Deferred Interpretations: Why Starting Dickens is Taxing but Reading Dickens Isn't

Comprehenders often need to go beyond conventional word senses to obtain an appropriate interpretation of an expression. We report an experiment examining the processing of standard metonymies (The gentleman read Dickens) and logical metonymies (The gentleman began Dickens), contrasting both to the processing of control expressions with a conventional interpretation (The gentleman met Dickens). Eye movement measures during reading indicated that standard (producer-for-product) metonymies were not more costly to interpret than conventional expressions, but logical metonymies were more costly to interpret than both standard metonymies and conventional expressions. These results indicate that constructing alternative senses is sometimes taxing and that not all types of deferred interpretations are processed in the same way. The results suggest that a critical factor in determining the attendant cost of constructing alternative senses is whether compositional operations must generate unexpressed semantic structure to realize an extended sense of an expression.     

Logical Metonymy Resolution in a Words‐as‐Cues Framework: Evidence From Self‐Paced Reading and Probe Recognition

Logical metonymy resolution (begin a book → begin writing a book) has traditionally been explained either through complex lexical entries (qualia structures) or through the integration of the implicit event via post‐lexical access to world knowledge. We propose that recent work within the words‐as‐cues paradigm can provide a more dynamic model of logical metonymy, accounting for early and dynamic integration of complex event information depending on previous contextual cues (agent and patient). We first present a self‐paced reading experiment on German subordinate sentences, where metonymic sentences and their paraphrased version differ only in the presence or absence of the clause‐final target verb (Der Konditor begann die Glasur → Der Konditor begann, die Glasur spreading the icing). Longer reading times at the target verb position in a high‐typicality condition (baker + icing → spread ) suggest that we make use of knowledge activated by lexical cues to build expectations about events. The early and dynamic integration of event knowledge in metonymy interpretation is bolstered by further evidence from a second experiment using the probe recognition paradigm. Presenting covert events as probes following a high‐typicality or a low‐typicality metonymic sentence (Der Konditor begann die Glasur → SPREAD ), we obtain an analogous effect of typicality at 100 ms interstimulus interval.     

A plea for logical objects

An account of validity that makes what is invalid conditional on how many individuals there are is what I call a conditional account of validity. Here I defend conditional accounts against a criticism derived from Etchemendy’s well-known criticism of the model-theoretic analysis of validity. The criticism is essentially that knowledge of the size of the universe is non-logical and so by making knowledge of the extension of validity depend on knowledge of how many individuals there are, conditional accounts fail to reflect that the former knowledge is basic, i.e., independent of knowledge derived from other sciences. Appealing to Russell’s pre-Principia logic, I defend conditional accounts against this criticism by sketching a rationale for thinking that there are infinitely many logical objects.     

It really just does not follow,comments on

I discuss points of agreement and disagreement with Francis (2013), and argue that the main lesson from his numerous one-off publication bias critiques is that developers of new statistical tools ought to anticipate their potential misuses and develop safeguards to prevent them.     

Topological Aspects of Branching-Time Semantics

The aim of this paper is to present a new perspective under which branching-time semantics can be viewed. The set of histories (maximal linearly ordered sets) in a tree structure can be endowed in a natural way with a topological structure. Properties of trees and of bundled trees can be expressed in topological terms. In particular, we can consider the new notion of topological validity for Ockhamist temporal formulae. It will be proved that this notion of validity is equivalent to validity with respect to bundled trees.     

Utterance at a distance

In this paper I defend Kaplan’s claim that the sentence “I am here now” is logically true. A number of counter-examples to the claim have been proposed, including occurrences of the sentence in answerphone messages, written notes left for later decoding, etc. These counter-examples are only convincing if they can be shown to be cases where the correct context with respect to which the utterance should be evaluated is the context in which it is decoded rather than encoded. I argue that this is not the case, and draw on the distinction between force and content to suggest an alternative account of how information is communicated in these cases that is consistent with Kaplan’s semantic theory.

