Arguing for Wisdom in the University: An Intellectual Autobiography

For 40?years I have argued that we urgently need to bring about a revolution in academia so that the basic task becomes to seek and promote wisdom. How did I come to argue for such a vast, wildly ambitious intellectual revolution? It goes back to my childhood. From an early age, I desired passionately to understand the physical universe. Then, around adolescence, my passion became to understand the heart and soul of people via the novel. But I never discovered how to tell stories in order to tell the truth. So, having failed to become a physicist, and failed to become a novelist, I studied philosophy at Manchester University and then, in 6?weeks of inspiration, discovered that the riddle of the universe is the riddle of our desires. Philosophy should be about how to live, and should not just do conceptual analysis. I struggled to reconcile the two worlds of my childhood ambitions, the physical universe and the human world. I decided they could be reconciled with one another if one regarded the two accounts of them, physics and common sense, as myths, and not as literal truths. But then I discovered Karl Popper: truth is too important to be discarded. I revised my ideas: physics seeks to depict truly only an aspect of all that there is; in addition, there is the experiential aspect of things??the world as we experience it. I was immensely impressed with Popper??s view that science makes progress, not by verification, but by ferocious attempted falsification of theories. I was impressed, too, with his generalization of this view to form critical rationalism. Then it dawned on me: Popper??s view of science is untenable because it misrepresents the basic aim of science. This is not truth as such; rather it is explanatory truth??truth presupposed to be unified or physically comprehensible. We need, I realized, a new conception of science, called by me aim-oriented empiricism, which acknowledges the real, problematic aims of science, and seeks to improve them. Then, treading along a path parallel to Popper??s, I realized that aim-oriented empiricism can be generalized to form a new conception of rationality, aim-oriented rationality, with implications for all that we do. This led on to a new conception of academic inquiry. From the Enlightenment we have inherited the view that academia, in order to help promote human welfare, must first acquire knowledge. But this is profoundly and damagingly irrational. If academia really does seek to help promote human welfare, then its primary tasks must be to articulate problems of living, and propose and critically assess possible solutions??possible actions, policies, political programmes, philosophies of life. The pursuit of knowledge is secondary. Academia needs to promote cooperatively rational problem solving in the social world, and needs to help humanity improve individual and institutional aims by exploiting aim-oriented rationality, arrived at by generalizing the real progress-achieving methods of science. We might, as a result, get into life some of the progressive success that is such a marked feature of science. Thus began my campaign to promote awareness of the urgent need for a new kind of academic inquiry rationally devoted to helping humanity create a wiser world.     

DO FALLIBILIST ACCOUNTS OF THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE UNDERESTIMATE AND ENDANGER SCIENCE?

All fallibilist theories may appear to be defective, because they allegedly underestimate the security of at least some scientific knowledge and thereby leave science less defensible than it otherwise might be. When they call all scientific knowledge conjectural they may seem at first blush to underestimate the superiority of science vis a vis pseudo‐science. Fallibilists apparently fail to account for the fact that science turns theory into facts, because even “facts” are held only provisionally. This impression is false: the relatively secure establishment of facts can be accounted for with a fallibilist view. After theories have been honed through sharp criticism, there is often no reason to doubt some aspects of them. These aspects are what we regard to be factual knowledge, even though these facts are also provisionally accepted as such. We then explain the newly won factual knowledge with deeper theories, which often correct our factual knowledge in spite of its apparent security. Theories of justification add nothing useful to the fallibilists' observation that science finds the best theories because it has the highest standards of criticism. Fallibilist theories today give the best account and defence of science. We may abandon the quest for some kind of assurance that goes beyond the determination that some theory can answer all known objections to it and take up more interesting problems, such as how we can find new objections and how criticism may be improved and made institutionally secure. ¹ 1 I am grateful to Joseph Agassi and an anonymous referee of this journal for comments on an earlier draft of this essay.
     

Representation and the active consumer

One of the central tasks for naturalistic theories of representation is to say what it takes for something to be a representation, and some leading theories have been criticised for being too liberal. Prominent discussions of this problem have proposed a producer-oriented solution; it is argued that representations must be produced by systems employing perceptual constancy mechanisms. However, representations may be produced by simple transducers if they are consumed in the right way. It is characteristic of representations to be consumed by systems which are capable of independent action. This paper defends this claim; discusses more precise, naturalistic formulations; and shows how it can illuminate the explanatory payoffs which science achieves by appealing to representation.

