Developmental changes in judgments of authentic objects

This study examined the development of an understanding of authenticity among 112 children (preschoolers, kindergarten, 1st graders, and 4th graders) and 119 college students. Participants were presented with pairs of photographs depicting authentic and non-authentic objects and asked to pick which one belongs in a museum and which one they would want to have. Results suggest that both children and adults recognize the special nature of authentic objects by reporting that they belong in a museum. However, this belief broadens with age, at first just for famous associations (preschool), then also for original creations (kindergarten), and finally for personal associations as well (4th grade). At all ages, an object's authentic nature is distinct from its desirability. Thus, from an early age, children appear to understand that the historical path of an authentic object affects its nature. This work demonstrates the importance of non-obvious properties in children's concepts. For preschool as well as older children, history (a non-visible property) adds meaning beyond the material or functional worth of an object.     

Causal essentialism in kinds

The current study examines causal essentialism, derived from psychological essentialism of concepts. We examine whether people believe that members of a category share some underlying essence that is both necessary and sufficient for category membership and that also causes surface features. The main claim is that causal essentialism is restricted to categories that correspond to our intuitive notions of existing kinds and hence is more attenuated for categories that are based on arbitrary criteria. Experiments 1 and 3 found that people overtly endorse causal essences in nonarbitrary kinds but are less likely to do so for arbitrary categories. Experiments 2 and 4 found that people were more willing to generalize a member's known causal relations (or lack thereof) when dealing with a kind than when dealing with an arbitrary category. These differences between kinds and arbitrary categories were found across various domains—not only for categories of living things, but also for artefacts. These findings have certain real-world implications, including how people make sense of mental disorders that are treated as real kinds.     

Differences in preschoolers’ and adults’ use of generics about novel animals and artifacts: A window onto a conceptual divide

Children and adults commonly produce more generic noun phrases (e.g., birds fly) about animals than artifacts. This may reflect differences in participants’ generic knowledge about specific animals/artifacts (e.g., dogs/chairs), or it may reflect a more general distinction. To test this, the current experiments asked adults and preschoolers to generate properties about novel animals and artifacts (Experiment 1: real animals/artifacts; Experiments 2 and 3: matched pairs of maximally similar, novel animals/artifacts). Data demonstrate that even without prior knowledge about these items, the likelihood of producing a generic is significantly greater for animals than artifacts. These results leave open the question of whether this pattern is the product of experience and learned associations or instead a set of early-developing theories about animals and artifacts.     

Preschoolers' use of spatiotemporal history, appearance, and proper name in determining individual identity

Humans construe their environment as composed largely of discrete individuals, which are also members of kinds (e.g., trees, cars, and people). On what basis do young children determine individual identity? How important are featural properties (e.g., physical appearance, name) relative to spatiotemporal history? Two studies examined the relative importance of these factors in preschoolers' and adults' identity judgments. Participants were shown pairs of individuals who looked identical but differed in their spatiotemporal history (e.g., two physically distinct but identical Winnie-the-Pooh dolls), and were asked whether both members in the pair would have access to knowledge that had been supplied to only one of the pairs. The results provide clear support for spatiotemporal history as the primary basis of identity judgments in both preschoolers and adults, and further place issues of identity within the broader cognitive framework of psychological essentialism.     

Developmental changes in children's understanding of future likelihood and uncertainty

Two measures assessed 4-10-year-olds’ and adults’ (N = 201) understanding of future likelihood and uncertainty. In one task, participants sequenced sets of event pictures varying by one physical dimension according to increasing future likelihood. In a separate task, participants rated characters’ thoughts about the likelihood of future events, their emotions, and their decisions in indeterminate social situations. Results showed significant development between ages 4 and 10 in seriating events according to future likelihood and in selecting thought and emotion ratings indicative of future uncertainty. Higher performance on the future likelihood ordering task correlated with greater understanding of future uncertainty in thought, emotion, and decision judgments. Females judged future events to be more uncertain than males.     

Developmental changes in children's understanding of the similarity between photographs and their referents

In a series of three experiments, we investigated the development of children's understanding of the similarities between photographs and their referents. Based on prior work on the development of analogical understanding (e.g. Gentner & Rattermann, 1991), we suggest that the appreciation of this relation involves multiple levels. Photographs are similar to their referents both in terms of the constituent objects and in terms of the relations among these objects. We predicted that children would appreciate object similarity (whether photographs depict the same objects as in the referent scene) before they would appreciate relational similarity (whether photographs depict the objects in the same spatial positions as in the referent scene). To test this hypothesis, we presented 3-, 4-, 5-, 6-, and 7-year-old children and adults with several candidate photographs of an arrangement of objects. Participants were asked to choose which of the photographs was 'the same' as the arrangement. We manipulated the types of information the photographs preserved about the referent objects. One set of photographs did not preserve the object properties of the scene. Another set of photographs preserved the object properties of the scene, but not the relational similarity, such that the original objects were depicted but occupied different spatial positions in the arrangement. As predicted, younger children based their choices of the photographs largely on object similarity, whereas older children and adults also took relational similarity into account. Results are discussed in terms of the development of children's appreciation of different levels of similarity.     

