Arguing Anselm's Argument

Interpretation surrounding Saint Anselm's celebrated Proslogion often divides across analytical (philosophical) and non-analytical (historical, phenomenological, etc.) lines, with focus on the argument(s) of Chapters 2 and 3 isolated from the rest of the text. Interpretations may vary significantly, but the lines of interpretation continue along these divisions, thus propagating the distinction. Alternative tools, however, expose difficulties of such a division of the Proslogion ; they permit analytical justification of claims, concerns and intuitions of historical, phenomenological, and other interests, implicating a more complex re-interpretation of the presuppositions supporting the isolation of Chapters 2 and 3.
Based on an approach to reading developed from semiotics and text linguistics, this analysis challenges the major line of analytic interpretation of the Proslogion . This paper argues that the Proslogion has a structure different from the previously realized one, and that the structure consists of three nested frameworks within a devotional whole, faith leading the heart to illuminate the intellect, which in turn can grasp the syllogisms of chapters 2–3/4. Such a textual structure suggests strongly different conclusions about the core significance, utility, and meaning of the Proslogion as argument.     

Arguing about definitions

What are the implications of taking seriously Chaïm Perelman's proposition that “definitions are rhetorical”? Efforts to find Real Definitions are dysfunctional to the extent they direct argumentation toward pseudo “is” claims and away from explicit “ought” claims about how words are to be used. Addressing definitional disputes explicitly as propositions ofought rather thanis could put on the agenda the pragmatic concerns of definitional choice that might otherwise remain tacit.     

Taking Religious Pluralism Seriously. Arguing for an Institutional Turn. Introduction

Discussions of the relations between religions, society, politics, and the state in recent political philosophy are characterized, firstly, by a strong US American bias focusing on limitations of religious arguments in public debate. Even if the restriction or radical exclusion of religious reasons from public debate has recently been extensively criticized, secularist interpretations of liberal-democratic constitutions still prevail. Here it is argued that both strong secularism and weak or second order secularism are counterproductive for many reasons. Secondly, separationist interpretations of state-church relations are predominant, even if the severe wall of separation is criticized more often nowadays. Here it is argued that there are more and more interesting options than either separationism or accommodationism, that we should not exclusively focus at the constitutional relations between state and churches but address the full reciprocal relationship between society, culture, politics, nation, state and (organized) religions, and that we need more historical and comparative perspectives for the required institutionalist turn in political theory in order to overcome the obstacles inherent in predominant American political philosophy. The articles included in this volume are first, modest steps in this new direction.     

Dogmatic behavior among students: testing a new measure of dogmatism

The study tested the validity of a new measure of dogmatism by examining university students' evaluations of the Bible. Those who believed that every word in the Bible came directly from God and that the Bible is free of any error, contradiction, or inconsistency scored much higher on this dogmatism measure than students who thought otherwise. Such "true believers" then read the 4 highly varying Gospel accounts of the resurrection of Jesus. The most dogmatic of them still insisted there were no contradictions or inconsistencies in the Bible. The less dogmatic acknowledged that contradictions and inconsistencies exist. These results reinforce those of 4 earlier studies that indicated that the new measure of dogmatism has empirical validity.     

Learning by Arguing About Evidence and Explanations

Collaborative learning with cases characteristically involves discussing and developing shared explanations. We investigated the argumentation scheme which learners use in constructing shared explanations over evidence. We observed medical students attempting to explain how a judge had arrived at his verdict in a case of medical negligence. The students were learning within a virtual learning environment and their communication was computer mediated. We identify the dialogue type that these learners construct and show that their argumentation conforms with an abductive form of argumentation scheme (‘inference to the best explanation’). We also assessed the students’ learning and propose that it is related to particular features of this argumentation scheme.     

Emergent Individuals

We explain the thesis that human mental states are ontologically emergent aspects of a fundamentally biological organism. We then explore the consequences of this thesis for the identity of a human person over time. As these consequences are not obviously independent of one's general ontology of objects and their properties, we consider four such accounts: transcendent universals, kind-Aristotelianism, immanent universals, and tropes. We suggest there are reasons for emergentists to favour the latter two accounts. We then argue that within such ontologies, emergentism about properties pushes one to the stronger claim that there are emergent individuals, though not individuals which are dual to person's bodies — substance emergentism, but not substance dualism.     

Emergent persons

Recent psychological theorizing about the emergence of persons makes a number of ontological claims that are not always explicit. A critical consideration of such claims reveals both considerable convergence and some points of disagreement across different psychological theories of emergent personhood. What is clear is that all such theories resist the reduction of persons to biophysical or sociocultural properties, conditions, and processes. In various ways, they each call for a nonreductionistic recognition of the sociocultural constitution of important aspects of personhood, without denying the necessity of biophysical requirements of personhood. Because standard emergentist positions in physical science and the philosophy of physical science mostly ignore the sociocultural level of reality, psychological theorizing about the emergence of persons requires an alternative ontological framework. It is proposed that an ontology of levels of reality that includes the physical, chemical, biological, sociocultural, and personal/psychological is appropriate for understanding how persons are both substantively and relationally emergent within the biophysical, sociocultural world. With such an ontological framework in place, it is possible to understand human activity in the world as the primary vehicle for both the phylogenetic evolution and ontogenetic development of persons.