Readers’ use of source information in text comprehension

In two experiments, we examined the role of discrepancy on readers’ text processing of and memory for the sources of brief news reports. Each story included two assertions that were attributed to different sources. We manipulated whether the second assertion was either discrepant or consistent with the first assertion. On the basis of the discrepancy-induced source comprehension (D-ISC) assumption, we predicted that discrepant stories would promote deeper processing and better memory for the sources conveying the messages, as compared to consistent stories. As predicted, readers mentioned more sources in summaries of discrepant stories, recalled more sources, made more fixations, and displayed longer gaze times in source areas when reading discrepant than when reading consistent stories. In Experiment 2, we found enhanced memory for source–content links for discrepant stories even when intersentential connectors were absent, and regardless of the reading goals. Discussion was focused on discrepancies as one mechanism by which readers are prompted to encode source–content links more deeply, as a method of integrating disparate pieces of information into a coherent mental representation of a text.     

Episodic memory reconsolidation: Updating or source confusion?

Reactivation of apparently stable, long-term memory can render it fragile, and dependent on a re-stabilisation process referred to as “reconsolidation”. Recently we provided the first demonstration of reconsolidation effects in human episodic memory (Hupbach, Gomez, Hardt, & Nadel, 2007 Hupbach, A., Gomez, R., Hardt, O. and Nadel, L. 2007. Reconsolidation of episodic memories: A subtle reminder triggers integration of new information. Learning & Memory, 14: 47–53. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Hupbach, Hardt, Gomez, & Nadel, 2008 Hupbach, A., Hardt, O., Gomez, R. and Nadel, L. 2008. The dynamics of memory context-dependent updating. Learning & Memory, 15: 574–579.  [Google Scholar]). Memory for a set of objects was modified by the presentation of a new set, if and only if participants were reminded of the first learning episode before learning the new set. The present study asks whether this effect can be interpreted as a source discrimination problem; i.e., participants have difficulties remembering which objects were presented during which session, and do not actually incorporate new objects into the reactivated memory. The present study used a recognition test and asked participants directly about the source of their memories. Participants in the no-reminder group showed very few source errors. Participants in the reminder group misattributed the source of objects from the second set as being from the first set but not vice versa, thus demonstrating updating of the original memory. This finding is informative with respect to the misinformation paradigm, and reconsolidation is discussed as a possible mechanism underlying our results and the misinformation effect.     

Is case-based reasoning a source of knowledge generalisation?

This study examines the link between case-based reasoning and knowledge generalisation. Experiment 1 showed that case-based reasoning is not in itself a source of generalisation. In this experiment, subjects were able to adapt knowledge acquired during analysis of an example in order to successfully solve a very similar problem. But immediately afterwards, they failed on a problem symmetrical to the one they had just solved. Experiments 2A and 2B showed, in this same situation, that it is possible to lead subjects to generalise simply by stating that the practice problems were similar to the examples. These findings suggest that knowledge generalisation accompanying case-based reasoning is the result of a process that must be actively implemented by the subject, and not an automatic outcome of the source-to-target transfer.     

When is schematic knowledge used in source monitoring?

Source monitoring involves judgments regarding the origin of information (M. K. Johnson, S. Hashtroudi, & D. S. Lindsay, 1993). When participants cannot remember the source in a source-monitoring task, they may guess according to their prior schematic knowledge (U. J. Bayen, G. V. Nakamura, S. E. Dupuis, & C.-L. Yang, 2000). The present study aimed at specifying conditions under which schematic knowledge is used in source monitoring. The authors examined the time course of schema-based guesses with a response-signal technique (A. V. Reed, 1973), and multinomial models that separate memory and guessing bias. Use of schematic knowledge was observed only when asymptotic old-new recognition was low. The time course of schematic-knowledge retrieval followed an exponential growth function. Implications for theories of source monitoring are discussed.     

The source of the truth bias: Heuristic processing?

People believe others are telling the truth more often than they actually are; this is called the truth bias. Surprisingly, when a speaker is judged at multiple points across their statement the truth bias declines. Previous claims argue this is evidence of a shift from (biased) heuristic processing to (reasoned) analytical processing. In four experiments we contrast the heuristic‐analytic model (HAM) with alternative accounts. In Experiment 1, the decrease in truth responding was not the result of speakers appearing more deceptive, but was instead attributable to the rater's processing style. Yet contrary to HAMs, across three experiments we found the decline in bias was not related to the amount of processing time available (Experiments 1–3) or the communication channel (Experiment 2). In Experiment 4 we found support for a new account: that the bias reflects whether raters perceive the statement to be internally consistent.     

