Hypnotic experience and the autism spectrum disorder. A phenomenological investigation

In recent decades, the focus in autism research progressively expanded. It presently offers extensive material on sensorimotor disturbances as well as on perceptive-cognitive preferences of people with autism. The present article proposes not only a critical interpretation of the common theoretical framework in autism research but also focuses on certain experiences common to some people with autism and which can be appropriately understood by phenomenology. What I will call “hypnotic experiences” in autism are moments in which some individuals withdraw into intense sensorial and perceptive experiences. Following their examples, I use the term “hypnosis” primarily to describe a trance state in which the individuals become highly alert to and awake for an experience of a totally new kind. Through a close analysis of autobiographical writings from people with autism I defend the idea that the particularity of hypnotic experiences in autism consists in a certain qualitative shift within experience itself: what changes, in the hypnotic moments, is the way a person with autism relates to his/her own bodily experiences. If this qualitative shift is indeed difficult to account for within a reifying and intellectualist research perspective, phenomenology offers a large conceptual framework for understanding it. Phenomenology, and precisely, phenomenological psychopathology, will thus emerge as a major device in accounting for such “hypnotic experiences”. The argument mainly draws on the twofold structure of experience which is traditionally used in phenomenological research: it claims that in hypnotic experience people with autism are inclined to focus on non-reified “sensings”, “perceivings” and “movings”, and thus leave aside the object itself and any intentional reification of it. Finally, I will claim that this restriction to mere non-reified sensings might lead to a completely new conception of self and world. In the hypnotic experiences of autism, neither the subject nor the object come to a full-blown and independent existence. A thorough phenomenological analysis of hypnotic experience in autism therefore also has to face the question of a corresponding ontology of these experiences.     

An Elegy,a Love Song,and a Lullaby

In the course of the past decade, I have found himself looking as much to poets and the experience of reading poetry as to the work of other analysts in my ongoing effort to become a psychoanalyst. Both the poet and the psychoanalyst are individuals whose life's work is that of making “raid[s] [on] the inarticulate” (Eliot, 1940, p. 128) in their effort to delve as deeply as possible into what it is to be human and to render that experience in the medium of language. To this end, I offer a reading of Seamus Heaney's (1987) “Clearances,” an elegy Heaney wrote for his mother soon after her death. I explore the ways in which the experience of mourning—whether in a poem or in an analytic experience—is not simply “conveyed” (as if illuminating something already there) but created in the very act of writing/saying the poem or of bringing feelings to life in words in an analytic session.

I begin by presenting a brief biographical account of Heaney not to “explain” his poetry in analytic terms but to allow the reader to create a more imaginative, more human reading of the poem as he or she enters into the conversation between the life of the man and the life of the poetry. Then I discuss the ways in which “Clearances” comes to life as a variety of coexisting forms of love that together shape an experience of grief.     

Categories of Life: The Status of the Camp in Derrida and Agamben

This essay is an exploration of the relationship between Agamben's 1995 text, Homo Sacer, and Derrida's 1992 “Force of Law” essay. Agamben attempts to show that the camp, as the topological space of the state of exception, has become the biopolitical paradigm for modernity. He draws this conclusion on the basis of a distinction, which he finds in an essay by Walter Benjamin, between categories of life, with the “pro‐tagonist” of the work being what he calls homo sacer, or bare life—life that is stripped of its humanity and value. Five years earlier, in 1990, Derrida had given a lecture at UCLA (later published in its entirety as “The Force of Law”) in which he had analyzed the very same essay by Benjamin and had highlighted the distinction between “base life” and “just life.” The implications of his analysis show a discomforting prox‐imity between Benjaminian messianism and the Nazi “final solution,” a conclusion that Agamben dismisses entirely. In this paper, however, I demonstrate that the structures of the two works are quite similar in many important ways. I argue that, though the broad scope of Agamben's work is original in many respects, and I would not wish to reduce Agamben's work to Derridean repetitions, he nevertheless utilizes much more of Derrida's analysis, specifically with respect to the categori‐zation of life, than he would like the reader to believe.     

