大学生道德精神培育面临的困境：来自社会的影响

道德精神是对道德的敬畏、向往和坚守的心理意识和精神态度,培育道德精神贯穿于德育的整个过程,也是德育的根本所在.对道德的敬畏、向往和坚守不能仅仅靠道德理论的说服力,社会的支持是必不可少的.当前大学生道德精神的培育面临着许多困境,其重要原因之一在于学校教育和社会遭遇之间的矛盾,而矛盾的主要方面在于社会对道德精神的支持不足和社会影响对道德教育造成的冲击.为走出这一困境,除了学校的努力,我们必须善于寻找道德精神培育的社会支持,以全景的视角应对高校德育面临的危机.     

超越原子主义权利观的“伦理精神”——樊浩教授“伦理精神”系列论著读后

樊浩教授通过对中国传统道德哲学和黑格尔伦理思想的分析,在细致辨析伦理和道德之异同的基础上,建构了内容丰富且具有创新意义的"伦理精神"学术体系。"伦理精神"的本质是"单一物和普遍物的统一","伦理精神"现实地存在于家庭和民族这两个基本的伦理实体以及个人与共同体的普遍伦理关系之中。"伦理精神"是对原子主义权利观的超越,它所内蕴的"从实体性出发"的意涵,可以帮助人们正确处理好复杂的人群共同体伦理关系,培育权利与义务相统一的道德品性,以克服原子主义迷恋个人权利的道德弊端。     

“后学院”语境下科学道德的批判性审视 ——兼论科学共同体的自由和自律

现代科学已经走向了"后学院"时代,在应用语境下与社会之网紧密纠缠。然而,随着科学语境的变迁,科学道德问题却日趋复杂,不断凸显出科学共同体自由和自律缺失所带来的道德困境。反思之后的理性选择是:在科学与社会适度"亲和"下保持道德张力,积极培育具有道德自律精神和自治能力的科学共同体,以科学精神和道德精神的辩证融合促进科学和社会的创新进步。     

道德信仰及其培育的基本理路

当前道德领域突出问题与长期忽视道德信仰的培育和倡导直接相关。道德信仰是人们对社会倡导的道德标准和行为准则所持的极度信赖和遵从的稳定的心理状态及行为倾向,具有整合道德品质的功能。道德治理是道德信仰养成的现实前提;道德信仰是道德治理的精神基础。道德信仰培育,需要在正确认识和理解其极端重要性的前提下,立足于培养人对于道德的尊重和敬畏感,把创新道德教育和厉行道德治理有机地结合起来。     

道德精神的社会资源支持

道德精神是对道德的敬畏、向往和坚守的心理意识和精神态度,培育道德精神离不开社会资源的支持。其中,制度作为最基本的道德是道德的基本保障;文化资源可以为道德的坚守培土;风俗或风气作为社会道德的评判机制有助于道德权威的确立;民族事件是道德精神的集中体现,可以塑造对道德精神的崇高感。     

社会主义核心价值观的道德属性及其价值意蕴

社会主义核心价值观具有道德的"质",是一种社会主义性质的道德。作为社会意识,它是道德自觉,规定了社会主义的价值本质和发展趋势;它是道德灵魂,从根本上影响了国家软实力;它是道德基石,为实现中华民族伟大复兴奠定了坚实的精神基础。作为规范体系,它是保证力量,维护和实现着广大人民群众的根本利益;它是"指路明灯",引领市场经济的健康发展。作为自律精神,它是精神之"钙",帮助人们树立了崇高的理想信念;它是生活动力,满足了人们追求美好生活的愿望;它是心理支撑,增强了人们的民族归属感;它是价值共识,为人们确定了德性修养的标杆。     

儒家和谐伦理体系及其道德哲学意义

儒家在历史上进行的最成功的努力之一,就是建立一个和谐道德哲学体系与和谐伦理精神体系.这个和谐道德哲学体系与和谐伦理精神体系具体表现为四个结构:道德哲学体系、伦理精神体系与家国一体、由家及国的特殊社会结构之间的和谐;以"五伦"为原理的伦理世界的和谐;以"四德"为内核的道德世界的和谐;以"中庸"为境界的伦理世界与道德世界之间的和谐.     

道德金律的内涵本质及其当代意义

对"己所不欲,勿施于人"道德金律正反两方面的表述进行分析,指出其存在某种缺陷,肯定其已具备的道德本质精神.在当代,充分揭示和确定其内在的基本价值理念,使之转化为人们的现实基本权利并加以践履,是十分重要与必要的.     

