Vocational choice: A decision making perspective

We propose a model of vocational choice that can be used for analyzing and guiding the decision processes underlying career and job choices. Our model is based on research in behavioral decision making (BDM), in particular the choice goals framework developed by Bettman, Luce, and Payne (1998). The basic model involves two major processes. First, the selection of a decision strategy according to four choice goals: maximizing decision accuracy, minimizing cognitive effort, minimizing negative emotion, and maximizing justifiability of the decision. Second, the construction of situation-specific preferences, which can reflect irrelevant task and context factors such as the evaluation mode. This basic model is extended to account for social influences and the long decision time typical of most career and job decisions. We review research on vocational choice in light of this model, discuss normative implications for counseling, and outline a research agenda for studying vocational choice from a behavioral decision making perspective.     

Comparison selection: An approach to the study of consumer judgment and choice

We introduce an alternative perspective on the study of consumer judgment and decision making, which is based on the notion that judgment and choice problems consist of comparisons that decision makers might select. Our new perspective proposes that if we can predict the likelihood that particular comparisons will become focal in a judgment or choice task, we will be able to gain a better understanding of and anticipate the resulting effect. Building on related literatures, we propose that comparison selection is driven by the task's latitude of acceptance (LOA) and comparison fluency (i.e., the overall ease of making that comparison). The task's LOA curve represents the range and concentration of potentially acceptable comparisons, whereas comparison fluency refers to the salience and ease of making the comparison. We illustrate our approach using previously studied problems (e.g., choice, variety seeking, the “jacket and calculator” problem, and contingent valuation) as well as new empirical tests.     

Strategy compatibility: The time versus money effect on product evaluation strategies

We show that time priming leads consumers to adopt an alternative-based evaluation strategy, whereas money priming elicits the use of an attribute-based evaluation strategy. In Experiment 1, we used process tracing in Mouselab to test this proposition, and the results suggested that the effect of time versus money priming on the choice of product-evaluation strategy was mediated by a holistic versus piecemeal information-processing. The results of Experiments 2A and 2B showed that the use of time versus money priming to trigger the choice of an alternative-based versus attribute-based evaluation strategy may result in systematic preference reversals. Specifically, when time (versus money) was primed, the participants were found to be more likely to choose a product dominating on a verbally described (versus numerically described) attribute (Experiment 2A), and one dominating on a non-alignable (versus alignable) attribute (Experiment 2B).     

Heuristics as beliefs and as behaviors: the adaptiveness of the "hot hand"

and analyzed reasoning by asking: what are the reasoner's goals? This emphasizes the adaptiveness of behavior rather than whether a belief is normative. Belief in the "hot hand" in basketball suggests that players experiencing streaks should be given more shots, but this has been seen as a fallacy due to failure to find dependencies between players' shots. Based on their findings, I demonstrate by Markov modeling and simulation that streaks are valid allocation cues for deciding who to give shots to, because this behavior achieves the team goal of scoring more. Empirically I show that this adaptive heuristic is supported by the fallacious belief in dependency, more so as skill level increases. I extend the theoretical analysis to identify general conditions under which following streaks should be beneficial. Overall, this approach illustrates the advantages of analyzing reasoning in terms of adaptiveness.     

Military Ethical Decision Making: The Effects of Option Choice and Perspective Taking on Moral Decision-Making Processes and Intentions

We investigated the ethical decision-making processes and intentions of 151 military personnel responding to 1 of 2 ethical scenarios drawn from the deployment experiences of military commanders. For each scenario, option choice and perspective affected decision-making processes. Differences were also found between the 2 scenarios. Results add to the emerging literature concerning operational ethical conflicts and highlight the complexity and challenge that often accompanies operational ethics.     

Between a rock and a hard place: The failure of the attraction effect among unattractive alternatives

Many important decisions that consumers face involve choosing between options that are unattractive or undesirable—the proverbial “lesser of two evils.” Consumers, who face budget or geographical constraints, for example, end up with mostly undesirable consideration sets; yet a choice is necessary. We examine the role of option set desirability in the context of the well-established attraction effect. In five studies, we show that the attraction effect occurs in desirable domains but is eliminated when all the options are undesirable (Experiments 1–4). We further find that this asymmetric effect is consistent with a shift in decision makers' processing styles. Decision makers show more vigilant processing when making choices among undesirable (vs. desirable) domains (Experiments 3A and 3B), which results in an attenuated attraction effect (Experiment 4). Our results indicate that the attraction effect might not be as robust as generally thought and establishes (un)desirability as an important boundary condition.     

