Science,Values, and Teleological Explanations of Human Action

Science has traditionally eschewed telic explanations as scientific accounts of human behavior. Given a telic nature of humans, psychology and related fields must learn how to incorporate teleology into their accounts. The article presents an initial step in that direction.     

Action, Causality, and Teleological Explanation

If, as Melden claims, causal explanations are "wholly irrelevant to the understanding we seek" of human actions then we are without an analysis of the "because" in "he did it because…," where we go on to name a reason.     

Culpable Control and Causal Deviance

Actions that are intended to produce harmful consequences can fail to achieve their desired effects in numerous ways. We refer to action sequences in which harmful intentions are thwarted as deviant causal chains. The culpable control model of blame (CCM) is a useful tool for predicting and explaining the attributions that observers make of the actors whose harmful intentions go awry. In this paper, we describe six types of deviant causal chains; those in which: an actor’s attempt is obviated by the intervention of another person or the environment; the intended effects could not have been produced regardless of the actor’s behavior; other causes diminish the actor’s causal role; the actor brings about foreseen but undesired consequences as a result of pursuing his or her focal goal; the focal action produces a chain of increasingly remote causal events; and the actor derives unforeseen benefits from his or her nefarious actions. A basic assumption of the CCM in these cases is that attributions for the participants’ actions will depend on positive and negative evaluations of their intentions and behaviors. We describe empirical findings that are consistent with this assumption, and predict other findings for causal deviance phenomena that have not yet been investigated empirically.     

Deviant Causal Chains and the Irreducibility of Teleological Explanation

Abstract: We typically explain human action teleologically, by citing the action's goal or purpose. However, a broad class of naturalistic projects within the philosophy of mind presuppose that teleological explanation is reducible to causal explanation. In this paper I argue that two recently suggested strategies - one suggested by Al Mele and the other proposed by John Bishop and Christopher Peacocke - fail to provide a successful causal analysis of teleological explanation. The persistent troubles encountered by the reductive project suggest that teleological explanations are irreducible and that the naturalistic accounts of mind and agency should be called into question.     

Ordinary Explanations and Career Theories

The author highlights the relatively unexplored relationship between ordinary language explanations of career behavior and formal theories of career development. As in Gergen and Gergen's (1982) framework, several ordinary explanations of career behavior are classified along two dimensions—the extent to which explanations are founded in the person or the situation and the extent to which they account for predictability and control or chance and change. The value of the framework for both theory development and practice is outlined. The use of ordinary explanations addresses a number of issues faced by counselors as they move between their clients' explanations and formal career and counseling theories.     

Knowledge and Other Norms for Assertion,Action, and Belief: A Teleological Account

Here I advance a unified account of the structure of the epistemic normativity of assertion, action, and belief. According to my Teleological Account , all of these are epistemically successful just in case they fulfill the primary aim of knowledgeability, an aim which in turn generates a host of secondary epistemic norms. The central features of the Teleological Account are these: it is compact in its reliance on a single central explanatory posit, knowledge‐centered in its insistence that knowledge sets the fundamental epistemic norm, and yet fiercely pluralistic in its acknowledgment of the legitimacy and value of a rich range of epistemic norms distinct from knowledge. Largely in virtue of this pluralist character, I argue, the Teleological Account is far superior to extant knowledge‐centered accounts.     

反事实思维两大理论：范例说和目标－指向说

反事实思维是个体对不真实的条件或可能性进行替换的一种思维过程。该文通过综合国外许多研究者的研究成果,探讨了反事实思维的定义、分类以及反事实思维的两大理论：范例说和目标－指向说。范例说认为反事实思维的激发是自动化过程,影响反事实思维产生的因素包括：正常性、结果的效价、与替代结果的接近性、前提的突变性和前提的突出性。目标－指向说则认为反事实思维的激发过程同样受目标、情绪控制、态度等认知因素的影响     