     

Solving the "real" mysteries of visual perception: the world as an outside memory.

Visual science is currently a highly active domain, with much progress being made in fields such as colour vision, stereo vision, perception of brightness and contrast, visual illusions, etc. But the "real" mystery of visual perception remains comparatively unfathomed, or at least relegated to philosophical status: Why it is that we can see so well with what is apparently such a badly constructed visual apparatus? In this paper I will discuss several defects of vision and the classical theories of how they are overcome. I will criticize these theories and suggest an alternative approach, in which the outside world is considered as a kind of external memory store which can be accessed instantaneously by casting one's eyes (or one's attention) to some location. The feeling of the presence and extreme richness of the visual world is, under this view, a kind of illusion, created by the immediate availability of the information in this external store.     

Mosuos' awareness of taxonomic relations in word associations, lexicon decisions and semantic categorizations

The development of representations for taxonomic categories is influenced by many factors, such as age, life experiences, and education. It was hypothesized that Mosuos might be aware of taxonomic relations differently than Hans, as indicated by Sha (1996). Three experiments--word associations, lexicon decisions, and semantic categorizations--were conducted on young adults of Mosuos and Hans and consistent results were obtained: the Mosuos were found both similar to and different from the Hans in their experimental performance. They were apparently aware of taxonomic relations less than the Hans among categories of different levels and among categories of basic level, consistent with the conclusion that the uniqueness of a specific culture influences the people's representations for the hierarchically structured taxonomic categories (López, Atran, Coley, Medin & Smith, 1997). The present forms of education did not seem to be as effective as educators expected to help promote Mosuo children's development of knowledge of taxonomic categories. If school education would be available that is compatible with the cultural value of a relatively isolated, small population, such as Mosuos, and is of practical value for the young children to develop a better knowledge of the world, then a study would be of critical value into how educated individuals would be different from uneducated ones in their awareness of taxonomic relations.     

Collaborative Teaching and Making Sense of Symbols: Comment on Lampert's "Knowing,Doing, and Teaching Multiplication"

Despite the progress research in cognitive science has made in the last few decades, it remains a challenge to demonstrate important practical benefits of this research. Too often it seems that the practical implications researchers can draw from their theories are either obvious to experienced practitioners or have small or tenuous effects in the real world. The article by Chandler and Sweller (1991) contrasts dramatically to this customary state of affairs: They apparently have found a simple characteristic of instructional materials that has dramatic effects on performance in real-world tasks. However, their article raises a number of deeper questions regarding the relation between research and application that will be the focus of this commentary. I argue that the best way to generate important practical results is to develop and test theories of mental processing that are concerned with variables and tasks that are important in the real world. Chandler and Sweller have not taken this approach, and this may limit the implications that can be drawn from their results.     

Incorporating Demographic Embeddings Into Language Understanding

Meaning depends on context. This applies in obvious cases like deictics or sarcasm as well as more subtle situations like framing or persuasion. One key aspect of this is the identity of the participants in an interaction. Our interpretation of an utterance shifts based on a variety of factors, including personal history, background knowledge, and our relationship to the source. While obviously an incomplete model of individual differences, demographic factors provide a useful starting point and allow us to capture some of this variance. However, the relevance of specific demographic factors varies between situations—where age might be the key factor in one context, ideology might dominate in another. To address this challenge, we introduce a method for combining demographics and context into situated demographic embeddings—mapping representations into a continuous geometric space appropriate for the given domain, showing the resulting representations to be functional and interpretable. We further demonstrate how to make use of related external data so as to apply this approach in low‐resource situations. Finally, we show how these representations can be incorporated into improve modeling of real‐world natural language understanding tasks, improving model performance and helping with issues of data sparsity.     

