谁来『打扫』这条街?

只要你稍稍留意,就会发现如今我们的一些城市,不论规模大小,甚至一些乡镇街道,都少不了一道独特的景观:有一条“集中经营”的“算命街”。“从业”者有男有女有老有少,有世俗人模样的,有道士和尚模样的……排成一长溜,以收费捞钱为目的,或给人算命或给人看相或给人占卜。人来人去,“生意”火     

Tarasoff and the Duty to Protect

Summary

The Tarasoff I and Tarasoff II cases were decided by the California Supreme Court in 1974 and 1976, respectively. These cases involved the murder of a young woman by her ex-boyfriend, who had been a patient at a University counseling center. The parents of the young woman sued, alleging negligence. Tarasoff I set forth a “duty to warn” on the part of psychotherapists. Upon rehearing in Tarasoff II, the decision was upheld but modified. The court ruled that when a therapist determines, or should have determined, that a patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, the therapist has a “duty to protect” that other person. In this article, we address subsequent cases that have arisen under the “duty to protect” doctrine, and analyze some of the legal issues that these cases have raised.     

The Duty to Object

We have the duty to object to things that people say. If you report something that I take to be false, unwarranted, or harmful, I may be required to say as much. In this paper, I explore how to best understand the distinctively epistemic dimension of this duty. I begin by highlighting two central features of this duty that distinguish it from others, such as believing in accordance with the evidence or promise-keeping. In particular, I argue that whether we are obligated to object is directly influenced not only by what other relevant members of the conversational context or community do, but also by the social status of the agent in question. I then show that these features are shared by the duty to be charitable, and the similarities between these two duties point to a potentially deeper explanation: while promise-keeping is regarded as a classic perfect duty, charity is an imperfect one. I then argue that the duty to object can be modeled on a particular conception of imperfect duties, one that takes the duty to belong to communities and other collectives, rather than to individuals. I conclude by showing that this framework provides us with reason for accepting that there are imperfect epistemic duties in general.     

Muslim Governance and the Duty to Protect

In this response to Johnson, Oh reaffirms the scholarly vision of Kelsay and Twiss, elaborates upon Muslim perspectives on human rights, and questions the emphasis on violent humanitarian interventions as part of the Responsibility to Protect mandate. Oh suggests that, in light of the historical relationship between Muslim and non‐Muslim states and the aftermath of the second Iraq War, more consideration be given to the rebuilding of Muslim‐majority societies. Oh also highlights the concept of duty as a religiously based ideal to which governments of Muslim nations ought to be held.     

A Duty to Adopt?

All over the world millions of children are without parental care. As a consequence they are liable to suffer serious harm. I argue the general duty to assist those in need extends to children without parental care and that some people are under a moral duty to adopt rather than have biological children. I defend this claim against the following objections: (1) intimate decisions are excluded from the duty to assist, (2) adopting children is too costly to be required by morality, (3) the duty to assist is a collective duty, (4) the duty to assist is an imperfect duty, and (5) there are, in fact, very few adoptable children.     

A Duty Not to Vote

The view that there is a duty to vote in a fair and free democracy has been a source of philosophical debate. In this paper I turn from the question of whether there is a positive duty to vote to whether there can be a duty not to vote in a 'decent' democratic state. Considerations of fairness and of respect for one's peers underpin an argument that a voter who is indifferent about the outcome of an election has a duty not to cast her ballot. This is not an argument against a general duty to vote, other things being equal, but points to one of the ways in which such a duty can be undermined or outweighed by competing considerations.     

The Tarasoff Warning and the Duty to Protect

Summary

Since the case of Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, mental health professionals have had an explicit legal duty to warn potential adult victims of violence. Subsequent case law expanded this standard to a broader duty-to-protect. Primary health care providers are increasingly treating psychiatric patients for whom the duty to protect is applicable. However, these providers are often unaware of the legal, ethical, and clinical issues involved. Assessment of violence risk should include demographic, psychiatric, and social dimensions. Interventions include notifying law enforcement authorities, potential victims, and possible use of psychiatric hospitalization to prevent aggressive behavior. The duty-to-protect as a standard-of-care has been applied to several other clinical situations, including impaired driving capacity, high-risk HIV behavior, and child sexual abuse. The article includes a step-by-step clinical protocol for evaluation and intervention in dangerous situations.     