Infants' Understanding of Looking,Pointing, and Reaching as Cues to Goal-Directed Action

Phillips, Wellman, and Spelke (2002) provided experimental evidence indicating that by the age of 12 months infants use information about an adult's gaze-direction and emotional expression to predict action. We investigate the generality of this ability, using Phillips et al.'s paradigm across different referential gestures. If infants have a rich concept of people as intentional agents, they should encode the person-goal relation and predict action from a variety of referential gestures (such as looking and pointing), as well as from (goal-directed) reaching and grasping actions. Results of Studies 1 and 2 (within-subjects design) and Study 3 (between-subjects design) converge in indicating that Phillips et al.'s basic finding generalizes to reach-and-gaze as cue condition. In Study 3b generalization was demonstrated for point-and-gaze as cue condition. Whereas these findings suggest a general understanding of referential intent at 12 months, a control experiment (Study 4) showed that infants' action expectations could be reversed following a psychologically inconsistent habituation phase (actor points at Object A and subsequently picks up Object B) in the point-and-gaze condition, although no such reversal was obtained in the reach-and-gaze condition. These findings indicate that 1-year-old infants have well-established expectations about action goals signaled by an actor's gaze-direction and reaching and grasping movements but that an understanding of pointing as a cue to action intentions may develop later and follow a different route of acquisition.     

Children's Theories of God: Explanations for Difficult-to-Explain Phenomena

Participants in 3 age groups (preschoolers, 3rd graders, and college students) generated explanations for various phenomena. Participants with higher levels of religious involvement provided more attributions to God than participants with lower levels of religious involvement. Also, older participants provided more attributions to God than younger participants. The results suggest that individuals who have higher levels of religious involvement develop theorylike understanding based on their conception of God. It appears that this theorylike understanding has explanatory utility that increases with age.     

萨尔蒙:"行为的因果解释"

包括逻辑经验主义在内的自然主义哲学家都认为,自然和社会是同构的,社会可以像自然科学一样进行研究,社会行为的解释也能套用自然科学的方法和理论.自然主义者相信,社会现象从属于那些类似于自然规律的决定性规律.     

Agency,Teleological Control and Robust Causation

I propose a compatibilist theory of agency and responsibility, according to which an agent is responsible for an effect, if and only if, she is the earliest source of robust causation over it, via an action she carried out in the service of her long term interests. This theory deploys a notion of teleological control, which is a type of guidance-control of the agent over the effect and it involves action plans and means-end reasoning. The theory makes room for degrees of responsibility, and accounts for the distinction between compulsion and determination. The teleological control view is informed by neuroscience and cognitive theory, and while it is indifferent to the distinction between determinism and indeterminism, it contends that the property of natural laws relevant to agency is the presence of successive stages of attractor and bifurcation dynamics. While the former grounds robust causation over effects of actions, the latter limits the temporal range of robustness, allowing us to characterize responsibility in terms of the earliest sources of robust causation.     

Skilled Activity and the Causal Theory of Action

Skilled activity, such as shaving or dancing, differs in important ways from many of the stock examples that are employed by action theorists. Some critics of the causal theory of action contend that such a view founders on the problem of skilled activity. This paper examines how a causal theory can be extended to the case of skilled activity and defends the account from its critics.     

Integrating Motivating and Constraining Forces in Deviance Causation: A Test of Causal Chain Hypotheses in Control Balance Theory

ABSTRACT

A major innovation in control balance theory is the integration of motivating and constraining forces into a “causal chain” explanation of deviance. To test these relationships, this research presents a parsed model of the causal chain that focuses on the associations among control ratios, deviant motivation, situational provocations, constraint, and deviant behavior. Results from a first-person scenario testing hypotheses from this model show that, as predicted, control ratios affect deviance both directly and indirectly through motivating and constraining variables. While the full model explains about 39% of the variation in deviance, control ratios do not, however, show great explanatory power regarding variation in motivation and constraint.