共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Yingjin Xu 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2011,6(3):465-479
In the current dialogue of “science and religion,” it is widely assumed that the thoughts of Darwinists and that of atheists
overlap. However, Jerry Fodor, a full-fledged atheist, recently announced a war against Darwinism with his atheistic campaign.
Prima facie, this “civil war” might offer a chance for theists: If Fodor is right, Darwinistic atheism will lose the cover
of Darwinism and become less tenable. This paper provides a more pessimistic evaluation of the situation by explaining the
following: Fodor’s criticism of adaptationism (as the backbone of Darwinism), viz., his refutation of any counterfactual-supporting
laws on the macro-evolutionary level, implies that a law-maker is dispensable on this level. This will either encourage skepticism
against the omniscience (at least that concerning the future of macro-evolution) of the Creator, or render the notion of God
less appealing. 相似文献
2.
3.
Kevan Edwards 《Synthese》2009,170(2):289-310
This paper identifies and criticizes a line of reasoning that has played a substantial role in the widespread rejection of
the view that Fodor has dubbed “Concept Atomism”. The line of reasoning is not only fallacious, but its application in the
present case rests on a misconception about the explanatory potential of Concept Atomism. This diagnosis suggests the possibility
of a new polemical strategy in support of Concept Atomism. The new strategy is more comprehensive than that which defenders
of the view, namely Fodor, have employed. 相似文献
4.
Fred Feldman 《Philosophical Studies》2006,129(1):49-79
Utilitarians are attracted to the idea that an act is morally right iff it leads to the best outcome. But critics have pointed
out that in many cases we cannot determine which of our alternatives in fact would lead to the best outcome. So we can’t use
the classic principle to determine what we should do. It’s not “practical”; it’s not “action-guiding”. Some take this to be
a serious objection to utilitarianism, since they think a moral theory ought to be practical and action-guiding. In response,
some utilitarians propose to modify utilitarianism by replacing talk of actual utility with talk of expected utility. Others
propose to leave the original utilitarian principle in place, but to combine it with a decision procedure involving expected
utility. What all these philosophers have in common is this: they move toward expected utility in order to defend utilitarianism
against the impracticality objection. My aim in this paper is to cast doubt on this way of replying to the objection. My central
claim is that if utilitarians are worried about the impracticality objection, they should not turn to expected utility utilitarianism.
That theory does not provide the basis for a cogent reply to the objection.
Originally presented at the 2004 Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference,
Bellingham Washington, August 2, 2004, with comments by Gustaf Arrhenius and Elizabeth Harman. I am grateful to Arrhenius
and Harman for their challenging criticism, as well as to Chris Heathwood, Michael Zimmerman, Owen McLeod, Elinor Mason, Eric
Moore and other participants at the Bellingham Conference for comments and suggestions. In October, 2004 I discovered Mark
Strasser’s ‘Actual Versus Probable Utilitarianism’. I see that in that paper Strasser anticipates a number of the points I
make here. 相似文献
5.
Bradley Rives 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(2):211-238
This paper concerns the dialectal role of Frege Cases in the debate between Concept Cartesians and Concept Pragmatists. I
take as a starting point Christopher Peacocke’s argument that, unlike Cartesianism, his ‘Fregean’ Pragmatism can account for
facts about the rationality and epistemic status of certain judgments. I argue that since this argument presupposes that the
rationality of thoughts turn on their content, it is thus question-begging against Cartesians, who claim that issues about
rationality turn on the form, not the content, of thoughts. I then consider Jerry Fodor’s argument that ‘modes of presentation’
are not identical with Fregean senses, and argue that explanatory considerations should leads us to reject his ‘syntactic’
treatment of Frege cases. Rejecting the Cartesian treatment of Frege cases, however, is not tantamount to accepting Peacocke’s
claim that reasons and rationality are central to the individuation of concepts. For I argue that we can steer a middle course
between Fodor’s Cartesianism and Peacocke’s Pragmatism, and adopt a form of Pragmatism that is constrained by Fregean considerations,
but at the same time denies that concepts are constitutively tied to reasons and rationality.
相似文献
Bradley RivesEmail: |
6.
Gary Williams 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2011,10(2):217-239
I respond to Ned Block’s claim that it is “ridiculous” to suppose that consciousness is a cultural construction based on language
and learned in childhood. Block is wrong to dismiss social constructivist theories of consciousness on account of it being
“ludicrous” that conscious experience is anything but a biological feature of our animal heritage, characterized by sensory
experience, evolved over millions of years. By defending social constructivism in terms of both Julian Jaynes’ behaviorism
and J.J. Gibson’s ecological psychology, I draw a distinction between the experience or “what-it-is-like” of nonhuman animals
engaging with the environment and the “secret theater of speechless monologue” that is familiar to a linguistically competent
human adult. This distinction grounds the argument that consciousness proper should be seen as learned rather than innate
and shared with nonhuman animals. Upon establishing this claim, I defend the Jaynesian definition of consciousness as a social–linguistic
construct learned in childhood, structured in terms of lexical metaphors and narrative practice. Finally, I employ the Jaynesian
distinction between cognition and consciousness to bridge the explanatory gap and deflate the supposed “hard” problem of consciousness. 相似文献
7.
