The Religious Function of Jaina Philosophy:AnekāntavādaReconsidered

This paper considers the socio-religious rationale for the Jaina theory of the non-one-sided nature of reality (anekāntavāda). In doing so it rejects the received view thatanekāntavāda's exclusive function is to promote non-violence at the intellectual level. Instead it advances a model which emphasizes the way in whichanekāntavādasustains a real connection between karmic matter and the soul (jīva) and so maintains the rationale for identity defining ascetic practice. The social and religious dangers of one-sided (ekānta) views for the Jaina tradition are demonstrated by a consideration of the Digambara teacher Kundakunda's idiosyncratic use of the two truths model of reality.     

Vedic and devotional waters: The Jalabheda of vallabhācārya

Summary Bhāvas, or comprehensive states of mental and emotional awareness, manifest different guṇas, or attributes, of the Lord. These attributes are wholly composed of saccidānanda, but due to variations in their bearers (ādhāra), which is to say in the antaḥkaraṇa of different speakers and listeners, they are affected, expressed, and experienced differently. In this way, bhāvas cannot exist without the Lord’s divine attributes, nor can they exist in the absence of the individual jīva. They are eternal because they belong to the Lord but become meaningful only because the individual through the senses can realize them. They thus serve as a fulcrum between the human and divine, and it is at this delicate point of balance that līlā is played out.     

The incarnated icon of Ṣaydnāyā: light and shade

The shrine of the Virgin Mary in the Syrian town of ?aydnāyā is an important Levantine Christian centre and one of the principal Christian pilgrimage sites in the Middle East, second only to the holy city of Jerusalem during the Middle Ages. This study's intent is to examine in detail, and to provide a key for interpreting, the major incongruity emerging through a comparison of the two main textual traditions regarding the shrine: the Christian-Arabic and the Latin-Western. The dissimilarity is constituted by the significant divergences concerning the representation of the miracle of the incarnation traditionally ascribed to the icon of the Virgin venerated in ?aydnāyā, which is essentially omitted in the Christian-Arabic sources. I argue that a key to the understanding of this reticence can be provided by an analysis of the heretical character ascribed to this particular miracle in Islamic theological thought and of the consequent threat it posed to the survival of the shrine itself. That being the primary focus of the investigation, the article also explores some aspects of the cultural and historical vicissitudes and crises of the cult of the shrine in the West from the fourteenth century onwards which, despite the great number of academic works dedicated to this subject, have remained unclear to this day. More specifically, I argue that apparently aporematic elements on the textual level can be interpreted logically by examining the central role played by the Knights Templar in the cult's material and cultural diffusion and by taking into account the connection of the shrine's decay with the order's downfall. The present analysis focuses almost exclusively on the medieval period as being the most significant for the formation and development of the cult of the shrine.     

The importance of Hinayāna and Mahāyāna

Volume 1. Hinayāna. Den tidlige indiske buddhisme. Volume 2. Mahāyāna. Den senere indiske buddhisme. Christian Lindtner, 1998, Copenhagen, Spektrum/Forum Publishers, Vol. 1: 228 pp., ISBN 87 7763 170 6; Vol. 2: 256 pp., ISBN 87 7763 174 9     

The early Yogācāra theory of no-self

ABSTRACT

I reconstruct early Yogācāra theory of no-self based on works by Asa?ga and Vasubandhu. I introduce the idea of the cognitive schema (CS) of the self, a conception borrowed from the developmental psychologist, Jean Piaget. A fundamental CS is a psychological function that guides the formation of perceptions. I propose that Manas can be understood in terms of being the CS of the self, a psychological mechanism from which perceptions of external objects are formed. In addition, I argue that non-imaginative wisdom can be regarded as an experience during which the CS of the self does not function, such that one only possesses pure sensations without perceptions of external objects. After the repeated experience of non-imaginative wisdom, the CS of the self is changed to the purified CS of no-self. It still supports interactions with the external world, but in a way that does not allow the four afflictions (self-delusion, self-belief, self-conceit, and self-love) to arise.

