Ethics, Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure

Universities can and have existed without academic freedom and academic tenure. But academic freedom is necessary for a university dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge in a democratic society. Both academic freedom and academic tenure are not only rights but also carry with them moral obligations. Furthermore academic tenure is the best defense of academic freedom that American universities have found. Academic tenure can be successfully defended from the many contemporary attacks to which it is being subjected only insofar as it is necessary to defend academic freedom, and only if all involved in the system of tenure observe the ethical requirements that the system demands.     

Freedom from and Freedom for: Luther's Concept of Freedom for the Twenty‐First Century

This article examines Martin Luther's two fundamental claims around Christian freedom. Drawing on Luther, I suggest three primary characteristics of Christian freedom that should be recovered and championed in our twenty‐first‐century context: it is relational, it is a gift; and it contains within it an ethical imperative for the sake of the neighbor. Together, these three characteristics point to the fact that in a Christian understanding, “freedom” is never considered by itself, but only in the larger context of “freedom from” and “freedom for.”     

Spinoza and the Feeling of Freedom

We seem to have a direct experience of our freedom when we act. Many philosophers take this feeling of freedom as evidence that we possess libertarian free will. Spinoza denies that we have free will of any sort, although he admits that we nonetheless feel free. Commentators often attribute to him what I call the ‘Negative Account’ of the feeling: it results from the fact that we are conscious of our actions but ignorant of their causes. I argue that the Negative Account is flawed. The feeling of freedom also depends on a vacillation of the mind. When the mind forms too many incompatible associations, it vacillates between them. When we act, the mind vacillates back and forth between the kinds of actions that we associate with our present mental state. We then mistake this subjective vacillation for an objective feature of ourselves—namely, the power to do otherwise.     

Managing Religion and the Judicialization of Religious Freedom

Religious freedom is a highly valued goal for many citizens and political leaders around the world, especially in Western‐oriented nations. Much ink has been spilled in defense of religious freedom and many have waxed eloquent about the virtues of promoting religious freedom. Most constitutions and other international documents around the world guarantee religious freedom even if those guarantees are sometimes honored in the breach. Why this focus on religious freedom is occurring and how it is being addressed are the focus of this article.     

Freedom and the Cogito

Drawing on Descartes' account of générosité, a reinterpretation of the Cogito is offered, emphasizing the role of the will. The paper's first part focuses on Cartesian ethics. It is argued that Descartes can be viewed as a Stoical thinker rather than a Baconian one. That is, he holds that theoretical contemplation is itself the primary ground of human happiness and tranquility of mind – experienced as the feeling of générosité. The paper's second part draws on the first in accounting for the relation between radical doubt and certainty. By engaging with doubt, it is argued, the meditator comes to experience générosité, assert freedom. This experience is not, then, as argued by some, merely the Cogito's ethical counterpart. It is rather the Cogito's foundation. The meditator's assertion sum follows from – insofar as freedom is, as the definition of générosité asserts, ‘the only thing truly belonging to us', it consists in – the assertion of freedom.     

Violent video games and aggressive behavior in young women

The increasing availability of violent video games and their implication in recent school shootings has raised the volume of public debate on the effects of such games on aggressive behavior and related variables. This article reports an experiment designed to test key hypotheses concerning the short term impact of exposure to violent video games on young women, a population that has received relatively little attention in this research literature. Results were that brief exposure to a violent video game increased aggressive behavior. Mediational analyses suggested that the violent video game effect on aggression was not mediated by instrumental aggressive motivation, but was partially mediated by revenge motivation. Other results suggested that the violent video game effect on aggression might be greater when the game player controls a same‐sex violent game character. Aggr. Behav. 29:423–429, 2003. © 2003 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.     

