Deflationism,Creeping Minimalism,and Explanations of Content

Metaethics, like many areas of philosophy, has for some time now been experiencing a trend toward deflationary conceptions of truth. This is owing both to a general skepticism about the prospects of any substantial account of truth and also to the “accommodationist” strategies of metaethical expressivists. But I'm skeptical of this trend toward deflationism. The main source of my skepticism, and what I explore in this paper, is the simple fact that deflationism has consequences—consequences that are far-reaching, controversial, and often underappreciated. I first draw out a number of consequences of deflationism, and then show how certain metaethical positions, despite their explicit acceptance of deflationism, run afoul of these consequences. The consequences of deflationism I have in mind are all consequences to the effect that deflationism is incompatible with one way or another of explaining content. The positions in metaethics I have in mind are all proposed solutions to a certain metaethical problem known as the problem of creeping minimalism. So in the end my claim will be that various proposed solutions to the problem of creeping minimalism both subscribe to deflationism and yet at the same time appeal to explanations of content that are demonstrably incompatible with deflationism.     

Moral Explanations of Moral Beliefs

Gilbert Harman and Judith Thomson have argued that moral facts cannot explain our moral beliefs, claiming that such facts could not play a causal role in the formation of those beliefs. This paper shows these arguments to be misguided, for they would require that we abandon any number of intuitively plausible explanations in non-moral contexts as well. But abandoning the causal strand in the argument over moral explanations does not spell immediate victory for the moral realist, since it must still be shown that moral facts do figure in our best global explanatory theory.     

Quietism and Cognitive Command

Crispin Wright has sought to establish the possibility of 'significant metaphysics' in the shape of a common metric with which to measure the realism or robustness of various discourses. One means by which to place discourses in the metric is via the 'cognitive command constraint'. Importantly, this constraint must be a priori . Richard Rorty has argued against this, that, given content is a function of standards of representationality, the a priori requirement cannot be satisfied. I show that this attack is inconsistent: to run his own argument Rorty must take recourse to a idealized view of identification of discourses which conflicts with his own basic premise about the determination of content. Hence Rorty's argument should not lead us to conclude that significant metaphysics is impossible.     

A Biological Alternative to Moral Explanations

Some moral realists claim that moral facts are a species of natural fact, amenable to scientific investigation. They argue that these moral facts are needed in the best explanations of certain phenomena and that this is evidence that they are real. In this paper I present part of a biological account of the function of morality. The account allows the identification of a plausible natural kind that could play the explanatory role that a moral kind would play in naturalist realist theories. It is therefore a candidate for being the moral kind. I argue, however, that it will underdetermine the morally good, that is, identifying the kind is not sufficient to identify what is good. Hence this is not a natural moral kind. Its explanatory usefulness, however, means that we do not have to postulate any further (moral) facts to provide moral explanations. Hence there is no reason to believe that there are any natural moral kinds.     

Minding One's Manners: Revisiting Moral Explanations

Philosophical Studies -     

Representations and Cognitive Explanations: Assessing the Dynamicist's Challenge in Cognitive Science

Advocates of dynamical systems theory (DST) sometimes employ revolutionary rhetoric. In an attempt to clarify how DST models differ from others in cognitive science, I focus on two issues raised by DST: the role for representations in mental models and the conception of explanation invoked. Two features of representations are their role in standing-in for features external to the system and their format. DST advocates sometimes claim to have repudiated the need for stand-ins in DST models, but I argue that they are mistaken. Nonetheless, DST does offer new ideas as to the format of representations employed in cognitive systems. With respect to explanation, I argue that some DST models are better seen as conforming to the covering-law conception of explanation than to the mechanistic conception of explanation implicit in most cognitive science research. But even here, I argue, DST models are a valuable complement to more mechanistic cognitive explanations.     

Moral outrage and pragmatism: Explanations for collective action

Two explanations for collective behavior were contrasted. The first, exemplified by relative deprivation theory, stresses the importance of feelings of moral outrage and perceived economic injustice. The second focuses on more pragmatic considerations, such as the availability of resources for mobilization. The present study examines these explanations for collective behavior in a laboratory setting. Subjects were members of a disadvantaged group. In a 3 × 2 factorial design two independent variables were manipulated. The magnitude of pay inequality between the disadvantaged group and a more advantaged group was manipulated to be large, moderate, or small. Mobilization resources available to the disadvantaged group were manipulated to be either present or absent. In accord with predictions based on relative deprivation theory, as the magnitude of the inequality increased, stronger feelings of deprivation were expressed. However, contrary to relative deprivation theory, larger magnitudes of inequality and stronger feelings of deprivation were not associated with greater willingness to engage in legitimate or illegitimate forms of collective behavior. Instead, as predicted by some critics of relative deprivation theory, willinginess to engage in illegitimate forms of collective behavior was affected only by a gragmatic consideration: the presence or absence of mobilization resources.     