The disjunction effect reexamined: Relevant methodological issues and the fallacy of unspecified percentage comparisons

Leonard J. Savage’s sure-thing principle (1954) is a key assumption of the consequentialist conception of decision making under uncertainty, which more-or-less assumes that decision makers are rational and thorough. The sure-thing principle states that if some option x is preferred given some other event A occurs, and if option x is preferred given this event A does not occur, then x should be preferred even when the outcome of A is unknown. Tversky and Shafir [Tversky, A., &; Shafir, E. (1992). The disjunction effect in choice under uncertainty. Psychological Science, 3(5) 305–309] claim that this basic principle is frequently violated in two-step gambles. They call such violations disjunction effects. Kuhberber, Komunska, and Perner [Kuhberber, A., Komunska, D., &; Perner, J. (2001). The disjunction effect: does it exist for two step gambles? Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 85(2) 250–264] attempted to replicate Tversky and Shafir’s findings and claim their results show that people do not violate the sure-thing principle in repeated gambles. This article evaluates Kuhberger, Komunska, and Perner’s claims, suggesting they did not appropriately analyze their results, and further provides evidence that people do regularly violate the sure-thing principle in two-step gambles, providing further evidence for the reality of disjunction effects.     

Decision making and confidence given uncertain advice

We study human decision making in a simple forced-choice task that manipulates the frequency and accuracy of available information. Empirically, we find that people make decisions consistent with the advice provided, but that their subjective confidence in their decisions shows 2 interesting properties. First, people's confidence does not depend solely on the accuracy of the advice. Rather, confidence seems to be influenced by both the frequency and accuracy of the advice. Second, people are less confident in their guessed decisions when they have to make relatively more of them. Theoretically, we develop and evaluate a type of sequential sampling process model—known as a self-regulating accumulator—that accounts for both decision making and confidence. The model captures the regularities in people's behavior with interpretable parameter values, and we show its ability to fit the data is not due to excessive model complexity. Using the model, we draw conclusions about some properties of human reasoning under uncertainty.     

Saving the worst for last: The effect of time horizon on the efficiency of negotiating benefits and burdens

Three experiments explored the effect of outcome delays—longer time horizons for the realization of outcomes—on the efficiency of negotiated agreements. We hypothesized that there would be a positive relationship between a longer temporal distance to the consequences of negotiated agreements and the efficiency of those agreements. Outcome delays did increase the efficiency of the negotiated agreements. In addition, type of resource, burden or benefit, moderated this relationship. Because negotiating for burdens is more difficult than negotiating for benefits in the present, the salutary discounting effects of outcome delays were greater for burdens. The multifaceted effects of time on negotiations are discussed.     

Magnitude effect contributes to the domain specificity in delay discounting

Discounting is a useful framework for understanding temporal choices. A person who prefers $50 immediately over $100 in 1 month exhibits a higher discount rate than a person deciding to wait for the higher payoff. Although previous research shows that discount rates are domain-specific, we propose an alternative to the domain specificity account. We suggest that differences in discounting alternatives across various domains may result not so much from the domains' nature per se but from differences in perceived attractiveness of the discounted alternatives. We replicated that an illustrative study evidencing domain specificity in discounting (Experiment 1) showed that people's subjective values of the payoffs in domains discounted in this experiment were different (Experiment 2) and used a novel method to match the attractiveness of the available alternatives across domains (Experiment 3). Finally, Experiment 4 showed that when matching was applied, the domain effect disappeared. We conclude that a magnitude effect can, at least partially, explain domain specificity in delay discounting.     

The decoy effect as a covert influence tactic

The purpose of this research was to determine whether individuals could use the decoy effect to influence others' choices. In study 1, undergraduates (n = 50) and executive master's of business administration (EMBA) students (n = 24) read an employee selection scenario in which they were randomly assigned to prefer one of two candidates that were equal in overall attractiveness, but that had different strengths and weaknesses. They were then asked to choose one of three inferior candidates to add to the choice set that would make their preferred candidate more likely to be chosen by other decision makers. The “correct” inferior candidate was asymmetrically dominated—dominated by one of the two existing candidates, but not the other. Participants chose the “correct” decoy candidate at better than chance levels. In study 2, undergraduates and EMBA students (total n = 66) completed a set of four decision tasks, in which they were asked to choose from potential decoy alternatives that would highlight their preferred job candidate or the product they preferred to sell to a customer. Participants again chose the correct option at better than chance levels. When participants provided free‐response reasons for their choices, these responses indicated a fairly strong recognition of the influential nature of creating a dominating relationship. Implications for understanding this effect and how it may be used by hiring managers, sales personnel, and others who attempt to influence others people's decisions at work, are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pricing risk and ambiguity: The effect of perspective taking

In the valuation of uncertain prospects, a difference is often observed between selling and buying perspectives. This paper distinguishes between risk (known probabilities) and ambiguity (unknown probabilities) in decisions under uncertainty and shows that the valuation disparity increases under ambiguity compared to risk. It is found that both the comparative versus noncomparative evaluation of risky and ambiguous prospects and the uniqueness of the valuation perspective (either seller or buyer) moderate this increase in the disparity under ambiguity. The finding is consistent with recent theoretical accounts of pricing under uncertainty. We discuss implications for market behaviour and for the ambiguity paradigm as a research tool.     