Short-term action intentions overrule long-term semantic knowledge

In the present study, we investigated whether the preparation of an unusual action with an object (e.g. bringing a cup towards the eye) could selectively overrule long-term semantic representations. In the first experiment it was found that unusual action intentions activated short-term semantic goal representations, rather than long-term conceptual associations. In a second experiment the reversal of long-term priming effects was replicated, while reducing the need for internal verbalization as a possible strategy to accomplish the task. Priming effects in the first two experiments were found to involve the selection of object knowledge at a semantic level, rather than reflecting a general effect of action preparation on word processing (Experiment 3). Finally, in a fourth experiment short-term priming effects were shown to extend beyond a lexical level by showing faster responses to pictures representing the short-term action goal. Together, the present findings extend the ‘selection-for-action’ principle previously used in visual attention to a semantic level, by showing that semantic information is selectively activated in line with the short-term goal of the actor.     

Towards a semantics for biscuit conditionals

This essay proposes a semantic analysis of biscuit-conditionals, such as Austin’s classic example “there are biscuits in the cupboard if you want some”. The analysis is grounded on the ideas of contextual restrictions, and of non-character encoded aspects of meaning, and provides a rigorous framework for the widespread intuitions that (i) the if-clause in a biscuit-conditional is truth-conditionally idle, but (ii) it ‘qualifies’ the speech-act in question. In the concluding section of this essay, the analysis is also applied to the importantly similar phenomenon of speech-act adverbs.

Book Notes: Adams,Frederick and Kenneth Aizawa,The Bounds of Cognition,Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008, pp. xiii + 197, AU$120.00 / NZ$130.00 (cloth)

Logical pluralism has been in vogue since JC Beall and Greg Restall 2006 articulated and defended a new pluralist thesis. Recent criticisms such as Priest 2006a Priest, Graham. 2006a. Doubt Truth to be a Liar, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  [Google Scholar] and Field 2009 Field, Hartry. 2009. Pluralism in Logic. Review of Symbolic Logic, 2/2: 342–59. doi:10.1017/S1755020309090182[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] have suggested that there is a relationship between their type of logical pluralism and the meaning-variance thesis for logic. This is the claim, often associated with Quine 1970 Quine, W. V. O. 1970. Philosophy of Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  [Google Scholar], that a change of logic entails a change of meaning. Here we explore the connection between logical pluralism and meaning-variance, both in general and for Beall and Restall's theory specifically. We argue that contrary to what Beall and Restall claim, their type of pluralism is wedded to meaning-variance. We then develop an alternative form of logical pluralism that circumvents at least some forms of meaning-variance.     

Linguistic self-correction in the absence of feedback: a new approach to the logical problem of language acquisition

In a series of studies children show increasing mastery of irregular plural forms (such as mice) simply by producing erroneous over-regularized versions of them (such as mouses). We explain this phenomenon in terms of successive approximation in imitation: Children over-regularize early in acquisition because the representations of frequent, regular plural forms develop more quickly, such that at the earliest stages of production they interfere with children's attempts to imitatively reproduce irregular forms they have heard in the input. As the strength of the representations that determine children's productions settle asymptotically, the early advantage for the frequent regular forms is negated, and children's attempts to imitate the irregular forms they have observed become more likely to succeed (a process that produces the classic U-shape in children's acquisition of plural inflection). These data show that children can acquire correct linguistic behavior without feedback in a situation where, as a result of philosophical and linguistic analyses, it has often been argued that it is logically impossible for them to do so.     

