Judgments relative to patterns: how temporal sequence patterns affect judgments and memory

Six experiments studied relative frequency judgment and recall of sequentially presented items drawn from 2 distinct categories (i.e., city and animal). The experiments show that judged frequencies of categories of sequentially encountered stimuli are affected by certain properties of the sequence configuration. We found (a) a first-run effect whereby people overestimated the frequency of a given category when that category was the first repeated category to occur in the sequence and (b) a dissociation between judgments and recall; respondents may judge 1 event more likely than the other and yet recall more instances of the latter. Specifically, the distribution of recalled items does not correspond to the frequency estimates for the event categories, indicating that participants do not make frequency judgments by sampling their memory for individual items as implied by other accounts such as the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) and the availability process model (Hastie & Park, 1986). We interpret these findings as reflecting the operation of a judgment heuristic sensitive to sequential patterns and offer an account for the relationship between memory and judged frequencies of sequentially encountered stimuli.     

Why do categories affect stimulus judgment?

The authors tested a model of category effects on stimulus judgment. The model holds that the goal of stimulus judgment is to achieve high accuracy. For this reason, people place inexactly represented stimuli in the context of prior information, captured in categories, combining inexact fine-grain stimulus values with prior (category) information. This process can be likened to a Bayesian statistical procedure designed to maximize the average accuracy of estimation. If people follow the proposed procedure to maximize accuracy, their estimates should be affected by the distribution of instances in a category. In the present experiments, participants reproduced one-dimensional stimuli. Different prior distributions were presented. The experiments verified that people's stimulus estimates are affected by variations in a prior distribution in such a manner as to increase the accuracy of their stimulus reproductions.     

异同判断加工中整体和局部特征的作用

采用三种整体局部特征（关系-属性,全局-局部,抽象-具体）图形,要求3组大学生被试完成异同判断任务,以考察异同判断加工中整体和局部特征的作用,探讨异同比较的加工机制。三个实验的结果表明：⑴三种整体特征均可加速同反应,因而不支持同判断加工是整体匹配的观点;⑵存在快同效应,但并不支持同判断的快速加工器对整个刺激加工完成后慢速比较器才开始工作的观点;⑶异反应时随差异特征的增多而减小,从而进一步支持异判断是分析加工、自终止的观点;⑷异反应时随差异特征从上至下、从整体到局部而增加,意味着异判断加工的顺序可能是自上而下、从整体到局部。上述结果支持研究假设：同判断的快速加工器先加工整体特征,然后再和异判断的慢速比较器一起开始加工局部特征。     

The effect of global versus local processing styles on assimilation versus contrast in social judgment

The authors propose a global/local processing style model (GLOMO) for assimilation and contrast effects in social judgment. GLOMO is based on Schwarz and Bless' (1992, 2007) inclusion-exclusion model, which suggests that when information is included into a category, assimilation occurs, whereas when information is excluded from a category, contrast occurs. According to GLOMO, inclusion versus exclusion should be influenced by whether people process information globally or locally. In 5 experiments, using both disambiguation and social comparison, the authors induced local versus global processing through perceptual tasks and time perspective and showed that global processing produced assimilation, whereas local processing produced contrast. The experiments showed that processing styles elicited in one task can carry over to other tasks and influence social judgments. Furthermore, they found that hemisphere activation and accessibility of judgment-consistent knowledge partially mediated these effects. Implications for current and classic models of social judgment are discussed.     

The concept of adaptation-level in psychological research

Vuorinen, R. The concept of adaptation-level in psychological research. Scand. J. Psychol., 1973, 14, 228–240.- Helson's adaptation-level theory (ALT) is appraised as a general theory of psychology. The reformulated Fechner law underlying ALT is shown to be untenable and the conceptual status of AL is shown to be self-contradictory. The ambiguous measures and the inconsistent theoretical definitions proposed for AL are found to limit the scope of ALT. Reasons for its flexibility and claimed heuristic value are analyzed and potential sources of confusion are suggested. Some defects of ALT are likely to be shared by other behaviouristic theories since they follow from a commitment to the strict S-R model.     

Studies in subjective probability l: Prediction of random events

When students are asked to predict the outcome of a random event, where all alternatives are equally probable (lotteries), they tend to choose central, "representative" values, and avoid extreme ones. In ten informal experiments, it is shown how this pattern of choices is influenced by various procedural and structural changes in the basic task. The results show that guessing behavior can be described as a kind of absolute judgment, subject to grouping, anchoring and context effects. Of the two general prediction heuristics originally proposed by Kahneman & Tversky (1973), "representativeness" applies better than "availability". In fact, a major strategy of guessing is apparently to eschew numbers with prominent, "non-random" properties, which at the same time are highly available to the subjects.     

