共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Jason Kawall 《Philosophia》2006,34(2):153-156
In my “Promising and Supererogation” I argue that one cannot fulfill promises to perform supererogatory actions (such as “I hereby promise to perform one supererogatory action every month”). In a response to my paper, David Heyd argues that there is an alternative solution to the problem I raise. While I agree with much that Heyd says about the examples he discusses, his proposed solution involves a crucial alteration of the problem; his proposed solution does not solve the problem I present.
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Jason KawallEmail: |
2.
Wolfgang Fasching 《Continental Philosophy Review》2009,42(2):131-148
In this paper I discuss the nature of the “I” (or “self”) and whether it is presupposed by the very existence of conscious experiences (as that which “has” them) or whether it is, instead, in some way constituted by them. I argue for the former view and try to show that the very nature of experience implies a non-constituted synchronic
and diachronic transcendence of the experiencing “I” with regard to its experiences, an “I” which defies any objective characterization.
Finally I suggest that the self, though irreducible to inter-experiential relations, is not a “separately existing entity”,
but should be conceived of as a dimension, namely the dimension of first-personal manifestation of the experiences.
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Wolfgang FaschingEmail: |
3.
Giolo Fele 《Human Studies》2008,31(3):299-322
The aim of my paper is twofold. First, I show how the notion of phenomenal field can be used to examine, describe and understand
particular collective patterns pertaining to the everyday domain of our common social experience. Secondly, I outline the
role of the notion of “phenomenal field” in ethnomethodology. I briefly discuss Gurwitsch’s notion of functional meaning. After presenting the argument, I show “the locally achieved ordinariness of a common task”, that is the lining up of the
player of the two teams in the pitch, as an embodied coherence of figural contexture in its empirical perceptual details, as Garfinkel says.
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Giolo FeleEmail: |
4.
David Braun 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):243-262
I criticized Jeffrey King’s theory of complex demonstratives in “Problems for a Quantificational Theory of Complex Demonstratives.”
King replied in “Complex Demonstratives as Quantifiers: Objections and Replies.” I here comment on some of King’s replies.
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David BraunEmail: |
5.
Christopher Hamilton 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(2):181-195
Raimond Gaita’s work in moral philosophy is unusual and important in focusing on the concept of sainthood. Drawing partly
on the work of George Orwell, and partly on the life and work of Simone Weil, as well as on further material, I argue that
Gaita’s use of this notion to help make sense of the concept of human preciousness is unconvincing, not least because he does
not properly explore the figure and psychology of the saint in any detail. I relatedly argue that the notion of human preciousness
in question is implausible and, in some ways, sentimental. I also explore Gaita’s concept of “speaking personally” in moral
philosophy, and suggest that matters here are a great deal more complicated than he supposes.
相似文献
Christopher HamiltonEmail: |
6.
Phillip Montague 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):125-131
This paper is a rejoinder to Thaddeus Metz’s article “Censure Theory Still Best Accounts for Punishment of the Guilty: Reply
to Montague.” In his article, Metz attempts to answer objections to censure theory that I had raised previously. I argue in
my rejoinder that Metz’s defense of censure theory remains seriously problematic despite what he says in his reply.
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Phillip MontagueEmail: |
7.
John E. Sarnecki 《Erkenntnis》2008,69(2):145-164
Advocates of sortal essentialism have argued that concepts like “thing” or “object” lack the unambiguous individuative criteria
necessary to play the role of genuine sortals in reference. Instead, they function as “dummy sortals” which are placeholders
or incomplete designations. In disqualifying apparent placeholder sortals, however, these philosophers have posed insuperable
problems for accounts of childhood conceptual development. I argue that recent evidence in psychology demonstrates that children do possess simple or basic sortals of physical objects or things. I contend that these concepts provide the genuine individuative
criteria necessary for reference. As a consequence, sortalism can be made compatible with the developmental facts of conceptual
development.
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John E. SarneckiEmail: |
8.
