What did I eat yesterday? Determinants of accuracy in 24-hour food memories

Large-scale diet-related epidemiological work relies on the quality of self-reported food consumption. As this epidemiological work forms the basis of knowledge of the relationship of diet to disease, it is essential that the self-reports of personal diet are understood. It is generally accepted that foods consumed are under-reported, even over as short a period as 24 hours. However, little is known about the potential systematic biases that may affect the quality of self-reported food intake. The current study examines the accuracy of memories of the consumption of snack foods eaten in the previous 24 hours and investigates factors that may bias these memories. All participants had previously participated in a randomized intervention trial to lower dietary fat intake to 20 per cent of calories. Fifty-six women (intervention and control) tasted eight snack foods in a laboratory setting. They were telephoned a day later and asked to recall the type of snack foods (M&Ms, pretzels, etc.) and the quantity of each food they consumed. Subjects in general under-reported the number of selections and the quantity of each item consumed. Women who accurately recalled an item, reported more liking for that item compared to those who forgot the item. Women currently maintaining a low-fat diet were less accurate in their recall of low-fat items than women on a high-fat diet. Low-fat eaters, however, may be slightly better at recalling how much of certain foods they consumed. Results have implications for survey research and understanding the psychological influences on reports of food consumption used in large-scale diet studies.     

Why did I do that? Explaining actions activated outside of awareness

We review the latest research investigating how people explain their own actions when they have been activated nonconsciously. We will discuss evidence that when nonconsciously activated behavior is unexpected (e.g., norm- violating, against self -standards), negative affect arises and triggers confabulations aimed to explain the behavior. Nonconsciously activated behaviors may provide a window into everyday confabulation of (erroneous) explanations for behavior, which may also affect self-knowledge. Implications for self-concept formation and intentionality are discussed.     

Why did I right that? Factors that influence the production of homophone substitution errors

Despite considerable research on language production errors involving speech, little research exists in the complementary domain of writing. Two experiments investigated the production of homophone substitution errors, which occur when a contextually appropriate word (e.g., beech) is replaced with its homophone (e.g., beach tree). Participants wrote down auditorily presented sentences containing dominant or subordinate homophones. Homophones were preceded by a lexical prime that overlapped in phonology and orthography (e.g., teacher) or only orthography (e.g., headmaster) with the target homophone. Results showed more substitution errors when the context elicited a subordinate homophone than when it elicited a dominant homophone. Furthermore, both types of primes equivalently increased production of homophone errors relative to control words (e.g., lawyer), suggesting that only orthographic overlap between the prime and target was necessary to influence errors. These results are explained within dual-route models of spelling, which postulate an interaction between lexical and sublexical routes when spelling.     

Why did I right that? Factors that influence the production of homophone substitution errors

Despite considerable research on language production errors involving speech, little research exists in the complementary domain of writing. Two experiments investigated the production of homophone substitution errors, which occur when a contextually appropriate word (e.g., beech) is replaced with its homophone (e.g., beach tree). Participants wrote down auditorily presented sentences containing dominant or subordinate homophones. Homophones were preceded by a lexical prime that overlapped in phonology and orthography (e.g., teacher) or only orthography (e.g., headmaster) with the target homophone. Results showed more substitution errors when the context elicited a subordinate homophone than when it elicited a dominant homophone. Furthermore, both types of primes equivalently increased production of homophone errors relative to control words (e.g., lawyer), suggesting that only orthographic overlap between the prime and target was necessary to influence errors. These results are explained within dual-route models of spelling, which postulate an interaction between lexical and sublexical routes when spelling.     

Gender and values: What is the impact on decision making?

In this study we investigated C. Gilligan's [(1982), In a different voice: Psychological theory and women's development, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press] suggestion that women and men, due to socialization, develop differently in terms of moral development [L. Kohlberg (1969), “Stage and Consequence: The Cognitive Development Approach to Socialization,” In D. G. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of socialization: Theory and research, Chicago: Rand McNally]. We also considered whether men and women differ in terms of a related construct, values of equity and equality [K. A. Rasinski (1987), “What's Fair Is Fair or Is It? Value Differences Underlying Public Views About Social Justice,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 53, pp. 201–211]. It is our expectation that gender influences overall orientation in terms of the two sets of values, and that differences in values lead decision makers to weigh decision issues and to make final decisions differently. Results suggest that there are some gender-related differences in value systems, weights of decision issues, and final decisions.     