Kantian non-conceptualism 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Robert Hanna 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):41-64
There are perceptual states whose representational content cannot even in principle be conceptual. If that claim is true,
then at least some perceptual states have content whose semantic structure and psychological function are essentially distinct
from the structure and function of conceptual content. Furthermore the intrinsically “orientable” spatial character of essentially
non-conceptual content entails not only that all perceptual states contain non-conceptual content in this essentially distinct sense, but also that consciousness goes all the way down into so-called unconscious or subpersonal mental states. Both my argument for the existence of essentially non-conceptual
content and my theory of its structure and function have a Kantian provenance.
相似文献
Robert HannaEmail: |
8.
Daniel Halliday 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(2):381-393
9.
Michael D. Barber 《Husserl Studies》2008,24(2):79-97
John McDowell rejects the idea that non-conceptual content can rationally justify empirical claims—a task for which it is
ill-fitted by its non-conceptual nature. This paper considers three possible objections to his views: he cannot distinguish
empty conception from the perceptual experience of an object; perceptual discrimination outstrips the capacity of concepts
to keep pace; and experience of the empirical world is more extensive than the conceptual focusing within it. While endorsing
McDowell’s rejection of what he means by non-conceptual content, and appreciating his insight into the experiential synthesis
of intuition and conception (in particular, its role in grasping objects), I will argue that Edmund Husserl presents an even
more comprehensive account of perceptual experience that explains how we experience the contribution of receptivity and sensibility
and how they cooperate in perceptual discrimination. Further, it reveals “horizons”—a unique kind of contents, surplus content
(rather than independent non-conceptual content)—beyond the synthesis of intuitive and conceptual contents through which objects
are grasped. Such horizons play a constitutive role, making experience with its conceptual dimensions and justificatory potential
possible; they in no way function like a bare given that is to fulfill some independent justificatory role. Whereas McDowell
focuses on how experience does not take place in isolation from the exercise of conceptual capacities, Husserl complements
his view by situating experience in a more encompassing whole and by elucidating the surplus-horizons that exceed the conceptual
content of experience; play an inseparable, constitutive role within it; and indicate the limits of conceptual comprehension.
相似文献
Michael D. BarberEmail: |
10.
Josh Parsons 《Philosophical Studies》2007,134(2):165-181
This paper discusses “inclusionism” in the context of David Lewis’s modal realism (and in the context of parasitic accounts
of modality such as\ John Divers’s agnosticism about possible worlds). This is the doctrine that everything is a world. I
argue that this doctrine would be beneficial to Divers-style agnosticism; that it suggests a reconfiguration of the concept
of actuality in modal realism; and finally that it suffers from an as-yet unsolved difficulty, the problem of the unmarried
husbands. This problem also shows that Stephen Yablo’s analysis of “intrinsic” is inadequate.
Thanks to Philip Bricker, Ross Cameron, Daniel Nolan, John Divers, Kit Fine, Kris McDaniel, Augustin Rayo, Steve Yablo, to
participants in the Arche modality seminar, University of St Andrews, and to the delegates of the APA Pacific Division Conference
2005. 相似文献
11.
Damon A. Young 《Sexuality & culture》2005,9(4):58-79
Karl Marx once compared philosophy to masturbation, essentially seeing both as privative, idealistic, and impractical activities.
Indeed, many lay folk see philosophers as “wankers.” While the present state of universities does throw doubt on the liberatory
character of contemporary philosophy, Marx’s jibe nonetheless mischaracterizes masturbation. This paper is a brief attempt
to correct Marx’s characterization of masturbation by drawing on the work of a thinker ofter associated with “intellectual
onanism”: Martin Heidegger. Speaking ontologically, Heidergger’s theories can be developed to show that masturbation it is
not privative, but “stretched” in time and place. Moreover, masturbation plays a practical role in the creative development
of the self, including the self’s essential bodiliness. While not necessarily defending philosophy against Marx’s charges,
this paper does show how even so-called “onanistic” philosophy might be redeemed.
“Only a being which, like man, ‘had’ the word... can and must ‘have’ ‘the hand’” —Martin Heidegger
“I have a dangerously supple wrist.” —Friedrich Nietzsche 相似文献
12.
Burleigh T. Wilkins 《The Journal of Ethics》2007,11(2):147-159
This paper explores some of the problems which arise from Immanuel Kant’s commitment to both human rights and the rights of
states. Michael Doyle believed it was contradictory for Kant to defend both human rights and non-intervention by states in
the affairs of other states, but I argue that for Kant there was no such contradiction, and I explore Kant’s claim that the
state is “a moral personality.” I also discuss Kant’s belief that “Nature guarantees” that perpetual peace will obtain, and
I consider Kant as a teleologist. 相似文献
13.
