1966 and All That: James Gibson and Bottom-Down Theory

ABSTRACT

The “later” James Gibson is widely misrepresented as an extreme stimulus–response theorist. In fact, Gibson's 1966 book presents a radical alternative to stimulus–response theory. “Perceptual systems” are not passive and receptive but “organs of active attention” (1966/1968, p. 58). Perceivers “reach out” into the world. This commentary examines some of the implications of Gibson's systems-cum-functionalist-cum-ecological approach, including the relations between the senses; the concept of “sensationless” perception; and most fundamentally, the nature of perceptual systems as extending beyond the body. I conclude that an adequate understanding of perception cannot be limited to the already severely limited domain of psychology. If Gibson is right, “ecological psychology” is a contradiction in terms.     

What Is an Affordance?

What should and should not be considered an affordance is still an open issue. At the 2002 North American meeting of the International Society for Ecological Psychology, a symposium was held concerning this topic. The articles in this special issue are expanded versions of the papers presented at that symposium. To set the stage for those discussions, this article presents an analysis of the evolution of J. J. Gibson's thinking on this issue, from some of his earliest writings (i.e., J. J. Gibson & Crooks, 1938) through his most recent writings (i.e., J. J. Gibson, 1979/1986). It is hoped that this forum will stimulate thinking concerning this important ecological concept.     

What’s Inside Your Head Once You’ve Figured Out What Your Head’s Inside Of

Abstract

In this article, we investigate the foundations for a Gibsonian neuroscience. There is an increasingly influential current in neuroscience based on pragmatic and selectionist principles, which we think can contribute to ecological psychology. Starting from ecological psychology, we identify three basic constraints any Gibsonian neuroscience needs to adhere to: nonreconstructive perception, vicarious functioning, and selectionist self-organization. We discuss two previous attempts to integrate affordances with neuroscience: Reed’s ecological rendering of Edelman’s selectionism as well as Dreyfus’ phenomenological interpretation of Freeman’s neurodynamics. Reed and Dreyfus face the problem of how to account for “value.” We then show how the free-energy principle, an increasingly dominant framework in theoretical neuroscience, is rooted in both Freeman’s neurodynamics and Edelman’s selectionism. The free-energy principle accounts for value in terms of selective anticipation. The selection pressures at work on the agent shape its selective sensitivity to the relevant affordances in the environment. By being responsive to the relevant affordances in the environment, an agent comes to have grip on its interactions with the environment and can thrive in its ecological niche.     

Task difficulty and risk in the determination of driver behaviour

The task–capability interface (TCI) model provides a theoretical formulation that enables integration of the competing concepts of Wilde’s risk homeostasis theory (Wilde, G.J.S., 1982. The theory of risk homeostasis: implications for safety and health. Risk Analysis 2, 209-225) and the zero risk theory of Näätänen and Summala (1976). The model proposes that drivers opt for a range of task difficulty they are prepared to accept and modify their speed in particular to maintain that level. Three predictions from the TCI model are that perceived difficulty should be systematically related to speed, that ratings of the likelihood of collision (i.e. statistical risk) should be independent of speed until task demand approaches capability and that feelings of risk should correlate with ratings of statistical risk. These predictions were tested in two experiments using 70 licensed participants (M = 24.7 years) who rated segments of three types of road driven at different speeds in a video simulation of the driving task, filmed from the driver’s perspective. The results of both experiments supported predictions from the TCI model that task difficulty ratings would be highly correlated with speed and that estimates of statistical risk would be independent of speed until the driving task became more demanding. However, ratings of perceived risk were completely independent of estimates of statistical risk at lower speeds, but were highly correlated with ratings of task difficulty throughout the range of speeds studied. Thus the experience of risk is not the same as subjective estimates of the probability of collision. It was concluded that feelings of risk may provide the motivational dimension for avoiding taking on a level of task difficulty which is too high.     