Why did you choose that person over me? Ingroup rejection and attributions to discrimination

The present research examined the attributions that people make when an individual rejects a member of his or her own group in favor of a member of an outgroup (i.e., ingroup rejection). Study 1 showed that Latinos rejected by an ingroup member (perpetrator) made more attributions to discrimination than Whites under similar circumstances. Study 2 showed that Latinos made more attributions to discrimination for ingroup rejection when the perpetrator was Latino as compared to when the perpetrator was White, whereas Whites' attributions to discrimination were relatively low regardless of perpetrator's ethnicity. Study 3 showed that priming loyalty norms increased attributions to discrimination among Latinos in response to ingroup rejection, but not in response to outgroup rejection. This research brings a new perspective to discrimination research by focusing on intragroup rejection and nonprototypical cases of discrimination.     

Does decision making transfer across similar and dissimilar sports?

ObjectivesThe ability to make decisions under time pressure is crucial to performance in sport. However, there remains a paucity of research that examines whether the skills underpinning decision-making transfer across similar or dissimilar sports. We examine whether decision making transfers from soccer to other sports that may be deemed to be either similar (basketball) or dissimilar (tennis) based on sports taxonomy.MethodsSkilled soccer players (N = 20) completed a video-based temporal occlusion test designed to measure decision-making involving offensive sequences of play from soccer, basketball, and tennis. Participants were required to decide on an appropriate action to execute for each situation presented.ResultsResponse accuracy was higher in the soccer decision-making task compared to the basketball and tennis tasks. Furthermore, accuracy scores were higher on the basketball compared to the tennis task.ConclusionsThere appears to be some positive transfer of decision-making between sports that share similar elements, supporting the importance both of specificity and generality in expert performance.     

When does duration matter in judgment and decision making?

Research on sequences of outcomes shows that people care about features of an experience, such as improvement or deterioration over time, and peak and end levels, which the discounted utility model (DU) assumes they do not care about. In contrast to the finding that some attributes are weighted more than DU predicts, Kahneman and coauthors have proposed that there is one feature of sequences that DU predicts people should care about but that people in fact ignore or underweight: duration. In this article, the authors extend this line of research by investigating the role of conversational norms (H. P. Grice, 1975), and scale-norming (D. Kahneman & T. D. Miller, 1986). The impact of these 2 factors are examined in 4 parallel studies that manipulate these factors orthogonally. The major finding is that response modes that reduce reliance on conversational norms or standard of comparison also increase the attention that participants pay to duration.     

Effects of problem frame and gender on principals’ decision making

Research indicates people’s decisions can sometimes be influenced by seemingly trivial differences in the framing (i.e., wording) of alternative options. The tendency to prefer risk averse options when framed positively and risky options when framed negatively is known as the framing effect. The current study examined the susceptibility of school principals to the framing effect. Additionally, analytical and intuitive decision styles, the degree to which one’s typical goal is to maximize (rather than satisfice), gender, and years of experience as a principal were measured to assess whether they are predictive of principals’ choices, and to test whether they moderate the effects of framing on choice. Seventy-one principals completed six decision problems (framed either positively or negatively) and instruments assessing decision style, typical decision goal, gender, and experience. Analyses demonstrated that principals are influenced by framing. Although the positively and negatively framed versions of the decision problems were objectively identical, negative framing resulted in more risky choices. Additionally, regardless of frame, men made more risky choices than women. There was no evidence that experience, decision style, or the degree to which one’s typical decision goal was to maximize, decreased framing effects. Several potential debiasing strategies are described, and limitations are noted.     

