Democracy,Deliberation and Disobedience

This paper develops a theory of civil disobedience informed by a deliberative conception of democracy. In particular, it explores the justification of illegal, public and political acts of protest in constitutional deliberative democracies. Civil disobedience becomes justifiable when processes of public deliberation fail to respect the principles of a deliberative democracy in the following three ways: when deliberation is insufficiently inclusive; when it is manipulated by powerful participants; and when it is insufficiently informed. As a contribution to ongoing processes of public deliberation, civil disobedience should be carried out in a way that respects the principles of deliberative democracy, which entails a commitment to persuasive, non-violent forms of protest.Civil disobedience is understood in this paper as public, illegal and political protest carried out against state laws or policies. Justification here is understood as a moral or political justification -- where civilly disobedient citizens claim that they are morally or politically entitled to disobey law. It does not imply legal justification.John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972); Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (London: Harvard University Press, 1985).     

Judicial Responses to Civil Disobedience: A Comparative Approach

In this paper, I compare the extent of Anglo-American judicial engagement in response to civil disobedience with that of the French judiciary. I begin by examining what the civil disobedient can realistically expect to achieve in a court of law. I shall argue that his priority should be to require the judge, acting as a mouthpiece for the law, to respond to his complaints. To do this, the civil disobedient must be able to deny liability for the offence he has allegedly committed by urging a different interpretation of the law on the basis of an alternative -- but plausible -- reading of constitutional or human rights. If the civil disobedient can do this, he can claim a victory of sorts, even if his claims are ultimately unsuccessful. But legal culture can present a further barrier. Judges have different roles in different jurisdictions and therein lie further difficulties for the French civil disobedient.     

Features of a Paradigm Case of Civil Disobedience

The purpose of this paper is not to define civil disobedience, but to identify a paradigm case of civil disobedience and the features exemplified in it. After noting the benefits of this methodological approach, the paper proceeds with an examination of two key, interconnected features: conscientiousness and communication. First, a link is made between the conscientious aspect of civil disobedience and moral consistency; a civil disobedient demonstrates a conscientious commitment to certain values through her willingness to condemn, and to dissociate herself from, governmental decisions that violate those values. A parallel is then drawn between the communicative aspect of civil disobedience and the communicative aspect of lawful punishment by the state. Both practices are associated with an aim to demonstrate protest against certain types of conduct and an aim to bring about a change in that conduct. In paradigm situations, a civil disobedient aims to lead policymakers not only to reform existing law, but also to internalise her objections so as to produce a lasting change in the law. Having such aims places some constraints upon the modes of communication that she reasonably may use to achieve these aims. This paper concludes by considering three controversial modes of communication -- coercion, publicity and violence.I wish to thank Adam Cureton, John Gardner, David Garrard, Kinch Hoekstra, Peter Jones, Christoph Ortner and John Tasioulas for their helpful comments on previous drafts of this paper. For one definition of civil disobedience, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971), 364. See also Hugo A. Bedau, On Civil Disobedience, Journal of Philosophy, 58/21 (1961), 653--61. For an alternative definition, see Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 263.     

Introduction: Law and Disobedience

This essay considers some major questions raised by civil and other forms of conscientious disobedience. What distinguishes that form of dissent? Can we recognise the legitimacy of a political system yet defy its laws? Is disobeying a democratic decision especially or entirely unacceptable, or can disobedience be an instrument of democracy? If a regime recognises rights, how should we regard disobedience that appeals to those rights in challenging the regime’s laws? How should reasons for obedience figure in our thinking about justified disobedience? The essay locates the contributions that make up this special issue of Res Publica within these debates about disobedience. It questions whether any general theory of justified disobedience can command agreement: the conditions that give rise to conscientious disobedience -- conflicting values and judgements -- seem to preclude consensus on when its use is justified.     

Identifying Systematic Disobedience in Milgram's Obedience Experiments: A Meta-Analytic Review

ABSTRACT— A meta-analysis of data from eight of Milgram's obedience experiments reveals previously undocumented systematicity in the behavior of disobedient participants. In all studies, disobedience was most likely at 150 v, the point at which the shocked "learner" first requested to be released. Further illustrating the importance of the 150-v point, obedience rates across studies covaried with rates of disobedience at 150 v, but not at any other point; as obedience decreased, disobedience at 150 v increased. In contrast, disobedience was not associated with the learner's escalating expressions of pain. This analysis identifies a critical decision point in the obedience paradigm and suggests that disobedient participants perceived the learner's right to terminate the experiment as overriding the experimenter's orders, a finding with potential implications for the treatment of prisoners.     

