Finishing on time: When do predictions influence completion times?

People typically predict they will finish projects earlier than they do. Whereas previous research has examined the determinants of this prediction bias, the present research explored potential consequences for behavior. In particular, we examined whether and when task completion predictions influence actual completion times. In four experiments we used anchoring manipulations to induce participants to make relatively early or late task completion predictions, and then examined when they started and/or finished the target tasks. As hypothesized, the prediction manipulation influenced completion times under certain conditions defined by the nature of the target task. Manipulated predictions affected completion times of closed tasks, defined as tasks carried out within a single, continuous session but not of open tasks, defined as tasks requiring multiple work sessions. This implies that task completion predictions help to initiate action, but their impact diminishes over the course of extensive, multi-stage projects.     

When do gestures communicate? A meta-analysis

Do the gestures that speakers produce while talking significantly benefit listeners' comprehension of the message? This question has been the topic of many research studies over the previous 35 years, and there has been little consensus. The present meta-analysis examined the effect sizes from 63 samples in which listeners' understanding of a message was compared when speech was presented alone with when speech was presented with gestures. It was found that across samples, gestures do provide a significant, moderate benefit to communication. Furthermore, the magnitude of this effect is moderated by 3 factors. First, effects of gesture differ as a function of gesture topic, such that gestures that depict motor actions are more communicative than those that depict abstract topics. Second, effects of gesture on communication are larger when the gestures are not completely redundant with the accompanying speech; effects are smaller when there is more overlap between the information conveyed in the 2 modalities. Third, the size of the effect of gesture is dependent on the age of the listeners, such that children benefit more from gestures than do adults. Remaining questions for future research are highlighted.     

A test of parafoveal‐on‐foveal effects with pairs of orthographically related words

One of the main controversies in the field of eye movements in reading concerns the question of whether the processing of two adjacent words in reading occurs in sequence, or in parallel. To distinguish between these views, the present experiment tested the presence of parafoveal‐on‐foveal effects with pairs of orthographically related words (or neighbours that differed by a single letter) in a controlled but reading‐like situation. Results revealed that fixation times on a foveal target word were shorter when the target was accompanied by an orthographically similar parafoveal word than when the parafoveal word was dissimilar. Furthermore, the size of the effect tended to vary with both the relative frequency of target and parafoveal words, and the position of the critical letter. These results were interpreted in the framework of a pure parallel processing hypothesis, where the processing of adjacent words is only limited by visual acuity, and the respective lexical properties of the foveal and parafoveal words.     

When do primes prime? The moderating role of the self-concept in individuals’ susceptibility to priming effects on social behavior

Using cooperative behavior in economic decision-making settings, we predicted and found that people’s susceptibility to priming influences is moderated by two factors: people’s chronic accessibility to a behavioral repertoire and people’s self-concept activation. In Experiment 1, we show that individuals highly consistent in their social value orientation (SVO) assimilate their behavior to their dispositions rather than to the primes, whereas the opposite effect is obtained among individuals with a low consistent SVO. In Experiment 2, we show that low consistent SVO individuals become less susceptible to priming influences when their self-concept is activated. These studies shed new light on individuals’ susceptibility to priming influences on social behavior.     

Charting the development of representational skills: When do children know that maps can lead and mislead?

This study was conducted to test Perner's (1991) hypothesis that 3-year-olds fail the false belief task because they cannot metarepresent (represent a representation's sense and reference). Preschoolers made and interpreted symbolic maps, and were tested on their understanding of the implications of following an incorrect map (false belief test). Young 3-year-olds showed some ability to make and use maps but performed poorly on the false belief tests. Children were more likely to use an incorrect map to predict behavior if the represented object was missing instead of in a wrong location. Many children were also able to predict that someone who used an incorrect map would not “find” the object. These results contradict Perner's hypothesis and suggest that representational skills develop gradually rather than appearing in a radical conceptual shift at age 4.     

When do children overestimate their knowledge of unfamiliar targets?

