Study 1, respondents (n = 179) read a hypothetical vignette in which a fictional character accurately predicts a plane crash 1 day before it occurs. The crash was described in either vivid or pallid terms with the final outcome being either severe (fatal) or non‐severe (non‐fatal). Respondents completed 29 causal attribution items, one attribution confidence item, nine scenario perception items, a popular paranormal belief scale, and a standard demographics questionnaire. Principal axis factoring reduced the 29 attribution items to four attribution factors which were then subjected to a 2 (event vividness) × 2 (event severity) × 2 (paranormal belief) MANCOVA controlling for respondent gender. As expected, paranormal believers attributed the accurate crash prediction less to coincidence and more to both paranormal and transcendental knowing than did paranormal sceptics. Furthermore, paranormal (psychokinesis) believers deemed the prediction more reflective of paranormal knowing to both (1) a vivid/non‐fatal and (2) a pallid/fatal crash depiction. Vividness, severity, and paranormal belief types had no impact on attribution confidence. In Study 2, respondents (also n = 179) generated data that were a moderately good fit to the previous factor structure and replicated several differences across attributional pairings albeit for paranormal non‐believers only. Corresponding effects for event severity and paranormal belief were not replicated. Findings are discussed in terms of their support for the paranormal misattribution hypothesis and the impact of availability biases in the form of both vividness and severity effects. Methodological issues and future research ideas are also discussed.     

Diverse Supernatural Portfolios: Certitude,Exclusivity, and the Curvilinear Relationship Between Religiosity and Paranormal Beliefs

Studies have attempted to understand the association between more conventional supernatural (religious) beliefs and practices and less conventional “paranormal” supernatural beliefs. Some have posited that the two comprise incompatible cultural spheres and belief systems, while others have argued that supernatural religious beliefs are “small steps” toward less conventional paranormal views (such as belief in astrology and telekinesis). We build upon recent scholarship outlining a more nuanced, nonlinear relationship between religiosity and paranormal beliefs by identifying a specific niche of believers who are particularly likely to dabble in unconventional supernatural beliefs. Strong believers in the paranormal tend to be characterized by a nonexclusive spiritualist worldview, as opposed to materialist or exclusive religious outlooks. Paranormal believers tend to be characterized by moderate levels of religious belief and practice, and low levels of ideological exclusivity. In general, the relationship between more conventional religiosity and paranormal beliefs is best conceptualized as curvilinear.     

Misperception of Chance,Conjunction, Belief in the Paranormal and Reality Testing: A Reappraisal

The present study examined the degree to which specific probabilistic biases (misperception of chance and conjunction fallacy) were associated with belief in the paranormal and proneness to reality testing (RT) deficits. Participants completed measures assessing probabilistic reasoning, belief in the paranormal and RT. Perception of randomness predicted the level of paranormal belief and proneness to RT deficits. These results provide support for the notion that paranormal believers demonstrate greater misrepresentation of chance. With regard to conjunction, a framing effect occurred. Problems presented in a paranormal context correlated negatively with the level of paranormal belief and proneness to RT deficits. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A study of paranormal belief, magical ideation as an index of schizotypy and cognitive style

This study examined the proposal that the association between paranormal belief and magical ideation may be mediated by distinctive cognitive styles for schizotypes as compared to believers in the paranormal. Schizotypes were found to differ from an atypical group of believers in the paranormal and to resemble schizophrenics in terms of cognitive style. Believers expressed a cognitive style reliant on notions of personal responsibility while schizotypes emphasised the role of randomness. Believers differed from schizotypes on more deviant aspects of schizotypy measures yet unexpectedly these groups did not differ on specific facets of paranormal belief. It is tentatively proposed that for some people certain paranormal beliefs represent a cognitive ‘defence’ against acceptance of the uncertainty of life events, while for others paranormal belief may be indicative of psychopathology.     

Paranormal belief and susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy

Numerous studies have shown paranormal believers misperceive randomness and are poor at judging probability. Despite the obvious relevance to many types of alleged paranormal phenomena, no one has examined whether believers are more susceptible to the ‘conjunction fallacy’; that is to misperceiving co‐occurring (conjunct) events as being more likely than singular (constituent) events alone. The present study examines believer vs. non‐believer differences in conjunction errors for both paranormal and non‐paranormal events presented as either a probability or a frequency estimation task. As expected, believers made more conjunction errors than non‐believers. This was true for both event types, with both groups making fewer errors for paranormal than for non‐paranormal events. Surprisingly, the response format (probability vs. frequency) had little impact. Results are discussed in relation to paranormal believers' susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy and more generally, to their propensity for probabilistic reasoning biases. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mental Rotation in False Belief Understanding

This study examines the spontaneous use of embodied egocentric transformation (EET) in understanding false beliefs in the minds of others. EET involves the participants mentally transforming or rotating themselves into the orientation of an agent when trying to adopt his or her visuospatial perspective. We argue that psychological perspective taking such as false belief reasoning may also involve EET because of what has been widely reported in the embodied cognition literature, showing that our processing of abstract, propositional information is often grounded in concrete bodily sensations which are not apparently linked to higher cognition. In Experiment 1, an agent placed a ball into one of two boxes and left. The ball then rolled out and moved either into the other box (new box) or back into the original one (old box). The participants were to decide from which box they themselves or the agent would try to recover the ball. Results showed that false belief performance was affected by increased orientation disparity between the participants and the agent, suggesting involvement of embodied transformation. In Experiment 2, false belief was similarly induced and the participants were to decide if the agent would try to recover the ball in one specific box. Orientation disparity was again found to affect false belief performance. The present results extend previous findings on EET in visuospatial perspective taking and suggest that false belief reasoning, which is a kind of psychological perspective taking, can also involve embodied rotation, consistent with the embodied cognition view.     