Samaritanism and Civil Disobedience

In this paper, I defend the existence of a moral duty to disobey the law and engage in civil disobedience on the basis of one of the grounds of political obligation—the Samaritan duty. Christopher H. Wellman has recently offered a ‘Samaritan account’ of state legitimacy and political obligation, according to which the state is justified in coercing each citizen in order to rescue all from the perilous circumstances of the state of nature; and each of us is bound to obey the law, as the state demands, because we each have a responsibility to help rescue others when this assistance is not unreasonably costly. Though Wellman recognizes that there can be reasons for disobeying the law and resisting injustice in otherwise legitimate states, he overlooks the possibility that at least some of these reasons could be Samaritan in nature, grounded in the duty to rescue people from peril. As I shall argue, the Samaritan duty supports obligations to disobey the law, when the law prohibits Samaritan rescues, and to engage in civil disobedience, when unjust laws and practices contribute to endangering people. The discussion proceeds as follows. After a brief overview of the Samaritan duty, I articulate my case for Samaritan duties to disobey the law, and duties to engage in civil disobedience when unjust laws, institutions, or practices enable what I call ‘persistent Samaritan perils’. I then examine and respond to several objections to my account: first, that the costs of law-breaking are unreasonable, and thus cannot be morally required; second, that individuals’ particular acts of protest and civil disobedience do not appear to make any difference to the rescue, and thus cannot be required; third, that I stretch the Samaritan duty beyond recognition; and fourth, that the Samaritan duty binds us to help people in need or peril anywhere, not particularly at home. I consider in conclusion the advantages and limits of my account of citizens’ Samaritan duties in the face of injustice.     

Animal Activists,Civil Disobedience and Global Responses to Transnational Injustice

Traditionally, acts of civil disobedience are understood as a mechanism by which citizens may express dissatisfaction with a law of their country. That expression will typically be morally motivated, non-violent and aimed at changing their government’s policy, practice or law. Building on existing work, in this paper we explore the limits of one well-received definition of civil disobedience by considering the challenging case of the actions of animal activists at sea. Drawing on original interviews with advocates associated with Sea Shepherd, Greenpeace and Humane Society International we find that even if animal activists are morally motivated and civil, the transnational nature of their activity makes it difficult to assess their intention to bring about a change in law or public policy. This means that a civil disobedience defence may not be available to activists operating across international borders. This raises important questions about the usefulness of the civil disobedience concept within the context of a globalised world. We conclude that while the actions of some anti-whaling activists may not meet definitions of civil disobedience as conventionally understood, this says more about the narrow way in which that concept has been traditionally defined, than it does about the type of activity some anti-whaling activists have undertaken in the Southern Ocean. Finally, we argue that activists wishing to make a stand against whaling may have no choice but to act as global citizens because policy change within a single nation-state is unlikely to lead to the cessation of this inherently transnational activity.     

Paternalism and the Criminal Law

ABSTRACT If it could be shown that law is, in some sense, a moral system the apparent contradiction between (moral) autonomy and (legal) heteronomy might be challenged. In order to prepare for such a challenge this paper questions the prevailing view that law is not in the business of enforcing morals. That is done primarily by using decisions of the criminal courts to show that the law does not always criminalise conduct merely to prevent harm to others. Paternalism is distinguished from the harm principle in order to show that the law (rightly or wrongly) sometimes seeks to secure that which is (thought to be) morally good, irrespective of the prevention of harm, at least overall harm.
If such an insight is well founded there are consequences for legal theory in that neither of the ruling paradigms (naturalism and positivism) seems able adequately to accommodate the view of law which emerges. Consequently, an attempt is made in the essay to develop a middle theory of law, between naturalism and positivism, which is referred to as 'normative positivism'. The theory presented has, in turn, consequences for political practice. If law can be seen as community morality rather than as merely the morality of officials, then everyone has a stake in the moral content of law and there may be good moral reasons for disobeying official laws. Civil disobedience is the citizen's ultimate resort against the official morality that has appropriated to itself the eulogistic name of 'law'. That law may be seen as community morality also calls into question some ruling paradigms as to the nature of morality but, if the claim can be sustained, then the legal system may be seen as applied moral philosophy in action.     

