Money does not stink: Using unpleasant odors as stimulus material changes risky decision making

Odors are strong elicitors of affect, and they play an important role in guiding human behavior, such as avoiding fire or spoiled food. However, little is known about how risky decision making changes when stimuli are olfactory. We investigated this question in an experimental study of risky decision making with unpleasant odors and monetary losses in a fully incentivized task with real outcomes. Odor and monetary decisions were matched so that monetary losses corresponded to the amount of money participants were willing to pay to avoid smelling an odor. Hierarchical Bayesian analyses using prospect theory show that participants were less sensitive to probabilities when gambling with odors than when gambling with money. These results highlight the importance of taking the sensory modality into account when studying risky decision making.     

The use of multiple reference points in risky decision making

Among psychologists and economists, prospect theory continues to be one of the most popular models of decision making. The theory's key property is reference dependence; specifically, how an individual's perception of loss or gain is dependent upon their starting point (i.e., the status quo). Although prospect theory is widely accepted, other authors have sought the inclusion of reference points besides the status quo. Initially these extensions focused on the importance of single reference points such as goals. More recently, authors have explained choice data by including multiple reference points within the value function. Multiple‐reference‐point theories generally assume that many choice situations possess an implicit or explicit goal, or point an individual will strive to obtain, and/or a minimum requirement (i.e., a “lower bound”) above which an individual will strive to stay. In two experiments, we present evidence that individuals can utilize the minimum requirement, status quo, and goal within a single risky decision task. Participants most often chose to maximize their chance of reaching reference points even when that decision was riskier, resulted in lower expected value, resulted in lower expected utility, or ran contrary to the predictions of prospect theory. Furthermore, salience and uncertainty moderated the use of goals and minimum requirements as reference points. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Evaluating a dual‐process model of risk: affect and cognition as determinants of risky choice

In three studies we addressed the impact of perceived risk and negative affect on risky choice. In Study 1, we tested a model that included both perceived risk and negative affect as predictors of risky choice. Study 2 and Study 3 replicated these findings and examined the impact of affective versus cognitive processing modes. In all the three studies, both perceived risk and negative affect were shown to be significant predictors of risky choice. Furthermore, Study 2 and Study 3 showed that an affective processing mode strengthened the relation between negative affect and risky choice and that a cognitive processing mode strengthened the relation between perceived risk and risky choice. Together, these findings show support for the idea of a dual‐process model of risky choice. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decision by sampling: The role of the decision environment in risky choice

Decision by sampling (DbS) is a theory about how our environment shapes the decisions that we make. Here, I review the application of DbS to risky decision making. According to classical theories of risky decision making, people make stable transformations between outcomes and probabilities and their subjective counterparts using fixed psychoeconomic functions. DbS offers a quite different account. In DbS, the subjective value of an outcome or probability is derived from a series of binary, ordinal comparisons with a sample of other outcomes or probabilities from the decision environment. In this way, the distribution of attribute values in the environment determines the subjective valuations of outcomes and probabilities. I show how DbS interacts with the real-world distributions of gains, losses, and probabilities to produce the classical psychoeconomic functions. I extend DbS to account for preferences in benchmark data sets. Finally, in a challenge to the classical notion of stable subjective valuations, I review evidence that manipulating the distribution of attribute values in the environment changes our subjective valuations just as DbS predicts.     

睡眠剥夺对风险决策的影响机制探讨

许多行业的决策者必须在睡眠不足的状态下做出选择与判断。睡眠剥夺是睡眠不足的实验室模型, 被证明能显著影响风险决策, 但内在机制不明。基于前人研究基础提出假设模型, 即睡眠剥夺通过影响个体的反馈加工、风险感知、抑制控制、决策理性, 进而影响风险决策。拟通过实验室研究与现场研究, 采用简单赌博任务、概率折扣任务、双选择Oddball任务等研究范式, 对比睡眠剥夺前后被试在执行上述实验任务时的行为差异, 同时比较执行控制网络、奖赏网络等脑功能网络连接强度, 以及任务诱发的FRN等脑电成分在睡眠剥夺前后的变化, 进而论证上述反应被试反馈加工等心理过程的行为-脑电-脑成像指标的变化与睡眠剥夺后被试风险决策变化的关系。研究结果将科学地解释睡眠剥夺影响风险决策的内在机制, 为进一步探讨如何规避睡眠不足导致的决策失误提供理论与实证依据。     

Dealing with Dynamic Decision Problems when Knowledge of the Environment Is Limited: An Approach Based on Goal Systems