White Habits,Anti-Racism,and Philosophy as a Way of Life

This paper examines Pierre Hadot’s philosophy as a way of life in the context of race. I argue that a “way of life” approach to philosophy renders intelligible how antiracist confrontation of racist ideas and institutionalized white complicity is a properly philosophical way of life requiring regulated reflection on habits—particularly, habits of whiteness. I first rehearse some of Hadot’s analysis of the “way of life” orientation in philosophy, in which philosophical wisdom is understood as cultivated by actions which result in the creation of wise habits. I analyze a phenomenological claim about the nature of habit implied by the “way of life” approach, namely, that habits can be both the cause and the effect of action. This point is central to the “way of life” philosophy, I claim, in that it makes possible the intelligent redirection of habits, in which wise habits are more the effect than simply the cause of action. Lastly, I illustrate the “way of life” approach in the context of anti-racism by turning to Linda Martín Alcoff's whiteness antieliminativism, which outlines a morally defensible transformation of the habits of whiteness. I argue that anti-racism provides an intelligible context for modern day forms of what Hadot calls “spiritual exercises” insofar as the “way of life” philosophy is embodied in the practice of whites seeing themselves seeing as white and seeing themselves being seen as white.     

Examining the role of moral foundations in promoting intergroup contact willingness

Improving people's motivation to seek meaningful intergroup contact is considered key to facilitating intergroup harmony. Based on moral foundations theory, this study examines how moral foundations as individual traits predict contact willingness with three minority groups (foreign domestic helpers, LGBT, and Chinese expats) and how moral emotions mediate such associations. We tested our hypotheses based on survey data across Hong Kong and Singapore. We found that care/harm foundation positively predicted contact willingness with foreign domestic helpers and LGBT people, mediated by compassion. Sanctity/degradation foundation negatively predicted contact willingness with LGBT people only in Singapore. Loyalty/betrayal foundation served as a positive predictor of willingness to contact Chinese expats. We also found care/harm foundation to be exclusively associated with compassion and promoted willingness to contact with helpers and LGBT people. Our findings highlight the influence of moral foundations, and possibly norms and intergroup dynamics at the societal level in predicting willingness to contact outgroups.     

LIFE AS EMERGENT AGENTIAL SYSTEMS: TENDENCIES WITHOUT TELEOLOGY IN AN OPEN UNIVERSE

Life is a relationship among various kinds of agents interacting at different scales in ways that are multifarious, complex, and emergent. Life is always a part of an ecological embedding in communities of interaction, which in turn structure and influence how life evolves. Evolution is essential for understanding life and biodiversity. Henri Bergson's Creative Evolution suggests a way of examining “tendencies” without “teleology.” In this paper I reexamine that work in light of recent concepts in evolutionary ecology, and explore how agential aspects of life are essential for understanding how emergence provides a basis for a process‐based metaphysics of life. In support of this project, I will explore how the major transitions of life on Earth have proceeded through increasing levels of cooperation among agents (e.g., mitochondria in animal cells forming a mutualistic relationship), which have allowed further emergences and complexity to evolve. This complexity always, however, emerges in the context of ecological relationships and a nonteleological evolutionary process. Yet, while nonteleological, the progression of life thus far on this planet seems to hold the promise of certain tendencies that seem inherent in life itself.     

A Best Practices Guide to Intersectional Approaches in Psychological Research

This paper serves as a “best practices guide” for researchers interested in applying intersectionality theory to psychological research. Intersectionality, the mutually constitutive relations among social identities, presents several issues to researchers interested in applying it to research. I highlight three central issues and provide guidelines for how to address them. First, I discuss the constraints in the number of identities that researchers are able to test in an empirical study, and highlight relevant decision rules. Second, I discuss when to focus on “master” identities (e.g., gender) versus “emergent” identities (i.e., White lesbian). Third, I argue that treating identity as a process situated within social structural contexts facilitates the research process. I end with a brief discussion of the implications for the study of intersectionality.     