A Direct Kantian Duty to Animals

Kant's view that we have only indirect duties to animals fails to capture the intuitive notion that wronging animals transgresses duties we owe to those animals. Here I argue that a suitably modified Kantianism can allow for direct duties to animals and, in particular, an imperfect duty to promote animal welfare without unduly compromising its core theoretical commitments, especially its commitments concerning the source and nature of our duties toward rational beings. The basis for such duties is that animal welfare, on my revised Kantian view, is neither a conditioned nor unconditioned good, but a final and nonderivative good that ought to be treated as an end‐in‐itself. However, this duty to promote animal welfare operates according to a broadly consequentialist logic that both accords well with our considered judgments about our duties to animals and explains differences between these duties and duties owed to rational agents.     

The Duty to Forgive Repentant Wrongdoers

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to consider the question of whether we have a duty to forgive those who repent and apologize for the wrong they have done. I shall argue that we have a pro tanto duty to forgive repentant wrongdoers, and I shall propose and consider the norm of forgiveness. This norm states that if a wrongdoer repents and apologizes to a victim, then the victim has a duty to forgive the wrongdoer, other things being equal. That someone has a pro tanto duty to forgive a repentant wrongdoer means that he or she ought to forgive unless other considerations outweigh the norm of forgiveness. Furthermore, a distinction is made between what are termed ‘general considerations’ and ‘case‐relative considerations’, and it is argued that only after all the relevant considerations have been examined can it be determined whether there is a duty to forgive, all things considered.     

The Duty to Support Nationalistic Policies

We demonstrate that citizens perceive a duty to support policies that benefit their nation, even when they themselves judge that the consequences of the policies will be worse on the whole, taking outsiders into account. In terms of actions, subjects think they would do their perceived duty rather than violate it for the sake of better consequences. The discrepancy between duty and judged consequences does not seem to result from self‐interest alone. When asked for reasons, many subjects felt an obligation to help their fellow citizens before others, and they also thought that they owed something to their nation, in return for what it did for them. The obligation to help fellow citizens was the strongest predictor of perceived duty. In an experiment with Israeli and Palestinian students, group membership affected both perceived overall consequences and duty, but the effect of group on perceived consequences did not account for the effect on perceived duty. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Duty to Take Rescue Precautions

There is much philosophical literature on the duty to rescue. Individuals who encounter and could save, at relatively little cost to themselves, a person at risk of losing life or limb are morally obligated to do so. Yet little has been said about the other side of the issue. There are cases in which the need for rescue could have been reasonably avoided by the rescuee. We argue for a duty to take rescue precautions, providing an account of the circumstances in which it arises. This novel duty has important implications for public policy. We apply it to the situation of some of the uninsured in the United States. Given the US clinician's duty to provide emergency care to all people regardless of ability to pay, some of the uninsured have a moral duty to purchase health insurance. We defend the duty against objections, including the possibility that a right to rescue can be waived, thus undermining a duty to take rescue precautions, that the duty of many professionals is voluntarily incurred, and that a distinction between actively assumed and passively assumed risks matters morally.     

Abortion, Intimacy, and the Duty to Gestate

In this article, I urge that mainstream discussions of abortion are dissatisfying in large part because they proceed in polite abstraction from the distinctive circumstances and meanings of gestation. Such discussions, in fact, apply to abortion conceptual tools that were designed on the premiss that people are physically demarcated, even as gestation is marked by a thorough-going intertwinement. We cannot fully appreciate what is normatively at stake with legally forcing continued gestation, or again how to discuss moral responsibilities to continue gestating, until we appreciate in their own terms the goods and evils distinctive of gestational connection. To underscore the need to explore further the meanings of gestation, I provide two examples of the difference it might make to legal and moral discussions of abortion if we appreciate more fully that gestation is an intimacy.