We experimentally analyzed decision procedures for dealing with a dynamic decision‐making problem in which only qualitative information about the deterministic dynamics of the environment was available to participants. A participant's task was to maximize long‐term profit in a computer‐simulated monopoly market featuring delays and inertia. The design enabled a goal‐system‐based procedure, whereby a participant could select one or several short‐term variables to be controlled (goal variables) and chose target values (aspiration levels) for each of them over a total of 50 periods. We report results based on a sample of 63 participants on the formation of goal systems and the process of aspiration adaptation. Our main findings are, first, that more frequently selecting goal systems that adequately reflect the causal structure of the underlying model is positively correlated with long‐term profit; second, that goal persistence, a measure of a participant's tendency to stick to the current goal system, is positively correlated with long‐term profit; and third, that aspiration levels tend to be adapted in strong agreement with certain basic principles of a benchmark model of aspiration adaptation. Our study thus suggests and provides empirical foundation for an approach to dealing with complex dynamic decision problems based on neither optimization nor learning. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The excess choice effect: The role of outcome valence and counterfactual thinking

Contrary to economic theory, psychological research has demonstrated increased choice can undermine satisfaction. When and why this ‘excess choice effect’ (ECE) occurs remains unclear. Building on theories of counterfactual thinking we argue the ECE is more likely to occur when people experience counterfactual thought or emotion and that a key trigger is a negative versus positive task outcome. Participants either selected a drink (Experiment 1) or chocolate (Experiment 2) from a limited (6) versus extensive (24) selection (Experiment 1) or were given no choice versus extensive (24) choice (Experiment 2). In both experiments, however, the choice was illusory: Half the participants tasted a ‘good’ flavour, half a ‘bad’ flavour. As predicted, extensive choice was only detrimental to satisfaction when participants tasted the ‘bad’ drink or chocolate, and this was mediated by the experience of counterfactual thought (Experiment 1) or emotion (Experiment 2). When outcomes were positive, participants were similarly satisfied with limited versus extensive and no choice versus extensive choice. Implications for our theoretical understanding of the ECE and for the construction of choice architectures aimed at promoting individual satisfaction and well‐being are discussed.     

Information search and mental representation in risky decision making: The advantages first principle

In three experiments the problem is investigated how people identify early in the decision process those alternatives that are worthwhile to be examined in more detail. We assume that decision makers employ the Advantages first Principle: They first search for information about positive outcomes and then focus their information search (e.g., for negative consequences or for risk defusing operators) on those alternatives that appear attractive after this initial evaluation. In Experiment 1 (120 participants), initial information about consequences was varied for eight alternatives (no information, positive consequences, negative, or mixed for four alternatives). In all conditions, the great majority of participants followed both aspects of the Advantages first Principle. In Experiment 2, 60 participants decided in two quasi‐realistic scenarios with two alternatives each. Initial information was presented so that one alternative had better positive consequences, worse negative consequences, or both. In all conditions, more information was searched for in the initially better alternative. In Experiment 3 (20 participants) the Advantages first Principle was not only confirmed for a scenario but also for choices in traditional gambling tasks with two and eight alternatives, respectively. Participants could win or lose real money. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

愤怒和悲伤情绪对助人决策的影响:人际责任归因的作用

基于具体情绪理论——评价倾向框架理论(ATF),采用两项研究考察负性情绪愤怒和悲伤对助人决策的影响,并探究人际责任归因在这一关系中的作用。两项研究均采用自传体情绪记忆任务诱发情绪,研究一中自变量情绪为组间变量,包括愤怒、悲伤和中性三个水平,因变量助人决策操作为为他人花费时间;研究二中自变量1为组间变量情绪,包括愤怒和悲伤,自变量2为组内变量人际责任归因,操作为模糊归因、不可控的情景归因、可控的自我归因三种情境,因变量助人决策操作为为他人花费金钱。结果发现:(1)与愤怒情绪相比,悲伤情绪下个体为他人花费的时间和捐助的金钱更多;(2)在模糊的人际责任归因条件下,悲伤个体会比愤怒个体捐助更多的钱。研究表明:同为负性情绪的愤怒和悲伤在助人决策上的作用不同,悲伤个体比愤怒个体做出更多的助人决策;人际责任性归因会影响附带情绪和助人决策的关系。研究结论有助于理解附带情绪对助人决策的影响,进一步丰富并延伸ATF理论的证据和领域,对发挥情境中人际责任归因在助人决策中的作用具有一定的现实意义。     

Modeling the Impact of Control on the Attractiveness of Risk in a Prospect Theory Framework

Many decisions involve a degree of personal control over event outcomes, which is exerted through one's knowledge or skill. In three experiments we investigated differences in decision making between prospects based on a) the outcome of random events and b) the outcome of events characterized by control. In Experiment 1, participants estimated certainty equivalents (CEs) for bets based on either random events or the correctness of their answers to U.S. state population questions across the probability spectrum. In Experiment 2, participants estimated CEs for bets based on random events, answers to U.S. state population questions, or answers to questions about 2007 NCAA football game results. Experiment 3 extended the same procedure as Experiment 1 using a within-subjects design. We modeled data from all experiments in a prospect theory framework to establish psychological mechanisms underlying decision behavior. Participants weighted the probabilities associated with bets characterized by control so as to reflect greater risk attractiveness relative to bets based on random events, as evidenced by more elevated weighting functions under conditions of control. This research elucidates possible cognitive mechanisms behind increased risk taking for decisions characterized by control, and implications for various literatures are discussed.     