Metatheoretical Structuralism: a General Program for Analyzing Science

In spite of the ‘experimental turn’ now fashionable in the philosophy of science, the question of the structure and identity criteria of scientific theories continues to be a central issue for the philosophical analysis of empirical science. We need a precise metatheory of empirical theories to deal with this issue. Metatheoretical structuralism appears to offer the most adequate approach in this sense so far. First, some basic intuitions about what empirical theories are, and how they are structured, are laid out. Then, the main notions used by metatheoretical structuralism to analyze theories are explained, and they are illustrated by applying them to an example of a simple physical theory. Finally, it is argued that the picture of the structure and identity of empirical theories coming out of structuralistic analysis adequately corresponds to the basic intuitions stated at the beginning.     

Towards a general theory of representation

Summary The models of science are representations of a part of reality. Every science has its own specific rules of constructing models, but there are many common rules that must be followed. These rules are to be part of what may be called a general theory of representation. This paper discusses some general aspects of representation that must be considered before such a general theory can be created. There are five sections: (1) an introduction to the topic of representation in general; (2) an overview of some general types of representation, such as goal-directed and self-organizational representations; (3) a short discussion of representation in some specific disciplines; (4) some formal aspects of representations; and (5) a discussion of epistemological aspects of representation, especially scientific reduction and mental causation.This paper was written during participation in the Research Project Mind and Brain, at the Centre for Interdisciplinary Research, University of Bielefeld, BRD.     

Metaphysics as modeling: the handmaiden’s tale

Critics of contemporary metaphysics argue that it attempts to do the hard work of science from the ease of the armchair. Physics, not metaphysics, tells us about the fundamental facts of the world, and empirical psychology is best placed to reveal the content of our concepts about the world. Exploring and understanding the world through metaphysical reflection is obsolete. In this paper, I will show why this critique of metaphysics fails, arguing that metaphysical methods used to make claims about the world are similar to scientific methods used to make claims about the world, but that the subjects of metaphysics are not the subjects of science. Those who argue that metaphysics uses a problematic methodology to make claims about subjects better covered by natural science get the situation exactly the wrong way around: metaphysics has a distinctive subject matter, not a distinctive methodology. The questions metaphysicians address are different from those of scientists, but the methods employed to develop and select theories are similar. In the first section of the paper, I will describe the sort of subject matter that metaphysics tends to engage with. In the second section of the paper, I will show how metaphysical theories are classes of models and discuss the roles of experience, common sense and thought experiments in the construction and evaluation of such models. Finally, in the last section I will discuss the way these methodological points help us to understand the metaphysical project. Getting the right account of the metaphysical method allows us to better understand the relationship between science and metaphysics, to explain why doing metaphysics successfully involves having a range of different theories (instead of consensus on a single theory), to understand the role of thought experiments involving fictional worlds, and to situate metaphysical realism in a scientifically realist context.     

‘Historicising Common Sense’

This essay is an expanded set of comments on the social psychology papers written for the special issue on History and Social Psychology. It considers what social psychology, and particularly the theory of social representations, might offer historians working on similar problems, and what historical methods might offer social psychology. The social history of thinking has been a major theme in twentieth and twenty-first century historical writing, represented most recently by the genre of ??cultural history??. Cultural history and the theory of social representations have common ancestors in early twentieth-century social science. Nevertheless, the two lines of research have developed in different ways and are better seen as complementary than similar. The theory of social representations usefully foregrounds issues, like social division and change over time, that cultural history relegates to the background. But for historians, the theory of social representations seems oddly fixated on comparing the thought styles associated with positivist science and ??common sense??. Using historical analysis, this essay tries to dissect the core opposition ??science : common sense?? and argues for a more flexible approach to comparing modes of thought.     

If Freud's theory be true....

If Freud's theory of defense and repression is true, it is proposed that the manifest content of his conscious thought (his theory) would not accurately represent his real thoughts. It would rather distort, disguise, and hide them. Freud's own special method of analysis and interpretation, which rejects the manifest meaning of conscious thought, would have to be used to gain insight into his "real,' but still hidden, thoughts. Wherever Freud's manifest thoughts, rather than his real thoughts, have shaped subsequent theories of therapy and clinical practice, re-appraisal of these later theories and practices is recommended. Resolving this misunderstanding of Freud's thought may facilitate integration of clinical theory.     

