Irony in psychoanalysis

Irony is a more important element of analysis than we generally recognize. First, verbal irony characterizes the discourse of certain patients who employ it as a defense, both adaptively and as a resistance, especially against the expression of intense affect associated with the transference. The frequent employment of irony reflects a significant character trait, an habitual mode of dealing with conflict. It is also a frequent manifestation of a particularly active self-critical faculty. Ironic employment of a "double audience" is also relevant to analytic technique. Second, situational irony is inherent in many aspects of psychoanalysis, as a process and a point of view. It implies the acceptance of the inevitability of conflict, ambiguity and paradox, never quite capable of perfect resolution. It emphasizes critical examination of mixtures of motives of both analysand and analyst, and it requires perpetual questioning of what might otherwise be taken as accepted doctrine, including the principles of psychoanalysis per se. An ironic stance requires some degree of detachment in conjunction with deep commitment, itself an ironic circumstance. Third, the capacity to understand and employ irony can be traced to childhood, relatively early in the course of development of speech and sphincter control; some of its early determinants are to be found in the anal phase of psychosexual development; it reflects as well the capacity to use certain early defenses and mechanisms originally described as characteristic of the dream work. Its later fate as a prominent feature of character is very much a matter of ego and superego development, including such components as intelligence, verbal skills, the capacity for joking and for play, i.e., controlled regression. Sources of identification in the family and the culture are of obvious importance. Finally, an understanding of irony has an important place in the theory of technique, especially with regard to transference and resistance. An ironic stance and understanding on the part of the analyst are valuable, even essential; but irony may become a questionable defense for him as well as for his patient.     

Psychoanalysis, psychoanalysis appropriated, psychoanalysis applied

The assumptions which predominate in the reading of psychoanalytic theory differ from those involved in listening to the patient in the psychoanalytic process. A weakness of much applied psychoanalysis is that these two sets of assumptions are confused and theoretical certainty is substituted for clinical exploration. This difference in assumptions is illustrated by the different assumptions about the signifier in two poems. In Freud's work on Leonardo, both attitudes toward the signifier are present, but the clinical aspect is located in Freud's method, not in his historical construction. The problems of maintaining a similar clinical stance in applied psychoanalysis are explored, and Freud's tendency toward historical certainty is speculatively considered as an instance of the parallelism phenomenon.     

Pandemic psychoanalysis

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis - Our clinical practice is contextualized by a co-participant trauma constituted by a confluence of upheavals–pandemic, politics, an epistemological...     

Cognitive difficulties in psychoanalysis

The author rises a number of questions about cognitive difficulties in relation to psychoanalysis. He presents the case of an adult patient in whom previously unrecognized childhood cognitive difficulties were discovered during the course of analysis. Their relationship to the patient's problems in adulthood is discussed. Some suggestions and speculations about the questions raised are presented with the hope of stimulating further exploration of what the author considers to be an interesting and important subject for psychoanalysis.     

Initiating psychoanalysis

This paper explores the coincidence of two substantial difficulties: where gross external interruptions to the psychotherapy (caused by the psychotherapist's miscarriage and subsequent pregnancy) paralleled circumstances of violence and abandonment in the patient's childhood and adulthood.

When two such difficulties coincide and are added to by time constraints, the question of what can be salvaged from the treatment arises. Two risks are discussed: that of withdrawing into a purely supportive, potentially collusive mode of treatment and, second, the risk of challenging the patient's denial (of damage to the therapist as well as evidence of any other damage) in a manically reparative, intrusive, way that is more to do with the therapist's wishes to avoid her guilt at letting the patient down.