Risk and rationality: the influence of decision domain and perceived outcome control on managers' high‐risk decisions

The issue of when managers will undertake different forms and amounts of risk in their new business creation decisions is still not fully understood. To address one facet of this issue, this paper advances the proposition that decision domain and perceived outcome control interact to impact managers' new‐product introduction decisions. Employing a causal method, a nested experimental design and indicators of risk's probability of loss and magnitude of loss elements, the study's results demonstrate that the manager's level of perceived outcome control combines with decision domain to determine subsequent levels of risk taking that are specific to each element of risk. Implications for theory, including prospect theory, and practice, especially firms wanting to pursue today's high‐risk new‐economy based initiatives, are discussed. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

前瞻性情绪作为社会风险的信息源假说：公共场景下风险决策的情绪及文化机制探讨

本研究从梳理决策的情绪理论入手, 在综合几种主要理论的基础上提出了“前瞻性情绪作为社会风险信息源”的假说。前瞻性情绪是在决策过程中产生的, 由于对决策选择的预期而感受到的, 进而影响决策行为的情绪。社会环境下的风险事件具有突发和稍纵即逝的特征, 如果一个公民对这类风险事件做出反应, 其结果的概率难于量化。在这种情况下, 前瞻性情绪能够为决策者快速提供有关信息, 并形成对决策预期结果严重性和可能性的综合表征, 从而成为公众场景下风险决策的有效线索。不同前瞻性情绪的组合在面对社会性风险事件时具有针对性的作用。近年来在文化比较中对于面子、荣誉和尊严文化的划分, 也为我们研究文化的情绪特征和行为效应提供了理论框架。本研究拟通过四项研究和多个实验探讨前瞻性情绪如何影响公众场景下人们的风险应对行为, 并对三种文化的情绪特征进行比较, 探索情绪性决策中个人因素、群体因素、及文化因素如何共同决定公共场景下风险决策(如亲社会行为或反社会行为)的发生与发展, 同时也期望为公共政策的制定及风险管理提供科学依据。     

The role of psychological resilience and positive affect in risky decision‐making

Past studies suggest that positive affect produces a wide range of desirable outcomes because it helps people build lasting resources. It may be assumed that these resources build on positive affect over time, which in turn may explain the beneficial effect of positive affect in stressful encounters. However, this assumption has not been directly tested by empirical studies. This question is important in that it helps clarify the underlying mechanism through which individuals with more positive affect might respond adaptively to adverse situations. Using a stressful task that included 20 rounds of risky investment choices, the current study examined whether psychological resilience, an important personal resource fuelled by positive affect, could account for the beneficial effects of positive affect. Specifically, we examined the relationship between individuals’ baseline levels of positive affect, their levels of psychological resilience, their choices in a risky investment decision task, and their levels of positive affect on the final investment task. The results demonstrate that psychological resilience could indeed help explain happier people's enhanced outcomes: They chose higher return although more risky investment options and experienced more positive affect at the end of the task. The current study supports the notion that individuals who experience frequent positive affect thrive through various challenges not simply because they feel good, but because they have resources that they can utilize to deal with these challenges. Findings from the present study support further investigation of the important relationship between specific positive affect, psychological resilience, and performance in risky investment tasks.     

Seeing is not enough: manipulating choice options causes focusing and preference change in multiattribute risky decision‐making

We show that preferences depend on the attributes that can be directly manipulated when people need to integrate multiple sources of information because direct manipulation causes focusing bias. This effect appears even when all relevant information is simultaneously and explicitly presented at the time the decisions are made. Participants decided how much to save, what investment risk to take and observed the future financial consequences in terms of the mean and variability of the expected retirement income. Participants who manipulated only the future income distribution saved more and took less risk. This effect disappears when the risk‐related variables are removed, which indicates that task complexity is a mediator of such focusing effects. A more balanced trade‐off between the choice attributes was selected when all attributes were manipulated. However, when there is a dichotomy between manipulating versus observing choice attributes, then decisions were based mostly on the manipulated attributes. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