We report four investigations in which 5 to 7 year olds judged whether or not they knew familiar- and unfamiliar-named targets. Under some conditions judgments were made in relation to performance on a relevant task, e.g., children judged whether they knew the picture they had picked from a set was the target. Under other conditions, children judged their state of knowledge not in relation to performance, e.g., they answered "Do you know who (target) is?" Under both types of condition, children nearly always made correct "know" judgments when targets were familiar. Correct "don't know" judgments about unfamiliar targets were relatively common when judgments were not made in relation to performance on a task (average scores 80-90% correct), but were less frequent when knowledge was judged in relation to performance on a task (average scores 40-70% correct). Knowledge judged in relation to performance was overestimated even when children did not choose the picture they thought might be the target before making their judgment, when the pictures were face-down, and when children predicted performance on a task not yet present. It seems that although children can make relatively accurate judgments of their own knowledge states, they tend to overestimate their competence when assessing their knowledge in relation to performance on a task. We discuss why this might be.     

Why do pictures produce priming on the word-fragment completion test? A study of encoding and retrieval factors

Three experiments examined why pictures produce priming on the word-fragment completion test, despite the fact that there is no match between the physical features of the picture and the word fragment. Pictures and words were presented as primes, and performance on the word-fragment completion test was measured; encoding and retrieval conditions were varied. Experi-ments 1 and 2 examined the role of picture labeling by increasing the presentation rate and by introducing a shadowing task during encoding; labeling appears to play a role in priming. In Experiment 3, the word fragments were presented for 500 msec, and subjects were required to provide a solution immediately. Word priming was unaffected, but picture priming was elimi-nated, suggesting that word fragments enable efficient recovery of perceptually similar primes (i.e., words), but slower and less direct recovery of conceptually similar but physically dissimilar     

When do errors in reinforcer delivery affect learning? A parametric analysis of treatment integrity

Treatment integrity is the extent to which components of an intervention are implemented as intended (Gresham, 1989). Recent behavior-analytic literature has begun to evaluate the effects of reduced-treatment integrity on the efficacy and efficiency of skill-acquisition interventions. This study extended the current literature on the effects of errors of omission and commission of reinforcer delivery by replicating and extending Hirst and DiGennaro Reed (2015). Using a randomized-control group design, we compared undergraduate student participants' acquisition of conditional discriminations in a parametric analysis of different error values. A computer program erred in reinforcer delivery on 0%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25% and 50% of trials. The purpose of the current study was to identify which levels of reduced integrity slowed or prevented acquisition. Our data replicated the findings of Hirst and DiGennaro Reed, and extended parametric analyses by identifying that errors in reinforcer delivery occurring on 15% or fewer trials (i.e., 85% integrity) were unlikely to prevent participants' responding from meeting the mastery criterion. These results could inform future research on how treatment-integrity errors change behavior-analytic procedures and the effects on skill acquisition for consumers of applied behavior analysis.     

When do people cooperate? The neuroeconomics of prosocial decision making

Understanding the roots of prosocial behavior is an interdisciplinary research endeavor that has generated an abundance of empirical data across many disciplines. This review integrates research findings from different fields into a novel theoretical framework that can account for when prosocial behavior is likely to occur. Specifically, we propose that the motivation to cooperate (or not), generated by the reward system in the brain (extending from the striatum to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex), is modulated by two neural networks: a cognitive control system (centered on the lateral prefrontal cortex) that processes extrinsic cooperative incentives, and/or a social cognition system (including the temporo-parietal junction, the medial prefrontal cortex and the amygdala) that processes trust and/or threat signals. The independent modulatory influence of incentives and trust on the decision to cooperate is substantiated by a growing body of neuroimaging data and reconciles the apparent paradox between economic versus social rationality in the literature, suggesting that we are in fact wired for both. Furthermore, the theoretical framework can account for substantial behavioral heterogeneity in prosocial behavior. Based on the existing data, we postulate that self-regarding individuals (who are more likely to adopt an economically rational strategy) are more responsive to extrinsic cooperative incentives and therefore rely relatively more on cognitive control to make (un)cooperative decisions, whereas other-regarding individuals (who are more likely to adopt a socially rational strategy) are more sensitive to trust signals to avoid betrayal and recruit relatively more brain activity in the social cognition system. Several additional hypotheses with respect to the neural roots of social preferences are derived from the model and suggested for future research.     