“Hall of Broken Mirrors”—Enactment in an Analytic Group of “Difficult Patients”

This article focuses on the transformation of dissociated self-states as a curative factor in an analytic group of “difficult patients.” Foulkes (1964) referred to the analytic group as a “curative hall of mirrors.” I would like to integrate group analytic theory with relational psychoanalytic concepts. I propose that when dissociated self-states are expressed in a group, this creates a “broken mirrors” experience that is sometimes expressed through enactment. I develop this idea, and argue that the group mirrors to the patient his image—distorted and defective—and forces him to cope with his “not me” states. I demonstrate, through three clinical vignettes, how dissociated states hinder the reflective space and create a “hall of broken mirrors” experience. I would argue that in a safe space, the patients’ “not me” states can be transformed, and the hall of broken mirrors can turn into a curative hall of mirrors.     

Reply to “Expanding the Frame” by Anthony Bass and to Commentaries

In this reply I offer a short answer to the question about the theme “What do we learn from experience?” I can say that certainly the power of that particular experience with that patient made me more sensitive and careful toward similar moments with other patients. I then offer some comment on the contributions in this issue of the journal. I emphasize the interweaving of structure and process and the process of building meaning as an intersubjective achievement. I also intervene on the theme “how to transmit psychoanalytic wisdom.”     

Science at the Supermarket: Multiplication,Personalization and Consumption of Science in Everyday Life

Which is the kind science’s psychological guidance upon everyday life? I will try to discuss some issues about the role that techno-scientific knowledge plays in sense-making and decision making about practical questions of life. This relation of both love and hate, antagonism and connivance is inscribable in a wider debate between a trend of science to intervene in fields that are traditionally prerogative of political, religious or ethical choices, and, on the other side, the position of those who aim at stemming “technocracy” and governing these processes. I argue that multiplication, personalization and consumption are the characteristics of the relationship between science, technology and society in the age of “multiculturalism” and “multi-scientism”. This makes more difficult but intriguing the study and understanding of the processes through which scientific knowledge is socialized. Science topics, like biotech, climate change, etc. are today an unavoidable reference frame. It is not possible to not know them and to attach them to the most disparate questions. Like in the case of Moscovici’s “Freud for all seasons”, the fact itself that the members of a group or a society believe in science as a reference point for others, roots its social representation and the belief that it can solve everyday life problems.     

The Ferenczi cult: its historical and political roots

I examine how Sándor Ferenczi has survived in the cultural memory of psychoanalysis, and why myths and legends have been created around his life and work. It seems that he could not escape the fate of the founding fathers of psychoanalysis, most notably, that of Freud and Jung: their life and work have become an object of cultic respect for the followers, diabolic figures for the enemies. Quasi-religious cultivation of the “great man” is an often observable phenomenon in literature, politics, history and in science, and it has several political and ideological functions. These functions may help to increase the inner cohesion and the group identity of the cultic community, to defend the group against external threats. Psychoanalysis has always been vulnerable to myth formation; first, for obvious sociological reasons, and, secondly, for reasons originating in the nature of therapy. The cultic functions can be realized in several ways, such as, for example, the ritualization of the transmission of knowledge, and the “biography as passion” that is, attempts to create a biographical narrative in which all life history moments crystallize around the great man's central theme. Most of the biographies on the life of great psychoanalysts are of this kind – and Ferenczi is no exception. A historiography of psychoanalysis must follow the path of modern historiography in general, which attempts at deconstructing both myths and counter-myths about persons, events and processes, in political, as well as in cultural and intellectual history. By examining the structure of myth formation about psychoanalysts we can learn a lot about how ideas are operating in changing social contexts.     

TIME AND PLACE FOR PHILOSOPHY

Abstract: Writing in continuous gratitude to Gary Matthews's wonderful project of rescuing childhood from its disregard, not to say banishment, in professional philosophy, I relate here certain moments in his considerations of early childhood to moments in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, which opens with a scene of childhood from Augustine's Confessions, and also to moments in later stages of childhood (as Matthews also significantly indicates) and, beyond that, to adolescent crises and to what I have called philosophy as “the education of grown‐ups.” I raise the issue of whether we are to see the “odd” questions of early childhood as proto‐science, which will eventually graduate into better science, or as proto‐philosophy, which will be continuously elaborated in philosophical investigation. This raises the question of whether philosophy is to be regarded, early or late, as inseparable from science or, as the later Wittgenstein urges, autonomous with respect to science's glamorous advances.     