Inference in the Wild: A Framework for Human Situation Assessment and a Case Study of Air Combat

Situation awareness is a key construct in human factors and arises from a process of situation assessment (SA). SA comprises the perception of information, its integration with existing knowledge, the search for new information, and the prediction of the future state of the world, including the consequences of planned actions. Causal models implemented as Bayesian networks (BNs) are attractive for modeling all of these processes within a single, unified framework. We elicited declarative knowledge from two Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) fighter pilots about the information sources used in the identification (ID) of airborne entities and the causal relationships between these sources. This knowledge was represented in a BN (the declarative model) that was evaluated against the performance of 19 RAAF fighter pilots in a low‐fidelity simulation. Pilot behavior was well predicted by a simple associative model (the behavioral model) with only three attributes of ID. Search for information by pilots was largely compensatory and was near‐optimal with respect to the behavioral model. The average revision of beliefs in response to evidence was close to Bayesian, but there was substantial variability. Together, these results demonstrate the value of BNs for modeling human SA.     

Examining the unfolding of moral decisions across time using the reach-to-touch paradigm

Abstract

Recent theories of decision making are characterised by a growing emphasis on understanding the cognitive mechanisms that produce decisions. This has seen a growth in methods that allow for the continuous collection of data during reasoning. Current applications of these methods to complex decision making have been limited in their ability to examine the dynamics of responding across time. In the current study we address this issue by examining the online dynamics of moral decisions. Participants were required to respond to moral dilemmas that differed according to harm or intention by reaching out and touching one of two response panels. Utilitarian and deontological responses to personal moral dilemmas were found to differ across time. Utilitarian decisions did not emerge more slowly overall, but rather emerged across a wider (less consistent) time period. Importantly, this result did not generalise to a set of standardized moral scenarios. Taken together these findings highlight how dilemma-specific variables can significantly influence moral reasoning and emphasize the importance of using well controlled stimuli together with a measure capable of examining decisions as they unfold over time.     

The effects of endowment on the demand for probabilistic information

Research shows that individuals are ambiguity averse: they choose unambiguous over equivalent ambiguous prospects and price them higher (either as buyers or sellers). Moreover, it is often assumed that ambiguity averse individuals are willing to pay an ambiguity premium for information that reduces ambiguity [Camerer, C. F., & Weber, M. (1992). Recent developments in modeling preferences: Uncertainty and ambiguity. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5(4), 325–370]. However, when people are asked to exchange an ambiguous alternative in their possession for an equivalent unambiguous one, they prefer to retain the former [Roca, M., Hogarth, R. M., & Maule, A. J. (2006). Ambiguity seeking as a result of the status quo bias. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 32(3), 175–194]. We present three experiments investigating the economic effects of endowment on attitudes towards ambiguity and the ambiguity premium. The experiments, based on a [Becker, G., DeGroot, M., & Marschak, J. (1964). Measuring utility by a single-response sequential method. Science, 9, 3] procedure, show that the value attributed to ambiguity reducing information is substantially affected by the status quo of the individual.     

Of matchers and maximizers: How competition shapes choice under risk and uncertainty

In a world of limited resources, scarcity and rivalry are central challenges for decision makers—animals foraging for food, corporations seeking maximal profits, and athletes training to win, all strive against others competing for the same goals. In this article, we establish the role of competitive pressures for the facilitation of optimal decision making in simple sequential binary choice tasks. In two experiments, competition was introduced with a computerized opponent whose choice behavior reinforced one of two strategies: If the opponent probabilistically imitated participant choices, probability matching was optimal; if the opponent was indifferent, probability maximizing was optimal. We observed accurate asymptotic strategy use in both conditions irrespective of the provision of outcome probabilities, suggesting that participants were sensitive to the differences in opponent behavior. An analysis of reinforcement learning models established that computational conceptualizations of opponent behavior are critical to account for the observed divergence in strategy adoption. Our results provide a novel appraisal of probability matching and show how this individually ‘irrational’ choice phenomenon can be socially adaptive under competition.     

People Wait Longer when the Alternative is Risky: The Relation Between Preferences in Risky and Inter‐temporal Choice

In two experiments, we demonstrate that despite indicating indifference when probed about risk or delay in isolation, when forced to explicitly trade‐off between the two, participants prefer delayed over risky rewards. This pattern of findings sets a boundary condition for any common utility‐based comparison process involving both risk and delay. Furthermore, this change from indifference‐in‐isolation to delay‐preference‐in‐a‐trade‐off strengthens as reward amount increases. Exploratory modeling results suggest that the shift in preference can be explained by allowing for different discount rates for delay‐only choices compared with when delay is in competition with risk. This explanation is better than one in which probability weighting is different between risk‐only choices and risks considered in the presence of a delay. Together, the empirical and modeling work lays a path for future investigations of why and when people's evaluation of the properties of risky and delayed choices vary as a function of the alternatives on offer. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

情绪和框架效应对个体捐赠决策影响的实验研究

本研究采用双因素被试间实验具体考察了特定即时情绪和框架效应对于捐赠决策的影响,结果发现存在显著的主效应和交互作用。悲伤情绪能够增加捐赠者的捐赠意愿,快乐情绪会降低捐赠者的捐赠意愿;损失框架能够增加捐赠者的捐赠意愿,幸存框架会降低捐赠者的捐赠意愿;快乐情绪的捐赠者的捐赠决策受框架效应的影响要弱于中性情绪和悲伤情绪的捐赠者,捐赠者在幸存框架下的捐赠决策受情绪的影响比在损失框架下受情绪的影响更小。