Shake and Fake: the Role of Interview Anxiety in Deceptive Impression Management

We investigated whether anxiety about self-presentation concerns during interviews (i.e., interview anxiety) is associated with applicants’ use of deceptive impression management (IM) tactics. We examined the relationship between interview anxiety and deceptive IM, and we examined whether the personality traits of honesty-humility and extraversion would be indirectly related to deceptive IM through interview anxiety. Participants (N?=?202) were recruited after an interview for a research assistant position. Interview anxiety scores were positively related to deceptive IM. Furthermore, there was evidence of a negative indirect effect of honesty-humility on deceptive IM, via overall interview anxiety. Also, extraversion was indirectly associated with deceptive IM through interview anxiety. Results suggest that deceptive IM can be used as a protective mechanism to maintain self-esteem or to avoid the loss of rewards. This paper is the first to examine the role of interview anxiety in interview faking.

     

学前儿童欺骗及欺骗策略发展的研究

选取130名学前儿童,采用“找钱币”欺骗任务和标准误信念任务,研究学前儿童欺骗及欺骗策略的发生、发展。结果发现:随年龄增长,采用“破坏证据”和“说谎”欺骗策略的人数呈下降趋势,采用四种联合策略的人数则呈上升趋势;即使3岁儿童也能出示“破坏证据”和“说谎”这两种行为主义的欺骗策略,但“制造虚假痕迹”的心理主义欺骗策略在4岁以后才开始出现;3岁、6岁儿童的误信念理解与欺骗策略不相关,而4岁和5岁儿童的则相关。     

How Children with Head Injury Represent Real and Deceptive Emotion in Short Narratives

Narratives are not only about events, but also about the emotions those events elicit. Understanding a narrative involves not just the affective valence of implied emotional states, but the formation of an explicit mental representation of those states. In turn, this representation provides a mechanism that particularizes emotion and modulates its display, which then allows emotional expression to be modified according to particular contexts. This includes understanding that a character may feel an emotion but inhibit its display or even express a deceptive emotion. We studied how 59 school-aged children with head injury and 87 normally-developing age-matched controls understand real and deceptive emotions in brief narratives. Children with head injury showed less sensitivity than controls to how emotions are expressed in narratives. While they understood the real emotions in the text, and could recall what provoked the emotion and the reason for concealing it, they were less able than controls to identify deceptive emotions. Within the head injury group, factors such as an earlier age at head injury and frontal lobe contusions were associated with poor understanding of deceptive emotions. The results are discussed in terms of the distinction between emotions as felt and emotions as a cognitive framework for understanding other people's actions and mental states. We conclude that children with head injury understand emotional communication, the spontaneous externalization of real affect, but not emotive communication, the conscious, strategic modification of affective signals to influence others through deceptive facial expressions.     

The role of movement exaggeration in the anticipation of deceptive soccer penalty kicks

Human movement containing deception about the true outcome is thought to be perceived differently compared to the non‐deceptive version. Exaggeration in the movement is thought to change the perceiver's mode of functioning from an invariant to a cue‐based mode. We tested these ideas by examining anticipation in skilled and less skilled soccer players while they viewed temporally occluded (?240 ms, ?160 ms, ?80 ms, 0 ms, +80 ms) deceptive, non‐deceptive, and non‐deceptive‐exaggerated penalty kicks. Kinematic analyses were used to ascertain that the kicking actions differed across conditions. The accuracy of judging the direction of an opponent's kick as well as response confidence were recorded. Players were over confident when anticipating deceptive penalty kicks compared to non‐deceptive kicks, suggesting a cue‐based mode was used. Furthermore, there was a significant relationship between less skilled players’ confidence ratings and their accuracy 80 ms before ball‐foot contact in the deceptive and non‐deceptive‐exaggerated conditions, but not the non‐deceptive condition. Because both deceptive and non‐deceptive‐exaggerated kicks contained exaggeration, results suggest exaggerated movements in the kickers’ action at 80 ms before ball‐foot contact explains why a cue‐based mode prevails when anticipating deceptive kicks at this time point.     