辅音和元音知觉中的启动效应差异

采用启动范式,在两个实验中分别考察了辅音范畴和元音范畴知觉中的启动效应。启动音是纯音和目标范畴本身,目标音是辅音范畴和元音范畴连续体。结果发现辅音范畴连续体知觉的范畴反应百分比受到纯音和言语启动音影响,辅音范畴知觉的反应时只受言语启动音影响;元音范畴连续体知觉的范畴反应百分比不受两种启动音影响,但元音范畴知觉的反应时受到言语启动音影响。实验结果表明辅音范畴和元音范畴知觉中的启动效应存在差异,这为辅音和元音范畴内在加工机制的差异提供了新证据。     

Involvement and response language effects in attitude scaling

An analytic procedure was developed for separating the effects of involvement from the number of response language categories the subject employs in judging a set of sentence stimuli. The procedure treats category usage as an independent variable and an aspect of the subject's response language. Category usage was shown to have significant influence on several attitudinal judgment processes: Informational complexity, mean judgment functions, and a successive intervals analysis testing Thurstone's assumption of the effect of involvement on equal category spacing. The decrement in scale responding typically associated with involvement is shown to depend on category usage operating either singly or in interaction with involvement. Some tentative conclusions about category usage as a response language variable are discussed.     

Caught in the act: When impressions based on highly diagnostic behaviours are resistant to contradiction

Research and theory emphasizing the role of cue diagnosticity in judgment (e.g. Skowronski and Carlston, 1987, 1989) suggests that under the proper conditions: (a) negativity effects should be observed in judgments of honesty/dishonesty; (b) positivity effects should be observed in judgments of intelligence/unintelligence, and (c) intelligence-implicative and dishonesty-implicative cues should be increasingly difficult to contradict as those cues become more extreme. Two experiments yielded data consistent with these predictions. In addition, two other important findings emerged from these studies. The results of Experiments 1 and 2 indicated that subjects do not respond as if highly diagnostic cues are sufficient for category membership, suggesting that the representational format of trait categories does not correspond to the format suggested by the ‘classical model’ of categorization. The results of Experiment 2 also indicated that negativity and positivity effects are not substantially altered by a role-playing manipulation designed to increase subjects' involvement in the judgment task.     

样例多样性和流畅性信念对类别学习判断的影响

目的:通过三个实验考查样例特征、流畅性和信念对类别学习及其元认知判断的影响。方法:实验1采用2(样例特征)×2(测试类型)的组内设计以检验样例特征的作用; 实验2采用2(样例特征)×2(测试类型)×2(流畅性)的组内设计以检验流畅性的作用; 实验3采用2(样例特征)×2(测试类型)×2(流畅性信念)的混合设计以检验信念对类别学习判断的作用。结果表明:样例特征影响学习成绩、类别学习判断和流畅感; 流畅性不会影响类别学习判断; 原理解释能够有效建立“关于流畅性的信念”,且“关于流畅性的信念”对类别学习判断起作用。即样例多样性和流畅性信念对类别学习判断起作用,支持信念假说。     

The magical number seven and some other features of category scaling: Properties of a model for absolute judgment

A model for absolute judgment is presented. This is derived from a theory of the processes which set and maintain response criteria (M. Treisman & T. C. Williams, 1984, Psychological Review, 91, 68–111) which has been applied to a number of problems in psychophysics. A Thurstonian model is assumed as a basis for absolute judgment, and criterion-setting theory is applied to the criteria in this model. The question is then considered, to what extent can such a model account for the main findings that have been obtained in category scaling? The range of explanations that the model can provide is investigated by means of computer simulation. It appears that features such as the upper limit on information transmission as the number of stimuli increases, the effect of stimulus range on information transmission, the accuracy edge effect, the resolution edge effect, the central tendency of judgment, stimulus and response dependencies, and related phenomena can be reproduced by simulations of the model.     

Higher order sequential effects in psychophysical judgments

We found that the depth of sequential effects depends on the judgment task. An experiment with squares indicated that stimulus-response pairs up to two trials back were included in the judgment process when subjects were required to make category judgments of size, whereas only the immediately preceding event was incorporated when subjects were making magnitude estimations. In the case of category judgment, interactions between the current stimulus and prior stimuli as well as configural effects indicated that events one and two trials back meet an equivalent function in the judgment process and that these events may jointly operate in one trial. These findings can be explained by a class of models that assume that the position of preceding stimuli relative to the current stimulus is decisive in the judgment process. The multiple-standards model is a representative of this class according to which there are two types of standards: (1) the endpoints of the range as long-term standards and (2) traces of preceding stimuli as short-term standards.     

Higher order sequential effects in psychophysical judgments

We found that the depth of sequential effects depends on the judgment task. An experiment with squares indicated that stimulus-response pairs up to two trials back were included in the judgment process when subjects were required to make category judgments of size, whereas only the immediately preceding event was incorporated when subjects were making magnitude estimations. In the case of category judgment, interactions between the current stimulus and prior stimuli as well as configural effects indicated that events one and two trials back meet an equivalent function in the judgment process and that these events may jointly operate in one trial. These findings can be explained by a class of models that assume that the position of preceding stimuli relative to the current stimulus is decisive in the judgment process. The multiple-standards model is a representative of this class according to which there are two types of standards: (1) the endpoints of the range as long-term standards and (2) traces of preceding stimuli as short-term standards.     

