Why do young people become Jihadists? A theoretical account on radical identity development

Identity status theory and Lofland and Starks' (1965, Becoming a world-saver: A theory of conversion to a deviant perspective, American Sociological Review, 30, 862–875) model of religious conversion were used to explain why young people become jihad fighters. Both theories maintain that young people with unclear commitments are vulnerable for radical identity change. A religious problem-solving perspective, along with a self-definition as religious seeker, steers this potential identity change into the direction of religious conversion. This may lead young Muslims or young people with an uncertain identity and a religious orientation to move closer to radical Islam and jihad. Also, research from both traditions found that absence of positive affective bonds with relevant others go together with unstable identity. A new group with a clear defined mission may therefore be able to solve their problems in two ways: it offers warm interpersonal bonds, as well as potential new personal goals and commitments. Groups of jihadists are perfectly fit to serve this twofold purpose.     

What's mom got to do with it? Contributions of maternal executive function and caregiving to the development of executive function across early childhood

Executive functions (EFs; e.g. working memory, inhibitory control) are mediated by the prefrontal cortex and associated with optimal cognitive and socio‐emotional development. This study provides the first concurrent analysis of the relative contributions of maternal EF and caregiving to child EF. A group of children and their mothers (n = 62) completed age‐appropriate interaction (10, 24, 36 months) and EF tasks (child: 24, 36, and 48 months). Regression analyses revealed that by 36 months of age, maternal EF and negative caregiving behaviors accounted for unique variance in child EF, above and beyond maternal education and child verbal ability. These findings were confirmed when using an early child EF composite‐our most reliable measure of EF – and a similar pattern was found when controlling for stability in child EF. Furthermore, there was evidence that maternal EF had significant indirect effects on changes in child EF through maternal caregiving. At 24 months, EF was associated with maternal EF, but not negative caregiving behaviors. Taken together, these findings suggest that links between negative caregiving and child EF are increasingly manifested during early childhood. Although maternal EF and negative caregiving are related, they provide unique information about the development of child EF. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NPKXFbbrkps     

What would Batman do? Self‐distancing improves executive function in young children

This experimental research assessed the influence of graded levels of self‐distancing – psychological distancing from one's egocentric perspective – on executive function (EF) in young children. Three‐ (n = 48) and 5‐year‐old (n = 48) children were randomly assigned to one of four manipulations of distance from the self (from proximal to distal: self‐immersed, control, third person, and exemplar) on a comprehensive measure of EF. Performance increased as a function of self‐distancing across age groups. Follow‐up analyses indicated that 5‐year‐olds were driving this effect. They showed significant improvements in EF with increased distance from the self, outperforming controls both when taking a third person perspective on the self and when taking the perspective of an exemplar other (e.g., Batman) through role play. Three‐year‐olds, however, did not show increased EF performance as a function of greater distance from the self. Preliminary results suggest that developments in theory of mind might contribute to these age‐related differences in efficacy. These findings speak to the importance of psychological distancing in the expression of conscious control over thought and action from a young age and suggest a promising new avenue for early EF intervention.     

Why do people self-harm?

The accuracy of perceptions about self-harm that are presented in the psychological and psychiatric literature was assessed with a sample of self-harmers. A list of 20 statements containing ten myths and ten accurate statements about self-harm behaviour was incorporated into an internet-based questionnaire. Respondents (n?=?243) rated their extent of agreement with each statement. Factor analysis confirmed the a priori classification of statements as being accurate. Only one item, regarding the relationship of self-harm to previous sexual abuse, did not confirm a priori classification; this statement was considered by self-harmers to be an accurate perception of self-harm. It was concluded that this questionnaire could be a useful aid for group-work training with professionals who are involved in working with people who engage in self-harm.     

Why do people change in therapy? A preliminary study

Why do people change in therapy? A preliminary study. This work represents the beginning of a new way to study the processes that can explain the therapeutic change. The method used is the observation and analysis of therapeutic sessions directly recorded and developed inside a behavioural approach. The category system tries to carry out a functional analysis of the therapist-client interaction which enables the identification of learning processes that work in clinical setting and explain success in therapy. Outcomes are provisional but show the utility of this initial trend of investigation to the comprehension of clinical phenomenon. Conclusions also emphasize the importance of associative learning processes on the therapeutic change.     