When do Gender Stereotypes Impair Math Performance? A Study of Stereotype Threat Among Ugandan Adolescents

The present study examined the effect of gender-based stereotype threat (ST) on the mathematics performance of high school students in Uganda, East Africa, as moderated by students’ stereotype endorsement and/or their perceptions of stereotypic expectancies by others. Participants were 190 ninth grade students (age 14–15, senior 2, in Uganda) from all-female and coed boarding schools. Only perceived stereotypic expectancies by others significantly moderated ST effects on performance. A reminder of cross-gender comparisons led both young women and young men to underperform if they assumed that the researchers expected their own gender to do worse than the other gender. Importantly, students’ perceptions of the stereotypic expectancies of authority figures (i.e. researchers) mattered more for predicting their math performance than did students’ own endorsement of stereotypes. Collectively, these findings support a basic assumption of ST theory– that knowledge of a cultural stereotype is a prerequisite to the ST experience. Therefore, studies conducted with younger samples and in diverse cultural contexts should establish participants’ awareness of the stereotype in question. Also, regarding gender and math stereotypes, it should not be assumed that males will always be immune from stereotype-based performance deficits on quantitative tasks when tested in different cultures. Finally, results suggest that conveying an expectation that young men and young women have equal ability and potential might be important to preventing ST among younger age groups.     

When do irrelevant visual stimuli impair processing of identical targets?

Three experiments investigated whether the repeated-letter inferiority effect (RLIE) and repetition blindness (RB) are identical phenomena or not and how the RLIE can be reconciled with the flanker compatibility effect (FCE). Participants reported a masked target and ignored an unmasked distractor. We manipulated the type of distractor (identical, alternative target, or neutral), the order of presenting distractor and target, and the predictability of target location. When distractors preceded the targets, distractors identical to the target always caused deficits in target processing (i.e., RB). With simultaneous presentation, identical distractors caused deficits (i.e., an RLIE) for unpredictable target locations only. Yet the RLIE was significantly smaller than RB. This result suggests that simultaneously presented stimuli are identified serially, in random order, if target position is unpredictable. As a result, RB arises only in the 50% of all trials with identical distractors in which the distractor is identified before the target. With simultaneous presentation and predictable target location, however, parallel processing of targets and distractors was possible that gave rise to an FCE in recognition accuracy. Analyses of false alarm rates revealed no evidence of significant response biases.     

When do spatial abilities support student comprehension of STEM visualizations?

Spatial visualization abilities are positively related to performance on science, technology, engineering, and math tasks, but this relationship is influenced by task demands and learner strategies. In two studies, we illustrate these interactions by demonstrating situations in which greater spatial ability leads to problematic performance. In Study 1, chemistry students observed and explained sets of simultaneously presented displays depicting chemical phenomena at macroscopic and particulate levels of representation. Prior to viewing, the students were asked to make predictions at the macroscopic level. Eye movement analyses revealed that greater spatial ability was associated with greater focus on the prediction-relevant macroscopic level. Unfortunately, that restricted focus was also associated with lower-quality explanations of the phenomena. In Study 2, we presented the same displays but manipulated whether participants were asked to make predictions prior to viewing. Spatial ability was again associated with restricted focus, but only for students who completed the prediction task. Eliminating the prediction task encouraged attempts to integrate the displays that related positively to performance, especially for participants with high spatial ability. Spatial abilities can be recruited in effective or ineffective ways depending on alignments between the demands of a task and the approaches individuals adopt for completing that task.     

When do letter features migrate? A boundary condition for feature-integration theory

Feature-integration theory postulates that a lapse of attention will allow letter features to change position and to recombine as illusory conjunctions (Treisman & Paterson, 1984). To study such errors, we used a set of uppercase letters known to yield illusory conjunctions in each of three tasks. The first, a bar-probe task, showed whole-character mislocations but not errors based on feature migration and recombination. The second, a two-alternative forced-choice detection task, allowed subjects to focus on the presence or absence of subletter features and showed illusory conjunctions based on feature migration and recombination. The third was also a two-alternative forced-choice detection task, but we manipulated the subjects' knowledge of the shape of the stimuli: In the case-certain condition, the stimuli were always in uppercase, but in the case-uncertain condition, the stimuli could appear in either upper- or lowercase. Subjects in the case-certain condition produced illusory conjunctions based on feature recombination, whereas subjects in the case-uncertain condition did not. The results suggest that when subjects can view the stimuli as feature groups, letter features regroup as illusory conjunctions; when subjects encode the stimuli as letters, whole items may be mislocated, but subletter features are not. Thus, illusory conjunctions reflect the subject's processing strategy, rather than the architecture of the visual system.     

