Against the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mind</Emphasis> Argument

The Mind Argument is an argument for the incompatibility of indeterminism and anyone’s having a choice about anything that happens. Peter van Inwagen rejects the Mind Argument not because he is able to point out the flaw in it, but because he accepts both that determinism is incompatible with anyone’s having a choice about anything that happens and that it is possible for someone to have a choice about something that happens. In this paper I first diagnose and clear up a confusion in recent discussions of the Mind Argument and then go on to show why it is a bad argument.     

Depression and cognitive sequelae registered within the first year among young Danish TBI survivors

The aim of the study was to determine the proportion of depression and cognitive sequelae among young (15-30 years) Danish TBI survivors referred to interdisciplinary evaluation through a nationwide government-initiated health initiative. The cross-sectional study is based on data from the “Danish register for young adults with acquired brain injury” on TBI survivors included from October 2013 to December 2016. The main measures were Major depression inventory, Trail making test A and B, Fluency, Word learning with selective reminding, Matrix reasoning, Coding and Glasgow outcome scale - extended (GOS-E). During the study period, 131 young TBI survivors were referred to one of five national outpatient clinics. Ninety-six had complete data and of these 14.6% fulfilled the ICD-10 diagnostic criteria for depression and 34.4% had cognitive sequelae. An association was found between depression and cognitive sequelae (p = 0.004). Patients with both depression and cognitive sequelae (n = 10) had a significantly lower mean score on GOS-E (p = 0.0001). Depression and cognitive sequelae were frequent and associated with a poorer global functional outcome among young TBI survivors referred within a year after trauma. This finding and the notion that only 20% of the expected TBI population was referred to this nationwide health initiative indicate an unacknowledged need for interdisciplinary follow-up.     

Embedding philosophers in the practices of science: bringing humanities to the sciences

The National Science Foundation (NSF) in the United States, like many other funding agencies all over the globe, has made large investments in interdisciplinary research in the sciences and engineering, arguing that interdisciplinary research is an essential resource for addressing emerging problems, resulting in important social benefits. Using NSF as a case study for problem that might be relevant in other contexts as well, I argue that the NSF itself poses a significant barrier to such research in not sufficiently appreciating the value of the humanities as significant interdisciplinary partners. This essay focuses on the practices of philosophy as a highly valuable but currently under-appreciated partner in achieving the goals of interdisciplinary research. This essay advances a proposal for developing deeper and wider interdisciplinary research in the sciences through coupled ethical-epistemological research. I argue that this more robust model of interdisciplinary practice will lead to better science by providing resources for understanding the types of value decisions that are entrenched in research models and methods, offering resources for identifying the ethical implications of research decisions, and providing a lens for identifying the questions that are ignored, under-examined, and rendered invisible through scientific habit or lack of interest. In this way, we will have better science both in the traditional sense of advancing knowledge by building on and adding to our current knowledge as well as in the broader sense of science for the good of, namely, scientific research that better benefits society.     

Addressing Diversity in the Decade of Behavior: Focus on Women of Color

The Decade of Behavior provides an opportunity to reflect on the need for psychologists to develop a "diversity mindfulness" in their education, training, and research activities, a need that has never been more urgent. In this article, we focus on the lives of women of color to illustrate diversity-mindful feminist principles that may inform research and program development related to other aspects of diversity. We discuss perspectives and priorities of women of color in psychology. We consider why implementing feminist psychology's inclusive vision for research is a continuing struggle, particularly with regard to research on poor women, and identify some contributions and priorities of feminist research on women of color that relate to Decade goals of achieving a "safer, better educated, healthier, more democratic and more prosperous nation" (White, Travis, & Russo, 2001, p. x). Understanding and incorporating perspectives of women of color in Decade activities is essential if researchers are to generate new knowledge "to prepare the world for facing emerging problems in the 21st century" (Decade of Behavior website: http://www.decadeofbehavior.org).     

Educating Political Adversaries: Chantal Mouffe and Radical Democratic Citizenship Education

Many scholars in the area of citizenship education take deliberative approaches to democracy, especially as put forward by John Rawls, as their point of departure. From there, they explore how students’ capacity for political and/or moral reasoning can be fostered. Recent work by political theorist Chantal Mouffe, however, questions some of the central tenets of deliberative conceptions of democracy. In the paper I first explain the central differences between Mouffe’s and Rawls’s conceptions of democracy and politics. To this end I take Eamonn Callan’s Creating Citizens as an example of Rawlsian political education and focus on the role of conflict and disagreement in his account. I then address three areas in which political education would need to change if it were to accept Mouffe’s critiques of deliberative approaches to democracy and her proposal for an agonistic public sphere. The first area is the education of political emotions; the second is fostering an understanding of the difference between the moral and the political; the third is developing an awareness of the historical and contemporary political projects of the “left” and “right.” I propose that a radical democratic citizenship education would be an education of political adversaries.