Why can't we just get along? Interpersonal biases and interracial distrust

The authors review a series of studies that illustrate how one form of contemporary racial bias of Whites, aversive racism, can shape different perspectives of Blacks and Whites in ways that can undermine race relations. This research demonstrates that contemporary racism among Whites is subtle, often unintentional, and unconscious but that its effects are systematically damaging to race relations by fostering miscommunication and distrust. In particular, the authors examine the effects of aversive racism on outcomes for Blacks (e.g., in selection decisions), on the ways that Whites behave in interracial interactions, in the impressions that Whites and Blacks form of each other in these interactions, and on the task efficiency of interracial dyads.     

Why do people need self-esteem? A theoretical and empirical review

Terror management theory (TMT; J. Greenberg, T. Pyszczynski, & S. Solomon, 1986) posits that people are motivated to pursue positive self-evaluations because self-esteem provides a buffer against the omnipresent potential for anxiety engendered by the uniquely human awareness of mortality. Empirical evidence relevant to the theory is reviewed showing that high levels of self-esteem reduce anxiety and anxiety-related defensive behavior, reminders of one's mortality increase self-esteem striving and defense of self-esteem against threats in a variety of domains, high levels of self-esteem eliminate the effect of reminders of mortality on both self-esteem striving and the accessibility of death-related thoughts, and convincing people of the existence of an afterlife eliminates the effect of mortality salience on self-esteem striving. TMT is compared with other explanations for why people need self-esteem, and a critique of the most prominent of these, sociometer theory, is provided.     

Why do fear and anger look the way they do? Form and social function in facial expressions

The origins of the appearances of anger and fear facial expressions are not well understood. The authors tested the hypothesis that such origins might lie in the expressions' resemblance to, respectively, mature and babyish faces in three studies. In Study 1, faces expressing anger and fear were judged to physically resemble mature and babyish faces. Study 2 indicated that characteristics associated specifically with babyishness are attributed to persons showing fear, whereas characteristics associated with maturity are attributed to persons showing anger. In Study 3, composite faces were used to minimize the possibility that the attributions were based on associations to the anger and fear emotions alone rather than to the physical resemblance of the expressions to static facial appearance cues. These results suggest that fear and anger expressions may serve socially adaptive purposes for those who show them, similar to the social adaptations associated with a babyish or mature facial appearance.     

Is preschool executive function causally related to academic achievement?

The primary objective of this study was to reevaluate the well-established result that preschoolers' performance on executive function tasks are positively associated with their performance on academic achievement tests. The current study replicated the previously established concurrent associations between children's performance on EF tasks and academic achievement tests. Specifically, children's performance on measures of inhibitory and motor control were positively associated with their performance on tests of reading, writing, and mathematics achievement (rs?=?.2?.5); moreover, although diminished in magnitude, most of these associations held up even after including an earlier measure of academic achievement as a covariate (rs?=?.1?.3). However, the application of an alternative analytic method, fixed effects analysis, a method that capitalizes on repeated measures data to control for all time stable measured and unmeasured covariates, rendered the apparent positive associations between executive function and academic achievement nonsignificant (rs?=?.0?.1). Taken together, these results suggest that the well-replicated association between executive function abilities and academic achievement may be spurious. Results are discussed with respect to the importance of utilizing analytic methods and research designs that facilitate strong causal inferences between executive function and academic achievement in early childhood, as well as the limitations of making curriculum development recommendations and/or public policy decisions based on studies that have failed to do so.     

Why do people need self-esteem? Converging evidence that self-esteem serves an anxiety-buffering function.