When false memories do not occur: Not thinking of the lure or remembering that it was not heard?

The aim of the present study was to evaluate two explanations for the non-occurrence of false memories in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. One explanation was that a critical lure is not recalled because the list failed to evoke it in the participant's mind. Another possible explanation was that the participant would identify the critical lure and would remember, at the time of recall, that the lure was not produced by an external source. In order to explore these two possible explanations for the non-occurrence of false memories, an experimental phase was added to the usual DRM paradigm: participants were asked to recall items they thought of but did not recall because these items were not members of the list presented by the experimenter. Among participants who did not recall the critical lure during the standard recall task, those who recalled the critical lure during the additional phase outnumbered those who did not recall it. This result is more consistent with the second explanation than with the first one.     

When do infants understand that they can obtain a desired part of a composite object by grasping another part?

When do infants start to understand that they can grasp an object by its handle when the interesting part is out of reach? Whereas it is known from preferential looking tasks that already at three months of age infants show surprise when all parts of an object do not move together, little is known about when infants are able to use such knowledge in an active grasp situation. To answer this question we presented six, eight, and 10 month-old infants in a cross-sectional and a longitudinal study with a white cardboard handle within reach and a bright ball at the end of the handle and out of reach. A trick condition, where the handle and the ball seem attached but were not, was added to get an indication of the infant's expectation by observing a possible surprise reaction.Results show that 6-month-olds’ most frequent first behaviors consisted in pointing toward the ball without grasping the handle, or grasping the handle without looking at the ball until it moved. In addition, they often did not look surprised in the trick condition. Eight- and 10-month-olds most often grasped the handle while looking at the ball, and showed clear surprise in the trick condition. This was interpreted as showing that around eight or 10 months, infants take a significant step in understanding the cohesiveness of composite objects during grasping.     

When false memories do not occur: not thinking of the lure or remembering that it was not heard?

The aim of the present study was to evaluate two explanations for the non-occurrence of false memories in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. One explanation was that a critical lure is not recalled because the list failed to evoke it in the participant's mind. Another possible explanation was that the participant would identify the critical lure and would remember, at the time of recall, that the lure was not produced by an external source. In order to explore these two possible explanations for the non-occurrence of false memories, an experimental phase was added to the usual DRM paradigm: participants were asked to recall items they thought of but did not recall because these items were not members of the list presented by the experimenter. Among participants who did not recall the critical lure during the standard recall task, those who recalled the critical lure during the additional phase outnumbered those who did not recall it. This result is more consistent with the second explanation than with the first one.     

A truth that’s told with bad intent: An ERP study of deception

Human social cognition critically relies on the ability to deceive others. However, the cognitive and neural underpinnings of deception are still poorly understood. Why does lying place increased demands on cognitive control? The present study investigated whether cognitive control processes during deception are recruited due to the need to inhibit a tendency to state the truth, or reflect deceptive intent more generally. We engaged participants in a face-to-face interaction game and examined event-related brain potentials (ERPs) while participants lied and told the truth with or without deceptive intention. The same medial frontal negative deflection (N450) occurred when participants lied and when they told the truth with deceptive intent. This suggests that the main challenge of lying is not to inhibit a tendency to state the truth. Rather, the challenge is to handle the cognitive conflict resulting from the need to keep others’ mental states in mind while deceiving them.     

When do response-related episodic retrieval effects co-occur with inhibition of return?

Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics - At some point, spatial priming effects more faithfully reflect response selection processes than they do attentional orienting or sensory processes....     

When do I ponder? The role of elaboration in counterfactual thinking

The counterfactual thought such as “If only I had…” has a powerful impact on people's subsequent behavioral intentions. The literature has documented what may happen with CFT. But little has been done to investigate how CFT produces these effects. In this research, three studies provided evidence to show that elaboration rather than priming is the mechanism for CFT to have an effect on behavioral intentions; and the factors such as argument strength, outcome severity, and goal valence may interfere with such counterfactual effects. These theoretical contributions to the CFT literature offer important managerial implications and help marketers determine optimal persuasion strategies to influence consumers' information processing style.