Developmental changes in understanding the influence of emotion upon cognitive performance and motivation

In the light of recent research concerned with children's understanding of mind, a study was conducted in order to test the hypotheses (a) that only older children (i.e., 8-year-olds) would understand that emotional states can influence cognitive performance, but (b) that both older and younger children (i.e., 5- and 8-year-olds) would understand its influence upon cognitive motivation. Children were explicitly questioned about the consequences for cognition and motivation of negative affect. Results based on children's predictions and justifications provided substantial support for the hypotheses.Sincere thanks are extended to the teachers and children of Hillside Infant and Junior Schools and Frithwood Primary School, Northwood, Middlesex. We wish also to express our gratitude to two anonymous reviewers for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.     

Moving targets: A developmental framework for understanding children's changes following disasters

This paper proposes a developmental framework for disaster studies with children that allows researchers to explore the interaction between developmental change (defined as change that is extended, self-regulated, qualitative, and progressive) and cataclysmic change. It outlines three levels of analysis related to disasters: 1) observing the harm of disasters in the context of age-related changes in children, 2) demonstrating how children are restored to age-typical developmental trajectories following disasters, and 3) investigating how specific disaster experiences are integrated over time with children's ongoing developmental processes, such as their understanding of self and their views of the world. The paper identifies existing studies at each level of the framework, outlines how these levels of analysis can be used in constructing developmental models of disaster response, and offers suggestions for expanding disaster research into additional developmental areas.     

Developmental trends in the understanding of perceptual adaptation

In the first of three studies, kindergartners, third graders, and sixth graders were questioned to determine whether they comprehend five types of perceptual adaptation or contrast effects. The results indicated little consistency among kindergartners, but there were strong improvements by the third-grade level, and at the sixth-grade level almost all of the children were showing perfect performance, demonstrating comprehension of the five forms of perceptual adaptation. In the second and third studies, children and adults were placed in a situation in which adaptation to temperature and weight could occur, and they were asked to predict subsequent perceptions. Correct performance in these studies generally occurred at later ages than in Study 1 with even college students showing incorrect performance in some cases. However, the age trends shifted quite markedly depending upon the nature and structure of the task. The results were consistent with a theory stressing the relation of early formed schemas in the form of memory traces of experiences to later appearing and more abstract schemas. The results show the importance of studying older children when considering developing theories of mind.     

Notation to symbol: Development in children's understanding of print

Three studies used the moving word task to examine children's understanding of the symbolic nature of print. A card containing a printed word is presented with two pictures, one of which is named by the word. The child is told what the card says and then asked three times what the word is. For the second question, the card is spatially adjacent to the picture it does not name, and 4-year-olds typically respond that the word has changed to name this picture. The studies examined the impact of how the move is carried out and the role of other cognitive abilities (Study 1), the influence of the source of the print and the visibility of the cards (Study 2), and the role of the matching picture in children's solutions (Study 3). In all cases, children continued to name the picture that is closest to the card, indicating an incomplete grasp of how print carries meaning. The conclusion is that children's error in this task represents a fundamental misconception about how print signifies meanings, and that prior to reading, children do not understand the symbolic function of the constituents of print. Furthermore, executive processes of representation and inhibition are identified as significant to children's solutions.     

Children's profiles of addition and subtraction understanding

The current research explored children's ability to recognize and explain different concepts both with and without reference to physical objects so as to provide insight into the development of children's addition and subtraction understanding. In Study 1, 72 7- to 9-year-olds judged and explained a puppet's activities involving three conceptual relations: (a) a+b=c, b+a=c; (b) a-b=c, a-c=b; and (c) a+b=c, c-b=a. In Study 2, the self-reports and problem-solving accuracy of 60 5- to 7-year-olds were recorded for three-term inverse problems (i.e., a+b-b=?), pairs of complementary addition and subtraction problems (i.e., a+b=c, c-b=?), and unrelated addition and subtraction problems (e.g., 3-2). Both studies highlighted individual differences in the concepts that children understand and the role of concrete referents in their understanding. These differences were related to using efficient procedures to solve unrelated addition and subtraction problems in Study 2. The results suggest that a key advance in children's conceptual understanding is incorporating subtractive relations into their mental representations of how parts are added to form a whole.     