Property law: A cognitive turn

Despite more than a century of research by psychologists on issues relating to the law, most such research has focused on a small subset of topics relevant to the legal system. Here, I review several legal topics amenable to psychological research that fall under the broad umbrella of property law: (1) how the concepts of property and ownership are represented cognitively; (2) the relationship between wealth and happiness, consumer behavior, and the priming effect of money concepts; (3) animal and child development in cognition about and behavior toward property and ownership; and (4) the relevance of psychological research on home to legal policy. These and other areas provide potential research agendas for cognitive and social cognitive psychologists. After noting the importance of such research for legal doctrine, theory, and policy, I close with suggestions for effectively communicating empirical findings to the legal community.     

More than One Flaw: Reply to Millican

Millican (Mind 113(451):437–476, 2004) claims to have detected ‘the one fatal flaw in Anselm’s ontological argument.’ I argue that there is more than one important flaw in the position defended in Millican (Mind 113(451):437–476, 2004). First, Millican’s reconstruction of Anselm’s argument does serious violence to the original text. Second, Millican’s generalised objection fails to diagnose any flaw in a vast range of ontological arguments. Third, there are independent reasons for thinking that Millican’s generalised objection is unpersuasive.     

Searle on rediscovering the mind

John R. Searle,The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992), 270 pp. $22.50. I would like to thank my colleagues Bernard Dauenhauer and Beth Preston for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay.     

Fixed-target efficient search has logarithmic efficiency with and without eye movements

Stage 1 processing in visual search (e.g., efficient search) has long been thought to be unaffected by factors such as set size or lure–distractor similarity (or at least to be only minimally affected). Recent research from Buetti, Cronin, Madison, Wang, and Lleras (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 145, 672–707, 2016) showed that in efficient visual search with a fixed target, reaction times increase logarithmically as a function of set size and, further, that the slope of these logarithmic functions is modulated by target–distractor similarity. This has led to the proposal that the cognitive architecture of Stage 1 processing is parallel, of unlimited capacity, and exhaustive in nature. Such an architecture produces reaction time functions that increase logarithmically with set size (as opposed to being unaffected by it). However, in the previous studies, eye movements were not monitored. It is thus possible that the logarithmicity of the reaction time functions emerged simply as an artifact of eye movements rather than as a reflection of the underlying cognitive architecture. Here we ruled out the possibility that eye movements resulted in the observed logarithmic functions, by asking participants to keep their eyes at fixation while completing fixed-target efficient visual search tasks. The logarithmic RT functions still emerged even when participants were not allowed to make eye movements, thus providing further support for our proposal. Additionally, we found that search efficiency is slightly improved when eye movements are restricted and lure–target similarity is relatively high.     

Measurement of cognitive functions in experts and elite athletes: A meta‐analytic review

An extraordinary physiological capacity combined with remarkable motor control, perception, and cognitive functioning is crucial for high performance in sports. Tests that assess the physical abilities are already well established. Moreover, a growing area of research evolved in the recent past that is particularly concerned with the basic cognitive functions by means of neurocognitive tests in experts and elite athletes. The aim of this meta‐analysis (k = 19) is to quantify differences among experts and nonexperts as well as elite athletes and non‐elite athletes. In addition, it aims to assemble and compare previous research and analyze possible differences in cognitive functions depending on age, skill level, and used cognitive tasks. Overall, the mean effect size was small to medium (r = 0.22), indicating superior cognitive functions in experts and elite athletes. The factor of skill definition significantly differentiates the cognition–expertise relationship. In contrast, differences in age groups and cognitive areas appeared but were not significant. Future research should prefer the elite rather than the expert definition and distinguish between high‐performance and amateur athletes. Furthermore, the findings suggest that it can be beneficial for coaches and sport clubs to integrate cognitive tests as an additional tool for scouting and for optimizing the athletic development of their players.     

OUTSOURCED COGNITION

Recent developments in technologically enabled social cognition call for a rethinking of many aspects of human cognition. According to the hypothesis of extended cognition, we must revise our psychological categories by eliminating allegedly superficial distinctions between internal cognition and external processes. As an alternative to this proposal, I outline a hypothesis of outsourced cognition which seeks to respect distinctions that are operative in both folk psychology and the social and cognitive sciences. According to this hypothesis, the cognitive states and processes of the individual are substantially and explanatorily distinct from the relevant external states and processes. In consequence, the individual remains a cognitive unit that is both central and indispensable in the explanations of cognitive science. As a case study, I consider the epistemology of testimony. I will argue that important epistemological categories may be preserved by adopting the hypothesis of outsourced cognition over the hypothesis of extended cognition. Moreover, I will argue that the outsourced cognition hypothesis deepens the problems that beset an extended epistemology of testimony.     

