‘Fundamentalism’ Christian and Islamic

This article seeks to answer the question whether the term ‘fundamentalism’ is an appropriate label for certain Islamic movements by undertaking a detailed comparison with Protestant Christian fundamentalism, for which the term was originally coined. After an effort to identify and characterize the two phenomena, a number of similarities and differences are discussed. Among the differences is the fact that the most obvious defining characteristics in each case (Biblical inerrancy for Protestants and politicalsocial involvement for Muslims) are of little relevance to the other case. Among the similarities is a common opposition to ‘modernism’ and a tendency to stress what has been distinctive to the Protestant and Islamic traditions, respectively. The conclusion is that, while the two phenomena do have much in common, ‘fundamentalism’ is not an appropriate common label. The author prefers ‘Islamic radicalism’ for the Muslim case and tentatively suggests ‘radical neotraditionalism’ as a common label.     

‘Who would take whose name?’ Accounts of naming practices in same‐sex relationships

The practice of a woman assuming her husband's last name upon marriage is a deeply embedded norm in some countries. Whether or not individual heterosexual couples reproduce or resist this practice, it provides a context for making decisions about marital names. No conventions, other than heteronormative ones, govern naming practices in same‐sex relationships and families, but very little is known about name changing in these contexts. This paper reports an exploratory qualitative study of the ways in which 30 lesbians and gay men in committed relationships made meaning of name changing and keeping. Only one participant reported changing her last name, some considered name changing a future possibility, but most had no plans to change their name. The lack of conventions regarding naming in same‐sex families created a dilemma for some participants—who would take whose name? Many participants did not want to entirely give up their name, thus a hyphenated last name was the most popular option for those contemplating a name change. Accounts of name changing centred on doing/being family. This was also a theme in accounts of name keeping, along with maintaining a continuity of personal and professional identity, avoiding hassle, complications and confusion and resisting heteronormativity. The findings are discussed in relation to other research on naming in same‐sex families and research on heterosexual marital naming practices. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

‘Lyin' Ted’, ‘Crooked Hillary’, and ‘Deceptive Donald’: Language of Lies in the 2016 US Presidential Debates

Language in the high‐stakes 2016 US presidential primary campaign was contentious, filled with name‐calling, personal attacks, and insults. Language in debates served at least three political functions: for image making, to imagine potential realities currently not in practice, and to disavow facts. In past research, the reality monitoring (RM) framework has discriminated accurately between truthful and deceptive accounts (~70% classification). Truthful accounts show greater sensory, time and space, and affective information, with little evidence of cognitive operations. An RM algorithm was used with Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count software to code candidates' language. RM scores were significantly higher in fact‐checked truth statements than in lies, and debate language in the 2016 primaries was as deceptive as fact‐checked lies. In a binary logistic regression model, one RM criterion, cognitive processes, predicted veracity using computerized RM, classifying 87% of fact‐checked truth statements but only 28% of fact‐checked lie statements (63% classification overall).Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

‘Good Impression’ as a Moderator in Employment‐related Assessment

There is widespread agreement that response bias variables, such as good impression, have little relevance, either as moderators or suppressors, in efforts to improve the accuracy of employment‐related predictions based on personality test scores. However, a recent review found that there were relatively few methodologically sound real‐life studies of the moderator function. Reported here are four such studies involving the prediction of job performance. As hypothesized, a significant moderator effect was shown in the two studies that utilized ‘transparent’ job‐related predictors, with useful prediction only at the lower levels of good impression, but not in the two studies that utilized personality variables as predictors. These results confirm that validity when using transparent items to predict employment‐related success can be affected by the operation of good‐impression response bias. Further research is needed to delineate other relevant effects of good impression in such situations.     

Against Pogge's ‘Cosmopolitanism’

Thomas Pogge labels the idea that each person owes each other person equal respect and concern ‘ethical cosmopolitanism’ and correctly states that it is a ‘non‐starter’. He offers as an allegedly more convincing cosmopolitan alternative his ‘social justice cosmopolitanism’. I shall argue that this alternative fails for pretty much the same reasons that ‘ethical cosmopolitanism’ fails. In addition, I will show that Pogge's definition of cosmopolitanism is misleading, since it actually applies to ethical cosmopolitanism and not to social justice cosmopolitanism. This means that cosmopolitanism as defined by Pogge is wrong in the light of his own arguments and that Pogge is not even a cosmopolitan in the sense of his own definition. I will further show that he is also not a cosmopolitan if cosmopolitanism is defined as a philosophical position involving the claim that state borders have no fundamental moral significance.     

