Remembering and Forgetting Childhood Sexual Abuse

Out of a large number of university students who responded to a questionnaire about childhood sexual abuse (CSA), approximately a quarter reported that they had an experience in childhood that qualified. The majority of students who reported a CSA experience refused, elsewhere in the questionnaire, to classify themselves as ‘sexually abused’. Moreover, those who claimed lack of understanding of the event at the time it occurred also reported that they thought about the event less often in the intervening years and that they conceivably would have not remembered the event even if asked directly about it. Lack of understanding at the time of encoding leads to less reported memory. These observations are discussed in terms of possible mechanisms for how genuine sexual abuse experiences might be temporarily forgotten-even for extended periods-and subsequently remembered.     

Afterwards—Forgetting,Remembering, Transmitting. Extreme Trauma and Culture in Post-National-Socialist Germany

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis - Facing the rupture the Shoah marks in the history of humanity and in the life of survivors and their relatives, this article approaches long-term...     

Habitual Prospective Memory and Aging: Remembering Intentions and Forgetting Actions

Routine or habitual prospective memory tasks (e.g., taking medication) have the potential for creating confusions regarding whether or not an action has already been performed. We developed a laboratory paradigm for examining the kinds of processes thought to be operating in these kinds of tasks. Younger and older participants were asked to perform an action once and only once on each of 11 trials. The results showed that age and divided attention contributed to both omission and repetition errors. This new paradigm reveals memory failures in a habitual prospective memory task, and the results demonstrate that older adults are particularly susceptible to these memory problems.     

Hineni and Transference: The Remembering and Forgetting of the Other

Emmanuel Levinas proposed a philosophical critique that worked to unsettle and decenter generalizing, totalizing, and thematizing attempts to define the self. However, on the other hand, Levinas provides the space for the formation of a configuration of the self that has been conditioned by ethical relation and even points to some of the ingredients for (or shape of) such a self. Throughout Levinas’ work, the concept of hineni (“Here I am”) is used to illustrate the moral event that best characterizes the “psyche.” In the following paper, we consider how to apply the notion of hineni to modern psychological constructs of the human self. In the first section, we flesh out the characteristics of a self lived as hineni. We argue that such a self is “shaped” or oriented morally toward the outside and is radically exposed to the Other (not merely a bearer of moral consciousness or moral attributes). It is a remembering of the preoriginal and primordial ethical relation. In the second section, we use the psychoanalytic concept of transference to illustrate how the moral shape of the self can be forgotten, and how the self enters a state of “mineness” wherein the Other is reduced to one’s own history (Levinas 1990). In this state of forgetfulness, we argue that a “concreteness of egoism” (Levinas 1969) is maintained and a self lived toward the outside remains untenable. Transference, we argue, is an impoverished relation and a forgetting of and violence to the Other. Its proper use, however, in the therapeutic alliance allows for the possibility of a remembering of the Other and a calling beyond oneself.

Remembering,understanding, and representation

Starting with the facts that not everything that is understood is remembered, and that not everything that is remembered is understood. this paper urges that models of language processing should be able to make a distinction between comprehension and memory. To this end. a case is made for a spreading activation process as being the essential ingredient of the comprehension process. It is argued that concepts activated during comprehension not only restrict the search set for candidate concepts to be used in a top-down fashion, they also constitute part of an episodic representation that can come to be p e of long-term memory. The way in which these representations atrophy is discussed, as is the way in which their idiosyncratic components are eliminated in producing representations in semantic memory. Some observations on the comprehension and memory of text are made and arguments are presented to show how intrusions and omissions in recall can be handled. Some existing experimental data is reanalyzed in terms of the proposed model and alternative interpretations consistent with the model are shown to be possible.     

