Afro-communal virtue ethic as a foundation for environmental sustainability in Africa and beyond

This paper addresses the question: Can an Afro-communal virtue ethic provide a plausible foundation for environmental sustainability? Drawing on Thaddeus Metz’s perspective and contributions to the Afro-communal ethic tradition, this paper examines the extent to which his proposal provides plausible grounds for environmental sustainability. Metz, in several essays, advances the need for an ethic of communion, which rests on the ubuntu (humanness) virtue principles of shared identity, solidarity, and participative empathy. This paper argues that Metz’s view is a version of virtue ethics, of which flourishing, care and goodwill are important aspects. While this African ethical construct has some limitations, this paper nevertheless maintains that it entails some virtues that have promising normative implications for environmental sustainability. Metz’s views on an Afro-communal virtue ethic is relevant to motivating behavioural changes in the environmental sustainability quest through its capacity to provoke salient virtuous attitudes and values of responsible inter-generational and intra-generational Earth stewardship. Though an African ethical construct, this paper argues that the potential foundational import of Metz’s proposal for environmental sustainability reaches far beyond the geopolitical boundaries of Africa.     

The Proper Structure of the Intellectual Virtues

If we adopt a virtue approach to epistemology, what form should the intellectual virtues take? In this paper, I argue that the proper structure of the intellectual virtues should be one that follows the tradition of internalism in epistemology. I begin by giving a general characterization of virtue epistemology and then define internalism within that framework. Arguing for internalism, I first consider the thought experiment of the new evil demon and show how externalist accounts of intellectual virtue, though constructed to accommodate our intuitions in such cases, cannot fully do so. I further argue that only adopting an internalist structure of the virtues will provide intellectual virtues that appropriately mirror the structure of the classical moral virtues. Finally, I argue that only an internalist structure of the virtues can explain why the intellectual virtues are valuable in themselves.     

The relation between evil and transcendence: new possibilities?

Evil has always been a main interest in the field of philosophy and, lately, in the field of ethics – in both continental and analytic traditions – the idea of evil seems to be making a comeback. The propensity in philosophy is to understand evil in radical immanent terms. Lars Svendsen, in A Philosophy of Evil, argues for example that evil is about inter-human relationships, not about a transcendent, supernatural force. Emmanuel Levinas, on the other hand, describes evil as something that cannot be integrated into the world, something that is always on the outside: the radical Other. Furthermore, evil appears to us as something chaotic, defying comprehension. Does this mean evil is something transcendent? In this article I will analyse the concept of evil in terms of the typology of transcendence that was developed by Wessel Stoker. I will argue that there are, within the (post-) modern discourse, and due to new developments in the understanding of transcendence, new nuanced possibilities of thinking about evil and its relation to transcendence – especially to ‘transcendence as alterity’. Traces of this kind of understanding of evil will be indicated in Paul Ricoeur's view of evil. This notion of evil may enhance our ethical responsibility towards it.     

The notion of the moral: the relation between virtue ethics and virtue epistemology

In this paper I argue that virtue ethics should be understood as a form of ethics which integrates various domains of the practical in relation to which virtues are excellences. To argue this it is necessary to distinguish two senses of the “moral”: the broad sense which integrates the domains of the practical and a narrow classificatory sense. Virtue ethics, understood as above, believes that all genuine virtue should be understood as what I call virtues proper. To possess a virtue proper (such as an excellent disposition of open-mindedness, an epistemic virtue) is to possess a disposition of overall excellence in relation to the sphere or field of the virtue (being open to the opinions of others). Overall excellence in turn involves excellence in integrating to a sufficient degree, standards of excellence in all relevant practical domains. Epistemic virtues, sporting virtues, moral virtues, and so on are all virtues proper. In particular it is impossible for an epistemic virtue to be a moral (narrow sense) vice.     