Paranormal Believers' Susceptibility to Confirmatory Versus Disconfirmatory Conjunctions

This study examines paranormal believers' susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy for confirmatory versus non‐confirmatory conjunctive events. Members of the UK public (N = 207) read 16 hypothetical vignettes before judging the likelihood that each constituent and their conjunction would (co) occur. Event type (paranormal versus non‐paranormal), outcome type (confirming versus disconfirming) and level of paranormal belief (in either extrasensory perception, psychokinesis or life after death)—plus relevant interaction terms—were entered into a linear mixed model analysis. As hypothesised, paranormal belief was associated with more conjunction errors regardless of event type with, in general, more errors made for confirmatory over disconfirmatory conjunctions. These trends existed for extrasensory perception and psychokinesis believers with those for life after death believers approaching significance. Consistent with Crupi and Tentori's Confirmation–Theoretical Framework, current findings suggest that paranormal believers are prone to a generic and confirmatory conjunction fallacy. Theoretical implications, methodological limitations and future research ideas are discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Erosion of belief and disbelief: effects of religiosity and negative affect on beliefs in the paranormal and supernatural

The authors investigated the effects of religiosity and negative affect on beliefs in the paranormal and supernatural among 94 undergraduate students enrolled in psychology classes at a small, private U.S. university. They hypothesized that religiosity would predict differential beliefs in the supernatural versus the paranormal but that negative affect would attenuate these beliefs. In addition, the authors predicted that belief in the supernatural and negative affect would interact to predict belief in the paranormal. Overall, the results were consistent with predictions. The religious participants were skeptical of paranormal phenomena but were accepting of supernatural phenomena. In addition, increased reports of negative affect over the preceding year appeared to attenuate belief in the supernatural for the religious participants. By contrast, for the nonreligious participants, increased belief in both the supernatural and paranormal was predicted when reports of negative affect were high. Finally, the interaction of supernatural belief and negative affect significantly predicted belief in the paranormal.     

Erosion of Belief and Disbelief: Effects of Religiosity and Negative Affect on Beliefs in the Paranormal and Supernatural

Abstract

The authors investigated the effects of religiosity and negative affect on beliefs in the paranormal and supernatural among 94 undergraduate students enrolled in psychology classes at a small, private U.S. university. They hypothesized that religiosity would predict differential beliefs in the supernatural versus the paranormal but that negative affect would attenuate these beliefs. In addition, the authors predicted that belief in the supernatural and negative affect would interact to predict belief in the paranormal. Overall, the results were consistent with predictions. The religious participants were skeptical of paranormal phenomena but were accepting of supernatural phenomena. In addition, increased reports of negative affect over the preceding year appeared to attenuate belief in the supernatural for the religious participants. By contrast, for the nonreligious participants, increased belief in both the supernatural and paranormal was predicted when reports of negative affect were high. Finally, the interaction of supernatural belief and negative affect significantly predicted belief in the paranormal.     

A laboratory analogue of mirrored-self misidentification delusion: The role of hypnosis,suggestion, and demand characteristics

Mirrored-self misidentification is the delusional belief that one’s own reflection in the mirror is a stranger. In two experiments, we tested the ability of hypnotic suggestion to model this condition. In Experiment 1, we compared two suggestions based on either the delusion’s surface features (seeing a stranger in the mirror) or underlying processes (impaired face processing). Fifty-two high hypnotisable participants received one of these suggestions either with hypnosis or without in a wake control. In Experiment 2, we examined the extent to which social cues and role-playing could account for participants’ behaviour by comparing the responses of 14 hypnotised participants to the suggestion for impaired face processing (reals) with those of 14 nonhypnotised participants instructed to fake their responses (simulators). Overall, results from both experiments confirm that we can use hypnotic suggestion to produce a compelling analogue of mirrored-self misidentification that cannot simply be attributed to social cues or role-playing.     

The need to belong can motivate belief in God

The need to belong can motivate belief in God. In Study 1, 40 undergraduates read bogus astrophysics articles "proving" God's existence or not offering proof. Participants in the proof-for-God condition reported higher belief in God (compared to control) when they chronically imagined God as accepting but lower belief in God when they imagined God as rejecting. Additionally, in Study 2 (72 undergraduates), these effects did not occur when participants' belongingness need was satisfied by priming close others. Study 3 manipulated 79 Internet participants' image of God. Chronic believers in the God-is-rejecting condition reported lower religious behavioral intentions than chronic believers in the God-is-accepting condition, and this effect was mediated by lower desires for closeness with God. In Study 4 (106 Internet participants), chronic believers with an accepting image of God reported that their belief in God is motivated by belongingness needs.     

The Swedes and the Paranormal

The hypothesis that Church and Science have lost some of their former standing in Sweden and made way for deviant beliefs is examined in two empirical studies which show a widespread belief in paranormal phenomena. The paper also discusses how believers in the paranormal relate to institutionalised religious beliefs and how problematic the interpretation of religious self-assessment items are.