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1.
Alberto Voltolini 《Synthese》2006,153(1):23-47
In this paper, I want to deal with the problem of how to find an adequate context of interpretation for indexical sentences
that enables one to account for the intuitive truth-conditional content which some apparently puzzling indexical sentences
like “I am not here now” as well as other such sentences contextually have. In this respect, I will pursue a fictionalist line. This line allows for shifts in interpretation contexts and urges that such shifts are governed by pretense, which has
to be understood in terms of socially shared make-believe games. By appealing to pretense so conceived, I will show that the
fictionalist perspective is halfway between an intentionalist perspective, according to which the above indexical sentences
have to be interpreted in a shifted intended context, (this perspective is primarily defined by Predelli 1998, Analysis
58, 107; Mind and Language
13, 400) and a conventionalist perspective, according to which indexical reference shifts in accordance with a conventional
setting. (For this perspective, cf. Corazza et al. 2002, Philosophical Studies
107, See also Corazza 2004, Reflecting the Mind: Indexicality and Quasi-Indexicality, Oxford University Press). Finally, I will claim that the fictionalist analysis of cases of non-ordinary uses of indexicals
like “here” and “now” can be retained in face of a new alternative analysis of those cases in terms of an ‘unbound anaphora’
– theory (cf. Corazza 2004, Synthese
138, 145). 相似文献
2.
On Speaking Thus: the Semantics of Indirect Discourse 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Jane Heal 《The Philosophical quarterly》2001,51(205):433-454
Indexical predication is possible as well as the more familiar indexical reference. 'My curtains are coloured thus' describes my curtains. The indexical predicate expression it contains ('coloured thus') stands to possible non-indexical replacements ('red') as a referring indexical ('he') does to possible non-indexical replacements ('Tom'), in that it calls upon the context of utterance to fix its semantic contribution to the whole. Indexical predication is the natural resource to call upon in talk about skilful human performances, where we exhibit considerable know-how but little explicit know-that. Speech is among such performances. Both direct and indirect speech reports may be illuminated by seeing them in the light of this thought. A corollary of the approach is that the prospects of providing a formal semantic treatment of indirect speech do not look good. 相似文献
3.
Hartley Slater 《Ratio》2004,17(1):84-89
It is clear that Tarski's T‐scheme, ‘T”p” if and only if p’, does not hold universally. It is not expected to hold, for instance, with ambiguous sentences, or with indexical sentences. Making explicit the circumstances where it does hold, however, is not just logical housekeeping: it turns out to have more radical consequences for the whole approach to Semantics associated with Tarski than has previously been envisaged. 相似文献
4.
This paper investigates the role of conditionals in hypothetical reasoning and rational decision making. Its main result is
a proof of a representation theorem for preferences defined on sets of sentences (and, in particular, conditional sentences),
where an agent’s preference for one sentence over another is understood to be a preference for receiving the news conveyed
by the former. The theorem shows that a rational preference ordering of conditional sentences determines probability and desirability
representations of the agent’s degrees of belief and desire that satisfy, in the case of non-conditional sentences, the axioms
of Jeffrey’s decision theory and, in the case of conditional sentences, Adams’ expression for the probabilities of conditionals.
Furthermore, the probability representation is shown to be unique and the desirability representation unique up to positive
linear transformation.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
5.
K. Romdenh-Romluc 《Philosophical Studies》2006,128(2):257-283
It has traditionally been maintained that every token of ‘I’ refers to its utterer. However, certain uses of indexicals conflict
with this claim, and its counterparts with respect to ‘here’ and ‘now’, suggesting that the traditional account of indexical
reference should be abandoned. In this paper, I examine some proposed alternatives and the difficulties they face, before
offering a new account of indexical reference. I endorse Kaplan’s view that the reference of an indexical is determined on
any occasion it is used by applying its character to a particular context, arguing that the problem cases show that this is not always the context of utterance. The task facing
the semantic theorist is thus to explain what fixes the reference-determining context. I consider and reject both Predelli’s
suggestion that the reference-determining context is the one intended by the utterer, and Corazza et al.’s proposal that the relevant context is fixed by conventions delivered by the utterance setting. The discussion of these
two accounts reveals that an adequate theory of indexical reference should allow the speaker to use indexicals in novel ways,
whilst holding that what a speaker can refer to with an indexical utterance is constrained by what an audience can understand.
I develop an account based around these two requirements. 相似文献
6.
Brad Thompson 《Philosophical Studies》2007,135(3):307-334
Sydney Shoemaker has given a sophisticated theory of phenomenal content, motivated by the transparency of experience and by
the possibility of spectrum inversion without illusion (1994, 2000, 2001, 2002). It centers on the idea that color experiences
represent what he calls “appearance properties”. I consider the different sorts of appearance properties that Shoemaker has
suggested might enter into phenomenal content – occurrent appearance properties, dispositional appearance properties, and
higher-order dispositional appearance properties – and argue that none of them are plausibly represented by color experiences.