Would I lie to you? “leakage” in deceptive facial expressions relates to psychopathy and emotional intelligence

This was the first investigation of individual differences in adopting deceptive universal emotional expressions. We hypothesized that psychopathic traits would lead to a heightened ability to suppress emotional expressions and exhibit less “leakage” of inconsistent emotions during deceptive displays. Further, we predicted that emotional intelligence (EI) would lead to a heightened ability to simulate emotional expressions. Participants (N = 100) viewed emotionally arousing (happy, sad, fearful, disgusting) images, responding to each with a genuine or deceptive expression. Each video frame (30/sec) was coded for emotion (in)consistent with the intended expression (365,550 frames coded for 2437 expressions). As predicted, psychopathic traits - specifically, high levels of interpersonal manipulation - were related to shorter durations of unintended emotional “leakage” during deceptive expressions. In contrast, the erratic lifestyle element of psychopathy predicted greater emotional inconsistency during deceptive displays. Individuals higher in EI - specifically, the ability to perceive and express emotion - feigned emotions more convincingly than others but were not more immune to emotional leakage.     

Can People Identify “Deceptive” or “Misleading” Items that Tend to Produce Mostly Wrong Answers?

In many domains, two‐alternative forced‐choice questions produce more correct responses than wrong responses across participants. However, some items, dubbed “deceptive” or “misleading”, produce mostly wrong answers. These items yield poor calibration and poor resolution because the dominant, erroneous response tends to be endorsed with great confidence, even greater than that of the correct response. In addition, for deceptive items, group discussion amplifies rather than mitigates error while enhancing confidence in the erroneous response. Can participants identify deceptive items when they are warned about their existence? It is argued that people's ability to discriminate between deceptive and non‐deceptive items is poor when the erroneous responses are based on the same process assumed to underlie correct responses. Indeed, participants failed to discriminate between deceptive and non‐deceptive perceptual items when they were warned that some of the items (Experiment 1) or exactly half of the items (Experiment 2) were deceptive. A similar failure was observed for general‐knowledge questions (Experiment 3) except when participants were informed about the correct answer (Experiment 4). Possibly, for these tasks, people cannot escape the dangers lurking in deceptive items. In contrast, the results suggest that participants can identify deceptive problems for which the wrong answer stems from reliance on a fast, intuitive process that differs from the analytic mode that is likely to yield correct answers (Experiment 5). The practical and theoretical implications of the results were discussed. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of unconscious memory errors in judgments of confidence for sentence recognition

The present experiment tested the hypothesis that unconscious reconstructive memory processing can lead to the breakdown of the relationship between memory confidence and memory accuracy. Participants heard deceptive schema-inference sentences and nondeceptive sentences and were tested with either simple or forced-choice recognition. The nondeceptive items showed a positive relation between confidence and accuracy in both simple and forced-choice recognition. However, the deceptive items showed a strong negative confidence/accuracy relationship in simple recognition and a low positive relationship in forced choice. The mean levels of confidence for erroneous responses for deceptive items were inappropriately high in simple recognition but lower in forced choice. These results suggest that unconscious reconstructive memory processes involved in memory for the deceptive schema-inference items led to inaccurate confidence judgments and that, when participants were made aware of the deceptive nature of the schema-inference items through the use of a forced-choice procedure, they adjusted their confidence accordingly.     

大学生求职说谎行为倾向研究

采用实验的方法对当前大学生在求职过程中的说谎行为现象进行了研究。将来自不同性别、院校性质、学历、学科、家庭来源及不同就业压力感的被试791名随机分配到16种实验处理情境当中。研究发现,不同人口变量的大学生在对说谎行为的选择以及对不同说谎内容的选择上存在着不同程度的差异。     

Processes leading to confidence and accuracy in sentence recognition: a metamemory approach

We propose that memory confidence is based on the processes and products of the just-completed memory task, along with the participants' metamemory beliefs about the relation of these processes and products to memory accuracy. We tested this metamemory approach to confidence by having participants carry out a simple recognition memory task with deceptive and nondeceptive items. The deceptive items were sentences that contained a possible synonym substitution, thus allowing errors based on gist memory. For nondeceptive items, high confidence was associated with high accuracy. For deceptive items the relationship reversed; high confidence was associated with low accuracy. A memory process questionnaire was developed that provided more differentiated phenomenal reports than the traditional know/remember distinction. For nondeceptive items, metamemory beliefs tended to be valid indicators of accuracy, but for deceptive items involving unconscious reconstructive memory processes, they tended to be invalid indicators of memory accuracy. The overall results lend strong support for our metamemory approach to memory confidence.     