论医学教育中的道德情感培育

随着现代医学模式的转变以及医学技术化、市场化的发展,道德情感的作用在医学教育和医疗实践中日渐式微,最终导致医学所倡导的仁爱精神被削弱、医生对病人同情感日趋弱化以及医学神圣性遭遇袪魅。基于医学"仁心仁术"的价值旨趣,道德情感所具有的超功利性、合同性、直接性等功能成为医学为人类谋福利所必不可少的内在精神动力。因此,在现代医学教育中,必须加大对医学生道德情感的培育,通过彰显医学的伦理抱负、开启医学生的伦理觉悟、提升医学生道德情感能力,把道德情感培育融入到医学教育的全过程。     

伦理学的对象问题审思

学界一直基于"伦理就是道德"的认识将伦理学的对象仅归于道德,致使伦理学学科体系一直存在一种结构性的缺陷。实际上,伦理与道德是两个有着内在逻辑关联的不同概念,关涉两个不同的社会精神领域,伦理属于社会关系范畴,道德属于社会意识范畴。道德的功能和价值在于维护伦理和谐,促使人们"心灵有序",维护和优化适应社会和人发展进步之客观要求的"思想的社会关系"。伦理学应以伦理与道德及其相互关系为对象,为此,需要在历史唯物主义的视野里丰富和发展伦理学的基本原理,这是当代道德哲学和伦理学研究与建设的一个重要学术话题。     

Moral Realism,Moral Disagreement,and Moral Psychology

Abstract

This paper considers John Doris, Stephen Stich, Alexandra Plakias, and colleagues’ recent attempts to utilize empirical studies of cross-cultural variation in moral judgment to support a version of the argument from disagreement against moral realism. Crucially, Doris et al. claim that the moral disagreements highlighted by these studies are not susceptible to the standard ‘diffusing’ explanations realists have developed in response to earlier versions of the argument. I argue that plausible hypotheses about the cognitive processes underlying ordinary moral judgment and the acquisition of moral norms, when combined with a popular philosophical account of moral inquiry—the method of reflective equilibrium—undercut the anti-realist force of the moral disagreements that Doris et al. describe. I also show that Stich's recent attempt to provide further theoretical support for Doris et al.'s case is unsuccessful.     

Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics

When speakers utter conflicting moral sentences (“X is wrong”/“X is not wrong”), it seems clear that they disagree. It has often been suggested that the fact that the speakers disagree gives us evidence for a claim about the semantics of the sentences they are uttering. Specifically, it has been suggested that the existence of the disagreement gives us reason to infer that there must be an incompatibility between the contents of these sentences (i.e., that it has to be the case that at least one of them is incorrect). This inference then plays a key role in a now‐standard argument against certain theories in moral semantics. In this paper, we introduce new evidence that bears on this debate. We show that there are moral conflict cases in which people are inclined to say both (a) that the two speakers disagree and (b) that it is not the case at least one of them must be saying something incorrect. We then explore how we might understand such disagreements. As a proof of concept, we sketch an account of the concept of disagreement and an independently motivated theory of moral semantics which, together, explain the possibility of such cases.     

Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge

To have moral worth an action not only needs to conform to the correct normative theory (whatever it is); it also needs to be motivated in the right way. I argue that morally worthy actions are motivated by the rightness of the action; they are motivated by an agent's concern for doing what's right and her knowledge that her action is morally right. Call this the Rightness Condition. On the Rightness Condition moral motivation involves both a conative and a cognitive element—in particular, it involves moral knowledge. I argue that the Rightness Condition is both necessary and sufficient for moral worth. I also argue that the Rightness Condition gives us an attractive account of actions performed under imperfect epistemic circumstances: by agents who rely on moral testimony or by those who, like Huckleberry Finn, have false moral convictions.     

Moral Accountancy and Moral Worth

People do good or bad things, and get or do not get good or bad credit for their actions, depending (in part) on knowledge of their actions. I attempt to unfold some of the interconnections between these matters, and between them and the achievement of moral worth. The main conclusion is that the heights of moral worth seem to appear in the oddest places.     

Moral Explanations of Moral Beliefs

Gilbert Harman and Judith Thomson have argued that moral facts cannot explain our moral beliefs, claiming that such facts could not play a causal role in the formation of those beliefs. This paper shows these arguments to be misguided, for they would require that we abandon any number of intuitively plausible explanations in non-moral contexts as well. But abandoning the causal strand in the argument over moral explanations does not spell immediate victory for the moral realist, since it must still be shown that moral facts do figure in our best global explanatory theory.