A Spiritual Revolution in Denmark?

ABSTRACT

Based on data from the Danish part of the European Values Study 1981–2008, this article explores the validity of the claim for a spiritual revolution as proposed by Paul Heelas and Linda Woodhead. The article suggests an operationalisation of spirituality. The results of the analyses are that religious values—Christian faith as well as spirituality—tend to be stable over an individual’s life course. This suggests that, if there is a spiritual revolution, it must be the product of cohort replacement. If a spiritual revolution is taking place, Christian faith would be expected to decline in younger cohorts while spirituality would increase, but an analysis of cohort support for Christian faith and spirituality from 1981 to 2008 shows that both were constant across cohorts. Thus Danish data contain no indication that a spiritual revolution is taking place or will take place. Finally, we show that, contrary to theoretical expectations, spirituality and Christian faith are strongly correlated. A closer analysis reveals an indirect and more complicated support for parts of the theory since the two variables are explained by different factors and it shows that Christian faith, but not spirituality, is correlated with morality.     

Organizational Culture: Critical Questions for Researchers and Practitioners

Abstract

The idea of career self-management is part of the growing move to encourage individuals to take ownership of their own development. The article explores why this makes sense both for individuals and for organizations, and defines specific initiatives individuals and organizations should take to make the concept work successfully. It is argued that most people are unlikely to take responsibility for themselves unless there is sound organizational support, but that with the right practical initiatives they can become energized by the process. There is, however, a need for organizations to centre much more closely on understanding people as individuals if performance levels at work are to be raised from competence to excellence.     

Making the good even better: A review and theoretical model of interpersonal capitalization

When good things happen, individuals will often retell this good news to others, a process termed capitalization . In so doing, individuals sharing their good news (i.e., capitalizers ) boost their mood and relationships with the person(s) to whom they retell their news (i.e., responders ). Most extant research has focused on the benefits for the capitalizers. Capitalization, however, is a social process that affects both capitalizers and responders, and research has only begun to explore the benefits of capitalization for responders. In this article, we provide a fresh perspective on the state of this literature by proposing the interpersonal model of capitalization (InterCAP). We illustrate how InterCAP (a) integrates and organizes existing research and theory, (b) formally emphasizes the interpersonal and iterative nature of the capitalization process, and (c) identifies gaps in current knowledge. We conclude by offering recommendations for integrating InterCAP with other theoretical models and suggestions for future research.     

THE UNIVERSITY AND THE STATE IN A PLURAL SOCIETY

Abstract

I address what I call the ‘Number Issue’, which is raised by our ordinary talk and beliefs about certain social groups and institutions, and I take the Hallé orchestra as my example. The Number Issue is that of whether the Hallé is one individual or several individuals. I observe that if one holds that it is one individual, one faces an accusation of metaphysical extravagance. The bulk of the paper examines the difficulty of reconciling the view that the Hallé is several individuals with two prima facie plausible theses about the manner of its persistence through time. The paper is structured around some remarks made by Peter Simons about groups, and the Hallé in particular, in his Parts.     

Reasonable People,Double Jeopardy,and Justice

The equipoise requirement in clinical research demands that, if patients are to be randomly assigned to one of two interventions in a clinical trial, there must be genuine doubt about which is better. This reflects the traditional view that physicians must never knowingly compromise the care of their patients, even for the sake of future patients. Equipoise has proven to be deeply problematic, especially in the Third World. Some recent critics have argued against equipoise on the grounds that clinical research is fundamentally distinct from clinical care, and thus should be governed by different norms. I argue against this “difference position,” and instead take issue with the traditional, exclusively patient-centered account of physicians' obligations that equipoise presupposes. In place of this traditional view, I propose a Kantian test for the reasonable partiality that physicians should show their patients, focusing on its application in clinical research and medical education.     

The Spirituality of Compassion: A Public Health Response to Ageing and End-of-Life Care

SUMMARY

The recent revival of interest in spirituality in later life marks a significant step forward in the person-centred care of ageing people. The benefits will, however, be of limited value if we do not attend to the settings in which spirituality is to be lived. In contemporary society many aged people are located in environments unsympathetic to spiritual belief and practice. Health care settings focus on professionally-assessed physical needs and are dominated by concerns about the cost of services. The national social policies that direct health care services and less directly shape older people's place in contemporary society are strongly influenced by globalised neoliberal economic policies characterised by individualism, competition, and greed. For robust and viable spirituality to develop at the individual level we need compassionate social policies that support interdependence within communities and between nations.     

The Postcolonial Other

Abstract

I locate the starting point for this essay on the common ground between the traditionally conceived attribute of divine love and the moral theory known as divine command ethics. The latter assumes that something is good because God commands it; with the former, the gift of divine love requires love in return. In this light, God's command to love is recognized as goodness itself by those ‘he’ loves. In other words, those persons loved by God are morally motivated to love. However, this theistic account of divine command theory simply assumes that love is knowable, do-able and so required. The obstacles to knowing love and loving are rarely made explicit. To tackle some of these, this essay is loosely structured around a dialogue with Kantian morality. Analysis of the gendered nature of love will take place indirectly in the course of my account of duty, pure goodness and moral motivation.     