Processes leading to confidence and accuracy in sentence recognition: A metamemory approach

We propose that memory confidence is based on the processes and products of the just-completed memory task, along with the participants’ metamemory beliefs about the relation of these processes and products to memory accuracy. We tested this metamemory approach to confidence by having participants carry out a simple recognition memory task with deceptive and nondeceptive items. The deceptive items were sentences that contained a possible synonym substitution, thus allowing errors based on gist memory. For nondeceptive items, high confidence was associated with high accuracy. For deceptive items the relationship reversed; high confidence was associated with low accuracy. A memory process questionnaire was developed that provided more differentiated phenomenal reports than the traditional know/remember distinction. For nondeceptive items, metamemory beliefs tended to be valid indicators of accuracy, but for deceptive items involving unconscious reconstructive memory processes, they tended to be invalid indicators of memory accuracy. The overall results lend strong support for our metamemory approach to memory confidence.     

孤独症个体的谎言理解及其与对自我/他人错误信念理解的关系

选取言语智力匹配的孤独症个体（19名）、典型发展个体（20名）、智力迟滞个体（19名）为被试,动画呈现以言语和非言语信息为线索的两个谎言情景,考察了孤独症个体谎言理解中的谎言行为判断、真假信息辨别、谎言意图理解及其与自我/他人错误信念理解的关系。结果表明：（1）孤独症个体能够进行谎言行为判断,其困难主要表现在辨别真假信息及对谎言意图的理解上;（2）孤独症个体对他人错误信念理解越好,对真假信息辨别也越准确,而谎言意图理解则与对自我错误信念的理解有关;（3）谎言线索以言语或非言语方式呈现对孤独症谎言理解并无影响。     

Practice effects, workload, and reaction time in deception

Cognitive theorists argue that deception may involve attentional capture, working memory load, or perceived incongruity with memory, whereas psychophysiologists argue for stimulus salience, arousal, and emotion. This article presents a comprehensive model of deception and assesses the effect of practice on deceptive responding. A three-session longitudinal study examined the effect of practice on reaction time (RT) in relation to deception and response congruity. Participants evaluated self-referent sentences and responded truthfully or deceptively. Findings indicate that deceptive responding generates longer RTs than does truthful responding and that this relationship remains constant with practice. We use these findings to support a cognitive model of deception.     

Young children's practical deceptions and their understanding of false belief

This paper deals with young children's understanding of false belief and their behaviour in situations of deception. It is argued that it is unsurprising that children under the age of 4 fail traditional false belief tests; and yet that children aged 2–3 do implement deceptive behaviours. To achieve compatibility, a particular category of deceptive acts (deceptive acts where awareness of the dupe's erroneous belief plays no role) is detailed. Deceptive behaviours are treated as belonging to the category of pretend behaviours. Some developmental considerations, concerning the links between deception and false belief are put forward.     

Electrophysiological markers of working memory usage as an index for truth-based lies

People prefer to lie using altered truthful events from memory, perhaps because doing so can increase their credibility while reducing cognitive and working memory (WM) load. One possible way to counter such deceptive behavior is to track WM usage, since fabricating coherent lies or managing between truth and lies is likely to involve heavy WM load. In this study, participants memorized a list of words in the study session and used these old words to provide deceptive answers when cued later, in the testing session. Our behavioral results showed that people needed more time to make a deceptive response during the execution stage, and this prolonged deceptive reaction time (RT) was negatively correlated with each participant’s WM capacity. Event-related potential findings showed a more negative-going frontal amplitude between the lie and truth conditions during the preparation stage, suggesting that WM preparatory processes can be detected long before a deceptive response is verbalized. Furthermore, we observed a larger positive frontal-central amplitude during the execution stage, which was negatively correlated with participants’ lie–truth RT differences, suggesting that participants’ efficiency in producing deceptive responses can be readily traced electrophysiologically. Together, these findings suggest that WM capacity and preparation are crucial to efficient lying and that their related electrophysiological signatures can potentially be used to uncover deceptive behaviors.     

Is It Worth Lying For? Physiological and Emotional Implications of Recalling Deceptive Affection

This investigation explored the risks of affectionate expressions in romantic relationships by examining the physiological and emotional implications of recalled expressed deceptive affectionate messages to romantic partners. Ninety‐nine participants were assigned to one of three conditions: deceptive affection, honest affection, or plans with a friend (control). Results indicate that individuals' blood pressure and heart rates are not differentially influenced when recalling deceptive affection compared to honest affection or common communication. Similarly, there were no differences in feelings of guilt and shame based on the motive for the deceptive expression. Posthoc analyses compared affectionate conditions (deceptive and honest) to the control condition and revealed no significant physiological differences. Implications for theory, methodological comparisons, and future research are discussed.     