Uncivil Disobedience: Political Commitment and Violence

Standard accounts of civil disobedience include nonviolence as a necessary condition. Here I argue that such accounts are mistaken and that civil disobedience can include violence in many aspects, primarily excepting violence directed at other persons. I base this argument on a novel understanding of civil disobedience: the special character of the practice comes from its combination of condemnation of a political practice with an expressed commitment to the political. The commitment to the political is a commitment to engaging with others as co-members in the on-going political project of living together. I show how such an understanding of civil disobedience is superior to the Rawlsian strain of thought, which focuses on fidelity to law. Rawls was concerned with civil disobedience solely in the context of overriding political obligation. The project of characterizing a contestatory political practice that can be distinguished and used in a wider variety of contexts than Rawls is concerned with, including under illegitimate regimes, beyond the nation-state, or on behalf of anarchism, requires a different understanding of civil disobedience.     

Animal Rescue as Civil Disobedience

Apparently illegal cases of animal rescue can be either open or covert: ‘open rescue’ is associated with organizations such as Animal Liberation Victoria and Animal Liberation New South Wales; ‘covert rescue’ is associated with the Animal Liberation Front. While the former seems to qualify non-controversially as civil disobedience I argue that (irrespective of other considerations such as effectiveness or advisability) at least some instances of the latter could also qualify as civil disobedience just so long as various norms of civility (e.g. norms concerning recognition of others, the avoidance of violence and threats) are satisfied. The case for such a move is defended against objections that covertness is (1) inherently suspect; (2) a failure to accept responsibility; and (3) inconsistent with civil disobedience as a form of communication. Against such objections, the paper emphasizes the importance of respecting the open texture of the concept of civil disobedience if it is to be of continuing relevance against the backdrop of changing forms of non-violent dissent.     

Aesthetic Disobedience

This article explores a concept of artistic transgression I call aesthetic disobedience that runs parallel to the political concept of civil disobedience. Acts of civil disobedience break some law in order to publicly draw attention to and recommend the reform of a conflict between the commitments of a legal system and some shared commitments of a community. Likewise, acts of aesthetic disobedience break some entrenched artworld norm in order to publicly draw attention to and recommend the reform of a conflict between artworld commitments and some shared commitments of a community. Considering artistic transgressions under the concept of aesthetic disobedience highlights often‐overlooked features of modern artworld practices. Most significantly, it draws attention to the deliberative participation of a wide variety of citizens of the artworld, including not just artists and performers but also members of audiences, in the transformation of the rules and boundaries of the artworld itself.     

Legal Facts in Argumentation-Based Litigation Games

This paper analyzes legal fact-argumentation in the framework of the argumentation-based litigation game (ALG) by Xiong (Leg Sci 370(9):16–19, 2012). Rather than as an ontological one, an ALG treats a legal fact as a fact-qua-claim whose acceptability depends on the reasons supporting it. In constructing their facts-qua-claims, parties to an ALG must interact to maintain a game-theoretic equilibrium. We compare the general interactional constraints that the civil (a.k.a. ‘continental’) and common law systems assign, and detail what the civil, administrative, and criminal codes of mainland China require of the suitor (S), the respondent (R), and the trier (T) to establish their respective S-, R- and T-facts. We also offer an improved version of the legal syllogism.     

Not bound by the law: legal disobedience in Israeli society

The issue of whether there is a 'prima facie obligation to obey the law' has intrigued human society since the days of Socrates. However, most of the writings in this field have dealt with theoretical aspects of the issue, such as the boundaries of legal obedience and frameworks defining the circumstances under which a citizen is not obliged to obey the law. Very few studies have investigated the phenomenon of legal disobedience empirically. The current study is based on a survey of Israeli citizens belonging to three sectors of the population (Jews in the general population, Israeli Arabs, and orthodox Jewish students enrolled in religious yeshiva seminaries). Respondents' attitudes towards the judicial system, the rule of law, and the duty to obey state laws were examined by means of a questionnaire especially designed for the study. The findings point to gaps between the three groups: Compared to the Arab population and the yeshiva students, support for state laws and the rule of law was stronger among Jews in the general population and, conversely, belief in the supremacy of other laws (i.e. religious laws) over state laws and readiness to take the law into one's own hands were stronger among the Arabs and the yeshiva students, compared to the general Jewish population.     