进化论、认知科学与道德原则的形成

生物学自然主义以不同于传统的超越主义伦理学的进路对道德原则的形成进行了探讨.进化论为其提供了经验基础;认知科学为其提供了科学证据;来自经济学的实验则对自然选择下的利他何以可能的问题进行了分析.在此基础上,论证了道德原则形成的神经生物学基础,说明了自然主义进路的可行性.     

Minimalism and Paradoxes

This paper argues against minimalism about truth. It does so by way of acomparison of the theory of truth with the theory of sets, and considerationof where paradoxes may arise in each. The paper proceeds by asking twoseemingly unrelated questions. First, what is the theory of truth about?Answering this question shows that minimalism bears important similaritiesto naive set theory. Second, why is there no strengthened version ofRussell's paradox, as there is a strengthened Liar paradox? Answering thisquestion shows that like naive set theory, minimalism is unable to makeadequate progress in resolving the paradoxes, and must be replaced by adrastically different sort of theory. Such a theory, it is shown, must befundamentally non-minimalist.     

Cognitive Transformation,Dementia, and the Moral Weight of Advance Directives

Abstract

Dementia patients in the moderate-late stage of the disease can, and often do, express different preferences than they did at the onset of their condition. The received view in the philosophical literature argues that advance directives which prioritize the patient’s preferences at onset ought to be given decisive moral weight in medical decision-making. Clinical practice, on the other hand, favors giving moral weight to the preferences expressed by dementia patients after onset. The purpose of this article is to show that the received view in the philosophical literature is inadequate and is out of touch with real clinical practice. I argue that having dementia is a cognitive transformative experience and that preference changes which result from this are legitimate and ought to be given moral weight in medical decision-making. This argument ought to encourage us to reduce our confidence in the moral weight of advance directives for dementia patients.     

The Application of Cognitive Therapy for Command Hallucinations

It has become increasingly recognized that cognitive therapy (CT) is an effective treatment for the positive symptoms of schizophrenia yet there are few cognitive therapists in North America who are specialized to work with this patient population. There is a need for further dissemination of CT for schizophrenia in order to increase its availability. A first step in dissemination is to become familiar with the cognitive theory and therapy model, as applied to schizophrenia. The purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate the applicability of CT for psychosis, using the example of command hallucinations. First, we summarize the cognitive theory of command hallucinations and present the stages of CT, using the example of “Joe,” a 24-year-old male with schizophrenia. The paper concludes with practical suggestions of how to enhance the effectiveness of CT for command hallucinations.     

Minimalism, the Generalization Problem and the Liar

In defense of the minimalist conception of truth, Paul Horwich(2001) has recently argued that our acceptance of the instances of the schema,`the proposition that p is true if and only if p', suffices to explain our acceptanceof truth generalizations, that is, of general claims formulated using the truth predicate.In this paper, I consider the strategy Horwich develops for explaining our acceptance of truth generalizations. As I show, while perhaps workable on its own, the strategy is in conflictwith his response to the liar paradox. Something must give. I consider and reject variousalternatives and emendations to the strategy. In order to resolve the conflict,I propose an alternative approach to the liar, one that supports Horwich's strategywhile leaving minimalism maximally uncompromised.     

Minimalism and Truth-Value Gaps

Philosophical Studies -     

Cognitive Therapy for Command Hallucinations: Not a Quasi-Neuroleptic

Command hallucinations (CH) are a distressing and high-risk group of symptoms that have long been recognised but little understood, with few effective treatments. In this paper we report and discuss the efficacy of cognitive therapy (CT) modified in accordance with ‘social rank theory,’ in a single blind randomised controlled trial. 38 patients with command hallucinations were randomly allocated to CT or treatment as usual and followed up for 6 then 12 months. Large reductions in compliance behaviour were obtained (effect size = 0.97) favouring the CT group. Other significant differences were found and maintained at 6 months follow up.     

Cognitive and Moral Enhancement: A Practical Proposal

According to Persson and Savulescu, the risks posed by a morally corrupt minority's potential to abuse cognitive enhancement make it such that we have an urgent imperative to first pursue moral enhancement of humankind – and, consequently, if we are a long way from safe, effective moral enhancement, then we have at least one good reason to consider opposing further cognitive enhancement. However, as Harris points out, such a proposal seems to support delaying life-saving cognitive progress. In this article, we first show that Harris's worry can be expanded to show that Persson and Savulescu's proposal also threatens the development of moral enhancement – precisely what they suggest we have pro tanto reason to pursue. From there, we offer our own, alternative proposal – one on which cognitively enhanced researchers play a key role in the production of moral enhancement, and those in the general population who wish to be cognitively enhanced must first accept moral enhancement as an entry requirement. We engage with four substantive objections to our proposal and use these objections to refine and strengthen the details.     

Unification,Reduction, and Non-Ideal Explanations

Kitcher's unification theory of explanation seems to suggest that only the most reductive accounts can legitimately be termed explanatory. This is not what we find in actual scientific practice. In this paper, I attempt to reconcile these ideas. I claim that Kitcher's theory picks out ideal explanations, but that our term explanation is used to cover other accounts that have a certain relationship with the ideal accounts. At times, versions and portions of ideal explanations can also be considered explanatory.