Advancing Psychology as a Bio-behavioral Science

Concerns for the integrity of psychology as an independent discipline have caused some psychologists to object to introducing any knowledge from the biological sciences into the training of psychologists. However, calls for the greater incorporation of the behavioral sciences in medical education, increased attention to research on the mechanisms of bio-behavioral interaction, and initiatives in translational medical research and clinical care, have prompted increased interest in interdisciplinary research, health care, and teaching. These changes, in turn, are resulting in a re-conceptualization of the structure of academic medicine with increasing emphasis upon multidisciplinary knowledge and interdisciplinary collaboration, and less emphasis upon disciplinary insularity and competitiveness. If clinical health psychology is to play a role in this evolving concept of academic health care, it must adequately prepare its trainees to function in interdisciplinary academic health care settings. This will require not only expertise in the role of behavioral factors relevant to medical disorders, but also some basic familiarity with the biological processes to which those behavioral factors relate. With the evolution of its fund of knowledge, clinical health psychology has the potential to utilize its science to discover, describe, interpret, teach and clinically apply knowledge of the mechanisms of interaction between biological functions and behavioral, learning, cognitive, socio-cultural and environmental processes. By failing to seize this initiative, clinical health psychology risks becoming irrelevant to the evolving model of medical research, education and health care. Presented, in part, to the Association of Psychologists in Academic Health Centers, Minneapolis, MN, May 2007.     

Farewell to the luck (and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mind</Emphasis>) argument

In this paper I seek to defend libertarianism about free will and moral responsibility against two well-known arguments: the luck argument and the Mind argument. Both of these arguments purport to show that indeterminism is incompatible with the degree of control necessary for free will and moral responsibility. I begin the discussion by elaborating these arguments, clarifying important features of my preferred version of libertarianism—features that will be central to an adequate response to the arguments—and showing why a strategy of reconciliation (often referred to as “deliberative libertarianism”) will not work. I then consider four formulations of the luck argument and find them all wanting. This discussion will place us in a favorable position to understand why the Mind argument also fails.     

Beyond cognitive myopia: a patchwork approach to the concept of neural function

In this paper, I argue that looking at the concept of neural function through the lens of cognition alone risks cognitive myopia: it leads neuroscientists to focus only on mechanisms with cognitive functions that process behaviorally relevant information when conceptualizing “neural function”. Cognitive myopia tempts researchers to neglect neural mechanisms with noncognitive functions which do not process behaviorally relevant information but maintain and repair neural and other systems of the body. Cognitive myopia similarly affects philosophy of neuroscience because scholars overlook noncognitive functions when analyzing issues surrounding e.g., functional decomposition or the multifunctionality of neural structures. I argue that we can overcome cognitive myopia by adopting a patchwork approach that articulates cognitive and noncognitive “patches” of the concept of neural function. Cognitive patches describe mechanisms with causally specific effects on cognition and behavior which are likely operative in transforming sensory or other inputs into motor outputs. Noncognitive patches describe mechanisms that lack such specific effects; these mechanisms are enabling conditions for cognitive functions to occur. I use these distinctions to characterize two noncognitive functions at the mesoscale of neural circuits: subsistence functions like breathing are implemented by central pattern generators and are necessary to maintain the life of the organism. Infrastructural functions like gain control are implemented by canonical microcircuits and prevent neural system damage while cognitive processing occurs. By adding conceptual patches that describe these functions, a patchwork approach can overcome cognitive myopia and help us explain how the brain’s capacities as an information processing device are constrained by its ability to maintain and repair itself as a physiological apparatus.     

The indeterminacy of color vision

A critical survey of recent work on the ontological status of colors supports the conclusion that, while some accounts of color can plausibly be dismissed, no single account can yet be endorsed. Among the remaining options are certain forms of color realism according which familiar colors are instantiated by objects in our extra-cranial visual environment. Also still an option is color anti-realism, the view that familiar colors are, at best, biologically adaptive fictions, instantiated nowhere.I argue that there is simply no fact of the matter as to which of these remaining options is correct. I blame this indeterminacy on the fact that color vision exhibits several of the hallmarks of a modular input system, as described by Jerry Fodor in The Modularity of Mind.Finally, I speculate that the range of live options falling within the scope of the indeterminacy may be even broader than initially indicated.     