Embodied grounding of memory: Toward the effects of motor execution on memory consolidation

Behavioural and neuroscientific research has provided evidence for a strong functional link between the neural motor system and lexical–semantic processing of action-related language. It remains unclear, however, whether the impact of motor actions is restricted to online language comprehension or whether sensorimotor codes are also important in the formation and consolidation of persisting memory representations of the word's referents. The current study now demonstrates that recognition performance for action words is modulated by motor actions performed during the retention interval. Specifically, participants were required to learn words denoting objects that were associated with either a pressing or a twisting action (e.g., piano, screwdriver) and words that were not associated to actions. During a 6–8-minute retention phase, participants performed an intervening task that required the execution of pressing or twisting responses. A subsequent recognition task revealed a better memory for words that denoted objects for which the functional use was congruent with the action performed during the retention interval (e.g., pepper mill–twisting action, doorbell–pressing action) than for words that denoted objects for which the functional use was incongruent. In further experiments, we were able to generalize this effect of selective memory enhancement of words by performing congruent motor actions to an implicit perceptual (Experiment 2) and implicit semantic memory test (Experiment 3). Our findings suggest that a reactivation of motor codes affects the process of memory consolidation and emphasizes therefore the important role of sensorimotor codes in establishing enduring semantic representations.     

Semantic grounding in models of analogy: an environmental approach

Empirical studies indicate that analogy consists of two main processes: retrieval and mapping. While current theories and models of analogy have revealed much about the mainly structural constraints that govern the mapping process, the similarities that underpin the correspondences between individual representational elements and drive retrieval are understood in less detail. In existing models symbol similarities are externally defined but neither empirically grounded nor theoretically justified. This paper introduces a new model (EMMA: the environmental model of analogy) which relies on co‐occurrence information provided by LSA (Latent Semantic Analysis; Landauer & Dumais, 1997) to ground the relations between the symbolic elements aligned in analogy. LSA calculates a contextual distribution for each word encountered in a corpus by counting the frequency with which it co‐occurs with other words. This information is used to define a model that locates each word encountered in a high‐dimensional space, with relations between elements in this space representing contextual similarities between words. A series of simulation experiments demonstrate that the environmental approach to semantics embodied in LSA can produce appropriate patterns of analogical retrieval, but that this semantic measure is not sufficient to model analogical mapping. The implications of these findings, both for theories of representation in analogy research and more general theories of semantics in cognition, are explored.     

Semantics of the transitive construction: prototype effects and developmental comparisons

This paper investigates whether an abstract linguistic construction shows the kind of prototype effects characteristic of non-linguistic categories, in both adults and young children. Adapting the prototype-plus-distortion methodology of Franks and Bransford (1971), we found that whereas adults were lured toward false-positive recognition of sentences with prototypical transitive semantics, young children showed no such effect. We examined two main implications of the results. First, it adds a novel data point to a growing body of research in cognitive linguistics and construction grammar that shows abstract linguistic categories can behave in similar ways to non-linguistic categories, for example, by showing graded membership of a category. Thus, the findings lend psychological validity to the existing cross-linguistic evidence for prototypical transitive semantics. Second, we discuss a possible explanation for the fact that prototypical sentences were processed differently in adults and children, namely, that children's transitive semantic network is not as interconnected or cognitively coherent as adults'.     

Local vs. global pragmatics

In ‘Local pragmatics in a Gricean framework’, Mandy Simons argues that, contrary to the received view, it is possible to accommodate local pragmatic effects utilising just the mechanisms for pragmatic reasoning provided by Grice. Although I agree with this overarching claim, this paper argues that we need to be careful in our understanding of ‘what is said’, and the nature of communicated content in general, when deciding between local and global accounts of pragmatic effects.     

A left cerebral hemisphere’s superiority in processing spatial-categorical information in a non-verbal semantic format

It has been shown that the left and right cerebral hemispheres (LH and RH) respectively process qualitative or “categorical” spatial relations and metric or “coordinate” spatial relations. However, categorical spatial information could be thought as divided into two types: semantically-coded and visuospatially-coded categorical information. We examined whether a LH’s advantage in processing semantic-categorical information is observed in a non-verbal format, and also whether semantic- and visuospatial-categorical processing are differentially lateralized. We manipulated the colors and positions of the standard traffic light sign as semantic- and visuospatial-categorical information respectively, and tested performance with the divided visual field method. In the semantic-categorical matching task, in which the participants judged if the semantic-categorical information of a successive cue and target was the same, a right visual field advantage was observed, suggesting a LH’s preference for processing semantic-categorical information in a non-verbal format. In the visuospatial-categorical matching task, in which the participants judged if the visuospatial-categorical information of a successive cue and target was identical, a left visual field advantage was obtained. These results suggest that the processing of semantic-categorical information is lateralized in LH, and we discuss the dissociation between the two types of categorical information.     

