The relationship between mental toughness and subjective mental illness recovery

Recently there has been an increasing interest in subjective mental illness recovery, and it has been recognised that there is an important role for characteristics such as self-efficacy and locus of control. Mental toughness describes a set of characteristics important for dealing with stress and pressure, and is comprised of challenge, commitment, control of emotion, control of life, confidence in abilities, and interpersonal confidence. The current study explored relationships between mental toughness and subjective mental illness recovery. Seventy-seven participants (nineteen males and fifty-eight females, the majority of which were young adults aged 18–21 years) who had previously recovered from, or were currently recovering from a mental illness (self-reported) completed questionnaire measures of mental toughness and subjective mental illness recovery. Mental toughness had a positive significant relationship to recovery, with particular roles for commitment and confidence in abilities. The findings are discussed in terms of implications for recovery-oriented practice, intervention, and measurement. Further research should examine the role of mental toughness in different aspects of subjective recovery, and also explore relationships with objective measures of recovery.     

Measuring the mental

Many philosophers have argued that the subjective character of conscious experience results in a fundamental deficit of third-person (henceforth: extrospective) access to first-person experience. By comparing extrospective measurement techniques with measurement techniques in the natural sciences, we will argue that extrospective methods suffer from no such deficit.After a rejection of some principled objections against extrospective methods, a historical comparison with the development of measurement techniques in the natural sciences will show that extrospective measuring methods are still in an early stage of development. However, they can be significantly improved by way of a bootstrapping strategy, similar to that which has proven successful in the development of physical measurement techniques. One reason to expect such improvement is the availability of multiple sources of evidence, which should allow for substantial advances in extrospective measurement techniques. Finally, we will discuss new developments in pain measurement in order to show that the bootstrapping strategy is already bearing fruit.     

Perceiving mental states

This paper argues that our awareness of the mental states of other agents is often perceptual in character. It draws partly on recent experimental findings concerning perception of animacy and intentionality. But it also emphasizes the unencapsulated nature of perception generally, and argues that concepts (including mental-state concepts) can be bound into the contents of conscious perception. One of the main arguments used in support of this conclusion draws on recent work concerning the nature and contents of working memory.     

Disproportional mental causation

In this paper I do three things. First, I argue that Stephen Yablo’s influential account of mental causation is susceptible to counterexamples involving what I call disproportional mental causation. Second, I argue that similar counterexamples can be generated for any alternative account of mental causation that is like Yablo’s in that it takes mental states and their physical realizers to causally compete. Third, I show that there are alternative nonreductive approaches to mental causation which reject the idea of causal competition, and which thus are able to allow for disproportional mental causation. This, I argue, is a significant advantage for such noncompetitive accounts.     

Intralevel mental causation

This paper identifies and critiques a theory of mental causation defended by some proponents of nonredutive physicalism that I call “intralevelism.” Intralevelist theories differ in their details. On all versions, the causal outcome of the manifestation of physical properties is physical and the causal outcome of the manifestation of mental properties is mental. Thus, mental causation on this view is intralevel mental to mental causation. This characterization of mental causation as intralevel is taken to insulate nonreductive physicalism from some objections to nonreductive physicalism, including versions of the exclusion argument. This paper examines some features of three recent versions of intralevelism defended by John Gibbons, Markus Schlosser, and Amie Thomasson. This paper shows that the distinctive problems faced by these three representative versions of intralevelism suggest that the intralevelist strategy does not provide a viable solution to the exclusion problem.     

Representations gone mental

Many philosophers and psychologists have attempted to elucidate the nature of mental representation by appealing to notions like isomorphism or abstract structural resemblance. The ‘structural representations’ that these theorists champion are said to count as representations by virtue of functioning as internal models of distal systems. In his 2007 book, Representation Reconsidered, William Ramsey endorses the structural conception of mental representation, but uses it to develop a novel argument against representationalism, the widespread view that cognition essentially involves the manipulation of mental representations. Ramsey argues that although theories within the ‘classical’ tradition of cognitive science once posited structural representations, these theories are being superseded by newer theories, within the tradition of connectionism and cognitive neuroscience, which rarely if ever appeal to structural representations. Instead, these theories seem to be explaining cognition by invoking so-called ‘receptor representations’, which, Ramsey claims, aren’t genuine representations at all—despite being called representations, these mechanisms function more as triggers or causal relays than as genuine stand-ins for distal systems. I argue that when the notions of structural and receptor representation are properly explicated, there turns out to be no distinction between them. There only appears to be a distinction between receptor and structural representations because the latter are tacitly conflated with the ‘mental models’ ostensibly involved in offline cognitive processes such as episodic memory and mental imagery. While structural representations might count as genuine representations, they aren’t distinctively mental representations, for they can be found in all sorts of non-intentional systems such as plants. Thus to explain the kinds of offline cognitive capacities that have motivated talk of mental models, we must develop richer conceptions of mental representation than those provided by the notions of structural and receptor representation.     

Contrastive mental causation

Any theory of mind needs to explain mental causation. Kim’s (upward) exclusion argument concludes that non-reductive physicalism cannot meet this challenge. One classic reply is that mental properties capture the causally relevant level of generality, because they are insensitive to physical realization. However, this reply suggests downward exclusion (if mental properties are causally efficacious, their physical realizers are causally impotent), contrary to physicalism’s assumption of closure. This paper shows how non-reductive physicalists can solve this problem by introducing a contrastive account of causation with non-exhaustive contrasts. That view has independent justification, because it is also needed to solve other puzzles. On this theory, both a mental property and its physical realizer can cause the same physical effect without lapsing into any problematic overdetermination when they cause that effect in contrast with distinct foils. This contrastive solution has advantages over previous accounts of mental causation and is defended against objections.

     

Positive mental imagery and mental health amongst university students in Pakistan

Mental health problems amongst university students pose a major public health challenge, and this is particularly the case in Pakistan. Alongside broader societal and cultural pressures, cognitive factors likely also play a role in the development of and resilience to mental health problems and may provide a feasible target for interventions. The current study built on previous research in primarily European samples investigating the relationship between one cognitive factor, positive future-oriented mental imagery, and mental health, extending this to a sample of university students in Pakistan (N = 1838). In a cross-sectional design, higher vividness of positive future-oriented mental imagery was associated with lower levels of depressive symptoms and higher levels of positive mental health amongst participants completing questionnaire measures on paper (N = 1430) or online (N = 408). In the sample completing the measures on paper, these relationships remained statistically significant even when controlling for socio-demographic and mental health-related variables. The results provide a foundation for further investigating positive mental imagery as a potential mechanism of mental health and intervention target amongst university students in Pakistan.