Intentional (Nation‐)States: A Group‐Agency Problem for the State’s Right to Exclude

Most philosophical defences of the state’s right to exclude immigrants derive their strength from the normative importance of self‐determination. If nation‐states are taken to be the political institutions of a people, then the state’s right to exclude is the people’s right to exclude – and a denial of this right constitutes an abridgement of self‐determination. In this article, I argue that this view of self‐determination does not cohere with a group‐agency view of nation‐states. On the group‐agency view that I defend, a nation‐state is the kind of group‐agent that does not supervene on the intentionality of member/citizens. If we think that a nation‐state is an intentional group‐agent in its own right, then we should think that self‐determination resides with the institutions of the state rather than with the citizens. If nation‐states do not supervene on the intentionality of citizens, then it is unclear why citizens might have the right to control membership in the state as a feature of self‐determination.     

Heidegger the Metaphysician: Modes‐of‐Being and Grundbegriffe

Modes‐of‐being (Seinsarten) figure centrally in Heidegger's masterwork Being and Time. Testimony to this is Heidegger's characterisation of two of his most celebrated enquiries—the Existential analytic and the Zeug analysis—as investigations into the respective modes‐of‐being of the entities concerned. Yet despite the importance of this concept, commentators disagree widely about what a mode‐of‐being is. In this paper, I systematically outline and defend a novel and exegetically grounded interpretation of this concept. Strongly opposed to Kantian readings, such as those advocated by Taylor Carman and Cristina Lafont, I interpret a mode‐of‐being as a universal that defines a district (Bezirk)—that is, a natural class of entities that ought to be conceptualised in a special way. As such, every mode‐of‐being plays an important metaphysical and epistemic role: serving both to unify a natural class of a high degree of generality and as the interpretandum of an act yielding the basic‐concepts (Grundbegriffe) pertaining to the entities therein. In explicating and arguing for this interpretation, I attribute a characteristically Aristotelian philosophical position to the early Heidegger, encompassing both metaphysical and epistemological realism and a conceptualist theory of universals.     

Learning representations of wordforms with recurrent networks: comment on sibley, kello, plaut, & elman (2008)

Sibley et al. (2008) report a recurrent neural network model designed to learn wordform representations suitable for written and spoken word identification. The authors claim that their sequence encoder network overcomes a key limitation associated with models that code letters by position (e.g., CAT might be coded as C‐in‐position‐1, A‐in‐position‐2, T‐in‐position‐3). The problem with coding letters by position (slot‐coding) is that it is difficult to generalize knowledge across positions; for example, the overlap between CAT and TOMCAT is lost. Although we agree this is a critical problem with many slot‐coding schemes, we question whether the sequence encoder model addresses this limitation, and we highlight another deficiency of the model. We conclude that alternative theories are more promising.     

Fuming with rage! Do members of low status groups signal anger more than members of high status groups?

Owuamalam, Weerabangsa, Karunagharan and Rubin found that Malaysians associate people in low status groups with anger more than their higher status counterparts: the hunchback heuristic. But is this belief accurate? Here, we propose the alternative possibility that members of low‐status groups might deliberately suppress anger to counter this stigma, while members of high‐status groups might disinhibit their anger to assert their superiority. To test these propositions, we manipulated undergraduate students’ relative group status by leading them to believe that provocative comments about their undergraduate social identity came from a professor (low‐status condition) or a junior foundation year student (high‐status condition). Using eye‐tracking, we then measured their gaze durations on the comments, which we used as a physiological signal of anger: dwelling (Experiment 1). Results revealed that dwelling was significantly greater in the high‐status condition than in the low‐status condition. Experiment 2 conceptually replicated this pattern using a self‐report method and found that the suppression‐disinhibition effect occurred only when reputational concerns were strong.     

Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck

Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008b; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge‐how is a kind of knowledge‐that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that have the same epistemic properties. In particular, knowledge‐how ought to be compatible with epistemic luck to the same extent as knowledge‐that. It is argued, contra reductive intellectualism, that knowledge‐how is compatible with a species of epistemic luck which is not compatible with knowledge‐that, and thus it is claimed that knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that come apart.     

Two experimental tests of trust in in‐group strangers: The moderating role of common knowledge of group membership

The role that shared group membership plays in decisions to trust others is now well established within social psychology. A close reading of this literature, however, shows that this process is often moderated by other variables. Currently, we examined one potential moderator of this process. In particular, we evaluated the role that common knowledge of a shared social group membership between self and a to‐be‐trusted stranger provides as a basis for trusting this stranger. This common knowledge emerges when the truster knows the group membership of the to‐be‐trusted other, and believes that this other also knows the group membership of the truster. In two experiments, using pre‐existing and minimal groups, we show that people are more likely to trust an in‐group member over an out‐group member under conditions of common group‐membership knowledge rather than private group‐membership knowledge (i.e. other does not know truster's group), even when they could choose not to trust anyone. The manner in which these data add to current understandings of group‐based trust in strangers is discussed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rule‐Following and Rule‐Breaking: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein

My aim in this paper is twofold: to establish that Kierkegaard's so‐called theory of the leap strongly anticipates a line of argument that is central to Wittgenstein's so‐called rule‐following considerations; and to begin to show how Kierkegaard's work has fruitful contributions of its own to make to on‐going discussions about rules and rule‐following. The paper focuses throughout on the question of how, if at all, human rule‐following can be distinguished from behaviour that is merely mechanical or instinctual. I identify a central line of argument in Wittgenstein that problematizes this question by establishing the basis our ability to follow rules in our spontaneous responses. I argue that Kierkegaard not only strongly anticipates this line of argument but also offers a distinctive story about what, at bottom, makes the difference between human rule‐following and behaviour that is merely mechanical or instinctual. In a word, on Kierkegaard's story, what makes the difference is: anxiety.     

(ANTI)‐Anti‐Intellectualism and the Sufficiency Thesis

Anti‐intellectualists about knowledge‐how insist that, when an agent S knows how to φ, it is in virtue of some ability, rather than in virtue of any propositional attitudpaes, S has. Recently, a popular strategy for attacking the anti‐intellectualist position proceeds by appealing to cases where an agent is claimed to possess a reliable ability to φ while nonetheless intuitively lacking knowledge‐how to φ. John Bengson and Marc Moffett and Carlotta Pavese have embraced precisely this strategy and have thus claimed, for different reasons, that anti‐intellectualism is defective on the grounds that possessing the ability to φ is not sufficient for knowing how to φ. We investigate this strategy of argument‐by‐counterexample to the anti‐intellectualist's sufficiency thesis and show that, at the end of the day, anti‐intellectualism remains unscathed.     

Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism

In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in Ethical Intuitionism, whose core claim is that normal ethical agents can and do have non‐inferentially justified first‐order ethical beliefs. Although this is the standard formulation, there are two senses in which it is importantly incomplete. Firstly, ethical intuitionism claims that there are non‐inferentially justified ethical beliefs, but there is a worrying lack of consensus in the ethical literature as to what non‐inferentially justified belief is. Secondly, it has been overlooked that there are plausibly different types of non‐inferential justification, and that accounting for the existence of a specific sort of non‐inferential justification is crucial for any adequate ethical intuitionist epistemology. In this context, it is the purpose of this paper to provide an account of non‐inferentially justified belief which is superior to extant accounts, and, to give a refined statement of the core claim of ethical intuitionism which focuses on the type of non‐inferential justification vital for a plausible intuitionist epistemology. Finally, it will be shown that the clarifications made in this paper make it far from obvious that two intuitionist accounts, which have received much recent attention, make good on intuitionism's core claim.     

Method for examining children's beliefs about the functional role played by defensive interpersonal behaviour

The goal of this study was to develop a method for examining children's expectations about the short‐term consequences of defensive interpersonal behaviour. We employed the theory of interpersonal defence (Dahmen & Westerman, in press; Westerman, 1998, 2005 ; Westerman & Prieto, 2006 ), an interpersonal reconceptualization of defence processes, as the framework for this method. We developed a two‐part procedure for eliciting children's responses to closed‐ended and open‐ended questions about interpersonal vignettes presented in storyboard format, and we employed this method in a preliminary investigation with a sample of 62 intellectually gifted boys and girls aged 7–8 and 10–11. The results showed that the participants understood that defensive interpersonal behaviours affect the likelihood that feared and wished‐for short‐term outcomes will occur. Participants demonstrated that they understood that people behave defensively in order to avoid feared consequences and nondefensively in order to pursue wished‐for outcomes. Findings also indicated that older participants understood that a person is more likely to behave defensively in highly conflict‐ridden situations. The results suggest that our method provides the basis for research that complements previous studies of children's understanding of how intrapsychic defence mechanisms regulate a person's affective experience. Future research using this method could investigate the role of beliefs about defensive behaviour in the development of behaviour problems.     

Word frequency effects in immediate serial recall: Item familiarity and item co‐occurrence have the same effect

In immediate serial recall, high‐frequency words are better recalled than low‐frequency words. A prevalent interpretation of this effect suggests that, at the point of recall, degraded representations undergo a reconstruction process calling upon long‐term knowledge of the to‐be‐remembered items. Recently, Stuart and Hulme () following Deese (), suggested that high‐frequency items are better recalled due to their better long‐term associative links. Their results revealed that a familiarisation procedure involving repeated presentations of the to‐be‐remembered items in pairs abolished the usual frequency effect. In the experiment reported here, an alternative interpretation of this result is examined. Prior to the memory task, subjects received either no familiarisation, item familiarisation, or pair familiarisation. Both item and pair familiarisation improved the item recall of low‐frequency items to the same extent, suggesting that increased familiarity can account for the co‐occurrence effect.     