Relative judgment and knowledge of the category structure

For evenly spaced stimuli, a purely relative judgment account of unidimensional categorization performance is trivial: All that is required is knowledge of the size of stimulus difference corresponding to the width of a category. For unevenly spaced stimuli, long-term knowledge of the category structure is required. In the present article, we will argue that such knowledge does not necessitate a direct, absolute mapping between (representations of ) stimulus magnitudes and category labels. We will show that Stewart, Brown, and Chater’s (2005) relative judgment model can account for data from absolute identification experiments with uneven stimulus spacing.     

Comparison and expectancy processes in human judgment

This work explored a judgment model proposed by Manis and Paskewitz (1984a). The model suggests that prior experience with the members of a given category affects the assessment of other category members in 2 ways: (a) by providing a basis for comparison and (b) by leading the judge to expect that new exemplars will resemble those previously encountered. In 4 experiments, respondents judged the height of different people on the basis of full-length photographs. The height of the models in an induction series constituted the main independent variable. The effects of contrasting inductions (e.g., short vs. tall women) affected the judges' subsequent assessments in a test series. Both comparison and expectancy processes played a significant role, sometimes opposing one another and sometimes acting in parallel (i.e., supporting one another).     

中文词汇加工过程中的无关言语效应

通过两个词汇识别任务,考察词汇加工过程中的无关言语效应。实验1采用真假词判断任务,考察有意义言语、无意义言语、白噪音和安静的背景声音对不同具体性的词汇识别的影响。结果发现,仅有意义言语干扰了词汇识别,且主要体现在对低具体性词汇判断的反应时显著增加。实验2采用了语义范畴判断任务,同样发现有意义言语条件下被试的反应时显著大于其他声音条件。结果表明,中文词汇加工过程中存在无关言语效应,且当任务强调语义加工时,干扰主要源于无关言语的语义成分,支持了语义干扰假说。     

类别使用的特征诊断效应

运用预备实验评定过的鱼轮廓图,考察了类别判断和特征预测这两种类别使用方式下的特征诊断效应。被试是48名大学生,学习材料是两类鱼的类别成员,在测验阶段,实验1判断新项目类别标签,实验2预测新项目的缺失特征。结果表明,类别判断条件下,单个特征诊断力加强和诊断性特征数量增加都对类别判断有促进作用;特征预测条件下,只有单个特征诊断力加强可以促进特征预测,诊断性特征数量增加无助于特征预测     

A dynamic context model of interactive behavior

A dynamic context model of interactive behavior was developed to explain results from two experiments that tested the effects of interaction costs on encoding strategies, cognitive representations, and response selection processes in a decision-making and a judgment task. The model assumes that the dynamic context defined by the mixes of internal and external representations and processes are sensitive to the interaction cost imposed by the task environment. The model predicts that changes in the dynamic context may lead to systematic biases in cognitive representations and processes that eventually influence decision-making and judgment outcomes. Consistent with the predictions by the model, results from the experiments showed that as interaction costs increased, encoding strategies and cognitive representations shifted from perception-based to memory-based. Memory-based comparisons of the stimuli enhanced the similarity and dominance effects, and led to stronger systematic biases in response outcomes in a choice task. However, in a judgment task, memory-based representations enhanced only the dominance effects. Results suggested that systematic response biases in the dominance context were caused by biases in the cognitive representations of the stimuli, but response biases in the similarity context were caused by biases in the comparison process induced by the choice task. Results suggest that changes in interaction costs not only change whether information was assessed from the external world or from memory but also introduce systematic biases in the cognitive representation of the information, which act as biased inputs to the subsequent decision-making and judgment processes. Results are consistent with the idea of interactive cognition, which proposes that representations and processes are contingent on the dynamic context defined by the information flow between the external task environment and internal cognition.     

Strategic processes in false recognition memory

In two experiments, the response signal technique (Reed, 1973) was combined with the DRM paradigm (e.g., McDermott & Roediger, 1998) to investigate the time course of false recognition memory— in particular, how this effect varies along the time course of generating a recognition judgment. Across the experiments, in addition to standard instructions, there were forewarning instructions encouraging the participants to avoid this effect, as well as inclusion instructions intended to enhance this tendency. It was found that the false memory effect was at its strongest at earlier response signals, diminishing when more time was given to make a recognition judgment. The forewarning instructions led to a more conservative overall response bias, rather than to a reduction of the effect. However, the participants were able to exaggerate this effect in the inclusion condition. The results are discussed in terms of the role of strategic processing in recognition memory. Part of this research was presented at the 42nd Annual Meeting of the Psychonomic Society, Orlando, in November 2001. It was supported by a grant from the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council of the United Kingdom.