Three studies were conducted to assess the proposition that self-esteem serves an anxiety-buffering function. In Study 1, it was hypothesized that raising self-esteem would reduce anxiety in response to vivid images of death. In support of this hypothesis, Ss who received positive personality feedback reported less anxiety in response to a video about death than did neutral feedback Ss. In Studies 2 and 3, it was hypothesized that increasing self-esteem would reduce anxiety among individuals anticipating painful shock. Consistent with this hypothesis, both success and positive personality feedback reduced Ss' physiological arousal in response to subsequent threat of shock. Thus, converging evidence of an anxiety-buffering function of self-esteem was obtained.     

Why do categories affect stimulus judgment?

The authors tested a model of category effects on stimulus judgment. The model holds that the goal of stimulus judgment is to achieve high accuracy. For this reason, people place inexactly represented stimuli in the context of prior information, captured in categories, combining inexact fine-grain stimulus values with prior (category) information. This process can be likened to a Bayesian statistical procedure designed to maximize the average accuracy of estimation. If people follow the proposed procedure to maximize accuracy, their estimates should be affected by the distribution of instances in a category. In the present experiments, participants reproduced one-dimensional stimuli. Different prior distributions were presented. The experiments verified that people's stimulus estimates are affected by variations in a prior distribution in such a manner as to increase the accuracy of their stimulus reproductions.     

Why do children confuse mirror-image obliques?

Thirty-five children aged from 4.17 to 6.58 years were given a delayed-matching task in which they had to choose on each trial which of two lines was the same as a previously displayed standard line. Their choices were no better than random when the lines differed in degree of slope but not in left-right orientation and were only marginally more accurate when the lines were left-right mirror images. Performance improved significantly when the lines differed both in degree of slope from the vertical and in left-right orientation and improved still further if at least one of the lines was horizontal or vertical. The results suggest that young children have extreme difficulty encoding in memory either the degree of slope or the left-right orientation of an oblique line.     

Why do we need perceptual content?

Most representationalists argue that perceptual experience has to be representational because phenomenal looks are, by themselves, representational. Charles Travis (2004 Travis, C. (2004). The silence of the senses. Mind, 113, 57–94.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) argues that looks cannot represent. I argue that perceptual experience has to be representational due to the way the visual system works.     

Why do doctored images distort memory?

Doctored images can cause people to believe in and remember experiences that never occurred, yet the underlying mechanism(s) responsible are not well understood. How does compelling false evidence distort autobiographical memory? Subjects were filmed observing and copying a Research Assistant performing simple actions, then they returned 2 days later for a memory test. Before taking the test, subjects viewed video-clips of simple actions, including actions that they neither observed nor performed earlier. We varied the format of the video-clips between-subjects to tap into the source-monitoring mechanisms responsible for the ‘doctored-evidence effect.’ The distribution of belief and memory distortions across conditions suggests that at least two mechanisms are involved: doctored images create an illusion of familiarity, and also enhance the perceived credibility of false suggestions. These findings offer insight into how external evidence influences source-monitoring.     

A teleological account of Cartesian sensations?

Alison Simmons, in Simmons (1999), argues that Descartes in Meditation Six offered a teleological account of sensory representation. According to Simmons, Descartes’ view is that the biological function of sensations explains both why sensations represent what they do (i.e., their referential content) and why they represent their objects the way they do (i.e., their presentational content). Moreover, Simmons claims that her account has several advantages over other currently available interpretations of Cartesian sensations. In this paper, I argue that Simmons’ teleological account cannot be sustained for both theoretical and textual reasons and that it does not have the advantages it is claimed to have.     

Why worry? The cognitive function of anxiety

The phenomenon of worry is considered to arise from cognitive processes involved in anxiety, that serve to maintain high levels of vigilance for personal danger. Rather than rely on self-report alone, the research described here draws on information processing methodology, to investigate this hypothesized cognitive function. Evidence is summarized to show that anxious subjects selectively attend to threatening information, and interpret ambiguous events in a relatively threatening way. However, the evidence on memory suggests that although such information may be easily activated, it is not necessarily more accessible. The allocation of attentional priority to threatening information is seen as a characteristic of anxious (rather than depressed) mood, while the ease with which this processing mode is adopted may underlie trait anxiety and vulnerability to anxiety disorders.