Promoting traffic safety among young male drivers by means of elaboration-based interventions

Previous research in social psychology has brought about significant changes in attitudes and behaviour by merely asking respondents to imagine, or reflect, on a phenomenon and arrive at their own conclusions. To test the potential of such interventions in the traffic safety area, an experiment comprising 353 young men 18–23 years old with a driver’s licence was conducted. Two experimental groups were induced to imagine a severe accident scenario and to visualize their feelings and the consequences on their future lives. A control group was interviewed about neutral issues. Attitudes towards risk-taking were measured post-intervention and at follow-up. The experimental groups showed more “ideal” attitudes than the control group post-intervention. At follow-up the attitudes of the experimental group remained unchanged, whereas the control group had changed towards more “ideal” attitudes. Self-reported risk-taking behaviour was measured pre-intervention and at follow-up. At follow-up all groups reported significantly less risk-taking behaviour than at pre-intervention. It is suggested that answering the questionnaires increased mental elaboration concerning risky driving, and it is concluded that interventions that unobtrusively make drivers reflect on their driving should be explored further as a means to promote traffic safety.     

T. V. Moore’s (1939)Cognitive Psychology

Thomas Verner Moore published a book calledCognitive Psychology in 1939, almost 30 years before Neisser’s (1967) more familiar and far more influential work. Although it covers most of the standard topics found in current cognitive psychology textbooks, and even anticipated several current trends, Moore’s text is not cited by any of the major histories of the “cognitive revolution” or any current cognitive textbook. We provide a brief sketch of Moore’s academic life and summarize several of his papers that are still cited. After describing the psychologies prevalent in 1939, we compare Moore’s text with two contemporary works, Woodworth (1938) and McGeoch (1942). We conclude by comparing the older text with Neisser’s and by offering several reasons why the book is virtually unknown.     

Enactivism,pragmatism…behaviorism?

Shaun Gallagher applies enactivist thinking to a staggeringly wide range of topics in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, even venturing into the realms of biological anthropology. One prominent point Gallagher makes that the holistic approach of enactivism makes it less amenable to scientific investigation than the cognitivist framework it seeks to replace, and should be seen as a “philosophy of nature” rather than a scientific research program. Gallagher also gives truth to the saying that “if you want new ideas, read old books”, showing how the insights of the American pragmatists, particularly Dewey and Mead, offer a variety of resources and tools that can be brought to bear on modern day enactivism. Here, I suggest that the adoption of enactivist thinking would undermine the assumptions of certain scientific positions, requiring their abandonment, rather than simply making it more difficult to conduct research within an enactivist framework. I then discuss how Mead’s work has been used previously as a “pragmatist intervention” to help resolve problems in a related 4E endeavour, Gibson’s ecological psychology, and make a case for the inclusion of radical behaviorism as another pragmatist resource for 4E cognition. I conclude with a plea for further enactivist intervention in studies of comparative cognition.

     

Risk Compensation: Implications for Safety Interventions

Several theories of driving behavior have suggested that individuals will react to environmental changes in a compensatory fashion such that riskier behaviors result from perceptions that the environment has become safer. Specifically, both Peltzman (1975) and Wilde (1982a) have proposed such compensation mechanisms, although Wilde takes a more stringent approach. Unfortunately, the majority of studies on the topic have attempted to test the compensation mechanism using aggregate accident data. Studies that have investigated risk compensation at the level of the individual have failed to assess subjective risk, a critical variable for the interpretation of the risk associated with specific behaviors. It is argued that risk compensation can only operate at the individual level and that previous studies testing the validity of risk compensation are difficult to interpret due to levels of analysis issues or unmeasured variables. In the current investigation, two judgment/decision making studies were designed to test risk compensation. Individual level analyses indicated that there was modest support for Peltzman's mild interpretation of the risk compensation mechanism, but that individuals do not compensate for changes in the environment enough to return to their original levels of risk as Wilde has predicted.     

Inviting complementary perspectives on situated normativity in everyday life

In everyday life, situations in which we act adequately yet entirely without deliberation are ubiquitous. We use the term “situated normativity” for the normative aspect of embodied cognition in skillful action. Wittgenstein’s notion of “directed discontent” refers to a context-sensitive reaction of appreciation in skillful action. Extending this notion from the domain of expertise to that of adequate everyday action, we examine phenomenologically the question of what happens when skilled individuals act correctly with instinctive ease. This question invites exploratory contributions from a variety of perspectives complementary to the philosophical/ phenomenological one, including cognitive neuroscience, neurodynamics and psychology. Along such lines we try to make the normative aspect of adequate immediate action better accessible to empirical research. After introducing the idea that “valence” is a forerunner of directed discontent, we propose to make progress on this by first pursuing a more restricted exploratory question, namely, ‘what happens in the first few hundred milliseconds of the development of directed discontent?’     