Constructing the truth From ‘Confusion of tongues’ to ‘Constructions in analysis’1

The author hypothesizes that the papers Freud wrote in the period 1934‐9 constitute a fi nal turning point in his work resulting from an attempt to work through, by means of self‐analysis, early traumatic elements reactivated by the conditions of his life in the 1930s. The author emphasizes that the ups and downs of Freud's relationship with Sándor Ferenczi and the mourning which followed his death in 1933 played an important role in this traumatic situation. He suggests that through these last works, Freud pursued a posthumous dialogue with Ferenczi. This working through led Freud, in Moses and monotheism, to an ultimate revision of his theory of trauma, a revision which the author examines in full, in the light of the works of the Egyptologist, Jan Assmann. A new analytical paradigm emerges: that of constructions in analysis developed in the article of the same name. The activity of construction appears as an alternative to the mutual analysis proposed by Ferenczi and is closely bound up with the notion of historical truth. In psychoanalysis, it would mean constructing a historical truth whose anchoring in the material truth of the past is essential, though it should not be confused with it.     

What does it mean to ‘live’ and ‘die’? A cross‐linguistic analysis of parent–child conversations in English and Indonesian

Previous work on children's intuitive knowledge about the natural world has documented their difficulty in acquiring an overarching concept of biological life that includes plants as well as humans and non‐human animals. It has also suggested that the acquisition of fundamental biological concepts like alive and die may be influenced by the language used to describe them, as evidenced by differences between English‐ and Indonesian‐speaking children's performance in tasks involving these concepts. Here, we examine one particularly important source of linguistic information available to children during this acquisition process: everyday conversations with their parents. We take a cross‐linguistic approach in analysing the evidence available to English‐ and Indonesian‐speaking children as they acquire meanings for words corresponding to the concepts alive and die . Our analysis illustrates that young children acquiring English and Indonesian are faced with distinct problems, but that parental input in both languages does little to support the acquisition of broad, inclusive biological concepts.     

Cross-cultural differences in colour vision: Acquired ‘colour-blindness’ in Africa

We report a study of the incidence of ‘colour-blindness’ in southern and central Africa, and we compare the African data with data from various European groups. There was a surprisingly high incidence of tritan errors (yellow–blue defect). The likelihood of making tritan errors increased with age, and was greater in rural areas than in towns. In Europe, no tritan errors were made by samples from the U.K., Eire or Spain, but some tritan errors were made by a sample from southern Greece. In contrast, most of a British sample of people over sixty-five years old makes tritan errors. Although tritan errors were the most frequent, they were often accompanied by protan and deutan errors. This mixed pattern of errors is consistent with the condition being acquired rather than congenital. Many languages of southern Africa categorise blues and greens with the same term. If the tritanopia we report has been endemic, it may have reduced the ‘perceptual pressure’ to split the blue-with-green categories into separate blue and green terms; a speculation consistent with Rivers, W. H. R. (1901. Introduction to A. C. Haddon (Ed.), Reports on the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to the Torres Straits. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) © 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved..     

‘Telepathic’ phenomena and separation anxiety

By discussing a treatment characterized by its difficult ending, the author strives to show the dynamic impact of separation on phenomena that can be seen as ‘telepathic’. Led to develop some inalienable attachment to her analyst in the primary transference, the analysand found herself caught up in the contradiction of her visceral dread of dependency, which compelled her to interrupt the work in progress. She then began to work out her analyst's comings and goings and to run into him in public places, as if to be assured of his immovability. This phenomenon arose with high frequency as the effect of some idealization of the maternal object aiming to deny the spatiotemporal gap. The chance that the experience of rejection via indifference may be repeated also entailed the transferential unfurling of a fantasy involving a double, undifferentiation counterbalancing the lived experience of separation. Furthermore, a ‘telepathic’ dream occurred as confirmation of this twin relationship which illustrates the analysand's refusal to renounce her narcissistic object. Projective identifications, agglutinated ego nuclei along with primitive cross‐identifications could, among other concepts, account for such phenomena which are projective in nature yet real all the same. Such mechanisms could have the power to relay thoughts the moment undifferentiated parts of the ego – if not unborn parts of the self – were activated in a potentially symbiotic zone. Marked by a feeling of dispossession, the analyst's countertransference not only seemed to underscore this hypothesis, it also gave a partial explanation for it. Until the analyst could recognize his own nostalgia for a symbiotic relationship, he had to encourage the occurrence of those unexpected meetings which stemmed from a convergence between the transference and the countertransference.     

