Responsibility,Reaction, and Value

Many writers accept the following thesis about responsibility: (R) For one to be responsible for something is for one to be such that it is fitting that one be the object of some reactive attitude with respect to that thing. This thesis bears a striking resemblance to a thesis about value that is also accepted by many writers: (V) For something to be good (or neutral, or bad) is for it to be such that it is fitting that it be the object of some pro-attitude (or indifference, or some contra-attitude). V has been the subject of intense debate in recent years, in part because of its incorporation into what has come to be called the “buck-passing” account of value. In particular, V is open to three challenges: that it is not necessarily the case that whatever is good is the fitting object of a pro-attitude; that it is not necessarily the case that whatever is the fitting object of a pro-attitude is good; and that, even if there is a strict equivalence between what is good and what is the fitting object of a pro-attitude, still the former is not to be analyzed in terms of the latter. The resemblance between V and R has not been previously commented on, but, once it is recognized, it is clear that R is open to challenges that resemble those to which V is vulnerable. This paper explores both the challenges to V and the parallel challenges to R and discusses responses that may be given to these challenges. The interrelation between V and R is then examined, and a general lesson is drawn concerning how to adjudicate disputes about the nature of moral responsibility.     

Summation,Variety, and Indeterminate Value

In this paper, I consider two sorts of objections to summative theories of value. The first objection concerns “indeterminate” value. The second concerns the importance of variety. I argue that both objections pose serious problems for the summative approach. I also argue that if we accept certain plausible views about the value of variety, we should reject certain forms of argument concerning what sorts of states have intrinsic value.     

Marriage,Morality, and Institutional Value

This paper develops a Kantian account of the moral assessment of institutions. The problem I address is this: while a deontological theory may find that some legal institutions are required by justice, it is not obvious how such a theory can assess institutions not strictly required (or prohibited) by justice. As a starting-point, I consider intuitions that in some cases it is desirable to attribute non-consequentialist moral value to institutions not required by justice. I will argue that neither consequentialist nor virtue-ethical accounts account for these intuitions, suggesting that a distinctive deontological account is needed. The account I give is drawn from Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals; I distinguish it from Kantian views of institutions developed by Barbara Herman and Onora O’Neill. Throughout, I use marriage as an example.

Aesthetic,Ethical, and Cognitive Value

Abstract

This paper addresses two recent debates in aesthetics: the ‘moralist debate’, concerning the relationship between the ethical and aesthetic evaluations of artworks, and the ‘cognitivist debate’, concerning the relationship between the cognitive and aesthetic evaluations of artworks. Although the two debates appear to concern quite different issues, I argue that the various positions in each are marked by the same types of confusions and ambiguities. In particular, they demonstrate a persistent and unjustified conflation of aesthetic and artistic value, which in turn is based on a more general failure to explicitly tackle the demarcation of aesthetic value. As such, the claims of each side are rendered ambiguous in respect of the relation that is supposed to hold between all these types of value and artistic value. These issues are discussed in light of a recent argument proposed by Matthew Kieran, to undermine, to some extent, the conceptual distinction between aesthetic, cognitive-ethical, and artistic values in our appraisal of art works. In rejecting his argument, I defend the conceptual distinction and a pluralistic conception of artistic value that allows for cognitive and ethical values to count as artistic, but not aesthetic, values.     

Children,Object Value,and Persuasion

We argue that, contrary to standard views of development, children understand the world in terms of hidden, nonobvious structure. We review research showing that early in childhood, items are not understood strictly in terms of the features that present themselves in the immediate “here‐and‐now,” but rather are thought to have a hidden reality. We illustrate with two related but distinct examples: category essentialism, and attention to object history. We discuss the implications of each of these capacities for how children determine object value. Across a broad range of object types (natural and artifactual, real and virtual, durable and consumable), an item is evaluated very differently, depending on inferred qualities and context. In this way, children's early‐emerging conceptual frameworks influence how objects attain both psychological and monetary value, and may have important implications for which messages children find most persuasive.     

Punishment,Consent and Value

In this paper I take another look at the view, defended by C. Nino, that we may punish criminals because, by knowingly breaking a law, they have consented to becoming liable to the prescribed punishment. I will first rebut the criticisms usually aimed at this view in the literature, aiming to show that they are inconclusive. They are all efforts to show that criminal offenders in fact do not consent to becoming liable to punishment simply by committing crimes. I then turn to a different line of criticism, which I find more promising. I argue that the moral power of effecting normative changes by consenting reflects the power holder’s value as a person, and show how this idea makes sense of how refusal to recognize that power wrongs a person. I then argue that the “power” of consenting to punishability does not fit that model, and is better explained as reflecting the value of other people, whom the offender has wronged. Hence the power of consenting is not involved in typical cases of wrongdoing.     

