惟我与无我：中西方自我观比较新解

该文从自我意识发展的轨迹来诠释中西方自我观的差异。认为从自我意识发展的动态过程来看。中西方自我处于不同的发展阶段：西方心理学将自我视为精神发展的核心,是“惟我”的;中国人文主义心理学则认为执着于自我将阻碍个体发展,心理发展的最高境界是对自我的超越．因而是“无我”的。自我研究方法的差异,表现为寻找自我实体的西方实证方法与可以深入自我背后本源的东方式禅定。     

自我的四位说与佛教破我观念的症结

所谓的“自我的四位说”（atmasya caturpada vatda）一词，主要是指：每一个自我本身，是可以分为四种层次。而所谓的“自我”（atman），顾名思义，就是指：在每一个人内心深处，都会有一个永恒不朽的灵魂。同时，这一个永恒不朽的灵魂，可分为：1．“形躯我”（sarire atman；身体我，肉体我，佛教称“色蕴”）；2．“梦中我”（svapne atman；情意我，经验我，佛教称“受、想、行、识”的四蕴）；3．“无梦我”（asvapne atman）；4．“最高我”（paramatman）。由于我们对于自我的探究，必须要层层突破，才到达最后这一个“最高我”的解脱境界。因此，一般研究佛教的学者，都会普遍地认为：佛教的无我论，其实就是在全盘否定《唱赞奥义书》中四个层次的所有自我。然而，倘若我们针对代表原始佛教的《杂阿含经》或者是《相应部》，去做仔细的学术分析或研究的话，就会慢慢地发现：原始佛教时期（B．c．550—B．C．300）所能破除的“自我”，其实顶多只有前面的两个层次而已。至于第三个层次的“无梦我”，则应该是产生于部派佛教时代（B．C．300—A．D．100），当时，就曾经引起了佛教对于“轮回主体”和“涅篥主体”的讨论，从而更产生了犊子部的非即蕴非离蕴的“补特伽罗说”（pudgalavada）。因此，本论文的写作，就是透过比较哲学和思想史的研究方法，把原始佛教破我的范围去做一个初步的思想锁定，才不会使得原始佛教的“无我论”，草率地沦为一种凡我必破的独断论。     

原始佛教的“无我”论与“十四无记”

自我拯救是原始佛教的最高宗旨,佛教全部教理即关注的问题就是如何认识自我的生存状况(即苦、集),如何通过自我的道德实践获得自我解脱(即灭、道)。由此看来,“自我”是佛教理论中的核心概念。 但是在佛教中,关于“自我”的看法存在诸多矛盾,一般看来,在原始佛教中,“无我”论与“十四无记”之间就存在这样的矛盾。“十四无记”,即对十四个问题不加分别,即宇宙是常还是无常?宇宙有边还是无边?生命死后是有还是无?生命与身是一还是     

补特伽罗(Pudgala)与阿特曼(Atman)的译名问题——兼谈轮回说与无我说

姚治华《补特伽罗与阿特曼的译名问题》一文,认为“我”是在不同层次上被使用的:在轮回层次上,指执着的“人我”;在解脱的层次上,指主宰的、自在的“本我”。“无我说”是为破除外道的“我者”而立;“常乐我净”之“我”或“天上天下,唯我独尊”之“我”,则是“无化”、“非化”的“本我”、“妙我”。文章以小见大,言之有物,持之有据,不仅对探讨佛教“无我说”,而且对理解整个佛教思想体系的意蕴也不无启发。     

心理治疗视域中自我认识的嬗变与启迪

自我认识是多学科、多领域探索的主题;认识自我是心理学的根本命题,也是心理治疗过程中的焦点所在。对包括精神分析疗法、认知行为疗法及以人为中心疗法的传统心理治疗、后现代叙事疗法及正念疗法的自我观进行梳理,揭示出心理治疗自我观从传统心理治疗流派的实体自我到后现代叙事疗法的关系自我,再到正念疗法无常无我的演变轨迹,发现东方佛教与西方心理学自我观走向融合的趋势,心理治疗各流派的理论和技术也日趋走向整合。     

佛教的"我"与"无我"

佛教以"无我"观念区别于其它宗教,通过提倡"无我"消除人们对两种自我的执着人我与法我,最终实现人的"真我",而把世间公认的人格我称为"假我".     