‘Yes,we have bananas!’1

This paper takes as its starting point ‘identifying markers of Latin American psychoanalysis’. The authors see this theme as a compromise between two diverging approaches. On one hand, the conference at which the content was presented provided the opportunity for Latin American psychoanalytical thinking to be discussed and, as a reward to the best papers, to be published. On the other, both the conference and the reward are more indicative of the observer's biases than of the object's peculiarities. The authors consider that the conference mistakenly focused on the search for minor differences (secondary identifi cations) instead of looking for invariances (identities). Considering that uncertainty, pluralism and complexity are issues relevant to the whole of psychoanalysis in its current stage of development as a scientifi c discipline, the authors think that treating these elements as ‘identifying markers of Latin American psychoanalysis’ is evidence of prejudice brought about by a coloniser‐colonised relationship. To develop their argument, the authors discuss a paper on editorial criteria by Tuckett as a clinical case, and use an episode of Brazilian history as further illustration. They address issues such as conformity to cultural patterns; the search for certainties and proofs; the domination of some groups over others; and editorial power‐more specifi cally, its infl uence on the acceptance or rejection of scientifi c ideas. These issues have distracted attention away from the fundamentals of psychoanalysis by introducing other, extraneous aims. Publication plays a key role in feeding a possibly vicious circle wherein only a small proportion of scientifi c contributions manages to reach a wide audience‐exactly those contributions that conform to established patterns. The act of publication turns that portion into offi cial knowledge, while unpublished ideas become increasingly excluded.     

Sparse distributed memory for ‘conscious’ software agents

In this work we are reporting a case study on the use of SDM as the associative memory for a software agent, CMattie, whose architecture is modeled on human cognition. Sparse distributed memory (SDM) is a content-addressable memory technique that relies on close memory items tending to be clustered together. In this work, we used an enhanced version of SDM augmented with the use of genetic algorithms as an associative memory in our ‘conscious’ software agent, CMattie, who is responsible for emailing seminar announcements in an academic department. Interacting with seminar organizers via email in natural language, CMattie can replace the secretary who normally handles such announcements. SDM is a key ingredient in a complex agent architecture that implements global workspace theory, a psychological theory of consciousness and cognition. In this architecture, SDM, as the primary memory for the agent, provides associations with incoming percepts. These include disambiguation of the percept by removing noise, correcting misspellings, and adding missing pieces of information. It also retrieves behaviors and emotions associated with the percept. These associations are based on previous similar percepts, and their consequences, that have been recorded earlier. SDM also possesses several key psychological features. Some enhancements to SDM including multiple writes of important items, use of error detection and correction, and the use of hashing to map the original information into fixed size keys were used. Test results indicate that SDM can be used successfully as an associative memory in such complex agent architectures. The results show that SDM is capable of recovering a percept based on a part of that percept, and finding defaults for empty perception registers. The evaluation of suggested actions and emotional states is satisfactory. We think that this work opens the door to more scientific and empirical uses for SDM.     

Dialogical journal writing as ‘self‐therapy’: ‘I matter’

Aim: This case study of one woman's (Jane's) experience of dialogical journal writing presents a way of finding a ‘compassionate image’ for self‐therapy. Various theoretical analyses are indicated with Mindfulness‐based conceptualisations at the forefront. Methodology: Based on three recorded interviews, the narrative inquiry took place over a year. Methodologically, this paper is also one contribution to an ongoing debate about different research approaches in therapeutic writing research. Participants: This study took place in Aotearoa New Zealand, where both Jane and I are migrants. Discussion: This account draws on a report of self‐directed writing for well‐being, seen as an alternative to counselling or medication for depression and anxiety. It focuses on how a particular style of writing evolved and how the motivation to write continues.     

