The Smuggler's Fallacy

Abstract: David Hume has warned us not to endeavor to derive an “ought” from an “is” (1990, 469–70), reprimanding those who attempt to draw value judgments from empirical facts. But Judith Jarvis Thomson refuses to accept that values and facts are logically disjoint in this manner, primarily because of her worry that such a partition of our moral values from the “facts” will place a grave limitation on any ethical system, namely, that its claims apparently cannot be proven. Consequently, Thomson is on the lookout for some provably true facts that can be used, contra Hume, to draw conclusions about moral values. Thomson begins by rejecting all generalist conceptions of the good (specifically, the utilitarian's identification of the good with pleasure) and proceeds to fracture the good into various kinds of “goodness in a way,” hoping to produce by this disintegration some moral facts that can be used to set ethics on an objective foundation. But I will argue that Thomson's so‐called objective facts are actually nothing but disguised moral claims, and that in attempting to sidestep the classic fallacy identified by Hume, she has blundered into another pitfall—the Smuggler's Fallacy, the offense of concealing her moral conclusions inside the premises of her argument.     

The Fallacy Fallacy: From the Owl of Minerva to the Lark of Arete

The fallacy fallacy is either the misdiagnosis of fallacy or the supposition that the conclusion of a fallacy must be a falsehood. This paper explores the relevance of these and related errors of reasoning for the appraisal of arguments, especially within virtue theories of argumentation. In particular, the fallacy fallacy exemplifies the Owl of Minerva problem, whereby tools devised to understand a norm make possible new ways of violating the norm. Fallacies are such tools and so are vices. Hence a similar problem arises with argumentative vices. Fortunately, both instances of the problem have a common remedy.

     

The Fallacy of Calibrationism

Calibrationism is an intuitively plausible thesis about the relation between rational credence and expected reliability. But calibrationism is misguided. It relies on the base-rate fallacy, a classic mistake in probabilistic epistemology. Thus while calibrationism is intuitive, it cannot be correct.     

The Comparative Set Fallacy

This paper argues for the validity of inferences that take the form of: A is more X than B; therefore A and B are both X. After considering representative counterexamples, it is claimed that these inferences are valid if and only if the comparative terms in the inference are taken from no more than one comparative set, where a comparative set is understood to be comprised of a positive, comparative, and superlative, represented as {X, more X than, most X}. In all instances where arguments appearing to be of this form are invalid, it is the case that the argument has fallaciously taken terms from more than one comparative set. The fallacy of appealing to more than one comparative set in an inference involving comparative terms is shown to be analogous to the fallacy of equivocation in argumentation. The paper concludes by suggesting a conflation of logical issues with grammatical issues is the core difficulty leading some to consider inferences in the form of A is more X than B; therefore A and B are X to be invalid.     

The Fallacy of Misplaced Presumption

One takes one’s word that p when a source vouches for p and one accepts the word of that source. If the source is reliable in this case, p is acceptable. The reliability of the source is a measure of its plausibility. If a source has the relevant competence, credibility, authority, that word is acceptable. Likewise, the word may be acceptable if accompanied by a cogent argument, but presumption may be misplaced. One may recognize a presumption for a statement when such recognition is not justified, the positive version of the fallacy. One may refuse to recognize a presumption for a statement when there really is a presumption for the statement, the negative version of the fallacy. The essay proceeds to explore various dimensions of when it is justified to take a source’s word for a claim, and when it is justified to reject a claim from a source. The discussion ranges over considerations of sexism and race, cultural differences, and the relationship of presumptions to fallacies. Also considered is the role of trust in taking someone’s word and the factors involved in trusting someone.

     

The Informational Fallacy in the Philosophy of Consciousness

This article argues that theories which regard the mind as merely a form of information processing are guilty of a fallacious conflation of the informational contents of consciousness with consciousness itself, with the consciousness of those contents. Such theories lie behind the thought that a consciousness could be transferred or uploaded onto a substrate other than the brain it initially occurred in. It is argued here that the ontology of information is that of a formal structure that can be instantiated in physical reality innumerable times, whereas the ontology of consciousness is that of an irreducibly singular subjective experience of being alive.     

个体证券投资者自我效能感对赌徒谬误的影响

赌徒谬误指当某一独立随机事件发生后,人们倾向认为这一结果再次出现的概率降低。如果一连串的随机事件呈现出一定的趋势,人们倾向于认为随机事件将呈现系统性反转。证券市场中的赌徒谬误指在股票上涨（下跌）序列中做出股价将要下跌（上涨）的判断。本研究探讨股票市场特征（趋势长度及方向）及投资者的人格特征（自我效能感）对赌徒谬误的影响。以83名股票投资者为对象,采用多层线性模型进行分析,结果发现：趋势长度主效应显著,短线情境下赌徒谬误频次更高;趋势方向主效应显著,下跌情境下赌徒谬误频次更高;二者交互作用显著,在短线下跌情境下,赌徒谬误频次更高;投资者的自我效能感对股票趋势长度具有调节作用,高自我效能的投资者在短线情境下更容易出现赌徒谬误。     