人无我论

被称为“印中之印”的“诸法无我”，乃佛教三法印的核心，是贯彻佛家诸乘堵宗教理的命脉，为鉴别是否佛法的准衡。大乘佛学分诸法无我为人无我、法无我两层义蕴。人无我之“人”，梵文原为“补特伽罗”（Putgala），意译“数取趣”，指多番出生入死、往来于诸道的论回主体──自我。执着实有这种东西，是生起诸多烦恼、导致生死苦果的总根子，也是掌生一切丑恶社会现象和人性阴暗面的渊惠。请乘佛典，皆共同力说补特伽罗无我，破斥补特伽罗我见，旨在引导众生如实认识自己，自宰其心，自净其心，令生命升华，社会祥和。补特伽罗无我的含义…     

大陆地区无我、如来藏思想的研究及其问题

“我”“无我”问题是佛教研究的核心问题.近三十年,随着佛教相关学科建设的逐渐完善,中国大陆地区佛学研究和佛教思想的发展呈现出了新的面貌,不但在佛教教理的研究上有所深入,在与印度哲学、西方哲学的参照研究上也有新的探索.多元视角的研究大大丰富了我们对佛教这一核心问题的认识,但同时我们也看到,这一方面的研究具有时代的迫切性,值得大家更多的关注和更加深入的研究.     

佛教的两大定律——性空无我与因果循环——佛学基础知识讲座之五

研究一切思想和学说,都要掌握它的基本定律。佛教的基本定律是什么?龙树在《中论》里已有答复:“诸佛依二谛,为众生说法。一以世俗谛,二第一义谛”。学佛者懂得这一道理,即可上成佛道,下化众生。现在就这个问题谈点看法,请海内的善知识指教。一、性空无我律一切事物,山河大地,森罗万象,情与无情,都是缘生缘灭,无有自性,无有实我(我是主宰义,自在义),故曰性空无我。它是佛教探讨宇宙真相的基本原则,也是佛教的本体     

乔荼波陀与佛教

本论文主要将印度吠檀多派哲学家乔荼波陀的哲学思想与佛教的思想进行比较研究。持“无我论”观点的佛教认为世间一切事物皆无自性实体可言;万物都为因缘和合聚散而生灭。持“有我论”观点的吠檀多派则认为存在着一个精神绝对体（梵我）,它是事物生灭的本源;现象世界随生随灭,而它恒常不灭。本论文认为,乔茶波陀作为印度正统派哲学家,在他的著作《圣教论》中却处处表现出对佛教思想的偏爱,接受了佛教大量的影响,运用唯识宗和空宗的理论来为自己的吠檀多哲学作论证。     

Psychological attachment,no-self and Chan Buddhist mind therapy

The role of Chan Buddhism for mind therapy is distinguished from psychotherapy by the objectives in diminishing or removing the deluded perceived self and the psychological self of attachments and cravings, which are considered as the more basic origins for psychological suffering and problems. The Buddhist concepts of impermanence, no-self and emptiness are discussed to explain the Buddhist explanation for human suffering. A four-stage theory is described to explain the common Buddhist meditation experience toward the realization of no-self. Removing psychological attachment is found to be of explanatory value for many enlightenment episodes of Chan masters. Meditation concentration and reduction of self-attachment will mutually reinforce each other toward a complete therapy of the mind. An innovative approach for psychotherapy in going further to tackle a person's basic life attachments is suggested.     

The development of our sense of self as a defense against invading thoughts: From Buddhist psychology to psychoanalysis

In interdisciplinary debates on the nature of the self, no-self accounts often refer to Buddhist psychology, arguing that the self is an illusion arising from our identification with mental content. What is often missing, however, is a developmentally, motivationally and emotionally plausible reason why this identification happens in the first place. It is argued that directing attention to our ongoing thought activities and their effect on our mind reveals their often invasive character. This is supported by psychoanalytic accounts on the ontogenetic and phylogenetic origins of thinking. On an experiential level, invading thoughts have similarities to attacks and provoke defensive reactions. The defense mechanism described as identification with the aggressor is used as a model in order to better grasp how we deal with invading thoughts, namely, by identifying with them and thus generating a sense of self as an agent of thoughts which provides an illusion of control.     

Self-Awareness without a Self: Buddhism and the Reflexivity of Awareness

In this paper, I show that a robust, reflexivist account of self-awareness (such as was defended by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, most phenomenologists, and others) is compatible with reductionist view of persons, and hence with a rejection of the existence of a substantial, separate self. My main focus is on the tension between Buddhist reflexivism and the central Buddhist doctrine of no-self. In the first section of the paper, I give a brief sketch of reflexivist accounts of self-awareness, using the Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti as my example. In the next section, I examine reductionism as it relates to accounts of the self. I then, in the third section, argue that a reductionist account of persons can account for the unique features of first-person contents and our deep and multi-layered sense of self.     