Between Remembering and Forgetting the Years of Political Violence: Psychosocial Impact of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Peru

This article analyzes the association between knowledge of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), evaluation of TRC's achievements, experience of victimization, attitudes toward remembering and forgetting past political violence, perceptions of socioemotional climate (SEC), belief in forgiveness and attitudes toward violence in Peru based on a study conducted in three Peruvian cities with different rates of victimization due to political violence during 1980–2000 (n = 1200). Results showed that a positive attitude toward remembering the past of political violence was predominant and related to a positive evaluation of TRC's achievements. Attitude toward remembering also has an ambivalent collective effect increasing both positive and negative SECs, and it is less accepted by victims of political violence. On the other hand, attitude toward forgetting is less accepted by participants, and it also has an ambivalent effect by increasing positive and negative SECs. Attitude toward forgetting has more societal costs, since it is related to attitudes toward violence and decreased knowledge and a positive evaluation of TRC. In general, findings suggest that remembering traumatic events has an emotional cost, but also it is shown that remembering seems to be more beneficial for society in the long‐term than forgetting.     

Remembering and Remembering to Forget

To navigate our lives we all need to find ways both to remember and sometimes to forget aspects of our experiences that threaten us or cause us anxiety. Often patients need help in developing a capacity to hold in some dialectical tension, both remembering and forgetting. Some people are so frightened by the harsher realities of their lives that they turn to us to take on the remembering side of this dialectic, and, sometimes, to take on the forgetting side. Part of the work of their therapy is to help them develop the capacity to do more of both for themselves. Other patients come better prepared to take on this challenge and use us to witness and support their own efforts. This paper considers how patients use their hours with us to remember and to forget and ways in which psychoanalysts might participate in this undertaking.     

Remembering, Familiarity, and Source Monitoring

Two experiments investigated recollective experience in a source monitoring task. Subjects saw an array of objects and performed, watched, or imagined actions involving pairs of objects. In a subsequent recognition test, subjects indicated whether their recognition judgements were made on the basis of conscious recollective experience (“remember” responses), or on some other basis such as familiarity (“know” responses). The proportions of correct “remember” responses for both objects and actions decreased from performed, through watched, to imagined actions, whereas the proportions of correct “know” responses were uninfluenced by the source of the memories. In addition, the relationship between recollective experience and accuracy of source judgement varied across sources. Source accuracy for performed actions was obtained only in “remember” responses, whereas source accuracy for imagined actions was obtained only in “know” responses. Source accuracy for watched actions was obtained in both “remember” and “know” responses. The findings suggest that the types of memory attributes available at retrieval determine the quality of subsequent memory experience, and it is proposed that memories with strongly self-referential attributes (arising from performed actions) powerfully cue recollective experience during retrieval.     

Justification and Forgetting

This article sets forth a view about how epistemic justification figures in the ongoing justification of memory belief, a view that I call moderate justificational preservationism (MJP). MJP presupposes a nontraditional notion of memorial justification according to which what makes one's present belief that p prima facie justified is that which provided one with prima facie justification to believe that p originally (or some portion thereof). The article offers support for MJP by examining a series of cases that involve forgetting, and in doing so, criticizes views of Jennifer Lackey, David Owens, Michael Huemer, and George Pappas.     

Remembering Early Childhood: How Much, How, and Why (or Why Not)

In this article, we consider recent research on three questions about people's memories for their early childhood: whether childhood amnesia is a real phenomenon, whether implicit memories survive when explicit memories do not, and why early episodic memories are sketchy. The research leads us to form three conclusions. First, we argue that childhood amnesia is a real phenomenon, as long as the term is defined clearly. Specifically, people are able to recall parts of their lives from the period between ages 2 and 5 years, but they recall less from that period than from other periods. Second, we conclude that implicit memories from early childhood may be evident even when explicit memories are not, a finding that suggests early experience may affect behavior in ways that people do not consciously recognize. Third, we argue that although young children are well known to be wonderfully efficient learners of semantic information, they have difficulty in either encoding or retrieving the interlinked aspects of events that lend them their autobiographical character. Although more evidence is needed, the relative lack of episodic memories of early childhood may be linked to maturation of prefrontal cortex.