Heikki Kirjavainen 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2008,64(2):75-88
In this paper I want to argue for the optimal way to characterise the logical and semantical behaviour of the singular term
‘God’ used in religious language. The relevance of this enterprise to logical theory is the main focus as well. Doing this
presupposes to outline the two rivaling approaches of well-definition of singular terms: Kripke’s (“rigid designators”) and
Hintikka’s (“world-lines”). ‘God’ as a “rigid designator” is purified from all real-life-language-games of identification
and only spells out a metaphysical tag, which favours the view of “anything goes”. Instead, ‘God’ as a “world-line,” plus
two ways of quantification, is much more flexible to theological traditions, teachings of the church, religious practices
and personal feelings. Thus, it provides a sufficiently well-defined singular term for the purposes of logical theory.
The whole sketch is based on Jaakko Hintikka’s logical ideas, mainly on his responses to different authors in PJH. I have systematically omitted direct references to his texts because I have modified considerably his ideas for my own purposes. 相似文献
14.
Ken Daley 《Philosophical Studies》2010,150(3):349-372
Jerry Fodor (Concepts: Where cognitive science went wrong. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) famously argued that lexical concepts are unstructured. After examining the advantages and disadvantages of both the classical
approach to concepts and Fodor’s conceptual atomism, I argue that some lexical concepts are, in fact, structured. Roughly
stated, I argue that structured lexical concepts bear a necessary biconditional entailment relation to their structural constituents. I develop this account of the structure of lexical concepts within the framework
of Pavel Tichy’s (The foundations of Frege’s logic. Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, 1988) theory of constructions. I argue that concepts are constructions which can be combined by way of Tichy’s construction-forming
operations of composition and closure and an additional operation, simplification, which I propose in section 6. The last of these construction-forming operations plays a central role in my account of lexical
concept structure. Stated generally, structured lexical concepts are a result of simplifying their structural constituents. 相似文献
15.
Feng P 《Science and engineering ethics》2000,6(2):207-220
This paper explores the role of ethics in design. Traditionally, ethical questions have been seen as marginal issues in the
design of technology. Part of the reason for this stems from the widely held notion of technology being “out of control.”
This notion is a barrier to what I call “ethical design” because it implies that ethics has no role to play in the development
of technology. This view, however, is challenged by recent work in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS). Looking
into the dynamics of technological change, STS scholars argue that human choices are present at every stage of a technology’s
development and, furthermore, that human values are reflected in the very design of artifacts. This alternative view suggests
that ethics can and should be included in the design process. Drawing on examples from the privacy arena. I point to some
of the potential advantages of addressing ethical concerns early on in the design of a technology. I conclude with some general
strategies for bringing ethics back into design.
A version of this paper was presented at ETHICOMP98, the Fourth International Conference on Ethical Issues of Information
Technology, March 25–27, 1998, Erasmus University, the Netherlands.
Patrick Feng is a Ph.D. student in the Science and Technology Studies Department at Rensselaer. His research focuses on the
development of technical standards that are designed to address social values such as privacy and trust. 相似文献
16.
Lilianna Kiejzik 《Studies in East European Thought》2010,62(1):55-62
In this paper I present Bulgakov’s conception of the sophiology of death considered, first, as a science of God’s Wisdom and,
second, as the content of Bulgakov’s work entitled “Sophiology of Death.” 相似文献
17.
Sirkku Ikonen 《Synthese》2011,179(1):187-202
My purpose in this paper is to look at Cassirer’s relation to critical philosophy from a new perspective. Most discussions
concerning Cassirer’s Kantianism have so far centered on his relation to neo-Kantianism and the Marburg school. My focus will
not be on neo-Kantianism but on Cassirer’s notion of a “critique of culture.” In an often cited paragraph from the introduction
to The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Cassirer says that his aim is to broaden Kant’s critical approach to all various forms of culture, to language as well as
myth and art, and thus to transform the “critique of reason” into the “critique of culture.” I will explore Cassirer’s concept
of the “critique of culture” and suggest that it can best be understood by placing it in the context of early twentieth century
German philosophy. More precisely, I will aim to show that Cassirer’s critique can be seen as an effort to find a middle path
between Lebensphilosophie and the positivism of the Vienna Circle. 相似文献
18.
19.
John J. Furedy 《Integrative psychological & behavioral science》2002,38(1):3-16
This paper offers an interpretation of the relation between Pavlov’s life and work and the missions of the Pavlovian Society,
both past (“observation and observation”) and present (“interdisciplinary research on the integrated organism”). I begin with
an acount of Pavlov's life and his influence on contemporary thought. I then indicate the relation of some of Pavlov's attitudes
(e.g., his motto, his epistemological stance) to the Society's past mission. In the concluding and most controversial section,
I argue for six guiding principles derived from Pavlov, to be applied to the Society’s mission. These are: (a) a confident
methodological behaviorism; (b) a significant role assigned to both physiological and psychological factors in the prediction
and control of the integrated organism; (c) approximately equal taxonomic precision of physiological and psychological explanatory concepts; (d) distrust of toleological
explanatory concepts; (e) rejection of psychology’s instrumentalist “cognitive paradigm shift”; and (f) rejection of the representational
theory of knowledge. 相似文献
20.
Continental Philosophy Review - This review explores the complex and nuanced views of Hermann Levin Goldschmidt’s conception of “setting contradiction free” in order to allow for... 相似文献