Does recognition of single words predict recognition of two?

Participants studied a list of words, presented 1 at a time. When they were tested on pairs of words and asked to indicate whether both had occurred in the list, they gave more positive responses than would be expected on the basis of results from participants tested 1 word at a time. When participants were asked whether either member of a test pair had been shown on the study list, they gave positive responses less often than expected. When participants were asked to indicate how many words in a test pair came from the study list, they answered "2" more often and "1" less often than would be expected on the basis of results from single-item recognition. Accuracy was not affected by testing items in pairs.     

How similar is false recognition to veridical recognition objectively and subjectively?

Three recognition memory experiments were conducted using modified Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) and DRM paradigms. In Experiment 1, the reaction time (RT) of the false alarms to critical nonpresented words (false memory) was compared with the RT of hits to the critical presented words and with the RT of hits to the studied list words (true memory). The RT of the false alarms to the critical nonpresented words was significantly longer than that of the hits to the critical words and than that of the studied list words. In Experiment 2, in addition to RT, participants' confidence level was measured on a 4-point scale for a yes or no response. Confidence rating was significantly higher for the hits to the critical presented words and to the list words than for the false alarms to the critical non-presented words. Experiment 3 further showed that how similar false memory experience was to that of true memory was a function of retention size (number of lists of words retained in memory). In all three experiments, the participants' recognition RTs distinguished false memory from veridical memory, and in Experiments 2 and 3, so did their confidence ratings. Therefore, false memory and veridical memory differ at both the objective and the subjective levels. The results are consistent with a single familiarity dimension model of recognition memory.     

Is object recognition automatic?

A new paradigm is proposed that involves a simple judgment on an object’s perceptual feature that is independent of object identity. Subjects were required to categorize as vertical or horizontal the main axis of elongation of an object picture. Both fake and real-world objects were presented, and a graphical manipulation was applied to their shapes so that the canonical elongation of the real-world objects was incongruent with the elongation of their shapes after the manipulation. The results showed an influence of the identity of the objects on the perceptual task in the form of a cost in judging the elongation of the incongruent real-world objects. The results are taken as evidence for automatic activation of objects’ stored representations. A “horse-race” model of the influence of these representations on the perceptual task is proposed in the final section of the article.     

Use of the recognition heuristic depends on the domain’s recognition validity,not on the recognition validity of selected sets of objects

According to the recognition-heuristic theory, decision makers solve paired comparisons in which one object is recognized and the other not by recognition alone, inferring that recognized objects have higher criterion values than unrecognized ones. However, success—and thus usefulness—of this heuristic depends on the validity of recognition as a cue, and adaptive decision making, in turn, requires that decision makers are sensitive to it. To this end, decision makers could base their evaluation of the recognition validity either on the selected set of objects (the set’s recognition validity), or on the underlying domain from which the objects were drawn (the domain’s recognition validity). In two experiments, we manipulated the recognition validity both in the selected set of objects and between domains from which the sets were drawn. The results clearly show that use of the recognition heuristic depends on the domain’s recognition validity, not on the set’s recognition validity. In other words, participants treat all sets as roughly representative of the underlying domain and adjust their decision strategy adaptively (only) with respect to the more general environment rather than the specific items they are faced with.     

Implicit word activation during pre‐recognition processing influences correct recognition and estimates of presentation frequency

False recognition of new test words is higher for experimental lures (e.g., universal) with initial phonemes identical to studied words (e.g., university) than for control lures. A proposed mechanism to explain this phenomenon involves implicit activation of potential solution words during the brief period of uncertainty immediately following onset of a spoken study word. Two experiments examined whether the presumed pre‐recognition processing during the stimulus discovery phase of spoken word identification increased familiarity of a studied word, thereby increasing correct recognitions and estimates of presentation frequency. Critical test words were presented a single time during study in Experiment 1, and their phonologically related words were presented one, two, or three times. Correct recognition and frequency estimates of targets were enhanced by multiple presentations of associates sharing initial phonemes. Experiment 2 provided a replication with five repetitions of phonological associates during study and two study presentations of critical test words. The results of these two experiments confirmed a necessary theoretical consequence of the implicit activation mechanism that has been invoked to explain the effects of phonological similarity on false recognition.     

Visual attention and word recognition in stroop color naming: is word recognition "automatic"?

In Stroop color naming, color targets were accompanied by a color word or a color word plus a neutral word that reduces or "dilutes" the Stroop effect. Abrupt-onset cues called the focus of attention to one stimulus or another. Cuing influenced the size of the Stroop effect but never eliminated it. Unlike the Stroop effect itself, Stroop dilution from the neutral word could be eliminated, by cuing the color word. Focusing visual attention on the color word protected it from Stroop dilution; focusing visual attention on the neutral word did not prevent Stroop interference. Thus, spatial attention is a modulator, protecting visual data from crosstalk, but a word need not be the focus of visual attention to be recognized.     

Can corrective feedback improve recognition memory?