The Mental Representation of Human Action

Various theories of moral cognition posit that moral intuitions can be understood as the output of a computational process performed over structured mental representations of human action. We propose that action plan diagrams—“act trees”—can be a useful tool for theorists to succinctly and clearly present their hypotheses about the information contained in these representations. We then develop a methodology for using a series of linguistic probes to test the theories embodied in the act trees. In Study 1, we validate the method by testing a specific hypothesis (diagrammed by act trees) about how subjects are representing two classic moral dilemmas and finding that the data support the hypothesis. In Studies 2–4, we explore possible explanations for discrete and surprising findings that our hypothesis did not predict. In Study 5, we apply the method to a less well‐studied case and show how new experiments generated by our method can be used to settle debates about how actions are mentally represented. In Study 6, we argue that our method captures the mental representation of human action better than an alternative approach. A brief conclusion suggests that act trees can be profitably used in various fields interested in complex representations of human action, including law, philosophy, psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, computer science, robotics, and artificial intelligence.     

Explanatory pluralism in cognitive science

This brief commentary has three goals. The first is to argue that "framework debate" in cognitive science is unresolvable. The idea that one theory or framework can singly account for the vast complexity and variety of cognitive processes seems unlikely if not impossible. The second goal is a consequence of this: We should consider how the various theories on offer work together in diverse contexts of investigation. A final goal is to supply a brief review for readers who are compelled by these points to explore existing literature on the topic. Despite this literature, pluralism has garnered very little attention from broader cognitive science. We end by briefly considering what it might mean for theoretical cognitive science.     

A program for the semantics of science

Concluding remarks Our program is ambitious, as is any attempt to match life (in our case real science) with virtue (e.g., exactness). We want our semantics to be not only simia mathematicae but also ancilla scientiae: built more geometrico and at the same time relevant, nay useful, to live science. The goal of exactness may sound arrogant but is actually modest, for the more we rigorize the more we are forced to leave out of consideration, at least for the time being. As to the service intention: we should try to be of some help to science because the latter faces semantic problems but has no tools of its own for solving them. If it had such tools scientists would not engage in spirited polemics over matters of sense and reference, as they often do. Witness the debates on whether the relativistic and quantum theories are concerned with sentient observers, whether population genetics refers to populations taken as wholes, whether psychology is actually concerned with the brain, and whether the sense of a theory is excreted by its mathematical formalism or is determined by the way the theory is tested.A semantics of science should help settle these and similar issues. Moreover it should give sound advice as to how to formulate scientific theories so as to avoid such imprecisions and ambiguities as may give rise to debates of the kind. Constructing such a semantics, both exact and relevant to science, should be more rewarding than either manufacturing neat but irrelevant theories or pursuing erratic polemics on meaning and meaning changes.

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How Do Artificial Neural Networks Classify Musical Triads? A Case Study in Eluding Bonini's Paradox

How might artificial neural networks (ANNs) inform cognitive science? Often cognitive scientists use ANNs but do not examine their internal structures. In this paper, we use ANNs to explore how cognition might represent musical properties. We train ANNs to classify musical chords, and we interpret network structure to determine what representations ANNs discover and use. We find connection weights between input units and hidden units can be described using Fourier phase spaces, a representation studied in musical set theory. We find the total signal coming through these weighted connection weights is a measure of the similarity between two Fourier structures: the structure of the hidden unit's weights and the structure of the stimulus. This is surprising because neither of these Fourier structures is computed by the hidden unit. We then show how output units use such similarity measures to classify chords. However, we also find different types of units—units that use different activation functions—use this similarity measure very differently. This result, combined with other findings, indicates that while our networks are related to the Fourier analysis of musical sets, they do not perform Fourier analyses of the kind usually described in musical set theory. Our results show Fourier representations of music are not limited to musical set theory. Our results also suggest how cognitive psychologists might explore Fourier representations in musical cognition. Critically, such theoretical and empirical implications require researchers to understand how network structure converts stimuli into responses.     

组织认同的基础理论、测量及相关变量

组织认同是个体源于组织成员身份的一种自我构念,它与组织认定、组织承诺等概念存在显著差异。文章阐述了组织认同基础理论的三种主要观点,对比了差异论、资源论和信息论的研究视角和相互关系。文章着重说明了组织认同的测量工具,分析了组织层面和个人层面的前因变量,以及组织认同对离职意愿等结果变量的影响。文章最后指出今后有必要对扩展定义、影响因素和国家文化差异等方面进行探讨