Violinists Run Amuck in South Dakota: Screen Doors Down in the Badlands!

Abstract

This paper proposes and defends an account of what it is to act for reasons. In the first part, I will discuss the desire-belief and the deliberative model of acting for reasons. I will argue that we can avoid the weaknesses and retain the strengths of both views, if we pursue an alternative according to which acting for reasons involves taking something as a reason. In the main part, I will develop an account of what it is to take something as a reason for action. On the basis of this, I will then offer a new account of what it is to act for reasons.     

Trusting the Media? TV News as a Source of Knowledge

Abstract

Why do we trust TV news? What reasons might support a recipient’s assessment of the trustworthiness of this kind of information? This paper presents a veritistic analysis of the epistemic practice of news production and communication. The topic is approached by discussing a detailed case study, namely the characteristics of the most popular German news programme, called the ‘Tagesschau’. It will be shown that a veritistic analysis can indeed provide a recipient with relevant reasons to consider when pondering on the trustworthiness of sources of information. Moreover, it will turn out that these reasons are part of what recipients might gather from media literacy.     

Feeling bad about progress does not lead people want to change their health behaviour

Objective: When do people decide to do something about problematic health behaviours? Theoretical models and pragmatic considerations suggest that people should take action when they feel bad about their progress – in other words, when they experience negative progress-related affect. However, the impact of progress-related affect on goal striving has rarely been investigated.

Design and Methods: Study 1 (N = 744) adopted a cross-sectional design and examined the extent to which measures of progress-related affect were correlated with intentions to take action. Study 2 (N = 409) investigated the impact of manipulating progress-related affect on intentions and behaviour in an experimental design.

Results: Study 1 found that, while engaging in health behaviours had the expected affective consequences (e.g. people felt bad when they were not eating healthily, exercising regularly or limiting their alcohol consumption), it was feeling good rather than bad about progress that was associated with stronger intentions. Study 2 replicated these findings. Participants induced to feel good about their eating behaviour had marginally stronger intentions to eat healthily than participants led to feel bad about their eating behaviour.

Conclusion: The findings have implications for interventions designed to promote changes in health behaviour, as well as theoretical frameworks for understanding self-regulation.     

Framing fast and slow: a dual processing account of multimodal framing effects

ABSTRACT

Human reasoning can be characterized by a continuum anchored by two extremes: fast, automatic, and emotional processing on the one side; versus slow, controlled and rational processing on the other. Despite theoretical linkages, no studies have empirically connected these types of information processing with the mechanisms of multimodal (visual and textual) media effects. We employ tools from dual processing theories in a framing effects paradigm to test whether the effects of news visuals and text take place via relatively more automatic and controlled information processing, respectively. To do so, we combine experimental manipulations and individual differences data collected across two experiments using different political issues. Results from experimental manipulations provide converging evidence for the distinct processing of visuals and text. Individual differences data paint a more nuanced picture, suggesting that the processing of multimodal news frames does not always conform to a simple automatic-controlled dichotomy.     

Youth purpose during the great recession: A mixed-methods study

ABSTRACT

Although research reveals purpose can buffer youth from negative states in other contexts, little is known about how youth with purpose function amidst significant economic challenges. This sequential explanatory mixed-methods study, conducted with a sample of Greek youth during the Great Recession, sought to determine (1) if the presence of purpose buffered youth from the potentially demoralizing effects of the economic crisis, and if so, (2) how it managed to do so. Survey results suggest youth with high purpose scores were resilient enough to look past the present challenges and envision a positive future. Qualitative findings suggest youth with purpose remained hopeful about the future by focusing on commitments to their friends, families, communities, and country, and at times, by tuning out the negative economic news. Implications of these findings for positive youth development are discussed.     

Moral Machines?

Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen??s Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right From Wrong (Oxford University Press, 2009) explores efforts to develop machines that, not only can be employed for good or bad ends, but which themselves can be held morally accountable for what they do??artificial moral agents (AMAs). This essay is a critical response to Wallach and Allen??s conjectures. Although Wallach and Allen do not suggest that we are close to being able to create full-fledged AMAs, they do talk seriously about making incremental progress in the direction of creating them (even if we never fully succeed). However, there are important questions about the moral development of AMAs that Moral Machines does not address. Given the responsibilities entrusted to human moral agents, we take questions about their moral development very seriously. In the case of children, the hope is that eventually they will develop into full-fledged moral agents. How might we expect this to go with less than fully formed AMAs? Will there be a comparable story of moral development and moral education that we can tell?     

The Causal Efficiency of the Passage of Time

Does mere passage of time have causal powers? Are properties like ??being n days past?? causally efficient? A pervasive intuition among metaphysicians seems to be that they don??t. Events and/or objects change, and they cause or are caused by other events and/or objects; but one does not see how just the mere passage of time could cause any difference in the world. In this paper, I shall discuss a case where it seems that mere passage of time does have causal powers: Sydney Shoemaker??s (1969) possible world where temporal vacua (allegedly) take place. I shall argue that Shoemaker??s thought-experiment doesn??t really aim at teaching us that there can be time without change, but rather that if such a scenario is plausible at all (as I think it is) it provides us with good reasons to think that mere passage of time can be directly causally efficient.     