Freedom and Necessity in Marx's Account of Communism

This paper considers whether Marx's views about communism change significantly during his lifetime. According to the ‘standard story’, as Marx got older he dropped the vision of self-realization in labour that he spoke of in his early writings, and adopted a more pessimistic account of labour, where real freedom is achieved outside the working-day, in leisure. Other commentators, however, have argued that there is no pessimistic shift in Marx's thought on this matter. This paper offers a different reading of this debate. It argues that there are two visions of the good life in Marx. However, it suggests that these two visions cannot be understood in terms of a simple shift between a ‘young’ and ‘mature’ Marx. Rather, it claims that Marx moves between these two visions throughout his writings. In this way, it suggests that Marx's intellectual development on this issue is best understood as an oscillation rather than a shift. Once this interpretive claim is advanced, the paper then moves on to consider some potential causes and implications of Marx's life-long oscillation between two different conceptions of the good life.     

Freedom and forgiveness

In the history of philosophy and political thought freedom has meant a number of different things. The author considers several of these meanings and their relevance to psychoanalytic theory. The general argument against freedom that has been mounted in the history of thought, and echoed by Freud, is the thesis of causal determinism; but it is urged here that this in itself is no threat to freedom in the sense of the word required for moral agency: a free choice is one that is caused to some extent by reasons and that is relatively unconstrained both by 'external' and 'internal' forces. Yet because agents are embedded in a causal nexus that includes both the physical world and other people, agency and freedom can be compromised in innumerable ways. Neither freedom nor agency is a condition which we absolutely have or lack, but a matter of degree. Psychoanalytic therapy works toward expanding the capacity for agency and diminishing the constraints of certain internal forces. In the sense defined here, objectivity is an attitude that accepts our embeddedness in the world. With objectivity may come both forgiveness and self-forgiveness, which in turn promote agency.     

Intellectual Freedom and Economic Sufficiency as Educational Entitlements

This paper explores the historic philosophical contributions ofMill and Marx toward a comprehensive conception of intellectual freedomas a basic educational entitlement. In a perhaps surprising confluence,Marx's theory of a material base for freedom of thought is then extendedin a discussion of contemporary freedoms including, importantly,academic freedom and its implication for teaching, the profession andits training.     

Three Arguments For Scientific Freedom

The principle of scientific freedom is usually taken forgranted; few attempts have been made to justify it systematically. The present paper discusses three “classic” arguments, which are used to justify this principle. However, it will become clear that (a) each argument refers to a different understanding of science and therefore justifies a different type of science, and that (b) each of them is based on assumptions which are not always consistent with the social reality of scientific research; the profound changes science has undergone since its inception are not sufficiently taken into account.     

Freedom deprivation in prisons of Serbia

The subject of this research is the deprivation of freedom at two time points. A total of 490 convicts from open, semi‐open, and closed prisons participated in the research. Freedom deprivation intensity was determined by using the freedom deprivation scale (α = .93). The results of the research indicate that almost all the participants reported freedom deprivation. The prison type had an impact on freedom deprivation intensity, whereas an influence of the ward type on deprivation was not demonstrated. Freedom deprivation intensity was consistent from the turn of the century to the present day.     

Freedom and Borderline Experience

In–depth interviews with 52 diverse informants about their experience of freedom reveal a devaluation of freedom relative to money and power. The way in which many of these informants conceptualize freedom has a borderline quality to it—a term that refers to borderline personality disorder, but which is conceptualized here as a cultural construct similar to that of the culture of narcissism, as Christopher Lasch called it. The conclusion speculates about why informants see the world in this way.     

Modelling simultaneous games in dynamic logic

We make a proposal for formalizing simultaneous games at the abstraction level of player’s powers, combining ideas from dynamic logic of sequential games and concurrent dynamic logic. We prove completeness for a new system of ‘concurrent game logic’ CDGL with respect to finite non-determined games. We also show how this system raises new mathematical issues, and throws light on branching quantifiers and independence-friendly evaluation games for first-order logic.     

绝对与人类自由--谢林《自由论》探析

本文集中探讨谢林的《自由论》及其在西方哲学史上的意义,作者在指出这部著作不足的同时,充分肯定谢林对自由及与之相关问题的发问,并认为这是近现代西方哲学对人类自身命运的一次重要思考。     

Freedom of the Will in Plato and Augustine

There has been a recent surge of interest in ancient accounts of free will. It is surprising, then, that there have been virtually no attempts to discuss whether Plato had such an account. Those who have made an attempt quickly deny that such an account is present in the dialogues. I shall argue that if we draw a distinction between two notions of free will, it is plausible that some account of free will is, in fact, present in the dialogues, the Republic in particular. This is the first in depth search into the question and I demonstrate that the defender of a Platonic free will thesis has more resources than she first appears to. It also has the benefit of giving us an obvious source material for Augustine's discussion.     