Stop Thinking So Much About ‘Sexual Harassment’

This article explores two related widespread mistakes in thinking about sexual harassment. One is a mistake made by philosophers doing philosophical work on the topic of sexual harassment: an excessive focus on attempting to define the term ‘sexual harassment’. This is a perfectly legitimate topic for discussion and indeed a necessary one, but its dominance of the literature has tended to prevent philosophers from adequately exploring other topics that are of at least equal importance, particularly that of bystanders' responsibilities. The other mistake is one made not just by philosophers but by most people attempting to deal with real‐world behaviour that is either sexual harassment or closely related to sexual harassment: an excessive focus on whether or not formal charges of sexual harassment are possible or appropriate. (This is clearly related to the first mistake in that a part of deciding whether charges are appropriate is deciding whether the behaviour meets the definition of sexual harassment.) I argue that these are not merely unfortunate errors in attempting to conceptualise certain problematic behaviours; they have extremely damaging real world effects.     

‘Introspectionism’ and the mythical origins of scientific psychology

According to the majority of the textbooks, the history of modern, scientific psychology can be tidily encapsulated in the following three stages. Scientific psychology began with a commitment to the study of mind, but based on the method of introspection. Watson rejected introspectionism as both unreliable and effete, and redefined psychology, instead, as the science of behaviour. The cognitive revolution, in turn, replaced the mind as the subject of study, and rejected both behaviourism and a reliance on introspection. This paper argues that all three stages of this history are largely mythical. Introspectionism was never a dominant movement within modern psychology, and the method of introspection never went away. Furthermore, this version of psychology’s history obscures some deep conceptual problems, not least surrounding the modern conception of “behaviour,” that continues to make the scientific study of consciousness seem so weird.     

Metaphysics of Pain; Semantics of ‘Pain’

Functionalism is often used to identify mental states with physical states. A particularly powerful case is Lewis's analytical functionalism. Kripke's view seriously challenges any such identification. The dispute between Kripke and Lewis's views boils down to whether the term ‘pain’ is rigid or nonrigid. It is a strong intuition of ours that if it feels like pain it is pain, and vice versa, so that ‘pain’ should designate, with respect to every possible world, all and only states felt as pain. Hence, in order to settle the dispute, we need to check which of the two – Kripke's use of ‘pain’ as rigid, or Lewis's use of ‘pain’ as nonrigid – better meets this intuition. I show that, despite crucial differences in both their semantic and metaphysical assumptions, surprisingly, both views meet this intuition equally well. Thus it appears that this question of rigidity cannot, in principle, be solved, and so, at least with respect to this particular dispute, the jury is still out on whether mental states are identical to physical states. 1     

THE ‘EXTENDEDNESS’ OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

In recent years, the idea has been gaining ground that our traditional conceptions of knowledge and cognition are unduly limiting, in that they privilege what goes on inside the ‘skin and skull’ (Clark 1997: 82) of an individual reasoner. Instead, it has been argued, knowledge and cognition need to be understood as embodied (involving both mind and body), situated (being dependent on the complex interplay between the individual and its environment), and extended (that is, continuous with, rather than separate from, the world ‘outside’). Whether these various interrelations and dependencies are ‘merely’ causal, or are in a more fundamental sense constitutive of knowledge and cognition, is as much a matter of controversy as the degree to which they pose a challenge to ‘traditional’ conceptions of cognition, knowledge and the mind. In this paper we argue that when the idea of ‘extendedness’ is applied to a core concept in epistemology and the philosophy of science—namely, scientific evidence—things appear to be on a much surer footing. The evidential status of data gathered through extended processes—including its utility as justification or warrant—do not seem to be weakened by virtue of being extended, but instead are often strengthened because of it. Indeed, it is often precisely by virtue of this extendedness that scientific evidence grounds knowledge claims, which individuals may subsequently ascribe to themselves. The functional equivalence between machine‐based gathering, filtering, and processing of data and human interpretation and assessment is the crucial factor in deciding whether evidence has been gathered, rather than the distinction between intra‐ and extracranial processes or individual and social processes (or combinations thereof). To prioritize biological processes here, and to assert the superiority of human cognitive capacities seems both arbitrary and unwarranted with respect to gathering evidence, and ultimately would lead to an unattractive skepticism about many of the methods used in science to gather evidence. In other words, conceiving of scientific evidence as ‘impersonal’ (or at least not necessarily personal) not only better captures the character of evidence‐gathering in practice, but also makes sense of a large amount of evidence‐gathering that ‘personal’ accounts fail to either acknowledge or accurately describe. Whilst we suggest it is likely that all internally‐distributed evidence‐gathering processes are merely contingently internal processes, a significant number of externally‐distributed evidence‐gathering processes are necessarily externally‐distributed. Some evidence can only be gathered by extended epistemic agents.