论伦理秩序

实存的伦理关系是客观条件与主观条件的历史性统一,伦理关系本质上是现实合理性秩序中的关系,是有主体精神渗透其中并通过道德、法律、习俗等规则体系维系的关系,它的首要问题是秩序的合理性和正当性。研究伦理秩序应把道德和伦理两个概念加以区分;伦理秩序的顺畅和谐在于道德的有效调节,也在于法律的有效控制。伦理秩序在社会变革中经过必然与自由的辩证运动,使矛盾化解,推动社会和谐发展。和谐社会应当是以公正支撑的合理的伦理秩序的社会。     

Disunity of Virtue

This paper argues against the unity of the virtues, while trying to salvage some of its attractive aspects. I focus on the strongest argument for the unity thesis, which begins from the premise that true virtue cannot lead its possessor morally astray. I suggest that this premise presupposes the possibility of completely insulating an agent’s set of virtues from any liability to moral error. I then distinguish three conditions that separately foreclose this possibility, concentrating on the proposition that there is more to morality than virtue alone—that is, not all moral considerations are ones to which some virtue is characteristically sensitive. If the virtues are not unified, the situationist critique of virtue ethics also turns out to be more difficult to establish than some have supposed.     

The Good Engineer: Giving Virtue its Due in Engineering Ethics

During the past few decades, engineering ethics has been oriented towards protecting the public from professional misconduct by engineers and from the harmful effects of technology. This "preventive ethics" project has been accomplished primarily by means of the promulgation of negative rules. However, some aspects of engineering professionalism, such as (1) sensitivity to risk (2) awareness of the social context of technology, (3) respect for nature, and (4) commitment to the public good, cannot be adequately accounted for in terms of rules, certainly not negative rules. Virtue ethics is a more appropriate vehicle for expressing these aspects of engineering professionalism. Some of the unique features of virtue ethics are the greater place it gives for discretion and judgment and also for inner motivation and commitment. Four of the many professional virtues that are important for engineers correspond to the four aspects of engineering professionalism listed above. Finally, the importance of the humanities and social sciences in promoting these virtues suggests that these disciplines are crucial in the professional education of engineers.     

The ethic of caring: the moral response to suffering

An ethic of care can be distinguished from an ethic based on autonomous rights, utilitarian principles, or indeed principles of any kind, since care has less to do with intellect than with emotions and will. Moreover, an ethic of care is consistent with the example of Jesus and the virtues advocated by the apostle Paul. Emily A. Hitchens and Lilyan S. Snow make their case with particular reference to accounts by Civil War nurses, who developed the skills of care without precedent and without the expectation of cure that scientific medicine has aroused.     

There is no such thing as environmental ethics

Engineers and scientists, whose professional responsibilities often influence the natural environment, have sought to develop an environmental ethic that will be in tune with their attitudes toward the non-human environment, and that will assist them in decision making regarding questions of environmental quality. In this paper the classical traditions in normative ethics are explored in an attempt to formulate such an environmental ethic. I conclude, however, that because the discipline of ethics is directed at person-person interactions, ethics as a scholarly discipline does not help us understand how we ought to treat non-human nature. We therefore cannot look to ethics as a source for understanding our attitudes and for providing guidance to our actions with regard to the environment. To do so is to ask too much of ethics. If we are to find an acceptable environmental morality, it must come from a new paradigm. One approach might be to understand our attitudes on the basis of spirituality, modeled after animistic religions.     