Abbreviations: MS: Mahāyānasa?graha; TS: Tri??ikā-kārikā; TSN: Trisvabhāvanirde?a; VVS: Vi??atikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi     

Ajātasattu and the future of psychoanalytic anthropology. Part I: The promise of a culture

Conclusion Thus, we can see that Obeyesekere’s notion and usage of some psychoanalytic concepts is at variance with Freud’s formulations and with those of standard psychoanalytic theory. This divergence is also evident in Obeyesekere’s formulation of the concept of disconnection, which is arguably the most important construct in the first chapter of The work of culture. Space constraints prevent us taking-up this concept here. So let me now conclude this first part of the essay, and begin part 2 with an examination of ‘disconnection’ in the context of a discussion of Obeyesekere’s accounts of two South Asian ecstatics.     

The paradox of negation in Nāgārjuna's philosophy

This essay discusses the paradox of the Nāgārjunian negation as presented in his Vigrahavyāvartani. In Part One it is argued that as the Naiyāyika remarks, Nāgārjuna's speech act ‘No proposition has its own intrinsic thesis’ seemingly contradicts his famous claim that he has no negation whatsoever. In Parts Two and Three I consider the traditional as well as modem responses to this paradox and offer my own. I argue that Nāgārjuna's speech act does not generate a paradox for two reasons: (a) the equivalence thesis of the kind‐?P = ?P is obviously false; and (b) since Nāgārjuna's speech act is situated in the dialogical/conversational universe of discourse as opposed to the argumentative/systematic universe of discourse, the teaching of the non‐intrinsic thesis of all statements that it purports, holds for all statements in its class, including itself. Lastly, it is argued that even though the Nāgārjunian speech act is not a negation situated in the argumentative universe of discourse, it serves both philosophical and soteriological purposes.     

The Arabico-Islamic background of Al-Fārābī's logic

This paper examines al-Fārābī's logical thought within its Arabico-Islamic historical background and attempts to conceptualize what this background contributes to his logic. After a brief exposition of al-Fārābī's main problems and goals, I shall attempt to reformulate the formal structure of Arabic linguistics (AL) in terms of the ontological and formal characteristics that Arabic logic is built upon. Having discussed the competence of al-Fārābī in the history of AL, I will further propose three interrelated theses about al-Fārābī's logic, in terms of which I will attempt to redefine it: the logico-linguistic conception, the project of logicization, and nuclear logic. The final question that will arise is how Aristotle's logic could be built upon AL, which has a nature contrary to logic. The present paper also contributes to examining our traditional research habits in Arabic studies.     

The Rādhāsoāmī Theory of Subtle Body as an Expression of Religious Inclusivism

This article looks at the yogic theory of subtle body as a hermeneutical and pedagogical tool used by the Rādhāsoāmī (rādhāsvāmī) tradition to construct an inclusivist strategy for appropriating other religious systems. When constructing the theory of surat-?abd-yoga, the Rādhāsoāmīs took the ha?ha yoga of the Nāths as a vital reference point. While rejecting the corporeal techniques of ha?ha yoga, they remained influenced by the Nāth theory of subtle body. A thorough modification and expansion of this theory enabled the Rādhāsoāmīs to construct a historiosophy based on a hierarchy of religious paths. The article discloses various manifestations of the inclusivist strategy in Rādhāsoāmī thought, establishes its historical and structural determinants, and examines the process of development of the theory of subtle body into a hermeneutical tool for interpreting rival paradigms of yoga in a manner that portrays them as inferior.

     

The nibbāna-parinibbāna controversy

Bahya ben Joseph Ibn Pakuda, The book of directions to the duties of the heart, Introduction, translation and notes by Menahem Mansoor. London: Routledge &; Kegan Paul, 1973, pp. VIII + 472. £6

Marasinghe, M.M.J., Gods in early Buddhism — a study of their social and mythological milieu as depicted in the Nikāyas of the Pali Canon, Sri Lanka, 1974, pp. xviii + 301. Library ed. RS. 50.00, Popular ed. Rs. 37–50

Conze, Edward, Buddhist wisdom books, The diamond sutra and The heart sutra, London: George Allen &; Unwin, 1975, paperback edition, pp. 110 £1.95

Schloegl, Irmgard (ed.), The wisdom of the Zen masters, London: Sheldon Press, 1975, pp. 80, paperback and cloth (£2.75)

Davies, W.D., The gospel and the land, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974, pp. xiv + 521

Dumery, Henry, Phenomenology and religion. Structures of the Christian institution, Translated by Paul Barrett. Hermeneutics: Vol. V. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975, pp. ix + 114 $7.95

Dhavamony, Mariasusai, Phenomenology of religion, Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1973, pp. 385. 4,000 lire