Wittgensteinian content‐externalism

Content‐externalism is the view that a subject's relations to a context can play a role in individuating the content of her mental states. According to social content‐externalists, relations to a socio‐linguistic context can play a fundamental individuating role. Åsa Wikforss has suggested that “social externalism depends on the assumption that individuals have an incomplete grasp of their own concepts”. In this paper, I show that this isn't so. I develop and defend an argument for social content‐externalism which does not depend on this assumption. The argument is animated by strands of thought in the later work of Wittgenstein. In addition to demonstrating that social externalists are not necessarily committed to thinking that a subject can have thoughts involving concepts which she incompletely understands, this argument is important insofar as it (a) supports a form of content‐externalism with extended scope, (b) avoids the controversy surrounding the claim that subjects can think with concepts which they incompletely understand, and (c) situates Wittgenstein's later work with respect to contemporary debates about content‐externalism.     

Practice‐based evidence in school‐based counselling

Aims: Counsellors are becoming commonplace within the support structures of secondary schools. To date, research findings from practice‐based outcome studies suggest this is a positive move. There are, however, numerous limitations to this work, and this project aims to develop this existing body of literature. Method: Nine 13–15 year olds attending counselling in six school‐based services participated in the project – one individual withdrew. A standardised self‐report questionnaire (YP‐CORE) was collected at four intervals: (1) the point of referral; (2) the onset of counselling; (3) the completion of counselling; and, (4) a two‐month follow‐up. The change indicated in each of these phases is examined and reported here. Additionally, YP‐CORE was completed during each session. Findings: The YP‐CORE indicates an improvement in the well‐being of this small sample, while waiting for and attending therapy. Further examination of session‐by‐session data also highlights how pre‐ and post‐outcome data should not necessarily be viewed as linear in nature. Discussion: This is a small‐scale investigation and further work is needed in this area. It does, however, raise a number of issues regarding the complexity inherent in conducting outcome research that warrant further investigation.     

SHOULD A B‐THEORETIC ATHEIST FEAR DEATH?

This article discusses Robin Le Poidevin's proposal that a commitment to the B‐theory of time provides atheists with a reason to relinquish the fear of death. For the purposes of the article, I grant Le Poidevin's assertion that the B‐theory gives us a sense in which our lives are ‘eternally real’; but I deny that the B‐theorist is entitled to regard this as sufficient to furnish a reason to cease fearing death. This is because, according to the most prevalent B‐theoretic conception of our emotional attitudes, A‐theoretic (and not B‐theoretic) beliefs are sufficient to ground these attitudes. I discuss this B‐theoretic account of our emotions, which I call the Mellor–MacBeath model, and explain how it relates to the fear of death. I argue that, according to this model, the fear of death – in so far as it is a fear of one's personal annihilation – is warranted, and hence that, if Le Poidevin's proposal is to stand, then we must be given either a new B‐theoretic account of the connection between beliefs and emotions, or an account of why the fear of death is unlike other emotional attitudes.     

The relationships between socially prescribed perfectionism,in‐group affect,negative urgency,and disordered eating in women

Socially prescribed perfectionism (SPP) is often considered as a key risk factor for disordered eating (DE). However, current conceptualizations of SPP largely assume that this perfectionism pressure is non‐specific (i.e., a global pressure), despite research indicating that for females experiencing DE, female‐dominated groups impose this pressure (as a perceived norm). Furthermore, this relationship may be mediated by a negative reaction to this pressure, in the form of impulsivity (or negative urgency). To date, no research has investigated whether the relationship between SPP and DE is mediated by negative urgency, nor has there been research clarifying how in‐group identification relates to DE, independent of SPP and negative urgency. To address these gaps, we assessed these variables in 147 female dieters (M_age = 25.12 years, SD = 3.08) using a cross‐sectional design. Consistent with our hypotheses, negative urgency fully mediated the link between female‐based SPP and disordered eating, while female‐based in‐group affect (identification) was predictive of disordered eating (although the latter relationship was not sustained in a multiple regression model). These findings suggest that the SPP from other women may relate to DE through increasing negative urgency, and that the link between in‐group (female) affect and DE may be better explained by SPP's link to DE.     

Heidegger's Generative Thesis

Abstract: For William Blattner, Heidegger's phenomenology fails to demonstrate how a nonsuccessive temporal manifold can ‘generate’ the appropriate sequence of world‐time Nows. Without this he cannot explain the ‘derivative’ status of ordinary time. In this article I show that it is only Blattner's reconstruction that makes failure inevitable. Specifically, Blattner is wrong in the way he sets out the explanatory burden, arguing that the structure of world‐time must meet the traditional requirements of ordinary time logic if the derivation is to succeed. He takes this to mean: mundane ‘tasks’, the contents of world‐time nows, must form a transitive series, importing back into world‐time the very structure that Heidegger says is derived by its levelling‐off. I argue, instead, that world‐time nows, seen at the level of lived content, can be quite ‘irrational’ but this is perfectly consistent with the generative thesis. Adapting Blattner's useful suggestion that temporality is sequence building or ‘iterative’ I show that iteration does not manifest itself at the level of tasks but at the ‘existential’ level of my involvement in a task. Depriving that involvement of its expressive content is what accounts for the levelling‐off of the world‐time now and thus the derivation of the ordinary concept of time.