审美主体与伦理主体的比较研究

本文通过对审美主体和伦理主体的比较研究揭示了个体存在的伦理层面的含义。首先考察了老庄和海德格尔的后现代宗教式的主体和儒家形而上的宗教主体,以及儒家就伦理问题对于老庄的挑战。结论是他们都缺乏把他者的生存作为自己的绝对的责任的伦理含义,因而是审美主体：其次,通过对于环境主体和伦理主体及审美主体的关系的讨论,阐释了这样一个哲学基本问题：伦理存在必须以有限性存在为前提;而后者只是一个哲学的抽象。片面地强调人的有限性(尼采),片面强调有限存在与超越者的关系(老庄和海德格尔),或否认人的有限性,这些观点都忽略了人在这个世界上的伦理责任。后现代伦理学是指我,作为一个个体(me),对于他者的一切负有不可推卸的责任。     

Ethical androcentrism and maternal substance addiction

In this paper, I argue that bioethics suffers from a masculinist approach--what I call "ethical androcentrism." Despite the genesis of other legitimate approaches to ethics (such as feminist, narrative, and communicative ethics), this masculinist tradition persists. The first part of my paper concerns the problem of ethical androcentrism, and how it is manifest in our typical ways of "doing" bioethics (as teachers, ethicists, policymakers, and medical practitioners). After arguing that bioethics suffers from a masculinist ethic, I consider the case of maternal substance addiction to show how this ethic negatively affects the treatment of pregnant addicts. I argue that by treatment maternal substance addiction from an androcentric approach, we fail to serve both pregnant addicts and their fetuses; furthermore, we misrepresent the intentional state of pregnant substance addicts and label them "prenatal abusers." If maternal substance addiction is to be ethically addressed--and if pregnant substance addicts are to be effectively treated--we cannot tacitly accept an androcentric ethic.     

INTRODUCTION: VIRTUE AND VICE

Abstract: This introduction to the collection Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic addresses three main questions: (1) What is a virtue theory in ethics or epistemology? (2) What is a virtue? and (3) What is a vice? (1) It suggests that a virtue theory takes the virtues and vices of agents to be more fundamental than evaluations of acts or beliefs, and defines right acts or justified beliefs in terms of the virtues. (2) It argues that there are two important but different concepts of virtue: virtues are qualities that attain good ends, and virtues are qualities that involve good motives. (3) Accordingly, vices are qualities that either fail to attain good ends or involve bad motives. Finally, the introduction summarizes the eleven essays in the collection, which are divided into four sections: the Structure of Virtue Ethics and Virtue Epistemology; Virtue and Context; Virtue and Emotion; and Virtues and Vices.     

On the idea of a global ethic

Two different kinds of rules are needed in the regulation of human conduct in the sphere of global interaction. There is a need for global ethics and also a need for a global ethic. The first exists but needs reinforcement. The second also exists but not sufficiently widely and therefore needs a fashioning out in some contexts. Because ethics and an ethic are grammatically cognate and are both concerned with behavior, it is easy to conflate the two. Accordingly, clarity will be sought below about the distinction between them. The hope is that such clarity might help in directing efforts in search of harmony and other good things on our planet.     

Raising the Virtuous Bar: The Underlying Issues of Genetic Moral Enhancement

From the perspective of virtue ethics, is it possible and permissible to enhance moral behavior through gene modification? In preparation to answer this question, we must ask five questions: (1) What may we assume regarding genetic inheritance and human nature? (2) Can specific genes predispose behavior related to the moral virtues? (3) What kind of genetic enhancement would be useful for moral enhancement? (4) Should there be a distinction between somatic and germline gene modification? (5) Is genetic modification best approach to moral enhancement? This article concedes that genetic engineering has the capacity to enhance the human disposition to moral behavior, but gene editing cannot create virtue because virtues are stable, habituated dispositions, acquired over time. That being said, gene editing for purposes of enhancing moral behavior is permissible.     

