Common-sense reasoning as proto-scientific agent activity

We wish to model common-sense reasoning in situations where it contains some of the ingredients typical of proto-scientific reasoning, with a view to future elaboration and proof of concept. To model this proto-scientific narrative, we employ the integrative formal computational machinery we have been developing and implementing for rational cooperative epistemic agents. In our logic-based framework, agents can update their own and each other's theories, which are comprised of knowledge, active rules, integrity constraints, queries, abducibles, and preferences; they can engage in abductive reasoning involving updatable preferences; set each other queries; react to circumstances; plan and carry out actions; and revise their theories and preferences by means of concurrent updates on self and others.     

Deductive and inductive conditional inferences: Two modes of reasoning

A number of single- and dual-process theories provide competing explanations as to how reasoners evaluate conditional arguments. Some of these theories are typically linked to different instructions—namely deductive and inductive instructions. To assess whether responses under both instructions can be explained by a single process, or if they reflect two modes of conditional reasoning, we re-analysed four experiments that used both deductive and inductive instructions for conditional inference tasks. Our re-analysis provided evidence consistent with a single process. In two new experiments we established a double dissociation of deductive and inductive instructions when validity and plausibility of conditional problems were pitted against each other. This indicates that at least two processes contribute to conditional reasoning. We conclude that single-process theories of conditional reasoning cannot explain the observed results. Theories that postulate at least two processes are needed to account for our findings.     

Representing Meta-Knowledge in Poole-Systems

We show how Poole-systems, a simple approach to nonmonotonic reasoning, can be extended to take meta-information into account adequately. The meta-information is used to guide the choice of formulas accepted by the reasoner as premises. Existence of a consistent set of conclusions is guaranteed by a least fixpoint construction. The proposed formalism has useful applications in defeasible reasoning, knowledge base fusion and belief revision.     

The ethic of care development: a longitudinal study of moral reasoning among practical-nursing, social-work and law-enforcement students

The study investigated changes in care-based moral reasoning, in the context of justice development over the 2-year period among practical-nursing, bachelor-degree social-work and law-enforcement students (N = 59). Main measures were Skoe's Ethic of Care Interview and Colby et al.'s Moral Judgment Interview. Of the participants 34% progressed in care reasoning, and 48% in justice reasoning. Social-work and nursing students progressed in care reasoning, and all groups progressed in justice reasoning. One participant (1.7%) regressed in care reasoning. Care and justice reasoning were parallel in terms of internal consistency, and they were positively related to each other. Findings suggest that care reasoning follows a developmental sequence, involving three main and two transitional levels, as suggested by Gilligan (1982). Main levels include self-concern (Level 1), caring for others (Level 2), and balanced caring for self and others (Level 3).     

Two approaches to the formalisation of defeasible deontic reasoning

This paper compares two ways of formalising defeasible deontic reasoning, both based on the view that the issues of conflicting obligations and moral dilemmas should be dealt with from the perspective of nonmonotonic reasoning. The first way is developing a special nonmonotonic logic for deontic statements. This method turns out to have some limitations, for which reason another approach is recommended, viz. combining an already existing nonmonotonic logic with a deontic logic. As an example of this method the language of Reiter's default logic is extended to include modal expressions, after which the argumentation framework in default logic of [20, 22] is used to give a plausible logical analysis of moral dilemmas and prima facie obligations.An earlier version of this article was written while the author was working at the Department of Computing, Imperial College London, supported by ESRC/MRC/SERC Joint Council Initiative Project G9212036. Work on the present version was supported by a research fellowship of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, and by Esprit WG 8319 Modelage. I thank one of the referees for his interesting comments. Also, many thanks are due to Marek Sergot for valuable discussions on the topic of this paper.     

复合命题推理能力相关影响因素的实证研究

本研究由两个实验组成,探讨了影响9-11岁的儿童,少年和成年人的复合命题推理能力发展的相关因素,主要有格式类型、性别、材料性质等因素.结果表明:小同的格式类型、性别对被试的复合命题推理能力有着碌著的影响.而材料性质对被试的复合命题推理能力的影响体现在阶段性上,它只对儿童阶段的被试有影响,而对少年阶段和成年阶段的被试影响却不大.     

推理与工作记忆

系统地总结了推理与工作记忆的研究进展,具体包括：（1）工作记忆的含义及其在推理中作用的相关研究;（2）推理与工作记忆关系的理论模型;（3）不同类型推理与工作记忆的实验研究;（4）推理与工作记忆的认知神经研究;（5）推理与工作记忆的未来研究展望     

Are Causal Structure and Intervention Judgments Inextricably Linked? A Developmental Study

The application of the formal framework of causal Bayesian Networks to children’s causal learning provides the motivation to examine the link between judgments about the causal structure of a system, and the ability to make inferences about interventions on components of the system. Three experiments examined whether children are able to make correct inferences about interventions on different causal structures. The first two experiments examined whether children’s causal structure and intervention judgments were consistent with one another. In Experiment 1, children aged between 4 and 8 years made causal structure judgments on a three‐component causal system followed by counterfactual intervention judgments. In Experiment 2, children’s causal structure judgments were followed by intervention judgments phrased as future hypotheticals. In Experiment 3, we explicitly told children what the correct causal structure was and asked them to make intervention judgments. The results of the three experiments suggest that the representations that support causal structure judgments do not easily support simple judgments about interventions in children. We discuss our findings in light of strong interventionist claims that the two types of judgments should be closely linked.     