风险决策心理因素的理论综述

风险决策理论对于人们是否作出冒险行为的选择提出了两种比较典型的解释:一种解释把风险决策归因于人们共有的基本过程,即“较冷”的心理和认知过程。这些理论认为风险选择是由人类基本的心理和感觉机制引起的。而另一种解释则把风险决策归因于“较热”的情感和动机过程。这些理论认为,情境和人格因素会增强风险决策的动机并导致风险决策个体差异的存在。本文对这两种解释的不同理论作了较为系统的论述。     

The decoy effect as a covert influence tactic

The purpose of this research was to determine whether individuals could use the decoy effect to influence others' choices. In study 1, undergraduates (n = 50) and executive master's of business administration (EMBA) students (n = 24) read an employee selection scenario in which they were randomly assigned to prefer one of two candidates that were equal in overall attractiveness, but that had different strengths and weaknesses. They were then asked to choose one of three inferior candidates to add to the choice set that would make their preferred candidate more likely to be chosen by other decision makers. The “correct” inferior candidate was asymmetrically dominated—dominated by one of the two existing candidates, but not the other. Participants chose the “correct” decoy candidate at better than chance levels. In study 2, undergraduates and EMBA students (total n = 66) completed a set of four decision tasks, in which they were asked to choose from potential decoy alternatives that would highlight their preferred job candidate or the product they preferred to sell to a customer. Participants again chose the correct option at better than chance levels. When participants provided free‐response reasons for their choices, these responses indicated a fairly strong recognition of the influential nature of creating a dominating relationship. Implications for understanding this effect and how it may be used by hiring managers, sales personnel, and others who attempt to influence others people's decisions at work, are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The origins and function of the reference point in risky group decision making the case of the Cuban missile crisis

This case study explores reference level effects on group decision making during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The group is composed of American President John F. Kennedy and his advisers. The results are consistent with much experimental evidence showing that reference levels play an important role in determining preferences. The results also extend the notion of reference-dependent risky choice to the group level, where the group consists of seasoned experts who each have a different role to play within the group and who are dealing with an issue of great importance.     

睾酮对价值加工的影响——基于“累积前景”理论框架的决策行为研究

较多研究支持睾酮和决策中的风险寻求行为呈正相关,但是也有其他的研究未能发现这种关系。基于决策的累计前景理论,本研究使用动态估计参数估计任务(DEEP),结合计算模型的方法,对120名双盲给药、有安慰剂对照的被试进行睾酮对价值加工过程作用的探究。结果显示,睾酮减少了个体的概率扭曲以及增加了损失规避,但是没有引发明显的风险寻求行为,研究结果表明睾酮对个体的价值加工过程产生了影响,使个体对概率的感知更接近于客观值并且增加了对损失的敏感性。     

Adding versus averaging: Evaluability theory applied to job choice decisions

While the unique roles of individual job attributes (e.g., salary and benefits) in job and organizational attraction have received extensive research attention, research examining the mechanisms through which an overall evaluation of a job option is made by combining evaluations of individual attributes is scarce. The current study examined the process through which job choice decisions are made under three conditions: when evaluating a single job offer, when comparing two job offers, and when evaluating more than two job offers. In Study 1, it was found that when a single job offer is evaluated, the average of perceived values of attributes in an offer (e.g., the perceived attractiveness of a salary) drives the choice, whereas the difference between jobs is what matters when two jobs are evaluated simultaneously, potentially leading to a preference reversal between conditions when the same two jobs are evaluated. In Study 2, it was found that average values of attributes across options (e.g., average salary in all job offers received) influence job choice when more than two job offers are evaluated simultaneously. These findings indicate that in all three conditions, job choice decisions are influenced by the evaluability of the choice set, which becomes low when a single job offer is evaluated without any context, or when more than two job offers are evaluated simultaneously, and becomes high when two jobs are compared with each other. When evaluability is low, candidates resort to averaging as the decision rule, whereas adding is used when evaluability is high.     

Vocational choice: A decision making perspective

We propose a model of vocational choice that can be used for analyzing and guiding the decision processes underlying career and job choices. Our model is based on research in behavioral decision making (BDM), in particular the choice goals framework developed by Bettman, Luce, and Payne (1998). The basic model involves two major processes. First, the selection of a decision strategy according to four choice goals: maximizing decision accuracy, minimizing cognitive effort, minimizing negative emotion, and maximizing justifiability of the decision. Second, the construction of situation-specific preferences, which can reflect irrelevant task and context factors such as the evaluation mode. This basic model is extended to account for social influences and the long decision time typical of most career and job decisions. We review research on vocational choice in light of this model, discuss normative implications for counseling, and outline a research agenda for studying vocational choice from a behavioral decision making perspective.