Linguistic correlates of self in deceptive oral autobiographical narratives

The current study collected orally-delivered autobiographical narratives from a sample of 44 undergraduate students. Participants were asked to produce both deceptive and non-deceptive versions of their narrative to two specific autobiographical question prompts while standing in front of a video camera. Narratives were then analyzed with Coh-Metrix software on 33 indices of linguistic cohesion. Following a Bonferroni correction for the large number of linguistic variables (p < .002), results indicated that the deceptive narratives contained more explicit action verbs, less linguistic complexity, and less referential coherence (sentences being cohesive with each other). The results support a theory that, in deceptive narratives, there is greater narrative distance between the self that narrates and the self that is narrated about. This suggests that narrative selves are constituted not as autonomous selves, but are subject to processes (e.g., psychological, linguistic, social) that are likely operating on a subconscious level.     

Lay Persons' and Police Officers' Beliefs Regarding Deceptive Behaviour

Research on the detection of deception, via non-verbal cues, has shown that people's ability to successfully discriminate between truth and deception is only slightly better than chance level. One of the reasons for these disappointing findings possibly lies in people's inappropriate beliefs regarding ‘lying behaviour’. A 64-item questionnaire originally used in Germany, which targets participants' beliefs regarding truthful and deceptive behaviour, was used. The present study differed from previous research in three ways: (i) instead of a student population, police officers and lay people were sampled, (ii) both people's beliefs regarding others' deceptive behaviour and their beliefs regarding their own deceptive behaviour were examined, and (iii) both non-verbal cues to, and content characteristics of, deceptive statements were examined. Results were consistent with previous studies, which found significant differences between people's beliefs regarding deceptive behaviour and experimental observations of actual deceptive behaviour. Further, police officers held as many false beliefs as did lay people and finally, participants were more accurate in their beliefs regarding their own deceptive behaviour than they were in their beliefs regarding others' behaviour.     

A truth that’s told with bad intent: An ERP study of deception

Human social cognition critically relies on the ability to deceive others. However, the cognitive and neural underpinnings of deception are still poorly understood. Why does lying place increased demands on cognitive control? The present study investigated whether cognitive control processes during deception are recruited due to the need to inhibit a tendency to state the truth, or reflect deceptive intent more generally. We engaged participants in a face-to-face interaction game and examined event-related brain potentials (ERPs) while participants lied and told the truth with or without deceptive intention. The same medial frontal negative deflection (N450) occurred when participants lied and when they told the truth with deceptive intent. This suggests that the main challenge of lying is not to inhibit a tendency to state the truth. Rather, the challenge is to handle the cognitive conflict resulting from the need to keep others’ mental states in mind while deceiving them.     

Knowledge is power? Outcome probability information impairs detection of deceptive intent

The benefits and costs of prior expectations that are (i.e., congruent) or are not in harmony (i.e., incongruent) with action outcomes appear to be balanced; however, researchers have yet to examine the influence on skilled detection of deception. In this study we investigated whether response bias resulting from probability information (a) is stronger for low-skilled than high-skilled participants, (b) is stronger for deceptive actions than genuine actions, and (c) impairs the discriminability of genuine and deceptive actions. High-skilled (n = 15) and low-skilled (n = 15) soccer players responded to life-sized projected video clips showing an oncoming opponent taking the ball to their left or right, with or without a deceptive ‘stepover’ action. Three probability conditions were used with respect to outcome direction: 50/50, 67/33, and 83/17. Participants responded by stepping on one of two corresponding pressure mats, as if attempting to intercept the player. Response accuracy for genuine and deceptive actions was used to generate measures of bias (c) and sensitivity (d’). The results confirmed stronger probability bias for deceptive actions than genuine ones, and for low-skilled than high-skilled participants. Congruence between high outcome probability and the direction of the fake significantly enhanced the effectiveness of the deceptive action. The study provides the first evidence that outcome probability information impairs skilled detection of deceptive intent.     

Detecting Deceit in Pairs of Children1

This study examined adults’ ability to distinguish between truthful and deceptive pairs of children. Adult observers (N = 88) judged the veracity of one of 22 truthful or deceptive pairs of children (12–13 years). The children were interviewed separately about their real or imagined encounters with an unknown man. Analyses showed that the overall accuracy was 62.5%; significantly better than chance level of 50%. Deception detection accuracy was higher when watching both pair members than when watching one child. The analysis of self‐reported cues to deception given by observers showed that the consistency between the children's statements was the most frequent cue. An analysis of the actual consistency of children's statements showed significantly more contradictions in the deceptive statements.