Why did Tiger Woods shoot 82? A commentary on

In a recent article, Toner and Moran (2015) argued that athletes need to pay conscious attention to body movements, and that an external focus of attention would not be effective for continued improvement at the elite level. Their arguments appear to be based on misunderstandings of the attentional focus literature. In this commentary, I clarify that adopting an external focus does not imply that performers are not aware of their body movements. Rather, an external focus (i.e., focusing attention of the intended movement effect) refers to the preparation of movement execution. I maintain that an external focus is necessary to optimize performance and learning at any level of performance.     

Who do you trust? The impact of facial emotion and behaviour on decision making

During social interactions, we use available information to guide our decisions, including behaviour and emotional displays. In some situations, behaviour and emotional displays may be incongruent, complicating decision making. This study had two main aims: first, to investigate the independent contributions of behaviour and facial displays of emotion on decisions to trust, and, second, to examine what happens when the information being signalled by a facial display is incongruent with behaviour. Participants played a modified version of the Trust Game in which they learned simulated players’ behaviour with or without concurrent displays of facial emotion. Results indicated that displays of anger, but not happiness, influenced decisions to trust during initial encounters. Over the course of repeated interactions, however, emotional displays consistent with an established pattern of behaviour made independent contributions to decision making, strengthening decisions to trust. When facial display and behaviour were incongruent, participants used current behaviour to inform decision making.     

Why do we eat? Children's and adults' understanding of why we eat different meals

In this study the author examined why children and adults think they need to eat. Preschoolers through adults were provided with physiological, social, psychological, and routine causes for eating breakfast, lunch, snack, and dinner, and were asked to either agree or disagree with the causal responses provided. A 4 Reason x 4 Meal repeated measures analysis of variance revealed significant main effects for meals and reasons, as well as significant Meal x Reason and Meal x Reason x Grade interactions. The effect sizes ranged from 0.1 to 0.7. Across all age groups, participants acknowledged physiological needs and desires (fulfilling hunger and needs to stay healthy) and routine (e.g., it is dinner time) as the primary causes for eating breakfast, lunch, and dinner. However, for snack physiological needs were the primary reason. Second-grade students onward spontaneously produced biological justifications such as the need for energy and nutrition as important reasons for food consumption. These results lend support to the developmental model that children's and adults' understanding of eating changes in middle childhood.     

Rational or uncommitted? Depression and indecisiveness in interpersonal decision making

Two studies were run which tested the prediction that clinically depressed persons, known for difficulties in making a decision, would process predecisional information relevant to an interpersonal choice in a more impartial, less biased way than non-depressed persons. Both studies provided confirmation for this hypothesis. In each case, the depressed group focused less on specific alternatives, asked more criterion-based questions, and made decisions on the basis of information which was more evenly distributed over alternatives, thus conforming less to biasing, dominance structuring processes, than non-depressed participants. The depressed and non-depressed participants did not differ, however, in evaluative aspects of their decisions, suggesting a relative independence of affective and informational aspects of predecisional processes. The question arises: are depressed patients less biased and hence more rational when making decisions or are they just indifferent and uncommitted? The data have been discussed with reference to research on effortful versus automatic information processing in depression.     

Does being attractive always help? Positive and negative effects of attractiveness on social decision making

Previous studies of organizational decision making demonstrate an abundance of positive biases directed toward highly attractive individuals. The current research, in contrast, suggests that when the person being evaluated is of the same sex as the evaluator, attractiveness hurts, rather than helps. Three experiments assessing evaluations of potential job candidates (Studies 1 and 3) and university applicants (Study 2) demonstrated positive biases toward highly attractive other-sex targets but negative biases toward highly attractive same-sex targets. This pattern was mediated by variability in participants' desire to interact with versus avoid the target individual (Studies 1 and 2) and was moderated by participants' level of self-esteem (Study 3); the derogation of attractive same-sex targets was not observed among people with high self-esteem. Findings demonstrate an important exception to the positive effects of attractiveness in organizational settings and suggest that negative responses to attractive same-sex targets stem from perceptions of self-threat.     