Prosocial video games reduce aggressive cognitions

Previous research has shown that playing violent video games increased aggressive tendencies. However, as pointed out by the General Learning Model (GLM) [Buckley, K. E., & Anderson, C. A. (2006). A theoretical model of the effects and consequences of playing video games. In: P. Vorderer & J. Bryant (Eds.), Playing video games motives responses and consequences (pp. 363-378). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum], depending on their content, video games do not inevitably increase but may also decrease aggressive responses. Accordingly, the present research tested the hypothesis that playing prosocial video games decreases aggressive cognitions. In fact, playing a prosocial (relative to a neutral) video game reduced the hostile expectation bias (Experiment 1) and decreased the accessibility of antisocial thoughts (Experiment 2). Thus, these results lend credence to GLMs assumption that the effects of video game exposure depend to a great extent on the content of the game played.     

英国的健康促进与个人自由

从英国的3种自由观——消极自由、积极自由和赋权自由出发,论述了健康促进和个人自由的关系。通过比较不同自由观的特征以及其对健康促进的影响,得出结论:当今英国政府主张的赋权自由,尊重和维护了公众的个人选择,提高了公众在健康教育过程中的参与性,有助于健康促进的开展。     

Anne Conway and Henry More on Freedom

ABSTRACT

This paper seeks to shed light on the often-overlooked account of divine and human freedom presented by Anne Conway in her Principles of the Most Ancient Modern Philosophy, partly through a comparison with the theory of freedom offered by her philosophical mentor, Henry More. After outlining More’s theory of freedom, explored in a number of different works, I argue that, given evidence from correspondence regarding Conway’s familiarity with More’s work, and the timing of the writing of the notes that would be compiled in the Principles, it is highly likely that she has his account of freedom in mind when she offers her own theory of divine and human freedom. Further, I argue that whilst they both agree in attributing substantive freedom to both God and human beings, the Principles crucially departs from More’s philosophy in refraining from limiting freedom to human beings alone but extending it to all creatures. However, I argue that the question of whether Conway follows More in allowing for the possibility of human beings to develop morally to the extent that they attain a good nature and no longer have indifference of the will in a strict sense is unclear.     

Religion and Rights: The Illusion of Freedom and the Reality of ControL

This paper examines legal guarantees of freedom of religion through the vehicle of rights using a case study of a Jehovah's Witness member in Calgary, Alberta, Canada, who refused to receive blood transfusions prescribed as part of her cancer treatment. The paper examines the pervasive concept of risk of harm that has recently become part of legal discourse in the balancing of rights process. The notion of governance is used to examine the social control of the individual and the deviant population. Aspects of both governmentality and resistance are explored.     

Varieties of Epistemic Freedom

When we deliberate about what to do, we appear to be free to decide on different options. Three accounts use ordinary beliefs to explain this apparent freedom—appealing to different types of ‘epistemic freedom’. When an agent has epistemic freedom, her evidence while deliberating does not determine what decision she makes. This ‘epistemic gap’ between her evidence and decision explains why her decision appears free. The varieties of epistemic freedom appealed to might look similar. But there is an important difference. Two rely on an agent's ability to justifiably form beliefs unconstrained by evidence, and identify decisions as beliefs—either beliefs about acts (Velleman) or about decisions (Joyce and Ismael). But, when used to explain apparent freedom, these accounts face serious problems: they imply that agents have epistemic freedom over evidence-based beliefs, and rely on a faulty notion of justification. Underlying these troubles, it turns out that these accounts presuppose an unexplained apparent ability to form different beliefs. A third variety of epistemic freedom uses ignorance conditions instead (Levi and Kapitan). We appear free partly because we're ignorant of what we'll decide. Ignorance-based accounts avoid the above problems, and remain a promising alternative.