Negativity bias in defeasible reasoning

In defeasible reasoning, initially drawn conclusions can be withdrawn in light of new information. In this paper, we examine how the conclusions drawn from conditionals describing positive or negative situations can be defeated by subsequent negative or positive information, respectively. Participants were confronted with conditionals of the form “If [situation], then I am happy/sad” which were either followed by no additional information or by additional information describing situations of the same or the opposite valence. The participant's task was to decide on a question asking for a possible conclusion (“Am I happy?” vs. “Am I sad?”). We found a negativity bias in defeasible reasoning: negative information defeated positively charged conclusions more strongly than positive information defeated negatively charged conclusions. We discuss our results in relation to the new psychology of reasoning.     

The effect of emotion on statistical reasoning: Findings from a base rates task

In this paper we explore the effect of emotion on statistical reasoning. We employed a base rates task to examine reliance on statistical information in the presence of congruent or incongruent anecdotal information. The impact of emotional content on statistical reasoning was investigated in controls and victims of sexual abuse. Two types of emotional contents were used, one generally emotional, and one related to sexual abuse. The latter category was included to investigate the effect of semantically identical stimuli that could potentially produce different levels of emotion in the victim and control groups. For control participants, emotional contents were associated with decreased use of statistical information and increased use of anecdotal information compared to neutral contents. Results from the victims group showed this effect to be increased for contents related to sexual abuse, suggesting that the effect is linked to the emotional connotation rather than semantic content. Victims perceived contents relating to their experience as more emotional and this was associated with specific reasoning impairments for these topics.     

概率的不同表征对贝叶斯推理的影响的研究

该研究以贝叶斯推算、判断为实验任务,探讨了三种概率表征(百分比、自然频率、概率词)、三种概率规则认识水平对贝叶斯推理的影响,结果表明:1)概率词表征的贝叶斯推算实质是判断过程。2)在三种概率表征中,频率表征更适合于正确完成贝叶斯推理,但存在学科背景的差异。3)贝叶斯推理使用的策略有正确规则、错误规则、命题知识、概率简捷式、直觉和个人意愿六种。4)贝叶斯判断的正确率高于贝叶斯推算,个体在贝叶斯判断上使用的正确规则多于贝叶斯推算过程。     

Elementary schoolchildren know a logical argument when they see one

Both empirical data and theoretical approaches suggest that argumentation is an important component of development of reasoning skills. We argue that if argumentation does have a primary role, then children should be able to distinguish more from less logical justifications even when they are incapable of determining the correct conclusion by themselves. We asked 8- and 11-year-old children to choose one of two conclusions for abstract reasoning problems, based on justifications from authority (friends and teacher) or logical ones (probability and counterexamples). Although there was a clear age-related increase, even the younger children considered logical justifications to be better than authority, irrespective of the specific conclusion endorsed. Thus, children can distinguish logical and non-logical justifications even when they cannot easily arrive at the correct conclusion by themselves.     

Sweatshop labor is wrong unless the shoes are cute: Cognition can both help and hurt moral motivated reasoning

The present research investigated the dual role of cognition as either an enabler of moral reasoning or self-interested motivated reasoning for endorsing sweatshop labor. Experiment 1A showed motivated reasoning: participants were more likely to endorse the use of sweatshop labor when considering a Caribbean vacation with questionable labor practices for themselves than for their friends. Experiment 1B demonstrated that endorsement of sweatshop labor mediated the relationship between product desirability and purchase intention. Experiment 2 found that cognitive resources were recruited to enhance motivated reasoning regarding sweatshop labor, the latter of which was reduced under cognitive load. Experiments 3A and 3B found that when cognitive resources were specifically directed in a comparative joint evaluation, participants offered harsher views on the ethicality of a favored company, and were less influenced by motivated factors than when under separate evaluations.     

Abductive inference in defeasible reasoning: a model for research programmes

Abduction is regarded as the inference process that goes from observations to explanations within a more general context or theoretical framework. There are good characterizations of abduction of surprising observations in monotonic theories. Also, in normal logic programs there are a tight relation among SLDNF and the abduction of negative literals. However, a problem that faces abduction is the explanation of anomalous observations, i.e., observations that are contradictory with respect to the current theory. For this reason, in this work we will consider the problem of embedding abduction of surprising and anomalous observations in defeasible (nonmonotonic) theories. We discuss some issues arising the pragmatic acceptance of abductive inferences in defeasible theories, and how to accommodate anomalous observations and characterize all the possible outcomes that a defeasible theory may face when confronted with new evidence. We explore the use of partial structures approach as a semantic foundation for our system. Finally, we discuss an application of our system as a formal device for representing the methodology of scientific research programmes. In this representation, a programme is regarded as a defeasible theory that draws predictions. When confronted with surprising or anomalous observations, the programme protects itself by means of heuristic procedures, which are represented in our system as abductive inference procedures.