I argue that Shoemaker's theory faces a dilemma – either it makes misperception too difficult, or it does not truly accommodate
veridical spectrum inversion. I then examine some alternative Russellian theories of phenomenal content that might be consistent
with Shoemaker's motivations, including a different sort of proposal recently suggested by Shoemaker (forthcoming). I argue
that these views are also lacking, for similar reasons as the appearance property view. Finally, I conclude that in order
for a representationalist theory to properly accommodate spectrum inversion without illusion, phenomenal content must include
an indexical element. Such a view requires the adoption of a broadly Fregean theory of phenomenal content, according to which
sameness of phenomenal character does not entail sameness in extension. What phenomenally identical experiences have in common
is not what they represent, but how they represent. 相似文献
7.
Bryan Pickel 《Philosophical Studies》2010,147(2):193-211
I defend the view that ordinary objects like statues are identical to the pieces of matter from which they are made. I argue
that ordinary speakers assert sentences such as ‘this statue is a molded piece of clay’. This suggests that speakers believe
propositions which entail that ordinary objects such as statues are the pieces matter from which they are made, and therefore
pluralism contradicts ordinary beliefs. The dominant response to this argument purports to find an ambiguity in the word ‘is’,
such that ‘is’ in these sentences means the same as ‘constitutes or is constituted by’. I will use standard tests for ambiguity
to argue that this strategy fails. I then explore and reject other responses to the argument. 相似文献
8.
Daniel M. Johnson 《Synthese》2013,190(17):3953-3970
The most important argument against the B-theory of time is the paraphrase argument. The major defense against that argument is the “new” tenseless theory of time, which is built on what I will call the “indexical reply” to the paraphrase argument. The move from the “old” tenseless theory of time to the new is most centrally a change of viewpoint about the nature and determiners of ontological commitment. Ironically, though, the new tenseless theorists have generally not paid enough sustained, direct attention to that notion. I will defend a general criterion of ontological commitment and apply it to generate a version of the new tenseless theory of time. I will argue that many of the extant versions of the new tenseless theory of time (specifically, all those which seek to identify tenseless truth-conditions of tensed sentences as a way out of apparent ontological commitment to tensed features of reality) are unsatisfactory because their general criterion of ontological commitment is inadequate. Those versions of the new tenseless theory which are adequate (specifically, those which identify tenseless truthmakers for tensed sentences) actually entail the criterion of ontological commitment that I defend, despite appearances to the contrary. 相似文献
9.
We present an experiment in which we explored the extent to which visual speech information affects learners’ ability to segment
words from a fluent speech stream. Learners were presented with a set of sentences consisting of novel words, in which the
only cues to the location of word boundaries were the transitional probabilities between syllables. They were exposed to this
language through the auditory modality only, through the visual modality only (where the learners saw the speaker producing
the sentences but did not hear anything), or through both the auditory and visual modalities. The learners were successful
at segmenting words from the speech stream under all three training conditions. These data suggest that visual speech information
has a positive effect on word segmentation performance, at least under some circumstances. 相似文献
10.
Martin Montminy 《Synthese》2010,173(3):317-333
I examine the radical contextualists’ two main arguments for the semantic underdeterminacy thesis, according to which all,
or almost all, English sentences lack context-independent truth conditions. I show that both arguments are fallacious. The
first argument, which I call the fallacy of the many understandings, mistakenly infers that a sentence S is semantically incomplete from the fact that S can be used to mean different things
in different contexts. The second argument, which I call the open texture fallacy, wrongly concludes that a sentence S lacks context-independent truth conditions from the fact that there are circumstances
in which the truth value of S would be indeterminate. I do however defend the claim that a certain class of sentences not
containing any indexicals do lack context-independent truth conditions, and put forward an argument to that effect. But this
argument, as I show, does not generalize to all sentences, and thus fails to support the semantic underdeterminacy thesis. 相似文献
11.
12.
C. J. F. Williams 《Ratio》1993,6(2):165-180
Kaplan claims that (1) ‘I am here now’, though analytic, is not a necessary truth. But this sentence is not a proposition, in a sense of proposition in which some, but not all, sentences are propositions. Since it is not a proposition, it is not true, and consequently not analytic. It is in fact a fragment of a proposition, the same fragment as ‘he was there then’ in (2) ‘CJFW said in Oxford on 23 September 1991 that he was there then’. Sentences containing indexicals in general owe their sense to the corresponding fragments of sentences containing ‘quasi-indexicals’(‘then’, for example, is the quasi-indexical to ‘now’ as indexical). Someone uttering (1) assertively will thereby make a proposition like (2) true. (2) entails (3) ‘CJFW said in Oxford on 23 September 1993 that CJFW was in Oxford on 23 September 1991′. So by uttering (1) in the appropriate circumstances I made it true that I had asserted the proposition (4) ‘CJFW was in Oxford on 23 September 1991′. What is analytic and necessarily true is the proposition ‘If (3) then (4)’. 相似文献
13.
14.