Long-term memory for speaker’s voice and source location

One hundred and twenty-eight subjects tried to recall 20 simple sentences that for some subjects were presented in two different voices or were presented from two loudspeakers on different sides of the room. In addition, some subjects were instructed to remember not only the sentences, but also their voice and location attributes. Intentional instructions for location resulted in poorer recall of the sentences, but intentional instructions for voice did not. The voice attribute seemed to be automatically coded under both intentional and incidental instructions for remembering the attribute, whereas the location attribute seemed to require cognitive processing in addition to that required for encoding the meaning of the sentence. A test for clustering by voice in recall was done to determine if the evidence for automatic ceding of voice was merely an artifact resulting from better recall because of organization. However, no clustering was found. The ideas that speaker's voice and sentence meaning were processed in parallel by different hemispheres of the brain and that the connotation of the voice influenced the meaning of each sentence were offered as two possible explanations of the results.     

The influence of linguistic labels on source‐monitoring decisions

Three studies explored the extent to which people use various object features, including linguistic label, shape, and category membership, to make decisions about the source of their memories. To isolate the influence of each feature, we used items that were related in the following four ways: as synonyms, as similar in shape and category membership, as homographs, or as unrelated. Participants read sentences and either saw or imagined a picture of the critical word's referent. Experiment 1 showed that participants committed more source errors for synonyms (e.g., rabbit and bunny) than for objects that were conceptually and perceptually similar (e.g., doughnut and bagel), which produced more errors than unrelated items. However, there was no effect of label, as people did not have more errors for homographs (e.g., baseball bat and flying bat) than unrelated items. In Experiment 2, presenting the critical word at study was not sufficient to lead people to use an item's label to make source decisions. However, Experiment 3 showed more source errors for homographs than unrelated pairs when semantic context was minimised at study, suggesting that people can use linguistic labels to make source decisions when other information is unavailable.     

Can implicit measures detect source information in crime-related amnesia?

Participants who are asked to simulate amnesia for a mock crime have a weaker memory for this event when they have to give up their role as a feigner, than those who are not asked to feign memory loss. According to the source monitoring framework (SMF), this memory-undermining effect of simulating amnesia for a crime would be due to misattribution of the right source of information. However, we know that the content of self-generated information (e.g., feigned version of the crime) might be preserved and recognised over time as a result of elaborative cognitive processing. In the present study, we aimed to contrast these two explanations. We showed participants a mock crime video and we instructed them to either feign amnesia (simulators) or confess the mock crime (confessors). Next, a free recall memory test was administered. After one week, participants were asked to perform a personalised source monitoring task using the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT). As predicted, we found that simulators were able to discriminate the content of their self-generated feigned story of the crime from the original version. Moreover, simulators were quicker than confessors at the aIAT task. Practical and theoretical implications of our results are discussed.     

Is there anything special about the aging of source memory?

A battery of cognitive tests designed to measure the constructs of episodic memory, perceptual speed, fluid ability, executive functioning, and vocabulary was administered to 330 adults between the ages of 18 and 89. Each participant also performed 4 different tasks designed to assess source memory. Structural equation modeling was used to evaluate the validity of a source-memory construct and to explore the relation of the source-memory construct to age and to the other cognitive variables. The variance common to the source-memory variables was strongly related to other cognitive abilities, suggesting that source memory may not have discriminant validity, and there were only small unique age-related effects on the source-memory construct after the influence of other abilities was considered.     

Does survival context enhance memory for source? A within-subjects comparison

ABSTRACT

Nairne, Thompson, and Pandeirada [2007. Adaptive memory: Survival processing enhances retention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 33, 263–273] demonstrated that processing words according to their relevance to a survival scenario enhanced their subsequent retrieval in recall and recognition tasks compared to a variety of control scenarios. From an adaptive perspective, it is maintained that processing words in a survival context should also enhance memory for source; however, evidence in the literature is rather mixed regarding a survival context advantage for source memory. In the current study, we conducted four experiments to systematically investigate the survival advantage in source memory, when the context itself is the source, with both recall (Experiments 1A and 1B) and recognition tests (Experiments 2A and 2B). Results showed a survival advantage for item memory over the control contexts in all experiments. The survival context advantage was not extended to source memory performance in Experiment 1A. Results from all other experiments, however, indicated a survival context advantage for both item and source memory. Findings are discussed in relation to possible proximate mechanisms underlying the survival processing effect.     

Aging,source memory,and the experience of “remembering”

In a previous study, we found source memory for perceptual features to differentiate between younger but not older adults’ reports of recollective (“remember”; R) and “know” (K) experiences. In two experiments with younger (17–30 years) and older (64–81 years) participants, we examined whether memory for meaningful speaker sources would accompany older adults’ recollective experience. Indeed, memory for male and female speakers (but not partial memory for gender; Experiment 1) as well as bound memory for speakers and their facial expressions (Experiment 2) distinguished between both younger and older adults’ RK reports. Thus, memory for some sources forms a common basis for younger and older adults’ retrieval experience. Nonetheless, older adults still showed lower objective source memory and lower subjective source-attribution confidence than younger adults when reporting recollective experiences, suggesting that source memory is less relevant to their retrieval experience than for younger adults.     