Utilisation de l’engagement pour limiter la valorisation des fumeurs chez les adolescents

IntroductionSocial psychology research about commitment has demonstrated that it is possible to change one people's cognition and behavior.ObjectiveThe aim of the present article is to show that commitment can be used as a reduction strategy of smokers’ valorization and smoking normativity in order to reduce smoking.MethodStudents have been followed into a longitudinal study from end of elementary school to 8th grade class. They have been divided into different groups representing the smoking prevention's degree of commitment.ResultsRsults suggest that the sooner they are engaged in schooling, the better is the prevention. Commitment intervention made later in schooling has no influence on students smoking valorization.ConclusionResults will be discussed in terms of commitment theory by highlighting that an intervention using commitment is efficient only if the target is not already committed in an opposite behavior.     

Aristotle’s dilemma

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle appears to use an elegant short argument to attack Plato’s doctrine of the good, which argument equally appears to attack Aristotle’s own doctrine of the good. I consider these two questions: First: Why does Aristotle reverse the judgment of Socrates/Plato on the issue: Which is better – things that are (only) good in themselves, or things that are both good in themselves and good for their consequences? Second: Why does Aristotle attack Plato’s doctrine that the Form of the Good is the chief good, with an argument that appears to threaten his own view that eudaimonia is the chief good? I think the answers to these two questions are related. The elegant short argument in question I call “Aristotle’s Fast Argument.”After apologizing for criticizing views held by friends of his, Aristotle deploys the Fast Argument as a clincher to cap off his refutation of Plato’s view that the Form of the Good is the chief good: “And one might ask the question, what in the world they mean by ‘a thing itself’, if in man himself and in a particular man the account of man is one and the same. For in so far as they are men, they will in no respect differ; and if this is so, neither will there be a difference in so far as they are good. But again it will not be good any the more for being eternal, since that which lasts long is no whiter than that which perishes in a day.” (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1096 a34–b4). I explore this sketchily presented Fast Argument. I consider why Aristotle may think it is valid and why he does not seem to realize that, on readings that make it effective against Plato’s view, his Fast Argument also seems to apply to his own view that eudaimonia is the chief good. This is what I will call “Aristotle’s Dilemma.” If the Fast Argument is interpreted too narrowly, its point about the whiteness of a white thing being independent of its duration will not apply to the goodness of the Form of the Good. If it is interpreted broadly enough to undermine the claim of the Form of the Good to be the chief good, it will equally undermine that claim for eudaimonia. Finally, I discuss some of the things Plato and Aristotle say about the chief good, and comparable things Immanuel Kant says about the good will. I draw some speculative conclusions that focus on the importance for Aristotle of the goodness of the chief good not being at risk.     

Care for one's own future experiences

We care for our own future experiences. Most of us, trivially, would rather have them pleasurable than painful. When we care for our own future experiences we do so in a way that is different from the way we care for those of others (which is not to say that we necessarily care more about our own experience). Prereflectively, one would think this is because these experiences will be ours and no one else's. But then, of course, we need to explain what it means to say that a future experience will be mine and how knowledge of this fact renders it rational for me to care for this experience in a special way. Indeed most philosophers take this route. But in doing so, they quickly stumble on insuperable problems. I shall argue that the problem of egocentric care, as it is sometimes called, can be solved by turning things upside down: it is much more fruitful to think that the special kind of care we feel for some future experiences (and not others) is part of what makes them ours should they occur. This requires an explanation of egocentric care for future experiences that does not draw in a theory of personal identity, but rather contributes to one. I will attempt to provide this explanation by making use of the idea of a diachronic mental holism.     

Reasons in Action

Abstract

When an agent performs an action because she takes something as a reason to do so, does she take it as a normative reason for the action or as an explanatory reason? In Reasons Without Rationalism, Setiya criticizes the normative view and advances a version of the explanatory view. I defend a version of the normative view against Setiya's criticisms and show that Setiya's explanatory account has two major flaws: it raises questions that it cannot answer about the occurrence of one motivational ‘because’ within the scope of another; and it cannot accommodate the fact that, if an agent can φ for the reason that p, then she could take p as a reason to φ without φ-ing.     

The psychological significance of humility

Abstract

Humility is a virtue with a rich and varied past. Its benefits and pitfalls – indeed, its status as a virtue – have been debated by philosophers and theologians. Recently, psychologists have entered into the dialectic, with a small but growing body of empirical research at their disposal. We will discuss this research on humility, including our own recent contributions. Our goal is to shed light on the following three important questions: First, what is humility? Second, why we should care about being humble? Finally, are there constructive steps we can take to induce people to adopt more humble at titudes towards themselves and others? In the process of answering these questions, we will consider the major empirical accounts of humility in the literature, highlight their primary difficulties, and then introduce a new account that cuts through the confusion, getting to the core of what we take humility to be.