Carl Baker 《Philosophical Studies》2012,157(1):107-123
In this paper I argue against one variety of contextualism about aesthetic predicates such as “beautiful.” Contextualist analyses
of these and other predicates have been subject to several challenges surrounding disagreement. Focusing on one kind of contextualism—individualized indexical contextualism—I unpack these various challenges and consider the responses available to the contextualist. The three responses I consider
are as follows: giving an alternative analysis of the concept of disagreement; claiming that speakers suffer from semantic
blindness; and claiming that attributions of beauty carry presuppositions of commonality. I will argue that none of the available
strategies gives a response which both (a) satisfactorily explains all of the disagreement-data and (b) is plausible independent
of significant evidence in favor of contextualism. I conclude that individualized indexical contextualism about the aesthetic
is untenable, although this does not rule out alternative contextualist approaches to the aesthetic. 相似文献
15.
Scott Soames 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2008,37(3):267-276
No semantic theory satisfying certain natural constraints can identify the semantic contents of sentences (the propositions
they express), with sets of circumstances in which the sentences are true–no matter how fine-grained the circumstances are
taken to be. An objection to the proof is shown to fail by virtue of conflating model-theoretic consequence between sentences
with truth-conditional consequence between the semantic contents of sentences. The error underlines the impotence of distinguishing
semantics, in the sense of a truth-based theory of logical consequence, and semantics, in the sense of a theory of meaning. 相似文献
16.
Jay Newhard 《Philosophical Studies》2005,126(1):1-27
Grelling’s Paradox is the paradox which results from considering whether heterologicality, the word-property which a designator
has when and only when the designator does not bear the word-property it designates, is had by ‘
ȁ8heterologicality’. Although there has been some philosophical debate over its solution, Grelling’s Paradox is nearly uniformly
treated as a variant of either the Liar Paradox or Russell’s Paradox, a paradox which does not present any philosophical challenges
not already presented by the two better known paradoxes. The aims of this paper are, first, to offer a precise formulation
of Grelling’s Paradox which is clearly distinguished from both the Liar Paradox and Russell’s Paradox; second, to offer a
solution to Grelling’s Paradox which both resolves the paradoxical reasoning and accounts for unproblematic predications of
heterologicality; and, third, to argue that there are two lessons to be drawn from Grelling’s Paradox which have not yet been
drawn from the Liar or Russell’s Paradox. The first lesson is that it is possible for the semantic content of a predicate
to be sensitive to the semantic context; i.e., it is possible for a predicate to be an indexical expression. The second lesson
is that the semantic content of an indexical predicate, though unproblematic for many cases, can nevertheless be problematic
in some cases. 相似文献
17.
Igor Douven 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2008,37(3):259-266
Kaufmann has recently argued that the thesis according to which the probability of an indicative conditional equals the conditional
probability of the consequent given the antecedent under certain specifiable circumstances deviates from intuition. He presents
a method for calculating the probability of a conditional that does seem to give the intuitively correct result under those
circumstances. However, the present paper shows that Kaufmann’s method is inconsistent in that it may lead one to assign different
probabilities to a single conditional at the same time. 相似文献
18.
Scott Sturgeon 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(2):183-203
Robert Stalnaker has recently argued that a pair of natural thoughts are incompatible. One of them is the view that items
of non-indexical factual knowledge rule out possibilities. The other is the view that knowing what sensuous experience is
like involves non-indexical knowledge of its phenomenal character. I argue against Stalnaker’s take on things, elucidating
along the way how our knowledge of what experience is like fits together with the natural idea that items of non-indexical
factual knowledge rule out possibilities.
I am grateful to Nel Block, Dque Chalmers, Benj Hellie, Mike Martin, Susanna Siejel, Robert Stalnaker and especially Majo
Spencer for help with this work. 相似文献
19.
This paper presents a pool of Spanish sentences designed for use in cognitive research and speech processing in circumstances in which the effects of context are relevant. These lists of sentences are divided into six lists of 25 equivalent high-predictability sentences and six lists of 25 low-predictability sentences according to the extent to which the last word can be predicted by the preceding context. These lists were also equivalent in phonetic content, length and frequency of the last word. These lists are intended for use in psycholinguistic research with Spanish-speaking listeners. 相似文献
20.
Kevin Falvey 《Philosophia》2010,38(2):297-312
Years ago, Michael Dummett defended McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time, arguing that it cannot be dismissed as
guilty of an “indexical fallacy.” Recently, E. J. Lowe has disputed Dummett’s claims for the cogency of the argument. I offer
an elaboration and defense of Dummett’s interpretation of the argument (though not of its soundness). I bring to bear some
work on tense from the philosophy of language, and some recent work on the concept of the past as it occurs in memory, in
an effort to support the claim that McTaggart is not guilty of any simple indexical fallacy. Along the way I criticize an
account of what is at stake in disputes about the reality of tense due to A. W. Moore, and I argue for the superiority of
the conception of tense-realism that is implicit in McTaggart’s work. The paper is intended to prepare the ground for a substantive
defense of the reality of tense. 相似文献