By name or by deed? Identifying the source of the feminist stigma

Prejudice and discrimination against feminists were explored across two contexts, a workplace and a social setting. We examined university students' reactions to a woman who called herself a feminist, behaved like a feminist by challenging sexism, did both, or did neither. In Study 1, participants (N = 177) evaluated a job candidate less favorably when she called herself a feminist after controlling for perceived assertiveness and participants' feminist self‐identification. However, our results showed no evidence of hiring discrimination. In Study 2, participants (N = 184) evaluated a peer less favorably and were less willing to befriend and date her when she called herself a feminist, controlling for perceived assertiveness. Participants were also less willing to befriend her when she behaved like a feminist. The contextual nature of the feminist stigma and the influence of perceived assertiveness are discussed.     

Anticipating partners’ responses: Examining item and source memory following interactive exchanges

Within the context of an interactive anagram-solving task, the present studies tested predictions about the role of cognitive anticipation in both source and item memory. After working in pairs to solve anagram problems, participants were surprised by a source-monitoring test focused on the source of solutions (self vs. partner, Experiment 1) or a standard recognition test focused on the solutions themselves (Experiment 2). With the intention of affecting the opportunity to anticipate partners' solutions, two variables were manipulated: anagram difficulty (easy vs. hard) and the delaybetween the presentation of an anagram problem and theprompt tha t designated one member of each pair as the anagram solver. Consistent w i th predictions, asthe opportunity t oanticipate partners'solutions increased, there was a decrease in source accuracy suggesting increased confusion about whether the solution had been self- or partner-generated. Generation-effect failures were observed in item memory. However, these failures reflected increases in item memory for partners' responses rather than decreases in memory for self-generated ones. These studies suggest that when opportunities to anticipate partners' responses are available, self-generative activities may be associated with both self-and partner-generated items, influencing the expression of the generation effect.     

The conscience debate: resources for rapprochement from the problem’s perceived source

This article critically evaluates the conception of conscience underlying the debate about the proper place and role of conscience in the clinical encounter. It suggests that recovering a conception of conscience rooted in the Catholic moral tradition could offer resources for moving the debate past an unproductive assertion of conflicting rights, namely, physicians’ rights to conscience versus patients’ rights to socially and legally sanctioned medical interventions. It proposes that conscience is a necessary component of the moral life in general and a necessary resource for maintaining a coherent sense of moral agency. It demonstrates that an earlier and intellectually richer conception of conscience, in contrast with common contemporary formulations, makes the judgments of conscience accountable to reason, open to critique, and protected from becoming a bastion for bigotry, idiosyncrasy, and personal bias.

When do children begin to understand logical inference as a source of knowledge?

Previous research (Sodian & Wimmer, 1987) suggests that it is not until about 6 years of age that children come to recognize that one can gain knowledge through inferential rather than direct means. However, a great deal of research suggests that children have a sophisticated understanding of other aspects of knowledge, such as perception and communication around age 4. Three experiments were carried out in which we made important task information more salient in order to determine whether children's performance in previous research on their understanding of inference had underestimated their abilities. The design included controls to ensure that children's attribution of knowledge to the story character could not be based on an egocentric tendency to attribute their own knowledge. Results indicated that (a) enhancing the salience of important information significantly improved children's performance; (b) by 4 or 5 years of age children begin to understand inference as a source of knowledge, around the same time they evidence an understanding of knowledge gained through perception and communication; and (c) that their performance lagged slightly behind that exhibited on a standard false-belief task.     

Is flashbulb memory a special instance of source memory? Evidence from older adults

Flashbulb memories (FMs) are vivid, stable memories for the reception of arousing, consequential news. Although such memories have been found in people of all ages, in the only examination of age differences to date, Cohen, Conway, and Maylor (1994) reported that older adults were less likely than young adults to experience a FM. We hypothesised that FM would be impaired in older adults with reduced frontal lobe (FL) function. To test this hypothesis, we asked older adults, who had been characterised according to FL function, to recall details of the moment that they first heard the news about the deaths of Princess Diana and Mother Teresa. Long-term retention was tested 6 months later. Details concerning the reception of the news about Princess Diana's death were retained better than those associated with Mother Teresa's death. Importantly, there was no evidence that memory for these contextual details was related to FL function. A measure of medial temporal lobe function, derived from neuropsychological tests of episodic memory, was also not associated with memory for the reception events, although it was associated with memory for the details of an everyday autobiographical event. We speculated that emotionally arousing autobiographical memories may be qualitatively different from everyday memories and may involve the amygdala.     

Auditory event perception: The source—perception loop for posture in human gait

There is a small but growing literature on the perception of natural acoustic events, but few attempts have been made to investigate complex sounds not systematically controlled within a laboratory setting. The present study investigates listeners’ ability to make judgments about the posture (upright—stooped) of the walker who generated acoustic stimuli contrasted on each trial. We use a comprehensive three-stage approach to event perception, in which we develop a solid understanding of the source event and its sound properties, as well as the relationships between these two event stages. Developing this understanding helps both to identify the limitations of common statistical procedures and to develop effective new procedures for investigating not only the two information stages above, but also the decision strategies employed by listeners in making source judgments from sound. The result is a comprehensive, ultimately logical, but not necessarily expected picture of both the source—sound—perception loop and the utility of alternative research tools.