BROWN ON SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND DISCRIMINABILITY1

Abstract:  In her recent book Anti-Individualism and Knowledge , Jessica Brown has presented a novel answer to the self-knowledge 'achievement problem' facing the proponent of anti-individualism. She argues that her answer is to be preferred to the traditional answer (based on Burge, 1988a). Here I present three objections to the claim that her proposed answer is to be preferred. The significance of these objections lies in what they tell us about the nature of the sort of knowledge that is in dispute. Perhaps the most important lesson I draw from this discussion is that, given the nature of knowledge of one's own thoughts, discriminability (from relevant alternatives) is not a condition on knowledge as such.     

DOING/ALLOWING AND THE DELIBERATIVE REQUIREMENT

Attempts to defend the moral significance of the distinction between doing and allowing harm directly have left many unconvinced. I give an indirect defence of the moral significance of the distinction between doing and allowing, focusing on the agent's duty to reason in a way that is responsive to possible harmful effects of their behaviour. Due to our cognitive limitations, we cannot be expected to take all harmful consequences of our behaviour into account. We are required to be responsive to harmful consequences that have some feature that makes it easy for us to become aware of them. I show that, under Jonathan Bennett's analysis of the doing/allowing distinction, harm that is incidentally done has such a feature, which is not shared by harm that is incidentally allowed. Any plausible analysis of the doing/allowing distinction will entail a similar asymmetry. It follows that, prima facie, an agent who incidentally does harm has violated a moral requirement (the deliberative requirement) which an agent who incidentally allows harm has not violated. 1     

REVELATION, CREATION AND LAW1

Through faith we understand that the worlds were made by the Word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear (Hebrews 11:3, AV )
By faith we understand that the universe was framed by God's command, so that the visible came forth from the invisible (Hebrews 11:3, NEB )     

THE UNDERDETERMINATION/INDETERMINACY DISTINCTION AND THE ANALYTIC/SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION

Two of W. V. Quine's most familiar doctrines are his endorsement of the distinction between underdetermination and indeterminacy, and his rejection of the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths. The author argues that these two doctrines are incompatible. In terms wholly acceptable to Quine, and based on the underdetermination/indeterminacy distinction, the author draws an exhaustive and exclusive distinction between two kinds of true sentences, and then argues that this corresponds to the traditional analytic/synthetic distinction. In an appendix the author expands on one aspect of the underdetermination/indeterminacy distinction, as construed here, and discusses, in passing, some of Quine's more general views on truth.     

AN ENERGY/AWARENESS/INFORMATION INTERPRETATION OF PHYSICAL AND MENTAL REALITY

Abstract. Interpreting the universe as a medium-message process has explanatory value in both scientific and philosophical/spiritual contexts. From this perspective, reality is seen to comprise an enduring medium modulated by transient information. Physically, the medium is energy. Mentally, the medium is awareness. Algorithmically, the medium is an information generator, a programmatic entity that generates temporary informational patterns which modulate the medium's energy aspect in space and time to produce matter and physical phenomena and modulate the medium's awareness aspect to produce subjective experience, mind. In philosophical terms, the medium is Being; the medium modulated by the message is existence.     

PHILIP HEFNER AND THE MODERNIST/POSTMODERNIST DIVIDE

Abstract Philip Hefner is part of neither the dominant Western paradigm nor the usual postmodernist reaction against it. He belongs within an Anglo‐American viewpoint that also is within neither the dominant Western nor the postmodernist paradigm. Herein I sketch the differences between these paradigms. I elaborate Hefner's theology of the created co‐creator to show where Hefner constrasts with them and then contrast his ideas with those of two contemporary theologians who fit into the second paradigm, George Lindbeck and Mark C. Taylor.     

THE LEGALIST SCHOOL1 AND LEGAL POSITIVISM2

Law is the authoritative principle for the people and is the basis of government; it is what shapes the people.
The Book of Lord Shang, Chap. V, Par. 26.
If the people be led by laws and controlled by punishments, they will try to evade them but have no sense of shame. If they be led by virtue and controlled by the rules of propriety, they will have the sense of shame and will moreover attain character.
Analects, book ii, Chap. iii
Lcgge, Vol. 1. p. 146