Developmental changes in face recognition during childhood: Evidence from upright and inverted faces

Adults are experts at recognizing faces but there is controversy about how this ability develops with age. We assessed 6- to 12-year-olds and adults using a digitized version of the Benton Face Recognition Test, a sensitive tool for assessing face perception abilities. Children's response times for correct responses did not decrease between ages 6 and 12, for either upright or inverted faces, but were significantly longer than those of adults for both face types. Accuracy improved between ages 6 and 12, significantly more for upright than inverted faces. Inverted face recognition improved slowly until late childhood, whereas there was a large improvement in upright face recognition between ages 6 and 8, with a further enhancement after age 12. These results provide further evidence that during childhood face processing undergoes protracted development and becomes increasingly tuned to upright faces.     

Developmental changes during childhood in single-letter acuity and its crowding by surrounding contours

Crowding refers to impaired target recognition caused by surrounding contours. We investigated the development of crowding in central vision by comparing single-letter and crowding thresholds in groups of 5-year-olds, 8-year-olds, 11-year-olds, and adults. The task was to discriminate the orientation of a Sloan letter E. Single-letter thresholds, defined as the stroke width forming the smallest discriminable E, were worse than those of adults (0.83 arcmin) at 5 years of age (1.05 arcmin) but not at older ages (8-year-olds: 0.81 arcmin; 11-year-olds: 0.78 arcmin). The maximum distances over which crowding occurred, as measured in multiples of threshold stroke width, were smaller in adults (2.83) than in the three groups of children, who did not differ from each other (5-year-olds: 7.03; 8-year-olds: 7.84; 11-year-olds: 7.13). Thus, even 11-year-olds are more affected than adults by surrounding contours despite having single-letter acuity that has been mature for several years. The stronger influence of crowding in children may be caused by immaturities in the brain areas beyond the primary visual cortex (V1) where early visual inputs are combined and may contribute to their slower reading speed.     

Developmental change in the understanding of affective meaning in music

The development of the understanding of affective meaning in music was investigated. Subjects aged 4, 5, 6, and 19 assigned verbal labels to musical segments previously determined by adults to be representative of one of four affects (happy, sad, angry, afraid). Analysis of correct interpretations and errors revealed a pattern of interactions among age, sex, and affect indicating that the ability to verbalize an understanding of affective meaning in music consistent with that of adult subjects is present during the preschool years. Age-related similarities in performance, as well as differences favoring both younger and older subjects, were observed and were discussed in relation to recent research in, and theories of, affective development and communication.The authors thank H. Julia Hannay, Edward Kemery, Shiela MacDonald, and Robert McGrath for their assistance in this research. The conceptual inspiration of Joseph Intrieri is gratefully acknowledged. We also thank Leslie Brody, Robin Hornik, and several anonymous reviewers for their comments on an earlier draft of the paper. Portions of this research were presented at the Southeastern Conference on Human Development, Baltimore, April 1982.     

Developmental parallels in understanding minds and bodies

A recent article by Onishi and Baillargeon presents evidence that 15-month-old infants attribute false beliefs (FBs) to other people. If correct, it lends dramatic new support to the idea that mental state concepts ("theory of mind") emerge from a specialized neurocognitive mechanism that matures during the second year of life. But it also raises new puzzles concerning the FB task--puzzles that have intriguing parallels in results from infants' reasoning about solid bodies.     

The myth of open concepts: Meehl’s analysis of construct meaning versus black box essentialism

Two views of theoretical concepts in psychology are compared. Meehl’s “open concept” account holds that theoretical concepts are implicitly defined by theories but that empirical criteria can be changed over time (e.g., added or dropped, weightings changed, exchanged for theoretical reductions). This account confuses concepts and theories, does not reflect how diagnostic concepts actually work in medicine and psychology, leads to theory incommensurability, and is unclear about when concepts are the same or different. I propose that an alternative “black box essentialist” account of theoretical concepts, drawn from recent philosophical work on natural kind concepts, better explains how we manage to refer to the same construct even as our theories and criteria change. One implication is that Meehl is incorrect to claim that a reason for psychology’s lack of progress is that its concepts are inherently different from those in the hard sciences.     

Relative contributions of kind- and domain-level concepts to expectations concerning unfamiliar exemplars: Developmental change and domain differences

Two inferential routes allow children to produce expectations about new instances of ontological categories like “animal” and “artefact.” One is to generalise information from a “look-up table” of familiar kind-concepts. The other one is to use independent expectations at the level of ontological domains. Our experiment pits these two sources of information against each other, using a sentence-judgement task associating properties with images of familiar and unfamiliar artefacts and animals. “Strange” properties are compatible with the ontological concept, but not encountered in any familiar kind. A look-up strategy would lead children to reject them and an independent expectation strategy to accept them. In both domains, we find a difference in reaction to strange properties associated with familiar vs. unfamiliar items, which shows that even young children do use independent domain-level information. We also found a U-shaped curve in propensity to use such abstract information. In addition, animal categories are the object of much more definite domain-level expectations, which supports the notion that the animal domain is more causally integrated than the artefact domain.