Kelly Oliver 《Continental Philosophy Review》2009,42(1):63-80
In this essay, I argue that the contemporary notion of law has been reduced to regulations and disciplinary codes that do
not and cannot give meaning to our emotional lives and moral sensibilities. As a result, we have increasing numbers of what
I call “abysmal individuals” who suffer from a split between law—broadly conceived as that which gives form and structure
to social life—and personal embodied sensations of pain and pleasure. My attempt to understand the place of Abu Ghraib within
American culture leads to an analysis of our valorization of innocence and ignorance that not only becomes the grounds on
which we morally (if not legally) excuse abusive behavior as “fun,” but also becomes part of the justification for condoning
some forms of violence while condemning others. In addition, I argue that the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate
violence trades on underlying assumptions about the relationship between culture and nature, technology and bodies, wherein
bodies are imagined as natural and outside of the realm of law.
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Kelly OliverEmail: |
9.
Igor Douven 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(3):361-375
It is widely believed that the so-called knowledge account of assertion best explains why sentences such as “It’s raining
in Paris but I don’t believe it” and “It’s raining in Paris but I don’t know it” appear odd to us. I argue that the rival
rational credibility account of assertion explains that fact just as well. I do so by providing a broadly Bayesian analysis
of the said type of sentences which shows that such sentences cannot express rationally held beliefs. As an interesting aside,
it will be seen that these sentences also harbor a lesson for Bayesian epistemology itself.
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Igor DouvenEmail: |
10.
Mark E. Jonas 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2009,28(2):153-169
In this paper, I argue that Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept of self-overcoming has been largely misinterpreted in the philosophy
of education journals. The misinterpretation partially stems from a misconstruction of Nietzsche’s perspectivism, and leads
to a conception of self-overcoming that is inconsistent with Nietzsche’s educational ideals. To show this, I examine some
of the prominent features of the so-called “debate” of the 1980s surrounding Nietzsche’s conception of self-overcoming. I
then offer an alternative conception that is more consistent with Nietzsche’s thought, and provides a more nuanced understanding
of Nietzsche’s “anti-democratic” pedagogy. Ultimately, I argue that while Nietzsche’s educational philosophy is not egalitarian,
it can be effectively utilized in “democratic” classrooms, assuming his concept of self-overcoming is properly construed.
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Mark E. JonasEmail: |
11.
John Martin Fischer 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):15-20
I explore a key feature of Robert Kane’s libertarianism (about which I have been puzzled for some time). Kane claims that
we should separate issues of alternative possibilities from issues of ultimacy, but he further argues that they are connected
in a certain way. I call into question this connection, and I continue to argue for a strict separation of considerations
pertaining to alternative possibilities and “actual-sequence” considerations.
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John Martin FischerEmail: |
12.
Alexander A. Guerrero 《Philosophical Studies》2007,136(1):59-97
This paper takes on several distinct but related tasks. First, I present and discuss what I will call the “Ignorance Thesis,”
which states that whenever an agent acts from ignorance, whether factual or moral, she is culpable for the act only if she
is culpable for the ignorance from which she acts. Second, I offer a counterexample to the Ignorance Thesis, an example that
applies most directly to the part I call the “Moral Ignorance Thesis.” Third, I argue for a principle—Don’t Know, Don’t Kill—that
supports the view that the purported counterexample actually is a counterexample. Finally, I suggest that my arguments in
this direction can supply a novel sort of argument against many instances of killing and eating certain sorts of animals.
相似文献
Alexander A. GuerreroEmail: |
13.
Adam Kadlac 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(1):35-52
This paper explores Descartes’s work with an eye towards abiding issues in moral epistemology. In so doing, I focus on the
role played by the so-called provisional morality that surfaces in “Discourse on the Method”. What I argue is that despite
the tenuousness with which it seems to be held, Descartes remained committed to the truth of this morality even in the midst
of his most strenuous philosophical reflections. Put in the contemporary epistemological terms which provide the context of
my discussion, I argue that Descartes believed in the goodness of his provisional morality as opposed to merely accepting
its maxims.
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Adam KadlacEmail: |
14.