Evolution, Theodicy and Value

In the first section I present a disagreement between a number of scholars (including T.H. Huxley, G.J. Romanes, George C. Williams and Holmes Rolston) concerning the goodness, indifference, evil or even wickedness both of nature and of nonhuman creatures. Section 2 examines and rejects the response to these diverse judgements that values are generated by human valuers employing different perspectives. In Section 3, the thesis that nonhuman animals are commonly either wicked or immoral is considered. The next two sections address the value or disvalue of predation and parasitism, and then of waste, selfishness and suffering. In the Section 6 I conclude that the evolutionary system of nature has vast overall value, and that although there are widespread evils within it, the only significant alternatives are a lifeless world, a world without sentient life, and a world of constant supernatural intervention, all probably worlds without such a positive balance of value as the actual world.     

Intransitivity,Essential Comparativeness,and Objective Value

Building on Goldman 2008 and 2009, which argue that objective values would be strange in coming in degrees but in no determinate number of degrees, this paper argues that related properties having to do with degrees of value make a further case against objective values. The properties of giving rise to intransitive orderings and being essentially comparative are explained by Larry Temkin in Rethinking the Good. He shows that “better than” is intransitively ordered. Many subjective states are too. But similar arguments for the intransitive orderings of intrinsic objective properties fail. Furthermore, subjective properties and states can change without these changes being explained by changes in their objects. This is similar to the essentially comparative nature of goodness. Given the analogies to subjective states and lack of analogies to objective properties that the present article points out, it argues that we should infer, as Temkin does not, that values are subjective.     

Intrinsic Value,Alternative Possibilities,and Reason

I address three issues in this paper: first, just as many have thought that there is a requirement of alternative possibilities for the truth of judgments of moral responsibility, is there reason to think that the truth of judgments of intrinsic value also presupposes our having alternatives? Second, if there is this sort of requirement for the truth of judgments of intrinsic value, is there an analogous requirement for the truth of judgments of moral obligation on the supposition that obligation supervenes on goodness? Third, if the truth of judgments of intrinsic value and those of moral obligation do presuppose our having access to alternatives, what should be said about whether determinism imperils the truth of such judgments? I defend an affirmative answer to the first question, a more guarded answer to the second, and a yet more restrained answer to the third.     

Cultural Property, Restitution and Value

abstract Demands for restitution of cultural artefacts and relics raise four main issues: 1) how claims to cultural property can be justified; 2) whether and under what conditions demands for restitution of cultural property are valid — especially when they are made long after the artefacts were taken away; 3) whether there are values, aesthetic, scholarly and educational, which can override restitution claims, even when these claims are legitimate; and 4) how these values bear on the question of whether artefacts should be returned to their place of origin. I argue that a proper conception of cultural property emphasises the role that artefacts play in the practices and traditions of a collectivity. On the basis of this conception, some restitution claims can be defended as legitimate. However, many demands for restitution are not justified (including the Greek claim to the Parthenon Marbles). Moreover, a case for restitution can be more or less strong, and other considerations sometimes prevail over rights of cultural property.     

Aesthetic Experts,Guides to Value

A theory of aesthetic value should explain the performance of aesthetic experts, for aesthetic experts are agents who track aesthetic value. Aesthetic empiricism, the theory that an item's aesthetic value is its power to yield aesthetic pleasure, suggests that aesthetic experts are best at locating aesthetic pleasure, especially given aesthetic internalism, the view that aesthetic reasons always have motivating force. Problems with empiricism and internalism open the door to an alternative. Aesthetic experts perform a range of actions not aimed at pleasure. Yet their reasons for acting are aesthetic. Since aesthetic values figure in aesthetic reasons, we can read a nonempiricist theory of aesthetic value off aesthetic experts’ reasons for acting.     

Love,Value and Supervenience*

Abstract

People are prone to ascribe value to persons they love. However, the relation between love and value is far from straightforward. This is particularly evident given certain views on the nature of love. Setting out from the idea that what causes us to have an attitude towards an object need not be found in the intentional content of the attitude, this paper depicts love as an attitude that takes non‐fungible persons as intentional objects. Taking this view as a starting point, the paper shows why it is difficult to combine with certain views on value. The main challenge comes from the idea that value judgments are universalizable. This view squares badly with the thought that the people whom we love are irreplaceable. Introducing the idea that properties may have different functions in the intentional content of the attitude, this paper determines what precisely it is about love that makes it hard to combine with universalizability. Moreover, it suggests two ways of meeting this challenge.