理性的区分

什么是哲学或形而上学?海德格尔的回答直指在者之在。这种回答与他追问“思想的第一开端”有关。而博德尔的见解与之不同,他认为,哲学是对智慧的爱,而这种爱体现为一种概念的表达,一种智慧的给予,它涉及到概念理性,哲学是在这种理性中实现出来的,它不能还原为本体论、神学。理性区分为三种类型:自然理性、世界理性和纯粹理性(即概念理性)。前两者是理性之内的区分,而纯粹理性是理性自己与自己的区分,后者产生了形而上学。     

Avoiding the Conditional Fallacy

Over-simple internalist accounts of practical reasons imply that we cannot have reasons to become more rational, because they claim that we have a reason to φ only if we would have some desire to φ if we were fully rational. But if we were fully rational, we would have no desire to become more rational. Robert Johnson has recently argued that in their attempts to avoid this problem, existing versions of internalism yield reasons which do not have an appropriate connection with potential explanations of action. I suggest that the problem is partly a result of failure to see that action-tokens are usually tokens of a wide variety of action-types, and that the internalist conditional need only be true of one of these types in order to justify a reason claim about the token.     

The Fallacy of the Slippery Slope Argument on Abortion

ABSTRACT This paper attempts to show that the acorn–oak tree argument against the slippery slope on the personhood of the fetus is valid and William Cooney's attack on this argument fails. I also argue that the slippery slope argument leads to on undesirable conclusion and should not be used as a valid tool in the debate on the personhood of the fetus.     

热手谬误和赌徒谬误心理机制研究述评

在知觉随机序列时,人们倾向于把序列中实际上各自独立的相邻结果看作是存在正相关或负相关的,而出现热手谬误或赌徒谬误,又称为随机序列中的正负近因效应。有关这两谬误最早的心理机制的探索中,Kahneman 和Tversky采用局部代表性启发法对此进行了解释。但是这种解释也存在诸多不足,因此近期的一些模型（因果模型、Urn模型、记忆模型、适应模型和两阶段格式塔模型）分别从不同角度对两种谬误提出了新的解释。最后文章指出研究方法、神经机制、个体差异以及生活中的应用是该领域研究的几个未来发展方向     

自我表征特点与成败情境下的自我关注选择倾向

本研究以小学三年级学生为被试进行情境实验,探讨成功与挫败情景下儿童的自我关注状态。实验结果表明,被试的自我描述选择在一定程度上受成败评语的影响。并且,被试自我概念特征与成败情景下的反应存在着一定的关系,来自不同学习环境的被试自我表征有不同的倾向性。本文分析了这些现象在儿童自我发展中的意义。     

Rethinking the Fallacy of Hasty Generalization

This paper makes a case for a refined look at the so- called fallacy of hasty generalization by arguing that this expression is an umbrella term for two fallacies already distinguished by Aristotle. One is the fallacy of generalizing in an inappropriate way from a particular instance to a universal generalization containing a for all x quantification. The other is the secundum quid (in a certain respect) fallacy of moving to a conclusion that is supposed to be a universal generalization containing a for all x quantification while overlooking qualifications that have to be added to the more limited kind of generalization expressed in the premise. It is shown that these two fallacies relate to two different kinds of generalization.The classification of fallacious generalizations is based on a new theory of generalization that distinguishes three kinds of generalizations – the universal generalization of the for all x type, used in classical deductive logic, the inductive generalization, based on probability, and the presumptive generalization, which is defeasible, and allows for exceptions to a general rule. The resulting classification goes beyond a logic-oriented analysis by taking into account how a respondent may oppose a potentially fallacious generalizing move by falsifying it. Using a dialectical interpretation of premise-conclusion complexes, the paper outline a richer concept of generalizing argument moves embedded in a communicational reconstruction of the strategic uses of such moves in which two parties take part in an orderly dialectical exchange of viewpoints.     

Effing the Ineffable: The Logocentric Fallacy in Argumentation

Words, just because they are words, are not inherently clear. The message they contain becomes clear to those who speak the language and are familiar with the issues and contexts. If the message lacks linguistic clarity the recipient of the message will typically make a query that will bring forth further information intended to clarify. The result might be more words, but it might also involve pointing or drawing, or words that utilize other modes such as references to context, history, and so on. If the ambiguity derives from an inconsistency between, say, words and behaviour, one may look to either mode for clarity. Communication, we must accept, actually occurs in messages, and our ability to transmit information may be limited by any number of factors. When we focus entirely on discursive aspects of communication we limit both the ways in which we receive and ways in which we transmit information. The logocentric fallacy is committed when language, especially in it's most logical guise, is seen to be the only form of rational communication.