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MORAL CONTEXTUALISM AND MORAL RELATIVISM 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Moral relativism provides a compelling explanation of linguistic data involving ordinary moral expressions like 'right' and 'wrong'. But it is a very radical view. Because relativism relativizes sentence truth to contexts of assessment it forces us to revise standard linguistic theory. If, however, no competing theory explains all of the evidence, perhaps it is time for a paradigm shift. However, I argue that a version of moral contextualism can account for the same data as relativism without relativizing sentence truth to contexts of assessment. This version of moral contextualism is thus preferable to relativism on methodological grounds. 相似文献
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KATHLEEN WALLACE 《Metaphilosophy》2007,38(4):380-403
Abstract: Bernard Gert argues that legitimate moral disagreement calls for tolerance and moral humility; when there is more than one morally acceptable course of action, then intolerance and what Gert calls “moral arrogance” would be objectionable. This article identifies some possible difficulties in distinguishing moral arrogance from moral reform and then examines Gert's treatment of abortion as a contemporary example of moral disagreement that he characterizes as irresolvable. 相似文献
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Mary Maxwell 《Zygon》1992,27(1):51-64
Abstract. The phenomenon of moral inertia is often explained by reference to all-encompassing features of human nature, such as laziness and cowardice, but in fact it has many causes. A modern person may fail to "stand up" to social evil because he has difficulty seeing it-perhaps because it is deliberately hidden or because she and her neighbors cannot find ways to recognize and discuss it as a soluble problem. Fourteen factors contributing to moral inertia will be listed here under the headings of cognitive and linguistic factors. Further, a consideration of ideology's role (both liberal and Marxist) in inhibiting action against social evil will be presented. 相似文献
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XIAOMEI YANG 《Metaphilosophy》2006,37(1):112-129
Abstract: Kant has argued that moral requirements are categorical. Kant's claim has been challenged by some contemporary philosophers; this article defends Kant's doctrine. I argue that Kant's claim captures the unique feature of moral requirements. The main arguments against Kant's claim focus on one condition that a categorical imperative must meet: to be independent of desires. I argue that there is another important, but often ignored, condition that a categorical imperative must meet, and this second condition is crucial to understanding why moral requirements are not hypothetical. I also argue that the claim that moral requirements are not categorical because they depend on desires for motivation is beside the point. The issue of whether moral requirements are categorical is not an issue about whether moral desires or feelings are necessary for moral motivation but are rather an issue about the ground of moral desires or moral feelings. Moral requirements are categorical because they are requirements of reason, and reason makes moral desires or feelings possible. 相似文献
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DOUGLAS W. PORTMORE 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2007,88(1):39-73
Abstract: To consequentialize a non-consequentialist theory, take whatever considerations that the non-consequentialist theory holds to be relevant to determining the deontic statuses of actions and insist that those considerations are relevant to determining the proper ranking of outcomes. In this way, the consequentialist can produce an ordering of outcomes that when combined with her criterion of rightness yields the same set of deontic verdicts that the non-consequentialist theory yields. In this paper, I argue that any plausible non-consequentialist theory can be consequentialized. I explain the motivation for the consequentializing project and defend it against recent criticisms by Mark Schroeder and others. 相似文献
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