At the same time

The essay on Husserl’s phenomenology of touch in Derrida’s recent On Touching—Jean-Luc Nancy represents his only substantial re-engagement with Husserlian phenomenology to be published following the series of texts dating from the period marked by his Mémoire of 1955 through to the essay ‘Form and Meaning’ included in Margins (1972). The essay, devoted to some key sections of Husserl’s Ideas II, appears to break new ground in Derrida’s readings of Husserl, but in fact demonstrates a profound continuity with his earlier readings. In fact, I argue that this continuity is in a part an effect of Derrida’s ongoing commitment to the ‘methodology’ of deconstruction. I show how this commitment leads Derrida to conflate three separate distinctions within Husserl’s discussion, a conflation that obliges Derrida to misread the letter of Husserl’s text, and which, in turn, blinds him to a certain radical potentiality within Husserl’s phenomenology of sensibility.

Physicians at the bedside: Practitioners' thoughts and actions regarding bedside allocation of resources

In the past, the study of the allocation of scarce medical resources centered around high-technology forms of health care such as the artificial heart, haemodialysis, et cetera. A major controversy considered in this study concerns the use of non-biomedical criteria (i.e., whether the social worth or financial status of a particular patient should dictate preferential medical treatment over another patient in times of shortage) in the allocation decision-making process. This article suggests that the study of allocation need not only focus on the dramatic realm of the high-tech, but should also concern itself with less dramatic everyday situations. Decisions concerning treatment based upon social worth and financial status are made almost daily by most practitioners; a thorough awareness of this phenomenon is prerequisite to the proper practice of medicine. Interviews with physicians disclose that most of these everyday allocation decisions are made tacitly, with non-biomedical criteria playing a role even in decisions that appear to have been prompted only by benign (even-guided) intentions.     

At the threshold of knowledge

We explore consequences of the view that to know a proposition your rational credence in the proposition must exceed a certain threshold. In other words, to know something you must have evidence that makes rational a high credence in it. We relate such a threshold view to Dorr et al.’s (Philosophical Studies 170(2):277–287, 2014) argument against the principle they call fair coins: “If you know a coin won’t land tails, then you know it won’t be flipped.” They argue for rejecting fair coins because it leads to a pervasive skepticism about knowledge of the future. We argue that the threshold view of evidence and knowledge gives independent grounds to reject fair coins.     

The clinical ethicist at the bedside

In this paper we attempt to show how the goal of resolving moral problems in a patient's care can best be achieved by working at the bedside. We present and discuss three cases to illustrate the art and science of clinical ethics consultation. The sine qua non of the clinical ethics consultant is that he or she goes to the patient's bedside to obtain specific clinical and ethical information. Unlike ethics committees, which often depend on secondhand information from a physician or nurse, clinical ethics consultants personally speak with and examine patients and review their laboratory data and medical records. The skills of the clinical ethics consultant include the ability to delineate and resolve ethical problems in a particular patient's case and to teach other health professionals to build their own frameworks for clinical ethical decision making. When the clinical situation requires it, clinical ethics consultants can and should assist primary physicians with case management.     

At Home with the Homeless:

The tragically increasing incidence of homelessness and the reasons for it have been documented and speculated about extensively in recent years. While having such information is necessary toward understanding the phenomenon in general, it still doesn't assure that one can communicate and empathize adequately with homeless people. More effective, if more discomforting, is to actually experience the world as they experience it. This p aper describes the efforts of one professional person to do this. After sleeping in office building doorways, in mission houses and homeless shelters, visiting welfare and employment offices and begging on the streets for two months, the author reaches some conclusions and recommendations rarely seen in the social science literature.