Uncanny Communication and the Porous Mind

In this paper I examine the phenomenon of “uncanny” unconscious communication and the plausibility of “telepathic” interconnectivity between patient and therapist. While reexamining long-standing psychoanalytic reluctance to engage with the topic of the “uncanny,” I present clinical examples of seeming anomalous transmission, followed by discussion from contrasting perspectives of psychoanalysis, neuroscience, quantum physics, and parapsychology. The patient’s and analyst’s reactions to these uncanny moments are explored, along with the potential clinical value of nurturing receptivity to this “frequency” of unconscious attunement.     

The construct and measurement of spontaneous attention to a number

The Spontaneous Attention to a Number (SAN) construct serves a different purpose than Hannula-Sormunen and colleagues’ Spontaneous Focus on Number (SFON) construct. As an extension of Eleanor J. Gibson’s differentiation theory, the premise of SAN is that children’s step-wise construction of small number concepts enables them to perceptually differentiate among increasingly larger numbers—to distinguish reliably between “oneness” or “twoness” and larger numbers, then between “threeness” and “larger numbers,” and eventually between “fourness” and larger numbers. In contrast, SFON refers to the tendency to attend to numbers in general—an attentional process that, unlike SAN, is separate from enumeration skill. Not surprisingly, then, although the prototype for both the SAN and SFON tasks is Nancy C. Jordan and colleagues’ non-directive nonverbal number task, the independent development of the SAN and SFON tasks resulted in key differences in how they are administered and scored and to whom they are administered.     

An approach to novice driver training

IntroductionBased upon neuroscience findings relevant to emerging adults, this paper considers 12 cognitive and behavioural features of young drivers’ performance and possible ameliorative strategies to address them.Literature findingsEvidence is explored on the extent to which each has been identified and evaluated in respect of young driver training and education in driving performance. The paper considers the extent to which each of these contributions to young driver safety is feasible and has been adopted, identifying those for which further development and implementation is required.DiscussionBased upon neuroscience findings as well as the evidence summarised in this paper, it concludes with an outline of an –“ideal”– training program for young novice drivers.     

Developing traffic safety interventions from conceptions of risks and accidents

By means of investigating the mental background to young male drivers’ risky traffic behaviour, this explorative qualitative study outlines a framework for the construction of interventions that could mitigate risk-taking among young male drivers. Seven males, 20–23 years of age, demonstrating excessive speeding behaviour when driving, were interviewed in-depth. Five themes, “Self-image as a good driver brings self-esteem”, “Commanding high speed – a pleasurable sensation”, “High awareness of risks, but notions of serious outcomes are not salient”, “Imagined accident scenarios evoke outcome conceptions” and “Perceived cause of accident influences anticipated affective reactions”, had central positions in their conceptions about risk-taking and accidents. The results were analysed in relation to previous literature on the concepts of Anticipated Regret and Imagining as antecedents to attitude and behaviour change, and it was concluded that interventions based on imagining the emotional aftermath of being the perpetrator of a serious accident should be developed and tested.     

人格心理学的学科架构初探

人格心理学作为心理学体系中的重要分支之一,自创立以来却一直缺乏一个完整统一的学科架构。这种状况极大地限制了该学科的发展。文章回顾了人格心理学的起源和发展,探讨了学科发展的趋势,呈现了当下几种主要的学科架构。在综合比较的基础上,对其中有代表性的Clonlinger人格“描述—动力—发展”的“3D”模型进行了修正：（1）增加了人格理论;（2）把第一个“D”由“人格描述”改为“人格表现”;（3）对原有“3D”的内容进行补充和完善。得出了对人格心理学学科架构的“3D”修正模型：即理论加“3D”     

中文语境下的“心理”和“心理学”