Development and test of a model of interdisciplinary competencies

Interdisciplinary work offers both innovative potential and challenges in collaboration. The present paper summarizes three studies intended to foster a psychological, competency-focused understanding of interdisciplinary work. In a qualitative interview study (Study 1) with expert practitioners of interdisciplinarity, we used the critical incident technique to explore which individual competencies support interdisciplinary collaborations and improve innovative outcomes. Focusing on competencies specific to interdisciplinarity, we derived a four-dimensional model. In Study 2, we tested the model dimensions (1) initiative for exchange, (2) target group-specific communication, (3) knowledge integration, and (4) reflection in a quantitative survey study among N = 315 employees who were experienced in interdisciplinary work using exploratory structural equation modelling. Finally, in Study 3, we studied the convergent and divergent validity of interdisciplinary competencies as well as their role in predicting team outcomes. Here, a dyadic sample of N = 448 target persons and N = 153 interdisciplinary colleagues were surveyed. We discuss possible applications for the new model of interdisciplinary competencies and the developed self-report instrument.     

Constructing a Mind,One Image Schema at a Time

In The Foundations of Mind, Jean Mandler describes how perceptual analysis provides a mechanism that allows infants to begin their journey into conceptual life, and subsequently to enter the advanced worlds of conceptual systems, memory, language, and consciousness. This review provides an overview of Mandler's theoretical position, celebrates her accomplishments, and supports the claim that The Foundations of Mind is a “must read” for all developmental scientists.     

Informed Outcomes: Self-rating measures and their use in psychodynamic therapy with adolescents

I am currently engaged in an A Space ¹ 1. A Space for Creative Learning and Support was set up as a research and development project in 1997 by The Glass-House Trust (a Sainsbury Family Charitable Trust), the Social Science Research Unit (Institute of Education, University of London) and Hackney Education. A core aim is to deliver psychodynamic therapies in the school setting, adapting and evolving current models of child and adolescent psychotherapy, where necessary, both in response to the educational context and to ensure that the needs of children and adolescents are best met. In 2010, A Space and The Centre for Psychoanalytic Studies, University of Essex, began a formal study into school-based therapy. Funded by The Glass-House Trust, this research will run through to 2013. A conference will be held in 2013, so that the findings can be more widely disseminated. /University of Essex research study looking at the ways in which psychodynamic counselling can best meet the needs of young people accessing therapy in the school setting. As part of the study, I have looked at the main outcome measures used in work with adolescents in clinics, the community and voluntary sector and in education settings. In this article, I look at the process of assessment, including the use of written self-rating outcome measures with young people. I critically review a selection of these and reflect on their application in practice. I go on to consider how collaborative written assessment procedures may be more appropriate for use by psychodynamic therapists working with school-based clients, given the challenges of delivering therapy in the education sector.     

Considerations on a <Emphasis Type="Italic">Phronetic</Emphasis> Proposal: a Bakhtinian Reply

The present text is a Bakhtinian reply to Eugene Matusov’s conceptual elaborations on the Aristotelic notion of phronesis, related to contemporary teaching activity and to his research-on-teaching proposal, carried out to involve pre-service practitioners in the educational field. Following his line of reasoning, some of the arguments raised in his search to define the specificities of teaching and researching in education are taken as fruitful ground for discussing the possibilities and limits of the concept of phronesis, and the educational implications of his phronetic proposal. The comments are circumscribed to two main focuses: 1. the notion of phronesis and the specificity of teaching/researching; and 2. the need for knowledge and research on teaching in contemporary world. An analysis of the implied conceptual assumptions with regards to Aristotle’s four ways of knowing leads to an inquiry about the need and the pertinence of bringing the concept of phronesis to define the personal dimension of teaching and of learning to teach. The Bakhtinian reply attempts to situate Matusov’s conceptual and practical work among the polemical issues that cross this uneasy field nowadays, highlighting the heuristic value of his conceptual elaborations to the present debates, also pointing to his positioning and specific contributions to teacher education and research activity.     

Social Epistemology,scientific practice and the elusive social

Social Epistemology, as formulated by Steve Fuller, is based on the suggestion that rational knowledge policy must be held accountable to brute facts about the nature of our human cognitive pursuits, whatever these may be. One difficulty for Fuller concerns the conception of the social which underwrites social epistemology. I argue that social epistemology conflates the social with human psychological properties that are available for public scrutiny and, accordingly, that social epistemology is best viewed as a brand of psychologism. Though Fuller's proposal signifies an important step in the ongoing attempt by scholars to eradicate the last traces of Descartes' epistemological device of a disembodiedres cogitans, I conclude that his conception of the social is too weak to serve as the basis for a socially-embedded discipline in anything but name only.