Larson, Gerald James (ed.), Myth in Indo-European antiquity, (co-edited by C. Scott Littleton and Jaan Puhvel), Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974, pp. 197. £5.00

Dumézil, Georges, From myth to fiction; the saga of hadingus, Translated by Derek Coltman, pp. 253, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1973

Kinsley, David R., The sword and the flute, Kālī and Krsna: Dark visions of the terrible and the sublime in Hindu mythology, University of California Press, 1975, pp. 159 + bibliography, £7.80

McDermott, Six pillars. Introductions to the major works of Sri Aurobindo, Robert A. (ed.), Chambersburg, Pa.: Wilson Books, 1974, pp. 198

Sperber, Dan, Rethinking symbolism, London: Cambridge University Press, 1975. £1.90 (paper)

Poliakov, Leon, The history of anti-semitism (The Littman Library of Jewish civilization), London: Routledge &; Kegan Paul, 1974. Vol. I, pp. ix + 340, £4.25; Vol. II, pp. xiii + 400, £4.25     

Candanbālā's hair: Fasting, beauty, and the materialization of Jain wives

Jain discourse on the body provides us with an opportunity to examine complex choreographies of ritual acts, which materialize the Jain body. The incipient moment of moving into womanhood is a key place for the materialization of wifely bodies. In order to understand this materialization, we must consider the ways in which discourses (here of wife-hood and nun-hood) shape the transition of Jain young women's bodies into the expected bodies (wives). The acceptance of the performative nature of the body among Jains allows us to examine the ways that Jain young women negotiate the seemingly contradictory discourses of wife-hood and nun-hood into bodies constitutive of both. Body practices suggest ways to explore the intersection of competing discourses and to destabilize the boundaries between them. In the Candanbālā Fast, Jain ritualized hair practices manifest the bodies (shaved nun and the luxurious long-haired bride) more overtly and the focus on the reiteration of the presence and discourse of loose, lovely hair enables these young women to negotiate the terrain of these seeming poles while maintaining the stated virtue of the celibate nun and the promise of the sexual and fertile wife.     

Clinging to Nothing: The Phenomenology and Metaphysics of Upādāna in Early Buddhism

The concept of clinging (upādāna) is absolutely central to early Buddhist thought. This article examines the concept from both a phenomenological and a metaphysical perspective and attempts to understand how it relates to the non-self doctrine and to the ultimate goal of Nibbāna. Unenlightened consciousness is consciousness centered on an ‘I’. It is also consciousness that is conditioned by and bound up with a being in the world. From a phenomenological perspective, clinging gives birth to the illusion of self, or what is called the ‘conceit of “I am”’. From a metaphysical perspective, clinging binds consciousness to a worldly being. Seen in the first way, Nibbāna is ‘centerless’ consciousness. Seen in the second, it is unconditioned consciousness. Viewed in either way, Nibbāna is a state of consciousness reached through the eradication of clinging     

The logic and language of Nirvāna: A contemporary interpretation

In contrast to historically orientedapproaches, this paper tackles the concept ofNirvna from the perspective ofcontemporary philosophy of language. It focuseson four propositions: Nirvna exists;Nirvna does not exist; Nirvna existsand does not exist; Nirvna neither exists nordoes not exist. The Buddha's rejectionof these propositions is interpreted by meansof explicit and conditionaldefinitions of existence. Stalnaker's notion ofpragmatic presupposition providesan explanation why the propositions are withoutmeaning. After comparing theword ``Nirvna' with indexicals, propernames and theoretical terms, it is finallyasked what linguistic function the word has.     

The Madhyamaka Concept of Svabhāva: Ontological and Cognitive Aspects

This paper considers the philosophical interpretation of the concept of svabhāva, sometimes translated as ‘inherent existence’ or ‘own-being’, in the Madyamaka school of Buddhist philosophy. It is argued that svabhāva must be understood as having two different conceptual dimensions, an ontological and a cognitive one. The ontological dimension of svabhāva shows it to play a particular part in theories investigating the most fundamental constituents of the world. Three different understandings of svabhāva are discussed under this heading: svabhāva understood as essence, as substance, and as the true nature of phenomena (absolute svabhāva). The cognitive dimension shows svabhāva as playing an important rôle in our everyday conceptualization of phenomena. Svabhāva is here seen as a superimposition (samāropa) which the mind projects onto the world.