SELF OR NO-SELF? CONVERGING PERSPECTIVES FROM NEUROPSYCHOLOGY AND MYSTICISM

Abstract. The nature of self is examined in relation to psychological observations which reveal some form of dissociation of knowledge from consciousness. Such dissociations are apparent in cases of blindsight, and amnesic patients displaying implicit memory effects, among others. While amnesic patients, for example, are unable consciously to recall material previously presented, such material does influence subsequent physiological and psychological processes. Thus, it is not the memories themselves that have been lost, but the ability to make conscious connection to them. In attempting to account for such observations, theoreticians generally have posited some kind of "consciousness system" that may become dissociated from brain modules dealing with specific processing.
It is argued here that a view of self along the lines of the Buddhist concepts of no-self and the conditioned nature of "I" introduces a more parsimonious perspective on the neuropsychological data. A theory of the nature of self is presented that constitutes a synthesis between key ideas drawn from Buddhist and other mainly mystical traditions and the scientific observations in psychology. Central to this theory is the role that the left hemisphere's interpreter (Gazzaniga 1985; 1988a; 1988b) plays in constructing a unified "I." This "I" is, in effect, a hypothesis that the mind generates to introduce some coherence into otherwise fragmentary mental elements. Although it appears to be the causal focus of the individual's behavior and experience, it is in fact a retrospective construction and not a true causal structure of the mind. This theoretical view is discussed in relation to various meanings of the term consciousness and also in relation to the relevant neuropsychological cases.     

No-Self and the Phenomenology of Ownership

The Abhidharma Buddhist revisionary metaphysics aims to provide an intellectually and morally preferred picture of the world that lacks a self. The first part of the paper claims that the Abhidharma ‘no-self’ view can be plausibly interpreted as a no-ownership view, according to which there is no locus or subject of experience and thus no owner of mental or bodily awarenesses. On this interpretation of the no-self view, the Abhidharma Buddhist metaphysicians are committed to denying the ownership of experiences, and thereby apparently obliged to explain our purported experience of ownership. My experiences seemingly come with the sense that I am the one who is undergoing this experience. But is there a really an experience of ownership—namely, an experience of being a subject that underlies our sense of ownership? I argue that there is nothing that it is like to be an owner of experiences, in the sense that there is no experiential phenomenology associated with the ownership of experience. The second part of the paper argues that, since there is no experience of ownership, there is no onus on the Abhidharma philosopher to give an explanation of the sense of ownership.     

A Buddhist Explanation of Episodic Memory: From Self to Mind

In this paper, I argue that some of the work to be done by the concept of self is done by the concept of mind in Buddhist philosophy. For the purposes of this paper, I shall focus on an account of memory and its ownership. The task of this paper is to analyse Vasubandhu’s heroic effort to defend the no-self doctrine against the Nyāya-Vai?e?ikas in order to bring to the fore the Buddhist model of mind. For this, I will discuss Vasubandhu’s theory of mind in the early Abhidharma as well as post-Abhidharma period to show the continuity in his work.     

佛教禅定：心理学方法论研究的一种新视角

佛教禅定作为一种佛家认知宇宙实相及自我意识的研究方法与操作技术,为中国人文主义心理学研究提供了一种觉知自我意识的极有效方法。本文从心理学方法论角度出发,结合佛教禅定的内证实践,系统阐述了禅定过程中的研究对象（识蕴）、研究方法（止观）等诸方面的内容和特点。佛教禅定的心理学方法论研究是有别于其他文化形态方法论研究的一种独特证知方法,是对西方心理学方法论研究的一种补充与超越。     

The Compatibility between Bodhisattva Compassion and ‘No-self’

Since arguably Bodhisattva Practice (bodhisattva-carya) is the foundation of Mahayana Buddhist ethics, it is significantly important for Bodhisattva compassion to be compatible with other Buddhist doctrines, specifically with the doctrine of ‘no-self ’ (anatta). There are two thoughts on the relation between compassion and ‘no-self ’: they are compatible or incompatibility. Most Buddhist authors accept the former view. However, the principal problem with the two views is that their arguments have not been singled out. So the acceptance or denial of the compatibility may not be well grounded. This paper is to identify and evaluate the arguments for and against the agreeability, and to defend the compatible view.     

A Buddhist–Lacanian Perspective on Lack

The historical and contemporary dialogue between psychoanalysis and Buddhism is examined to advance theories of self-representation. This theoretical foundation provides for a reinterpretation of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory as it applies to the unconscious lack that haunts human subjectivity. The inevitable failure to construct an enduring and permanent sense of self is linked to a chronic feeling of lack and cultural malaise. Drawing upon the work of Buddhist philosopher David Loy, the article proposes that this feeling of lack is symptomatic of a more fundamental and primary repression: a fear of no-self, or egolessness. Both the Buddhist tradition and Lacanian methods rely on unconventional and indirect methods for circumventing the will of the ego. Such unconventional methods are employed to decenter our familiar and common modes of representational discourse in order to deconstruct the ego.     

EGO-LESS AGENCY: DHARMA-RESPONSIVENESS WITHOUT KANTIAN AUTONOMY

My critical focus in this article is on Rick Repetti's compatibilist conception of free will, and his apparent commitment to a Kantian conception of autonomy, which I argue is in direct conflict with the Buddhist doctrine of no-self. As an alternative, I defend a conception of ego-less agency that I believe better coheres with core Buddhist teachings. In the course of the argument, I discuss the competing conceptions of free agency and autonomy defended by Harry Frankfurt, John Martin Fischer, Christine Korsgaard, and David Velleman.