Should I go with my gut? Investigating the benefits of emotion-focused decision making

Deliberative decision strategies have historically been considered the surest path to sound decisions; however, recent evidence and theory suggest that affective strategies may be equally as effective. In four experiments we examined conditions under which affective versus deliberative decision strategies might result in higher decision quality. While consciously focusing on feelings versus details, participants made choices that varied in complexity, in extent of subsequent conscious deliberation allowed, and in domain. Results indicate that focusing on feelings versus details led to superior objective and subjective decision quality for complex decisions. However, when using a feeling-focused approach, subsequent deliberation after encoding resulted in reduced choice quality. These results suggest that affective decision strategies may be more effective relative to deliberative strategies for certain complex decisions.     

Are dietary restraint scales valid measures of moderate- to long-term dietary restriction? Objective biological and behavioral data suggest not

Prospective studies indicate that elevated scores on dietary restraint scales predict bulimic symptom onset, but experiments indicate that assignment to dietary restriction interventions reduces bulimic symptoms. One possible explanation for the inconsistent findings is that the dietary restraint scales used in the former studies are not valid measures of dietary restriction. The authors previously found that dietary restraint scales were not inversely correlated with objective measures of short-term caloric intake (E. Stice, M. Fisher, & M. R. Lowe, 2004). In this follow-up report, 3 studies indicated that the Three-Factor Eating Questionnaire dietary restraint scale was not correlated with doubly labeled water estimated energy intake over 2-week periods or with observationally measured caloric intake over 3 months. Results from this study and others suggest that dietary restraint scales may not be valid measures of moderate- to long-term dietary restriction and imply the need to reinterpret findings from studies that have used dietary restraint scales.     

Is timely information always better? The effect of feedback frequency on decision making

Recent advances in information technology make it possible for decision makers to track information in real-time and obtain frequent feedback on their decisions. From a normative sense, an increase in the frequency of feedback and the ability to make changes should lead to enhanced performance as decision makers are able to respond more quickly to changes in the environment and see the consequences of their actions. At the same time, there is reason to believe that more frequent feedback can sometimes lead to declines in performance. Across four inventory management experiments, we find that in environments characterized by random noise more frequent feedback on previous decisions leads to declines in performance. Receiving more frequent feedback leads to excessive focus on and more systematic processing of more recent data as well as a failure to adequately compare information across multiple time periods. These results suggest that caution be used in the design and implementation of real-time information systems.     

Moral in whose eyes? Cross-cultural differences in moral decision making and behaviour

All people want to feel that they are morally adequate. People tend to evaluate their moral adequacy by judging their behaviour through their own eyes (first-person perspective) or the eyes of others (third-person perspective). People in all cultures use both perspectives, but there may be cultural variations in which perspective takes precedence. By conducting two studies, we explore the way people in face cultures are more likely to secure their moral self-regard through the eyes of others (vs. their own eyes), whereas the opposite is true in case of people from dignity cultures. Study 1 found that people from face culture (Korean participants) cheated to a lesser extent when others were invoked (vs. not invoked), but people from dignity culture (American participants) were not affected by this priming. Study 2 found that moral intentions were more strongly influenced by what participants perceived others to do in moral situations in face (vs. dignity) cultures. In contrast, moral intentions were found to be more strongly influenced by what they believed they should do in moral situations in dignity (vs. face) cultures.     

Sadder but wiser or happier and smarter? A demonstration of judgment and decision making

Researchers have debated whether positive or negative emotions will positively improve decision performance (B. Kuvaas & G. Kaufmann, 2004). The author explored (a) which coping strategies decision makers use when they experience positive or negative emotions and (b) how cognitive processes are influenced by negative and positive emotions. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 120) in positive emotional states (i.e., happier and smarter) were better at problem-focused coping than were participants with negative emotions (i.e., sadder but wiser). In Experiment 2, participants (N = 124) displayed greater accuracy of choice, took longer to research information, and processed a larger amount of information when they were in positive emotional states. The two experiments showed similar results between judgment and decision-making contexts in which positive emotion enhances problem solving.