An understanding of the effects of corrective feedback on recognition memory can inform both recognition theory and memory training programs, but few published studies have investigated the issue. Although the evidence to date suggests that feedback does not improve recognition accuracy, few studies have directly examined its effect on sensitivity, and fewer have created conditions that facilitate a feedback advantage by encouraging controlled processing at test. In Experiment 1, null effects of feedback were observed following both deep and shallow encoding of categorized study lists. In Experiment 2, feedback robustly influenced response bias by allowing participants to discern highly uneven base rates of old and new items, but sensitivity remained unaffected. In Experiment 3, a false-memory procedure, feedback failed to attenuate false recognition of critical lures. In Experiment 4, participants were unable to use feedback to learn a simple category rule separating old items from new items, despite the fact that feedback was of substantial benefit in a nearly identical categorization task. The recognition system, despite a documented ability to utilize controlled strategic or inferential decision-making processes, appears largely impenetrable to a benefit of corrective feedback.     

Do instructional warnings reduce false recognition?

After previously encoding lists of related words (e.g. bed, rest, awake, etc.) associated with one critical word (e.g. sleep), participants frequently falsely recognize critical words as having been previously presented. Past research indicates that warning participants of this memory illusion can reduce false recognition of critical words. However, the memory processes responsible for this reduction are not known. We investigated whether the increase in critical‐word memory performance reflects changes that are specific to the processing of critical words, or alternatively, changes that are applied generally to processing in all conditions. Different participants were warned (in two different ways) or not warned before encoding, and recognition sensitivity for critical words, related words and unrelated words was tested. The warnings increased memory performance equally across all conditions, not just for critical words. These results help to more effectively conceptualize false recognition and reductions in false recognition in this paradigm. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does recognition memory improve with age?

In order to test the hypothesis that recognition is a developmentally stable component of the memory system, age differences in recognition of faces were examined while controlling for nonmemory factors that might contribute to differences between the groups. Three groups of children (mean ages: 3 years, 4 months; 4 years, 9 months; and 6 years, 11 months) and a group of college students were tested on a recognition task and a similar matching task. The results indicated no change in recognition across the preschool years but an improvement from the later preschool period to the first grade. Further analyses indicated that this improvement was not due to changes in decision criteria or perceptual skills. These findings call into question the view that recognition is a developmentally invariant component of the memory system.     

Serial-position effects in infants’ recognition memory

Preverbal infants (7 months of age) were repeatedly shown a fixed series of photographs of adult female faces. The effects of the order of presentation of a photo (first, middle, or last) and the duration of retention (5 sec, 1 rain, or 5 rain) were subsequently assessed in a probe-recognition test. Both primacy and recency effects were obtained, but there was no evidence of recognition of the face that appeared in the middle of the series. There was also no evidence of recognition of the most recently studied face following the 5-rain retention interval. The bowed serial-position function and labile recency effect match those found in the performance of older subjects in classical verbal learning tasks, and we suggest an automatic process underlying these effects. Our explanation emphasizes differential learning and the context of the items to be remembered.     

What types of visual recognition tasks are mediated by the neural subsystem that subserves face recognition?

Three divided visual field experiments tested current hypotheses about the types of visual shape representation tasks that recruit the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying face recognition. Experiment 1 found a right hemisphere advantage for subordinate but not basic-level face recognition. Experiment 2 found a right hemisphere advantage for basic but not superordinate-level animal recognition. Experiment 3 found that inverting animals eliminates the right hemisphere advantage for basic-level animal recognition. This pattern of results suggests that the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying face recognition are recruited when computational demands of a shape representation task are best served through the use of coordinate (rather than categorical) spatial relations.     

Are morphological structures computed during word recognition?

In the recent literature in generative morphology, it has been assumed that multimorphemic words must be characterized as having a hierarchical internal structure which is expressible in the form of morphological trees. This paper reports on an experiment which addresses the following question: Are these structures relevant to complex word recognition? In a naming latency experiment, subjects were presented with prefixed and suffixed nonsense roots. The use of stimuli such as these allowed for the control of real word effects such as frequency and semantic plausibility and made it possible to systematically vary the configuration of the morphological trees. Significant response time differences were found between the morphologically illegal forms and legal configurations. This was taken as evidence that subjects do compute morphological representations. Because no differences were found between legal left-branching structures and legal right-branching structures, it was concluded that morphological computation is not sensitive to the serial ordering of morphemes within a complex word.     

How position dependent is visual object recognition?

Visual object recognition is often assumed to be insensitive to changes in retinal position, leading to theories and formal models incorporating position-independent object representations. However, recent behavioral and physiological evidence has questioned the extent to which object recognition is position independent. Here, we take a computational and physiological perspective to review the current behavioral literature. Although numerous studies report reduced object recognition performance with translation, even for distances as small as 0.5 degrees of visual angle, confounds in many of these studies make the results difficult to interpret. We conclude that there is little evidence to support position-independent object recognition and the precise role of position in object recognition remains unknown.     