“心”或“心理”等词语在汉语中有相当长的历史,对这些词语的理解反映了中国人关于“心理”的认识。中文的“心”往往不是指一种身体器官而是指人的思想、意念、情感、性情等,故“心理学”这三个汉字有极大的包容性。任何学科都摆脱不了社会文化的作用,中国心理学亦曾受到意识形态、科学主义和大众常识等方面的影响。近年中国学者对心理学自身的问题进行了反思。从某种意义上说,中国人对“心理”和“心理学”的理解或许有助于心理学的整合,并与其他国家的心理学一道发展出真正的人类心理学     

From “The Depleted Self” to “The Will to Believe”: Excavating the Hermeneutics of Donald Capps

The concept of “reframing” lies at the heart of the pastoral psychology of Donald Capps. In previous articles I have argued that the process of reframing follows a circular hermeneutics. An excavation of Capps’ hermeneutics reveals foundations in the fields of philosophy and psychology. This article focuses on the legacy of Johann Gottfried von Herder, Friedrich Schleiermacher, William James and Paul Ricoeur. It explores the differences and commonalities between William James and Friedrich Schleiermacher’s understanding of religious experience as well as Paul Ricoeur’s understanding of narrativity and traces these strains to Capps’ pastoral psychology. As illustration of his pastoral approach to healing and wholeness the problem of “the depleted self,” so prevalent in “our narcissistic age,” encounters the healing narrative of Jesus that appeals to “the will to believe.”     

On-road trust and perceived risk in Level 2 automation

To encourage appropriate use of driving automation, we need to understand and monitor driver’s trust and risk perception. We examined (1) how trust and perceived risk are affected by automation, driving conditions and experience and (2) how well perceived risk can be inferred from behaviour and physiology at three levels: over traffic conditions, aggregated risk events, and individual risk events.30 users with and without automation experience drove a Toyota Corolla with driving support. Safety attitude, subjective ratings, behaviour and physiology were examined.Driving support encouraged a positive safety attitude and active driver involvement. It reduced latent hazards while maintaining saliently perceived risks. Drivers frequently overruled lane centring (3.1 times/minute) and kept their feet on or above the pedals using ACC (65.8% of time). They comfortably used support on curvy motorways and monotonic and congested highways but less in unstable traffic and on roundabouts. They trusted the automation 65.4%, perceived 36.0% risk, acknowledged the need to monitor and would not engage in more secondary tasks than during manual driving.Trust-in situation reduced 2.0% when using automation. It was 8.2% higher than trust-in-automation, presumably due to driver self-confidence. Driving conditions or conflicts between driver and automation did not affect trust-in-automation.At the traffic condition level, physiology showed weak and partially counter-intuitive effects. For aggregated risk events, skin conductance had the clearest response but was discernible from baseline in  < 50%. Pupil dilation and heart rate only increased with strong braking and active lane departure assist. For individual risk events, a CNN classifier could not identify risk events from physiology. We conclude that GSR, heart rate and pupil dilation respond to perceived risk, but lack specificity to monitor it on individual events.     

The coming of history: Heidegger and Nietzsche against the present

Heidegger’s 1938–1939 seminar on Nietzsche’s On the Utility and Liability of History for Life continues Heidegger’s grand interpretation of Nietzsche as a metaphysical thinker of presence. Nietzsche’s conceptions forgetting, memory, and even life itself, according to Heidegger, are all complicit in the privileging of presence. Simultaneous with his seminar, Heidegger is also compiling the notebook, Die Geschichte des Seyns (The History of Beyng), 1938–1940, wherein he sketches his own conception of history. Examining Heidegger’s criticisms of Nietzsche in the light of his contemporaneous notebook allows us to articulate Heidegger’s concern for history and for “what has-been” (das Gewesene) as a thinking of the “coming” of being. For Heidegger, to exist historically is to exist as something sent, something arriving, as something that “comes” to us. This coming of history is an ontological determination of all that is, no longer construed as present-at-hand objects, but as always arriving, relational beings. After presenting Heidegger’s view of the coming of history, I return to Nietzsche’s Utility and Liability of History to draw attention to an aspect of his text that is neglected by Heidegger, that of the political. The concluding sections of Nietzsche’s text confront the politics of the present, in both senses of the genitive, in order to rally against the closure of society. In the conclusion to the paper, I turn to the political dimension of Nietzsche’s thinking of history with an eye to how it might elude Heidegger’s interpretation.