Using logical relevance for question answering

We propose a novel method of determining the appropriateness of an answer to a question through a proof of logical relevance rather than a logical proof of truth. We define logical relevance as the idea that answers should not be considered as absolutely true or false in relation to a question, but should be considered true more flexibly in a sliding scale of aptness. This enables us to reason rigorously about the appropriateness of an answer even in cases where the sources we are getting answers from are incomplete or inconsistent or contain errors. We show how logical relevance can be implemented through the use of measured simplification, a form of constraint relaxation, in order to seek a logical proof than an answer is in fact an answer to a particular question. We then give an example of such an implementation providing a set of specific rules for this purpose.     

Examining lateralized semantic access using pictures

A divided visual field (DVF) experiment examined the semantic processing strategies employed by the cerebral hemispheres to determine if strategies observed with written word stimuli generalize to other media for communicating semantic information. We employed picture stimuli and vary the degree of semantic relatedness between the picture pairs. Participants made an on-line semantic relatedness judgment in response to sequentially presented pictures. We found that when pictures are presented to the right hemisphere responses are generally more accurate than the left hemisphere for semantic relatedness judgments for picture pairs. Furthermore, consistent with earlier DVF studies employing words, we conclude that the RH is better at accessing or maintaining access to information that has a weak or more remote semantic relationship. We also found evidence of faster access for pictures presented to the LH in the strongly-related condition. Overall, these results are consistent with earlier DVF word studies that argue that the cerebral hemispheres each play an important and separable role during semantic retrieval.     

Children’s solutions of logical versus empirical problems: What’s missing and what develops?

This research examined the development of the ability to differentiate logical from empirical problems and the different ways in which children solve these problems. Thirty-two 4- and 5-year-olds, thirty-four 8- and 9-year-olds, and thirty-five 11- and 12-year-olds were given five questions regarding an imaginary character’s predictions as to where a ball would land after being dropped through a ‘tautology machine’. The questions examined encoding and recall of problems, children’s understanding of when evidence was necessary, and children’s evaluation of form and evidence. Data were analyzed in two ways: (1) by comparing differences across participants on component questions and (2) an individual analysis examining the consistency of responses to component questions across the problem set. Overall, the results indicated that: (1) sixth graders tended to differentiate logical from empirical problems while preschool and third grade children rarely did; (2) young children tend to ignore both the logical connective and the second half of problems-termed a ‘cut;’ (3) these cuts are less frequent when a problem is compatible with one empirical possibility; (4) cuts do not stem from encoding or recall errors, but seem to be the product of incomplete problem processing and (5) from third to sixth grade, children’s understanding of logical form increased as the rate of cuts decreased.     

Implicit ontological commitment

Quine’s general approach is to treat ontology as a matter of what a theory says there is. This turns ontology into a question of which existential statements are consequences of that theory. This approach is contrasted favourably with the view that takes ontological commitment as a relation to things. However within the broadly Quinean approach we can distinguish different accounts, differing as to the nature of the consequence relation best suited for determining those consequences. It is suggested that Quine’s own narrowly formal account fails. Then a consideration of the necessitation approach championed by Jackson and Lewis shows that it does not do justice to the role of acknowledging consequences in determining rationality. I suggest that an approach which puts a priori consequence as the key relation does a better job. The task of spelling out the nature of a priori consequence is sketched, along with reasons to doubt the adequacy of the double indexing approach to analysing the a priori. The sorts of relations we can stand in to theories which allow us to inherit ontological commitments are touched on with a number of important philosophical strategies for introducing belief-like attitudes which nevertheless avoid ontological commitment.