Markus Knauff 《Topoi》2007,26(1):19-36
The aim of this article is to strengthen links between cognitive brain research and formal logic. The work covers three fundamental
sorts of logical inferences: reasoning in the propositional calculus, i.e. inferences with the conditional “if...then”, reasoning
in the predicate calculus, i.e. inferences based on quantifiers such as “all”, “some”, “none”, and reasoning with n-place
relations. Studies with brain-damaged patients and neuroimaging experiments indicate that such logical inferences are implemented
in overlapping but different bilateral cortical networks, including parts of the fronto-temporal cortex, the posterior parietal
cortex, and the visual cortices. I argue that these findings show that we do not use a single deterministic strategy for solving
logical reasoning problems. This account resolves many disputes about how humans reason logically and why we sometimes deviate
from the norms of formal logic.
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Markus KnauffEmail: |
15.
In this article we defend the inferential view of scientific models and idealisation. Models are seen as “inferential prostheses”
(instruments for surrogative reasoning) construed by means of an idealisation-concretisation process, which we essentially
understand as a kind of counterfactual deformation procedure (also analysed in inferential terms). The value of scientific
representation is understood in terms not only of the success of the inferential outcomes arrived at with its help, but also
of the heuristic power of representation and their capacity to correct and improve our models. This provides us with an argument
against Sugden’s account of credible models: the likelihood or realisticness (their “credibility”) is not always a good measure
of their acceptability. As opposed to “credibility” we propose the notion of “enlightening”, which is the capacity of giving
us understanding in the sense of an inferential ability.
相似文献
Xavier de Donato RodríguezEmail: |
Jesús Zamora Bonilla (Corresponding author)Email: |
16.
Jakub Čapek 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):453-463
The first part of this essay is basically historical. It introduces the explanation–understanding divide, focusing in particular
on the general–unique distinction. The second part is more philosophical and it presents two different claims on action. In
the first place, I will try to say what it means to understand an action. Secondly, we will focus on the explanation of action
as it is seen in some explanatory sciences. I will try to argue that in some cases these sciences commit what I call an “external
contradiction”.
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Jakub ČapekEmail: |
17.
Peter Alward 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(2):235-255
In this paper, I argue, contra Perry, that the existence of locating beliefs does not require the abandonment of the analysis
of belief as a relation between subjects and propositions. I argue that what the “problem of the essential indexical” reveals
is that a complete explanation of behaviour requires both an explanation of the type of behaviour the agent engaged in and
an explanation of why she engaged in it in the circumstances that she did. And I develop an account of belief which encompasses
both explanatory roles and which still treats belief as a two-place relation between subjects and propositions.
相似文献
Peter AlwardEmail: |
18.
Shamik Dasgupta 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(1):35-67
We naturally think of the material world as being populated by a large number of individuals. These are things, such as my laptop and the particles that compose it, that we describe as being propertied and related
in various ways when we describe the material world around us. In this paper I argue that, fundamentally speaking at least,
there are no such things as material individuals. I then propose and defend an individual-less view of the material world
I call “generalism”.
相似文献
Shamik DasguptaEmail: |
19.
Jay Newhard 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(3):345-352
Contextual theories of truth are motivated primarily by the resolution they provide to paradoxical reasoning about truth.
The principal argument for contextual theories of truth relies on a key intuition about the truth value of the proposition
expressed by a particular utterance made during paradoxical reasoning, which Anil Gupta calls “the Chrysippus intuition.”
In this paper, I argue that the principal argument for contextual theories of truth is circular, and that the Chrysippus intuition
is false. I conclude that the philosophical motivation for contextual theories of truth fails.
相似文献
Jay NewhardEmail: |
20.
Michael Weber 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(2):209-226
Larry Temkin has shown that Derek Parfit’s well-known Mere Addition Paradox suggests a powerful argument for the intransitivity
of the relation “better than.” The crux of the argument is the view that equality is essentially comparative, according to
which the same inequality can be evaluated differently depending on what it is being compared to. The comparative view of
equality should be rejected, I argue, and hence so too this argument for intransitivity.
相似文献
Michael WeberEmail: |