The future of involuntary civil commitment in the U.S.A. after Kansas v. Hendricks

This article examines new sexual predator commitment laws enacted recently in the United States to civilly commit dangerous sex offenders after they have served their prison sentences. It then examines Kansas v. Hendricks, a Supreme Court case that upheld these laws as constitutionally permitted. The article next describes the broad parameters that demarcate the government's civil commitment authority identified by the Supreme Court in that case. The author concludes that Hendricks establishes that the state has expansive civil commitment power much greater than our previous understanding. The government may use civil commitment solely to protect the public from dangerous individuals without proving a medically recognized mental disorder, recent evidence of dangerousness, or a treatment purpose or possibility. Moreover, this quarantine system may be justified by proving the same unlawful behavior for which the individual has already been criminally punished.     

Technology and civil disobedience: Why engineers have a special duty to obey the law

Summary Engineers have a greater responsibility than many other professionals not to commit civil disobedience in performing their jobs as engineers. It does not follow that engineers have no responsibility for their company’s actions. Morally, engineer may be required to speak out within the company or even publicly against her company. An engineer may be required to work on a project or quit her job. None of these acts, generally, are against the law. An engineer may be morally required to commit civil disobedience as a private citizen. But, given the institutional character of engineering and the division of labor in the modern world, very rarely will conscience require an engineer to violate the law in the performance of her job as an engineer.     

In Defense of Penalizing (but not Punishing) Civil Disobedience

While many contemporary political philosophers agree that citizens of a legitimate state enjoy a moral right to civil disobedience, they differ over both the grounds of that right and its content. This essay defends the view that the moral right to civil disobedience derives from (or is a facet of) a general right to political participation, and the characterization of that right as precluding the state from punishing, but not from penalizing, those who exercise it. The argument proceeds by way of rebuttals to criticisms of both claims recently advanced by Kimberley Brownlee. While in some cases those criticisms fail on their merits, in other cases the responses offered here reveal that the dispute over the ground and content of a moral right to civil disobedience reflects deeper disagreements regarding two foundational issues: first, whether moral rights are best conceived of as defeasible evaluative principles or conclusive normative ones, and second, whether principles of justice should be theorized on the basis of full or partial compliance.     

Birth order and civil disobedience: a test of Sulloway's "Born to Rebel" hypothesis

In Born to Rebel, F. Sulloway (1996) argued that, throughout history, later-borns have been more likely than first-borns to challenge the status quo. The authors tested Sulloway's hypothesis among a group of U.S. college students who had participated in civil disobedience as part of a labor dispute. The authors predicted that there would be a higher percentage of later-borns among those who had been arrested than among a group of their friends who had not participated in civil disobedience or among a control group of students drawn from classes at the college. The findings, in fact, revealed a significant relationship between the number of times the students had been arrested and birth order.     

Toward an International Rule of Law: Distinguishing International Law-Breakers from Would-Be Law-Makers

An interesting fact about customary international law is that the only way you can propose an amendment to it is by breaking it. How can that be differentiated from plain law-breaking? What moral standards might apply to that sort of international conduct? I propose we use ones analogous to the ordinary standards for distinguishing civil disobedients from ordinary law-breakers: would-be law-makers, like civil disobedients, must break the law openly; they must accept the legal consequences of doing so; and they must be prepared to have the same rules applied to them as everyone else.     

Birth Order and Civil Disobedience: A Test of Sulloway's “Born to Rebel” Hypothesis

Abstract

In Born to Rebel, F. Sulloway (1996) argued that, throughout history, laterborns have been more likely than first-borns to challenge the status quo. The authors tested Sulloway's hypothesis among a group of U.S. college students who had participated in civil disobedience as part of a labor dispute. The authors predicted that there would be a higher percentage of later-borns among those who had been arrested than among a group of their friends who had not participated in civil disobedience or among a control group of students drawn from classes at the college. The findings, in fact, revealed a significant relationship between the number of times the students had been arrested and birth order.     

Law and LGBQ-Parent Families

This paper addresses how the law affects LGBQ-parent families. We first outline the legal landscape that LGBQ parents face in the US, underscoring that it varies drastically by state and creates inequity for families. Reviewing existing social science research, we then address how the law affects three processes for LGBQ people: desiring parenthood, becoming a parent, and experiencing parenthood. Our review indicates that the law affects if and how LGBQ people become parents. LGBQ people consider the law as they make decisions about whether to pursue adoption, donor insemination, or surrogacy and often view the latter two pathways as the most legally secure. Further, the law continues to be salient for LGBQ parents throughout parenthood and affects family well-being. Specifically, legal inequity diminishes parent’s well-being, the relationship among couples who are parenting, and parents’ ability to effectively advocate for their children in institutional settings like healthcare contexts. Finally, we address directions for future research for scholars interested in the law, family processes and outcomes, and LGBQ families.