An Existential Foundation for an Ethics of Care in Heidegger’s Being and Time

Martin Heidegger’s existential account of care in Being and Time (2010) provides us with an opportunity to reimagine what the proper theoretical grounding of an ethic of care might be. Heidegger’s account of care serves to deconstruct the two primary foundations that an ethic of care is often based upon. Namely, that we are inevitably interdependent upon one another and/or possess an innate disposition to care for fellow humans in need. Heidegger’s account reveals that both positions are founded upon an ontic (meaning factual existence), as opposed to an ontological (which refers to the nature of being), understanding of care. The distinctions between an ontic and ontological understanding of care are significant. Yet, I maintain that they are not completely incompatible. Both Heidegger and care ethicists contend that our existence with others is understood through a relational ontology. Furthermore, there are certain ontological structures from Heidegger which resonate with an ethic of care. Two key existential structures are leaping-ahead and being-guilty. These existential structures are latent in care ethics, and by explicitly revealing them I reinforce the connection between Heidegger’s account and care theory. Lastly, I develop the theoretical foundations of care ethics by proposing an existential ethic of care.

     

ETHICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY Ecclesial Existence in a Postmodern Era

This essay endeavors to show that application of a universalist epistemic method in theological ethics results in a construal of God, which is, from a biblical perspective, reductionist, and is a form of ethics in which universality is achieved at the expense of plurality. It argues for the formal possibility of an ecclesial ethics grounded in a tradition‐centered rationality. It further argues that such an ethic need not result in a narrow and defensive sectarianism, a rigid and static orthodoxy, or an authoritarian dogmatism. The posture of an ecclesial ethic based on the kind of critical realism advocated here may retain an apologetic and dialogical relation with the broader society, as it seeks to embody the incarnational narrative in its particular context.     

试论罗尔斯顿环境伦理学的理论主旨

罗尔斯顿从整个西方伦理思想发展的角度出发,认为道德是人的存在方式,环境伦理的产生不是要推翻或取代人际伦理,而是要为自然共同体中的人类确立生存方式。人类道德之所以要观照自然生态系统,是因为自然生态系统具有自身的内在价值和存在目的,以文化方式生存于其中的人类须对此给予道德的尊重。环境伦理与人际伦理共同构成了完整的人之伦理,它们都是人的生存之道。     

AN EPISTEMICALLY DISTANT GOD? A CRITIQUE OF JOHN HICK'S RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM OF DIVINE HIDDENNESS*

God is thought of as hidden in at least two ways. Firstly, God's reasons for permitting evil, particularly instances of horrendous evil, are often thought to be inscrutable or beyond our ken. Secondly, and perhaps more problematically, God's very existence and love or concern for us is often thought to be hidden from us (or, at least, from many of us on many occasions). But if we assume, as seems most plausible, that God's reasons for permitting evil will (in many, if not most, instances) be impossible for us to comprehend, would we not expect a loving God to at least make his existence or love sufficiently clear to us so that we would know that there is some good, albeit inscrutable, reason why we (or others) are permitted to suffer? In this paper I examine John Hick's influential response to this question, a response predicated on the notion of ‘epistemic distance’: God must remain epistemically distant and hence hidden from us so as to preserve our free will. Commentators of Hick's work, however, disagree as to whether the kind of free will that is thought to be made possible by epistemic distance is the freedom to believe that God exists, or the freedom to choose between good and evil, or the freedom to enter into a personal relationship with God. I argue that it is only the last of these three varieties of free will that Hick has in mind. But this kind of freedom, I go on to argue, does not necessitate an epistemically distant God, and so the problem of divine hiddenness remains unsolved.     

What is so Good about Moral Freedom?

Many Christian philosophers believe that it is a great good that human beings are free to choose between good and evil, so good indeed that God is justified in putting up with a great many evil choices for the sake of it. But many of the same Christian philosophers also believe that God is essentially good – good in every possible world. Unlike his sinful human creatures, God cannot choose between good and evil. In that sense, he is not 'morallyFree'. It is not easy to see how to fit these two theses into a single coherent package. If moral freedom is such a great good in human beings, why is it not a grave defect in God that he lacks it? And if the lack of moral freedom does not detract in any way from God's greatness, would it not have been better for us not to have it? I develop, but ultimately reject, what I take to be the most initially promising strategy for resolving this dilemma.