Russian Philosophers on Continuous Creation as the Basis for Social Change

Vladimir Solov’ëv, Sergej Bulgakov, Nikolaj Berdjaev, and Semën Frank shared the conviction that Creation is incomplete: humanity must arrive at organizing social life on an “eighth day.” Thus they prophesied the Universal Church, “social Christianity,” “personalist socialism,” and “spiritual democracy.” Their attempt to avoid any illegitimate confusion between independent rational thought and Christian faith prompted Bulgakov to become an ordained theologian, Berdjaev a “philosophical poet,” and Frank a “Christian realist.” Solov’ëv’s theosophical attempt to philosophically substantiate faith and consequently eschatological prophecy finds itself in the same tragic predicament as Christian faith in general when amalgamated on a one to one basis with the world. I am to show that this is not the case for any of the three other authors discussed, however, much they did adhere to some of Solov’ëv’s major lines of thought.     

The Immigrant Analyst: A Journey From Double Consciousness Toward Hybridity

In this paper I utilize the concept of “double consciousness” as a framework for theorizing the subjectivity of the immigrant analyst. I invite the reader to journey with me as I deconstruct my experiences as an immigrant analyst in North America in order to depict how “double consciousness” shapes subjectivity. I show that I developed a binary, bifurcated analyst self, despite my wish to become a multicultural analyst who could “stand in the spaces.” This subtly clouded my clinical judgment causing me to side with the immigrant boyfriend of an American patient and to ignore significant differences between myself and a French patient because he too was an immigrant. When I named and processed my “double consciousness” I experienced resignification, my subjectivity was reconfigured, I was able to experience a panoply of selves, a hybrid “me-ness,” and I could recognize and address “double consciousness” in my immigrant patients.     

(Re)encountering Individuality: Schlegel's Romantic Imperative as a Response to Nihilism

According to Friedrich Schlegel: “The Romantic imperative demands [that] all nature and science should become art [and] art should become nature and science”; “[P]oetry and philosophy should be made unified”, and “life and society [should be made] poetic”. The aim of this paper is to explain why Schlegel believes that this is an imperative that constrains philosophy and ordinary life. I argue that the answer to this question requires that we regard the Romantic imperative as a response to the skeptical worry that was introduced by Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi as nihilism. The aspect of nihilism that I discuss concerns the worry that we are incapable of experiencing individuals qua individuals. According to Schlegel, this skeptical threat requires a reorientation in thought and philosophical method, one that must be modeled on the aesthetic orientation towards the world. More precisely, the experience of individuals qua individuals, which is called into question by the nihilist, depends on the special normative structure of the creative and critical attitude towards art and beauty that Schlegel called Romantic Poesie. Kant failed to address nihilism because he failed to recognize that the normative structure that he himself ascribed to the judgment of taste is required also for experiencing individuals as individuals, and for being properly responsive to persons.     

Momentums of Meeting

ABSTRACT

In this article, I attempt to engage questions about the momentums of the moments of meeting formulated by Lou Sander as propitious for early development. I wanted to portray observations that grapple with the intersection between psychic change and complex dynamics, like imagistic confluence with verbalized interaction, embodied recognition from parent to child, and affecto/libidinal communication between patient and analyst. The focus is on four different directions for comments: (1) Some links to my own clinical practice and research; (2) An instance of “confluence of visual image between patient and analyst”, a moment of imagistic meeting, as understood through self-analysis by an open-minded analyst, including the discovery of “the importance of unsuccessful empathy in learning and growing”; (3) A study of “engrossment,” exemplifying the ways in which the earliest moments of “recognizing” ones infant, can engender joyful, expansive affects, with enhancement of self-image in fathers; and (4) The continuing generative momentum of Lou Sander’s participation within the Boston Change Process Study Group.