The “other-accent” effect in voice recognition

The current paper examines an “other-accent” effect when recognising voices. English and Scottish listeners were tested with English and Scottish voices using a sequential lineup method. The results suggested greater accuracy for own-accent voices than for other-accent voices under both target-present and target-absent conditions. Moreover, self-rated confidence in response to target-absent lineups suggested greater confidence for own-accent voices than other-accent voices. As predicted, the other-accent effect noted here emerged more strongly for English listeners than for Scottish listeners, and these results are discussed within an expertise framework alongside both other-race effects in face recognition, and other-accent effects in word recognition. Given these results, caution is advised in the treatment of earwitness evidence when recognising a voice of another accent.     

The recognition heuristic in memory‐based inference: is recognition a non‐compensatory cue?

The recognition heuristic makes the strong claim that probabilistic inferences in which a recognized object is compared to an unrecognized one are made solely on the basis of whether the objects are recognized or not, ignoring all other available cues. This claim has been seriously challenged by a number of studies that have shown a clear effect of additional cue knowledge. In most of these studies, either recognition knowledge was acquired during the experiment, and/or additional cues were provided to participants. However, the recognition heuristic is more likely to be a tool for exploiting natural (rather than induced) recognition when inferences have to be made from memory. In our study on natural recognition and inferences from memory, around 85% of the inferences followed recognition information even when participants had learned three cues that contradicted recognition and when some of the contradictory cues were deemed more valid than recognition. Nevertheless, there were strong individual differences in the use of recognition. Whereas about half of the participants chose the recognized object regardless of the number of conflicting cues—suggestive of the hypothesized noncompensatory processing of recognition—the remaining participants were influenced by the additional knowledge. The former group of participants also tended to give higher estimates of recognition's validity. In addition, we found that the use of recognition for an inference may be affected by whether additional cue knowledge has been learned outside or within the experimental setting. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does visual expertise improve visual recognition memory?

In general, humans have impressive recognition memory for previously viewed pictures. Many people spend years becoming experts in highly specialized image sets. For example, cytologists are experts at searching micrographs filled with potentially cancerous cells and radiologists are expert at searching mammograms for indications of cancer. Do these experts develop robust visual long-term memory for their domain of expertise? If so, is this expertise specific to the trained image class, or do such experts possess generally superior visual memory? We tested recognition memory of cytologists, radiologists, and controls with no medical experience for three visual stimulus classes: isolated objects, scenes, and mammograms or micrographs. Experts were better than control observers at recognizing images from their domain, but their memory for those images was not particularly good (D’ ~ 1.0) and was much worse than memory for objects or scenes (D’ > 2.0). Furthermore, experts were not better at recognizing scenes or isolated objects than control observers.     

Distributed study facilitates infants’ delayed recognition memory

Infants of 5–6 months of age were tested for recognition of briefly presented photographs of faces. The interaction typically obtained with adults, a beneficial effect on retention due to the temporal spacing of study, was obtained with these infants. The results suggest that the distribution effect reflects a fundamental and automatic process of human memory.     

Is Locke’s answer to Molyneux’s question inconsistent? Cross-modal recognition and the sight–recognition error

Abstract

Molyneux’s question asks whether someone born blind, who could distinguish cubes from spheres using his tactile sensation, could recognize those objects if he received his sight. Locke says no: the newly sighted person would fail to point to the cube and call it a cube. Locke never provided a complete explanation for his negative response, and there are concerns of inconsistency with other important aspects of his theory of ideas. These charges of inconsistency rest upon an unrecognized and unfounded assumption that seeing entails recognition. Locke’s negative answer to Molyneux’s question is consistent with his other philosophical commitments.     

Can response preparation begin before stimulus recognition finishes?

The present experiments were designed to determine whether information obtained early in the process of recognizing a stimulus can be used to begin preparing keypress responses before recognition of the stimulus has completely finished. This question is relevant to the recent debate between discrete (e.g., Sternberg, 1969a) and continuous (e.g., McClelland, 1979) models of human information processing. Stimulus sets were chosen so that recognition processes could extract incomplete preliminary information about a stimulus much faster than they could extract secondary information needed for unique stimulus identification. Discriminability of the secondary information was manipulated to vary the opportunity for response preparation based on preliminary information, with difficult secondary discriminations providing more time for response preparation than easy ones. Precues were given on some trials to allow response preparation to occur before the stimulus was presented, thereby reducing any difference in response preparation as a function of discriminability. Continuous models predict that precues should facilitate response preparation less when the secondary discrimination is difficult than when it is easy, and discrete models predict equal facilitation regardless of secondary discrimination difficulty. Evidence of response preparation was obtained with some but not all stimulus sets. The results were interpreted as support for the asynchronous discrete coding model (Miller, 1982a), in which response preparation can begin only after recognition processes have completely activated a code used in categorizing the stimulus.